Plato Republic 1.343

Paul Shorey (Translator)

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.

Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)
Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 1.343 focus

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras ( Protagoras 334), when pressed by Socrates’ dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he might shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the Gorgias. Justice is another’s good which only the naive and innocent pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the Republic is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.
2. κορυζῶντα L. and S., also s. v. κόυζα. Lucian, Lexiphanes 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, Satire i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30
ἀλλ’ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι
.
3. Literally, if you don’t know for her. For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare Taming of the Shrew, I. ii. 8
Knock me here soundly.
Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. Shepherd of the people, like survival of the fittest, may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 431, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 2. 1, Suetonius Vit. Tib. 32, and my note in Class. Phil . vol. i. p. 298.
4. Thrasymachus’s real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates’ true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton.
5. Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 1203
πρόβατ’ ἄλλως
, Herrick,
Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep.
6. This (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, so far advanced, better accords with ἀγνοεῖς and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus.
7. τῷ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, Laches 187 B, Philebus 64 E. Similarly ἐτήτυμον of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes Birds 507
τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐκεῖν ἦν τοὔπος ἀληθῶς
, etc. Cf. Anth. Pal. v. 6. 3. With εὐηθικῶν, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, simple, which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning of good character. Cf. 348 C, 400 E, Laws 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of silly with selig, and in Italian, Leopardi’s bitter comment on dabbenaggine ( Pensieri xxvi.).
8. Justice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another’s good. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, but one’s own harm, for which see 392 B, Euripides Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates’ protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as the other fellow’s good; which recalls Woodrow Wilson’s favourite limerick, and the definition of business as l’argent des autres.
9. For the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating graft cf. the story of Deioces in Herodotus i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, Laches 180 B, Isocrates xii. 145, Aristotle Pol. v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. Meno 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, Praecept. reipub. ger. 13) cited by Goodwin ( Political Justice) in the form:
God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies.
Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

εἰς τοὐναντίον . Justice has now become τὸ τοῦ ἥττονος (rather than κρείττονος) συμφέρον.

κορυζῶντα : ‘snivelling,’ μωραίνοντα, μυξάζοντα· κόρυζα γὰρ ἡ μύξα, ἣν οἱ Ἀττικοὶ κατάρρουν φασίν (Schol.). Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. quotes among other passages Lucian Alex. § 20 ἦν δὲ τὸ μηχάνημα τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ μὲν οἵῳ σοι, εἰ δὲ μὴ φορτικὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ οἵῳ ἐμοί. πρόδηλον καὶ γνῶναι ῥᾴδιον, τοῖς δὲ ἰδιώταις καὶ κορύζης μεστοῖς τὴν ῥῖνα τεράστιον καὶ πάνυ ἀπίστῳ ὅμοιον, and Horace Sat. I 4. 8 (of Lucilius) emunctae naris.

ὅς γε αὐτῇ κτλ. “Apte αὐτῇ interpositum; nam ipsi nutrici Socratis insipientiam opprobrio esse, Thrasymachus vult significare” Ast. Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. for 1867 p. 140) ought not to have suggested ὅς γε αὐτός. The sense is ‘for she cannot teach you to recognise even sheep or shepherd,’ not ‘you do not know either sheep or shepherd’ (J. and C.), which would require οὔτε— οὔτε. The phrase is clearly a half-proverbial expression borrowed from the nursery.

ὅτι οἴει τοὺς ποιμένας κτλ. Thrasymachus gives a new turn to the nursery saying. The illustration from the shepherd and his sheep (which is now for the first time introduced) was used by the historical Socrates to justify the opposite conclusion ( Xen. Mem. III 2. 1 ) ἐντυχὼν δέ ποτε στρατηγεῖν ᾑρημένῳ τῳ, Τοῦ ἕνεκεν, ἔφη, Ὅμηρον οἴει τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα προσαγορεῦσαι ποιμένα λαῶν; ἆρά γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ τὸν ποιμένα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶαί τε ἔσονται αἱ ὄϊες, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶοί τε οἱ στρατιῶται ἔσονται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσι, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα στρατεύονται τοῦτο ἔσται; So also Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII 13. 1161^{a} 12 ff. εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν’ εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. In Plato Pol. 271 D ff. the deities of the golden age are compared to shepherds, and the comparison of a good ruler to a shepherd is very frequent in Plato: see Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v. νομεύς. In Socrates' view ‘the shepherd careth for his sheep.’ With Thrasymachus' attitude should be compared the picture of the tyrant in Theaet. 174 D as a συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἤ τινα βουκόλον—πολὺ βδάλλοντα (he squeezes as much milk as he can out of his flock): also Solon ap. Arist. Rep. Ath. ch. 12 εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλος ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν, οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον οὐδ’ ἐπαύσατο, | πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα. In the word ἀμοργοί or ἀμολγοί used by Cratinus in the sense of πόλεως ὄλεθροι (Meineke Fr. Com. Graec. II 1, p. 140) the image is the same. Compare the eloquent words of Ruskin in Sesame and Lilies § 43 and Milton's Lycidas 113—129.

ἡγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι . The conjecture διακεῖσθαι for διανοεῖσθαι is tempting in view of διατεθείη which follows, but διανοεῖσθαι is better suited to σκοπεῖν and βλέποντας just above. For the somewhat rare construction Schneider compares Laws 626 D αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον, ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν; and 628 D.

πόρρω εἶ περί . πόρρω can hardly (I think) mean ‘far from’ (sc. knowing): this would require πόρρω εἶ <τοῦ τι εἰδέναι> περί, as Herwerden suggests: cf. Lys. 212 A οὕτω πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτήματος ὥστε κτλ. The meaning is (I believe) ‘so far on’; ‘so profoundly versed are you in justice’ etc.: cf. πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου Ap. 38 C and phrases like πόρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνειν: see also Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 192 . Such biting sarcasm is appropriate in the mouth of Thrasymachus.

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν . Arist. Eth. Nic. V 3. 1130^{a} 3 f. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ (with Stewart's note) and ib. 10. 1134^{b} 5.

τῷ ὄντι is not τῷ ὄντι δικαιῳ, but revera (as Stallbaum observes).

ὡς ἀληθῶς as well as ἀληθῶς, τῷ ὄντι, and the like, is used to indicate that a word is to be taken in its strict and full etymological sense ( εὐ‐ηθικῶν): cf. Phaed. 80 D εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, and infra II 376 B, V 474 A, VI 511 B, VIII 551 E notes

τά γε οἰκεῖα ‐‐ μοχθηροτέρως . Wells aptly cites the refusal of Deioces in Herod. I 97 to continue as an arbiter: οὐ γάρ οἱ λυσιτελέειν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐξημεληκότα τοῖσι πέλας δἰ ἡμέρης δικάζειν. Cf. also Ap. 23 B , 31 B. In like manner Aristotle mentions it as one of the safeguards of a democracy engaged in agriculture that the necessity of looking after their private interests will prevent the citizens from often attending the assembly ( Pol. Z 4. 1318^{b} 11). Plato is fond of the comparative ending in ‐ως (affected, says Cobet, by those “qui nitidissime scribunt”): see Kühner-Blass Gr. Gramm. I p. 577.

ἀπεχθέσθαι . ἀπέχθομαι as a present is not well attested in Plato's time; and the aorist ‘to incur the enmity of’ is at least as suitable in point of meaning here.

λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον . Ast points out that nothing in what has been already said corresponds to the words τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, and reads ὅπερ on slight MS authority. But no special reference is intended: the words mean simply ‘I mean the man I meant just now.’ Thrasymachus asserts that he has all along been referring to τὸν μεγάλα κτλ.