Plato Republic 10.617

τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου κτλ. The second and fifth are Saturn and Mercury, or Φαίνων and Στίλβων, as they were sometimes called, with reference to their brightness or colour. See the de mundo 2. 392^{a} 23 ff. Yellow, according to Plato, is a mixture of white and red ( Tim. 68 B ). The third ( τρίτον δέ) or Jupiter was known also as Φαέθων, and the fourth, or Mars, as Πυρόεις. Venus, which is the sixth, and comes next to Jupiter in whiteness, had the name Φωσφόρος ( de mundo l. c.). Cf. [ Epin.] 986 E ff. and Diels Dox. Gr. 344.

κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ δὴ κτλ. Cf. Tim. 36 C , D. The whorl of the fixed stars revolves from East to West, bearing with it in its revolution the other seven whorls. In this way Plato portrays the apparent daily revolution of the stars and planets. In order to represent the movements of the Sun, Moon and planets in their own particular orbits, Plato says that each of the seven inner whorls is all the while pursuing on its own account a motion in the opposite direction, viz. from West to East. The revolving whorls in the words of Proclus, ‘carry round the stars’ ( περιάγουσι τοὺς ἀστέρας l. c. p. 226. 12) which are situated in their rims.

τάχιστα μὲν κτλ. Cf. Tim. 38 C , D, 39 C, 40 B and [ Epin.] 986 E ff.

ἅμα ἀλλήλοις . Πλάτων καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ ἰσοδρόμους εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον, τὸν ἑωσφόρον (Venus), Στίλβωνα (Mercury): see Diels Dox. Gr. 346 and cf. Tim. 36 D , [ Epin.] 986 E and Proclus l.c. 226. 21. Plato's language certainly means that these three bodies travel at the same pace, and if their speed is the same, obviously they cannot complete their orbits in the same period. But it is doubtful whether the contradiction was present to Plato's mind, and Proclus may be right in holding that Plato was really thinking of the periods of the planets (l.c. and in Tim. 259 C). See also on 617 B below.

τρίτον δὲ κτλ. See cr. n. The article, which was first rejected by Schleiermacher, is probably a dittographical mistake. Schneider, Hermann and Baiter retain it, despite the ambiguity.

ἐπανακυκλούμενον . The revolution, relatively to that of the whole, is retrograde: hence ἐπανακυκλούμενον.

Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν . Plato means us to imagine Necessity as seated in the centre of the Universe. The notion is probably Pythagorean; for Parmenides, who attaches himself to the Pythagoreans in this part of his system (Zeller^{5} I p. 572), speaks of a central Ἀνάγκη as the cause of all movement and birth: see Diels Dox. Gr. 335. 12 ff. τῶν δὲ συμμιγῶν (sc. στεφανῶν) τὴν μεσαιτάτην ἁπάσαις τοκέα πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ὑπάρχειν, ἥντινα καὶ δαίμονα κυβερνῆτιν καὶ κλῃδοῦχον ἐπονομάζει δίκην τε καὶ ἀνάγκην, and Zeller l.c. p. 577 note 3. (Zeller identifies this Ἀνάγκη with the central fire of the Pythagoreans.) The same school seem also to have held that Ἀνάγκη surrounds and holds the world together (Diels l. c. 321), and Zeller thinks it is this external Ἀνάγκη of which Plato here avails himself (l.c. p. 434 note 3). But it is quite clear that Plato's Ἀνάγκη is in the middle: see on 616 B and 621 A, B. The interpretation of Plato's symbolism of course is that Necessity and Law spin the threads of life—the life of the Universe as well as that of man. ἐν τοῖς τῆς Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν is an echo of θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται and the like: cf. Proclus l.c. 227. 12.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων κτλ. βεβηκέναι means ‘is perched.’ Proclus more suo assures us that the Sirens are ψυχαί τινες νοερῶς ζῶσαι (l.c. 238. 6), but they are of course only a poetic fiction to express the ‘music of the spheres.’ Cf. Merchant of Venice V I “There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st, But in his motion like an angel sings.” Plato goes beyond Shakespeare, setting the angels on the orbs and making them sing. Cf. Milton Arcades 63 ff. “the celestial Sirens' harmony That sit upon the nine”—in Plato there are only eight— “infolded Spheres.” The seven planets by their movements were supposed by the Pythagoreans to give forth sounds corresponding to the notes of the Heptachord. This was probably the original form of the ‘Music of the Spheres.’ Later, it was held that the circle of the fixed stars had also a note of its own, and a ‘harmony’ or mode (see on III 398 E ff.) resulted like that of the Octachord. The underlying idea of the doctrine of the ‘Music of the Spheres’ was well expressed by Dorylaus when he said the Universe was the ‘organum Dei’ (Censor. de die natali 13: cf. also Milton Ode on the Nativity “And bid the bass of heaven's deep organ blow”). See also next note.

