γραμμάτων
. See on II 368 D. The reference in
εἴχομεν, however, is not to that passage, but to the actual experience of the speakers.
ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστιν
: i.q.
ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν οἷς ἔστι, by a common idiom: see on II 373 E and cf. VII 520 D, IX 590 C.
ὡς οὐ δέοι
depends on the idea of thinking involved in
ἀτιμάζομεν. Richards suggested
δέον, “sine causa,” as Hartman observes.
εἰκόνας γραμμάτων
. The reference to letters throughout this part of the
Republic is only by way of illustration, and we must beware of reading more into Plato's words than they are capable of meaning in the context where they occur. No doubt it is true, as Dr Jackson remarks, that “this passage makes us acquainted with the relation of copy and model which is to become important later,” but Bosanquet goes too far when he asserts that “the expression ‘images of letters’
points forward to the classification of grades of knowledge, at the end of Book VI, the allegory of the cave at the beginning of Book VII, and the argument of Book X.”
αὐτά
is emphatic: ‘the letters themselves’ as opposed to their
εἰκόνες. There is of course no allusion to ‘Ideas’ of letters.
τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη κτλ.
Are the
εἴδη Plato's Ideas? So Zeller (II^{4} 1 p. 560 note), and many other critics, understand the word; nor can it be denied that the language of Plato,
if interpreted in the light of Book VII, can bear this meaning. Nevertheless we are bound in the first instance to interpret this passage by itself, and not by Book VII, the more so as the doctrine of transcendent or separate (
χωρισταί) Ideas appears nowhere else in I—IV, and seems to be expressly reserved by Plato for his philosophical, as distinct from his musical education (see IV 435 D and VI 504 B note). What is meant by the words
εἰκόνας αὐτῶν? The context shews conclusively that
εἰκόνες refers to copies (sc. of the virtues
σωφροσύνη etc.) represented in poetry and the fine arts (so also Krohn
Pl. Frage p. 47). On any other interpretation the introduction of these
εἰκόνες is irrelevant in a discussion on the rules which imitative art must obey. This being so, if
εἴδη means the Ideas, Poetry will be a direct imitation of the Ideas, which is inconsistent with X 595 C —598 D. Or does Plato mean to suggest that Poetry and Art in his ideal city are really to imitate the Ideas directly? This is a bold and attractive solution, and there are several hints elsewhere to the same or nearly the same effect, but Plato expressly speaks of the
εἴδη here only as immanent, and not transcendent (
ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν), and we must therefore suppose that the artist copies from the life (cf.
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα D). The word
εἴδη is repeatedly used by Plato without reference to transcendent Ideas, as has been amply proved by Krohn (
Pl. St. pp. 65, 66), Pfleiderer (
Zur Lösung etc. p. 17), and Campbell (II pp. 296 ff.). Here it does not mean ‘varieties’ (as if there were more than one variety of
σωφροσύνη), but simply ‘forms’ or ‘kinds,’ in the sense in which the immanent reality which every general notion attempts to express is a ‘form’ or ‘kind’—a genus or species—of the totality of things. Cf. IV 435 B note The genitives are genitives of definition. The use of
εἴδη in the sense of “immanente Seinsformen” (Krohn) is interesting as a harbinger of the Ideal theory of VI and VII—a sort of half-way house between the Socratic
λόγοι and Plato's ideas. It recurs in IV 434 D, 435 B, 437 D. See further Krohn
Pl. Frage pp. 54—58, and cf. VI 504 D note But although the separatists have (as I think) made out their claim that transcendent Ideas do not appear in Books I—IV, I agree with Hirmer (
Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. p. 645) in thinking their deductions from this fact unwarrantable.
μεγαλοπρεπείας
. μεγαλοπρέπεια in Plato is ‘highmindedness,’ not, as in Aristotle, ‘magnificence’: cf. VI 486 A note In like manner Plato's
ἐλευθεριότης denotes the virtue proper to an
ἐλεύθερος, and is not restricted to liberality in spending money. Contrast Arist.
Eth. Nic. IV cc. 2—6.
τῶν δὴ ‐‐ ἀσπάζεσθαι
. Cf.
Symp. 209 B
and 210 B, C. The whole of Diotima's wonderful speech (210 D— 212 A) should be compared with the closing sections of this chapter. In point of language the words
κάλλιστον θέαμα— ἐρασμιώτατον closely resemble
Tim. 87 D
.
ἀξύμφωνος
: i.e. (as Glauco's answer shews) strictly speaking one whose soul and body do not harmonise in point of beauty, but the word also suggests “the man who has no music in his soul.” Cf.
Symp. 206 C
τὰ δὲ (
κύησις καὶ γέννησις)
ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. With the sentiment in general cf.
Tim. 87 D
ff.
μανθάνω ‐‐ ὅτι
: ‘I understand: (you say so) because’ etc.: see I 322 A note
οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα
. This somewhat extreme example of a common liberty in concord serves to increase the rhetorical emphasis by the energetic repetition of Glauco's
ipsissima verba. The emphasis becomes still greater in Glauco's reply
οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δία, προσοιστεόν. The particle
μέντοι is especially used in replies when the words of a previous speaker are repeated (Hoefer
de part. Plat. p. 32).
q and Flor. U have
προσοιστέα.
