πολὺ πλείω τῶν παρόντων
. Cf. 619 B, 620 C. The combination of
κλήρωσις and
αἵρεσις, which appears also in
Phaedr. 249 B
, is according to Thompson “a mythical mode of reconciling freedom and necessity—choice being left free under limiting conditions.” I think the introduction of the lot is rather intended to account for the conspicuous inequalities between different men in respect of accidents of birth, fortune and the other
ἀδιάφορα προηγμένα (to use a Stoic term).
Ceteris paribus, a soul would presumably select a
μετρίως κεχορηγημένον βίον: where it does not, we may suppose, in general, that the
κλήρωσις compelled it to choose late. Cf. Plot.
Ennead. II 3. 15
οἱ κλῆροι τίνες; ἢ—τὸ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τόδε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τῶνδε γονέων καὶ ἐν τούτοις τόποις γίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως, ὡς εἴπομεν, τὰ ἔξω. This interpretation is supported also by the case of Odysseus below (620 C). See also on 619 D.
ζῴων τε γὰρ κτλ.
Did Plato seriously believe in the transmigration of the soul? Teichmüller summarily dismisses the entire theory as unplatonic (
Die Plat. Frage pp. 1—20), while Susemihl, in harmony with certain ancient writers (see the references in Simson
Der Begriff d. Seele bei Platon p. 152 note), takes Plato at his word so far as concerns the passage of the soul into new human bodies, but refuses to allow that he could have believed in transmigration into the forms of the lower animals (
Genet. Entwick. II p. 272). Plato's language is however quite explicit, and there is the less reason for resorting to an allegorical interpretation, because the doctrine was already familiar in Greek philosophical and religious thought (see F. Laudowicz
Wesen u. Ursprung d. Lehre v. d. Präexistenz d. Seele etc. pp. 12—29 and Rohde
Psyche^{2} II pp. 162 ff.), and is itself in general conformity with Plato's own conception of immortality. The doctrine of transmigration meets us frequently in Plato's dialogues, e.g. in
Men. 81 A
ff.;
Phaed. 81 E
ff., 113 A;
Phaedr. 249 B
;
Tim. 42 B
ff.: cf. 91 D ff. Most if not all of these passages have a mythical colouring, and should therefore be read in the light of the caveat which Plato subjoins to the eschatological myth of the
Phaedo:
τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ’ ἐστιν ἢ τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν—ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν (114 D). That soul is immortal, Plato is firmly convinced: and transmigration he regards as probable, to say the least. Cf. 608 D note
διατελεῖς
. This word, for which Cobet proposes
διὰ τέλους, is extremely rare in classical Greek, occurring only here and in
Soph.
O. C. 1514
.
εἰς πενίας κτλ.
. “Expectes
εἰς φυγάς τε καὶ πενίας καὶ εἰς πτωχείας κτλ.” (Herwerden). The text may well stand. Plato contrasts poverty and exile (
πενίας τε καὶ φυγάς) with beggary, presumably at home (
καὶ εἰς πτωχείας).
ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν ‐‐ γίγνεσθαι
. Cf. Hom.
Od. XVIII 136 f.
τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων |
οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἅγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, XVII 322 f. and Empedocles 319 f. Karsten
ὅσσον γ’ ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ |
καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο with Karsten ad loc. See also on I 335 B.
τὰ δ’ ἄλλα
: sc. except
ψυχῆς τάξιν. In
τὰ ἄλλα are included
κάλλος, προγόνων ἀρεταί etc.
μεσοῦν τούτων
: i.q.
μεσοῦντα εἶναι τούτων, viz.
πλούτων καὶ πενιῶν, νόσων καὶ ὑγιειῶν. Cf. 619 A
τὸν μέσον—τῶν τοιούτων βίον.
τοῦ μαθήματος
and
μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν are bracketed by Herwerden. The emphatic pleonasm is thoroughly Platonic. Cf. V 472 C et al.
καὶ εἰδέναι
. See cr. n.
καί is found in several MSS besides
Ξ and
q. Hermann removes the
καί before
ξυντιθέμενα and places it before
ἀναλογιζόμενον, but
ἀναλογιζόμενον “necessario cum
αἱρεῖσθαι cohaeret” (Schneider).
αἱρεῖσθαι κτλ
. αἱρεῖσθαι ‘to make his choice’ is used absolutely as in 620 A.
πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κτλ. means ‘defining the worse and the better life with reference to the nature of the
soul, calling that worse’ etc. (So also Schneider.) The two parts of
τόν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον are afterwards taken separately in
χείρω μέν and
ἀμείνω δέ, as with so-called ‘partitive apposition’: cf. 611 D and IV 431 A note Others take
αἱρεῖσθαι with
τόν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον, but
αἱρεῖσθαι is different from
διαιρεῖσθαι and the possibility of a zeugma is excluded because
τὸν χείρω precedes
τὸν ἀμείνω and not
vice-versâ.
ἐκεῖσε
looks forward, of course, to
εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι. Herwerden's
ἐκεῖ (=
ἐν Ἅιδου) is both needless and wrong: for the soul becomes
ἀδικωτέρα, if at all, during its life on earth: in Hades it is purged.
ἐάσει
. Ξ and
v, followed by editors before Schneider, have
ἐᾶν. The future is easy if the sentence be made independent.
ξὺν νῷ
. On
ξύν see IV 424 E note
συντόνως ζῶντι
: according to the motto (
ἁπλοῦς καὶ)
ἀτενής (VIII 547 E).
συντόνως ζητοῦντι, which Herwerden conjectured, appears in
q and Flor. U: but the reading of A is far more characteristic and significant.
ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας κτλ.
Cf.
Phaed. 82 A
f.
οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, and see also on VI 500 D, 506 C. It is interesting to observe that philosophic virtue is not a
sine qua non for admission to the Platonic heaven. Throughout the whole myth, rewards and punishments are distributed for good and bad actions rather than for knowledge and ignorance (cf. 615 B ff.); and correct opinion or ‘Orthodoxy,’ in Plato's sense of the word, provided the lines have fallen to it in pleasant places, may well have been both blameless and beneficent on earth. But in the moment of supremest peril (618 B), when we have to choose another life, it is Knowledge, and not ‘Orthodoxy,’ that prevails. In the
Phaedo l.c. Plato says that the ‘orthodox’ probably enter as before
εἰς τοιοῦτον—πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἤ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν, ἢ μυρμήκων, ἣ καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.
ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν
: not “according to Er's account” (D. and V.), but ‘as one might say,’ ‘broadly speaking,’ i.q.
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. Cf.
Laws 639 E (
ξύμπανθ’ ὡς εἰπεῖν), 795 D,
Soph. 220 E
,
Phaedr. 258 E
, and [
Epin.] 976 E. These examples are cited by Grünenwald in Schanz's
Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. Gr. Spr. II 3. pp. 21 ff.
καὶ διὰ ‐‐ τύχην
‘as well as by the fortune of the lot’ is doubted by Herwerden, while Richards calls for
καὶ <οὐ> διά, relying on 619 B
καὶ τελευταίῳ—ἀθυμείτω and on ‘the drift of the whole passage.’ In point of fact, however, Plato nowhere denies that the fortune of the lot affects the issue. On the contrary, his whole theory supposes that it does, for those souls who choose late have fewer lives to choose from: see 617 E, 618 A, 620 C.
ὁ τελευτῶν, it is true, need not despair (619 B), but none the less is the lot likely to produce
μεταβολὴ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Cf. Procl. l.c. 302. 15 ff.
τούτοιν χρεία δυεῖν, ἑνὸς μὲν τῆς ὀρθῆς κρίσεως περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον τῶν προτεινομένων βίων, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ τὸν κλῆρον μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις πίπτειν· τί γὰρ εἰ καὶ ὁ αἱρούμενος εἴη περὶ κρίσιν ἀσφαλής, ἀλλ’ οἱ προτεινόμενοι βίοι διὰ δή τινας αἰτίας οἱ τυχόντες εἶεν; See also on 618 A and following note.
ἐπεὶ κτλ.
The connexion of ideas is: The fortune of the lot, and our individual choice, are the two influences that affect our destiny: for if our lot is reasonably early and we choose as befits philosophers, it will be well with us.
ἐπεί “reddit rationem ante dictorum” (Schneider). The sense is surely both plain and satisfactory, although Richards asserts that “
ἐπεί has no meaning, unless there was an
οὐ preceding.”
οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν ‐‐ οὐρανίαν
is explained by 614 B—D: see notes ad loc. In the
Phaedrus those souls which choose the philosophic life three times successively are “excused from seven of the ten millennial probations through which the rest have to pass” (Thompson on 249 A).
γάρ
is resumptive. For examples of this usage see Shilleto on Dem.
F. L. 107.
