Plato Republic 3.410

ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐάσουσιν . Cf. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 231 A κράτιστον δὲ ἔλεγε (sc. Παυσανίας ) τοῦτον ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν μὴ κατασήποντα τοὺς ἀρρωστοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τάχιστα θάπτοντα. In laying down this law, Plato speaks from the standpoint of the Regal or Political Art, prescribing for the subordinate arts of Medicine and Justice the conditions under which it is good to live and good to die. See Grote Plato I p. 362.

αὐτοί = ipsi is said in opposition to the mere ‘permission to die’ which bodily disease requires. αὐταί (suggested by Richards) is unnecessary: see II 377 C note

ἆρ’ οὖν κτλ. This epilogue describes concisely the aim and underlying principle of Plato's earlier scheme of education. Its object is to produce citizens who shall combine gentleness and strength—sensibility and courage—intellectual activity and moral stedfastness. It is an ideal in which the distinctive virtues of Athens and Sparta—of Greece and Rome—are united and transfigured. See II 375 C and the passages referred to there. The ideal of Pericles ( φιλοσοφεῖν ἄνευ μαλακίας) in many ways resembles Plato's (Thuc. II 40). Cf. also Nettleship Hell. pp. 88—90 and Bosanquet Companion pp. 115—117. It is noteworthy that the doctrine of this section is best explained by a comparison with one of the dialogues often held to be late ( Pol. 306 C —311 C): see also Laws 773 C, D. This is not pointed out by Krohn in his otherwise acute analysis ( Pl. St. pp. 24—28).

ὁ μουσικὸς ‐‐ αἱρήσει . ὁ μουσικός is ὁ τῇ ἁπλῇ μουσικῇ χρώμενος, as defined in the last sentence. ἴχνη διώκων and αἱρήσει are metaphors from the chase: see II 375 A.

αὐτὰ μὴν ‐‐ ἰσχύν . The theory of gymnastic propounded here was apparently new in Plato's time (see on II 376 E), although the practice of athletics as an educative discipline, especially at Sparta, conformed to it in no small measure (see Plut. Lyc. 17 ff., Xen. Rep. Lac. 2 ff.).

μεταχειρίζονται . See cr. n. I have followed Hermann in adopting Galen's text. With οὐχ ( μὴ ) ὡς or ὥσπερ the verb should have for its subject the nominative contained in the ὡς clause: cf. VII 539 D, X 610 D. Symp. 179 E is in reality no exception to this rule.

τινες . It has been supposed that τινες refers to Isocrates, who in his Antidosis (180—185) expounds at length the usual Greek view of gymnastic. This is possible only if the present section was added within the last four years or so of Plato's life, which is most improbable. See Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 663, and Introd. § 4. In other passages the Antidosis has been held to presuppose the Republic: see Dümmler Chronologische Beitr. etc. pp. 12, 13.

καθιστᾶσιν . Cf. Dem. 24. 145 οὗτος γὰρ (sc. ὁ νόμος)— οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς κεκριμένοις—κεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκρίτοις, ἵνα μὴ—ἀναγκάζοιντο ἀγωνίζεσθαι, and Phil. 34 C (where however it is easy to write λάβωμεν). In the first of these cases the reference is, as here, to the establishment of laws or ordinances. καθιστᾶσιν is used somewhat like φησί 407 A. Madvig's emendation καθίστασαν commends itself to Weber ( Entwick. d. Absichtssätze in Schanz's Beiträge II 2 p. 58) and others, but has not yet been proved to be necessary, and καθιστάναι below tells rather against it. For other examples of the idiom see Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 897, 898. Cases like Soph. O. C. 11 and El. 57, 760 are different, and have been justly emended. As regards the sentiment, it is characteristic of Plato to invent a historical sanction for his theories (cf. 414 B ff.); but he doubtless sincerely believed that the spirit of Greek gymnastics had degenerated.

ἦν δ’ ἐγώ . There seems to be no other case in which ἦν δ’ ἐγώ is so long deferred. Stallbaum and Bekker insert the words after σκληρότητος without any MS authority. If change is needed, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ had better be omitted (so q, whose reading is very different here). But it is better to note than to obliterate such peculiarities.

ἢ ὡς is not ‘pro simplici ἤ vel ὡς positum’ (Stallbaum), but=‘quam quomodo.’

αὐτοῦ . Does the pronoun mean τοῦ ἡμέρου or τοῦ φιλοσόφου? Four qualities are first distinguished: viz. the wild, the hard, the soft and the tame. The source of wildness is the spirited element, which if rightly cultivated becomes brave, if unduly strained, hard. So far, all is clear; but difficulties now begin. We should expect Plato to continue: τὸ ἥμερον is an attribute of τὸ φιλόσοφον, and τὸ φιλόσοφον —not τὸ ἥμερον—when relaxed becomes too soft, when rightly educated becomes κόσμιον (the virtue which contrasts with τὸ ἀνδρεῖον). At first sight, then, it looks as if αὐτοῦ meant ‘the philosophic temperament’ (so Stallbaum and J. and C.); but this is grammatically impossible, unless we make τὸ ἥμερον the subject to μαλακώτερον εἴη and therefore to ἥμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον, which is hardly tolerable. We must therefore acquiesce in taking αὐτοῦ as τοῦ ἡμέρου, unless there is corruption somewhere. If Plato had written καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀνεθὲν μαλακώτερον εἴη τοῦ δέοντος, καλῶς δὲ τραφὲν σῶφρόν τε καὶ κόσμιον, everything would be clear, but I do not venture to change the text. σῶφρον for ἥμερον is suggested also by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 26). Apelt proposes ἔμμετρον ( Berl. Philol. Wochenschr. 1895 p. 969).

ἀμφοτέρα ‐‐ φύσει : viz. τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ φιλόσοφον.

σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία . σωφροσύνη is the virtue of τὸ φιλόσοφον, ἀνδρεία of τὸ θυμοειδές: cf. 399 C and Pol. 307 C . The meaning would be caught more easily if Plato had written—as perhaps he did— σῶφρόν τε καὶ κόσμιον for ἥμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον above, just as he wrote ἀνδρεῖον (410 D). ἄγροικος (implying, like ἀνελεύθερος, ἀνδραποδώδης, with which it is coupled in Laws 880 A, lack of power to control the feelings) is properly opposed to σώφρων here.