φωνὴν μίαν, ἕνα τόνον : ‘a single sound, a single musical note.’ “Additum ἕνα τόνον per epexegesin est” (Stallbaum). Cf. Proclus l.c. 236. 27 ff. ἡ μὲν γὰρ μία φωνὴ δηλοῖ τὴν ἀμετάβολον τοῦ τῆς ἐνεργείας εἴδους εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μέλος ὕπαρξιν, ὡς ἑκάστης Σειρῆνος ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἱείσης φωνήν· ὁ δὲ εἷς τόνος τὴν ποιὰν φωνὴν ἐδήλωσεν εἰς ἑνὸς ἀπήχησιν φθόγγου τελοῦσαν· παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τάσιν καὶ ὁ φθόγγος καλεῖται τόνος. There is also perhaps a slight rhetorical effect, though less than in τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα IX 590 A. The reading ἕνα τόνον is confirmed by Plut. de anim. procr. 1029 C and Proclus in Tim. 259 C and in remp. l.c. et al. It is difficult to understand ἀνὰ τόνον, which Hermann and Baiter read, following q and a few inferior MSS. ἀνὰ τόνον could hardly mean ‘one note each,’ as Hermann supposes. With regard to the ἁρμονία itself, the pitch of the several notes will of course be determined by the speed of the different whorls (cf. VII 530 D note), so that if we express the notes by the names of the circles which produce them, the ἁρμονία will be:—

Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας . Ettig l.c. p. 309 note 3 thinks this an Orphic trait, comparing Frag. 253 A bel Μοίρας—λευκοστόλους.

ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν . These words are bracketed by Herwerden, on the ground that περὶ τὰς κεφαλάς would alone be good Greek, an opinion which few scholars will share.

Λάχεσιν μὲν κτλ. Lachesis is the Fate of the Past, Clotho of the Present, and Atropos of the Future: cf. Laws 960 C, where Plato approves of the ancient tradition Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἄτροπον δὲ τρίτην and Proclus l.c. 244. 20 ff. The positions of Lachesis and Atropos were sometimes interchanged, as for example in [Arist.] de mundo 7. 401^{b} 18 ff. τέτακται δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς μία τῶν Μοιρῶν, Ἄτροπος, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἄτρεπτά ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Λάχεσις ( εἰς πάντα γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν μένει λῆξις), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὸς Κλωθώ, συμπεραίνουσά τε καὶ κλώθουσα ἑκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεῖα: cf. also Proclus l.c. 244.

τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρί . The right hand is reserved for the outermost whorl, or circle of the Same, which is the more honourable, and itself, according to Tim. 36 C , moves ἐπὶ δεξιά: the left for the less honourable circle of the Other, which moves ἐπ’ ἀριστερά (ib.). Pythagorean influence is doubtless at work again here: cf. 614 C note

συνεπιστρέφειν : “cum matre simul vertere” (Ficinus).