φιλεῖν
is ‘kiss’ (as Schneider rightly translates the word): cf. V 468 B and Arist.
Pol. B 4. 1262^{a} 32 ff., where
χρήσεις (as Hicks observes) means ‘endearments.’
ἅπτεσθαι κτλ.
We think of Socrates and the ‘disciple whom he loved’ in the
Phaedo:
εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας (89 B).
ὥσπερ ὑέος
. Herwerden's conjecture
ὡς πατὴρ ὑέος (or
ὥσπερ πατὴρ ὑέος) deserves the praise of ingenuity, but Plato's text is better and more expressive, because it represents the object of affection almost as the lover's very son. It should be noted that in Plato's
ἔρως it is the elder who loves, and the younger who is loved; and that the aim and purpose of Platonic love is
τόκος ἐν καλῷ (
Symp. 206 B
)—the bringing to birth of noble thoughts and aspirations from the beautiful soul of youth. Socrates was the embodiment of Plato's ideal in this respect (
Symp. 216 D
ff.). Some true and excellent observations on the subject will be found in Dugas
L'Amitié Antique pp. 50—53 al.
τῶν καλῶν χάριν
. Plato is resolved that Love, as well as Art, shall serve Virtue and not Vice.
τὰ δ) ἄλλα ‐‐ ξυγγίγνεσθαι
. σπουδάζειν πρός τινα occurs with the same sense in
Gorg. 510 C
. Madvig's
περὶ ὧν for
πρὸς ὅν would give quite a wrong meaning.
σπουδάζει has been suggested for
σπουδάζοι (Ast, Richards, Hartman), but the optative puts the case more generally: any one in whom one may be interested. Cf.
Soph.
Ant. 666
ἀλλ’ ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν, with Jebb's note. The previous sentence has told us what the actual relations of the pair of friends must be; and Plato now forbids all conduct likely in any way to occasion scandal or misapprehension: hence
δόξει (‘be supposed to’). Such conduct is in bad taste (
ψόγον ἀμουσίας), rather than positively
αἰσχρόν or immoral, like actual vice.
μαργότερα τούτῳ (Herwerden) instead of
μακρότερα τούτων is a singularly gross conjecture.
ὑφέξοντα
. “Si
ὑφέξοντα non sanum, corrige
ὑφέξειν” (Hartman). This catches the point, but, as Hartman admits, the text can be defended as it stands. The participle agrees with the subject of
ὁμιλεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή being all but adverbial, and therefore not followed by a main clause. Cf.
Prot. 311 D
.
δεῖ δέ που κτλ.
The love of Beauty is
φιλοσοφία (
Symp. 204 B
); so that the famous saying of the
Phaedo (61 A)
φιλοσοφία μεγίστη μουσική resembles this. I agree with Krohn (
Pl. St. p. 71) in holding that
τοῦ καλοῦ is still beauty as it is revealed in Nature and in Art (see on 402 C), the
πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ of
Symp. 210 D
, and not yet the transcendent Idea of the Beautiful, the contemplation of which demands a still higher flight (ib. 210 D—212 A). But Plato leaves his
μουσικός already knocking at the gates ‘of the blest promised Land.’
γυμναστικῇ κτλ.
Plato's statements on
γυμναστική have been carefully collected and expounded by Kanter
Platos Anschauungen über Gymnastik, Graudenz 1886. Admirable remarks on the whole subject will be found in Nettleship
Hell. pp. 132—134: cf. also his
Lectures and Remains II pp. 123—126. Plato deals here chiefly with the hygienic aspect of gymnastic—a subject which was much discussed in his day: see
Dict. Ant. I p. 929, where we are reminded that gymnasia were dedicated to Apollo, father of Asclepius, and himself a god of healing. In his interesting treatise
Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippokratischen Schriften (Landshut 1882) Poschenrieder has shewn that Plato was strongly influenced throughout this passage by the views of Hippocrates and his school. See also Häser
Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. I pp. 94 ff. The athletics of Gymnastic are treated of in
Laws 795 D ff., 833 ff.
ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ ‐‐ βέλτιστον
. No very recondite theory of the relation of body and soul is here involved. Plato simply means that the soul has more power over the body than the body over the soul. (The restriction in
ὡς οἷόν τε should be noted.) On this principle some doctors held that to cure the body one should minister to the mind diseased: see the curious passage in
Charm. 156 B
—157 C. The general sentiment is well illustrated by J. and C. from Democr.
Fr. Mor. 128 (Müllach)
ἀνθρώποισι ἁρμόδιον ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος ποιέεσθαι λόγον· ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ τελεωτάτη σκήνεος μοχθηρίην ὀρθοῖ, σκήνεος δὲ ἰσχὺς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχὴν οὐδέν τι ἀμείνω ποιεῖ.
εἴπομεν
. 398 E.
ἀθληταὶ ‐‐ ἀγῶνος
. Cf.
Laws 829 E
ἀθλητὰς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγώνων, and
Lach. 182 A
.
τῶνδε
means contemporary athletes: cf. IV 425 C note With Plato's strictures on Greek athletics cf. Arist.
Pol.
Θ. 4. 1338^{b} 10 (with Susemihl and Hicks' note) and especially
Eur.
Fr. 284
: for his attack on the diet and training of athletes cf.
Dict. Ant. I pp. 98, 928 and the authorities there cited.