τὴν ἔξω περιφορὰν κτλ. The circle of the Same may be taken as the type of that which ‘is’: hence it is entrusted to Clotho, the Fate of τὰ ὄντα. The courses of the Planets or ‘wandering’ stars are symbolical of the unknown and (as it seems to us) uncertain Future, so that they are appropriately given to the Fate of the Future, i.e. Atropos. διαλείπουσαν χρόνον means ‘leaving intervals’ i.e. ‘from time to time.’ Clotho leaves off occasionally to make room for Lachesis, as Plato explains in τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν below. Similarly also Proclus l.c. 252. 8.

ὡσαύτως : i.e. διαλείπουσαν χρόνον.

τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν κτλ. : ‘while Lachesis lays hold of either in turn, the one with the one hand, the other with the other’ (“abwechselnd den einen mit der einen, den andern mit der andern angreifend” Schneider). She turns the circle of the Same with her right hand, the others—here treated as a single περιφορά as in Tim. 36 C —with her left. The translation “laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other” (Jowett) is not, I think, what Plato means: for it would seem from what is said of Clotho and Lachesis that the right hand is appropriated to the circle of the Same, the left to that of the Other: see on 617 C. The words ἐν μέρει—if my view is right— belong only to ἑκατέρας ἐφάπτεσθαι and not also to ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ χειρί. As the fate Past, Lachesis fitly contributes to both revolutions: for on the Past depends both the Present and the Future. A similar lesson is conveyed by representing the lots and samples of lives as lying in the lap of Lachesis: cf. also 620 A κατὰ συνήθειαν—αἱρεῖσθαι and 620 E note

Ἀνάγκης κτλ. Proclus' remarks on the style of this speech deserve attention: πανταχοῦ μὲν ὁ Πλάτων νοῦν ἡγεμόνα προστησάμενος ὧν φθέγγεται νοερῶν ὄντως ἐπάξια φθέγγεται θεαμάτων· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τοὺς κρείττονας ἡμῶν ἀπεικονίζηται, σαφῶς ἐνθεάζοντι προσέοικε καὶ τοὺς φοιβολήπτους μιμεῖται, ῥήματα ἀφιεὶς ὥσπερ βέλη νοῦ γέμοντα καὶ ὑψηλῶν ἐπιβολῶν· συνεξορμώσης δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς ἑρμηνείας ταῖς νοήσεσιν ἀκαλλωπίστως συνεστραμμένοις μὲν χρῆται φθέγμασιν, ἀπολελυμένα δὲ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ διίστησιν τὴν ἀπόλυτον μιμούμενος θέαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπ’ ἄλλων ἐπ’ ἄλλα πηδῶσαν· οἷα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐργάζεται τῶν τοῦ προφητου λόγων, ἐν ἐλαχίστοις μὲν ἀπεριήγητα νοήματα συλλαβών, ἀσύνδετα δὲ τὰ τλεῖστα φθεγξάμενος, συστρέψας δὲ τὰ κῶλα τοῖς αἰνίγμασιν παραπλησίως (l.c. 269). The omission of articles also adds dignity and impressiveness: cf. VII 518 A al.

ψυχαὶ κτλ. Plato loosely calls the souls ἐφήμεροι, because their connexion with body is transient. In themselves of course, they are immortal— ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος ( Phaedr. 245 C ). The explanation of Proclus is somewhat different, and, as often happens, too recondite: τὰς μὲν ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς, οὔτι γε πάσας, ἀλλὰ τὰς γενέσεως ἐπορεγομένας ἤδη καλῶν ἐφημέρους, ὡς θνητῶν καὶ ἐφημέρων ἁπτομένας (l.c. 270). περιόδου means of course τῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπὶ γένεσιν περιόδου, viz. 1100 years (supra 615 A note); and θανατηφόρου, ‘fraught with death,’ ‘death-bringing’ agrees with περιόδου.

οὐχ ὑμᾶς ‐‐ αἱρήσεσθε . Cf. infra 620 D, E ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα—φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων. Each individual soul is accompanied throughout its life on earth by a δαίμων of its own. This δαίμων is the personification of its destiny throughout that particular life—its genius in short, albus or ater (Hor. Epp. II 2. 189), according as the soul is εὐδαίμων or κακοδαίμων. There are not a few traces of this belief before the time of Plato, e.g. in Heraclitus' famous saying ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων ( Fr. 121 B ywater) in Pind. Ol. 13. 28 Ζεῦ πάτερ—Ξενοφῶντος εὔθυνε δαίμονος οὖρον, and often in Euripides (examples in Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 113); and Döring (l.c. p. 489) is no doubt right in holding that the doctrine was not exclusively Orphic or Pythagorean. According to the popular view, which Plato himself is content to make use of in Phaed. 107 D ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, we do not choose our δαίμων, but are rather allotted to it: cf. Theocr. 4. 40 αἲ αἲ τῶ σκληρῶ μάλα δαίμονος, ὅς με λέλογχεν, and the fine lines of Menander ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται | εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου (Mein. Frag. Com. Graec. IV p. 238), together with Homer Il. XXIII 79 ( κὴρ) ἥπερ λάχε γεινόμενόν περ. In the emphatic οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, Plato proclaims his dissent from the popular view: the individual is himself responsible for his destiny ( ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς—αἱρήσεσθε). Hence αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. On later, especially Stoic, developments of the doctrine of a δαίμων see Rohde Pysche^{2} II p. 316 note See also on 620 D.

πρῶτος ‐‐ βίον . See on 618 A πολὺ πλείω τῶν παρόντων.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης . The choice, though free, is irrevocable: ἐνεδέχετο γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον βίον ζῆν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως, μετὰ δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἀδύνατον (Proclus l.c. 275).

ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον . “Mortals that would follow me, Love Virtue, she alone is free” (Milton Comus 1018 f.). On Platonic principles, a thing is in so far as it is good (VI 509 B ff.), so that our truest individuality is nothing more or less than that which is the best and highest part of our nature: cf. the words of Aristotle, who in Eth. Nic. X 7. 1178^{a} 2 πλατωνίζει as follows: δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ κράτιστον των ἐν αὑτῷ), εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. We therefore attain our fullest development and enjoy our only true liberty as individuals by becoming servants of Virtue. In the words of Goethe, “Das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben.” Proclus' comment, though true and instructive as far as it goes, does not exhaust the significance of Plato's saying: ἀδέσποτον δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν μόνον, ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλευθέραν ἀποτελεῖ τῶν πικροτάτων δεσποτῶν, οἷς ἡ δουλεύουσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν στέρεται πάντων (l.c. 276. 5 ff. Cf. also Pl. Rep. I 329 C and especially Xen. Mem. IV 5. 3 —5). The germ of the Platonic doctrine of moral freedom is to be found in the Socratic οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός (see on IX 577 D, E): for its sequel, we should look to the Stoic theory of the freedom of the wise man ( ἐλευθέρους τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον Zeno ap. D. L. VII 33): see especially Epictetus Gnom. Epict. Stob. 31 ed. Schenkl ἐλευθερία καὶ δουλεία, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ κακίας and the chapter περὶ ἐλευθερίας ib. Dissert. IV 1.

αἰτία ‐‐ ἀναίτιος . Cf. II 379 B ff. and Tim. 42 D . The whole of Lachesis' speech is frequently quoted or referred to by later Greek writers (see the references in Schneider's note), and these words in particular became a kind of rallying-cry among the champions of the freedom of the will in the early Christian era (Dieterich Nek. p. 115 note). A bust of Plato found at Tibur and dating from the first century B.C. bears the inscription αἰτία ἑλομένῳ ( sic). Θεὸς ἀναίτιος, together with ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος (from Phaedr. 245 C ). See Kaibel IGIS 1196 quoted by Dieterich l.c. With the sentiment itself cf. Laws 904 B—D.