Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 1.333

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

[333] By no means. There is a use then even in peace for justice? 333a Yes, it is useful. But so is agriculture, isn’t it? Yes. Namely, for the getting of a harvest? Yes. But likewise the cobbler’s art? Yes. Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes. Certainly. Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace? In engagements and dealings, Socrates. And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else? Associations, of course. Is it the just man, 333b then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player? The player. And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder? By no means. Then what is the association¹ in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords? For money-dealings,² I think. Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common 333c or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn’t it so? Apparently. And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot. It would seem so. What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner? When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates. You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle³? Quite so. Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it? 333d It looks that way. And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful? Apparently. And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music. Necessarily. And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful? It looks that way. 333e
Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth⁴ if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against⁵ a blow? Assuredly. Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection? I think so.

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.

Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 1.333 focus

[333] 333a
χρήσιμον.
καὶ γὰρ γεωργία· ἢ οὔ;
ναί.
πρός γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν;
ναί.
καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική;
ναί.
πρός γε ὑποδημάτων ἂν οἶμαι φαίης κτῆσιν;
πάνυ γε.
τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι;
πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες.
συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο;
κοινωνήματα δῆτα. 333b
ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός;
ὁ πεττευτικός.
ἀλλʼ εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ;
οὐδαμῶς.
ἀλλʼ εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ τε καὶ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων;
εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
πλήν γʼ ἴσως, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε 333c δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἱππικός. ἦ γάρ;
φαίνεται.
καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης;
ἔοικεν.
ὅταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων;
ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐκοῦν λέγεις ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι;
πάνυ γε.
ὅταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ᾖ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος ἐπʼ αὐτῷ 333d ἡ δικαιοσύνη;
κινδυνεύει.
καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἡ ἀμπελουργική;
φαίνεται.
φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέῃ φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικήν;
ἀνάγκη.
καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἑκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος;
κινδυνεύει. 333e
οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὂν τυγχάνει. τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἆρʼ οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι;
πάνυ γε.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας;
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. Justice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 14.

2. Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines.

3. Interest is ignored. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.

4. A virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in Hippias Minor 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between habit and faculty ( ἕξις and δύναμις). Cf Topics, vi. 12. 6, Eth. Nic. v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, Met. 1046 b, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 38.

5. The shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

ξυμβολαια are contracts where money is involved. Polemarchus (as in εἰς ἀργυρίου in B below), in harmony with the natural meaning of Simonides' saying, thinks first of pecuniary dealings as the sphere in which δικαιοσύνη acts. Socrates substitutes for ξυμβόλαια the more general term κοινωνήματα, in order once more to introduce the analogy of the arts.

εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν is idiomatic for εἰς τίνος δὴ κοινωνίαν. Compare VIII 556 C ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις and τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην (where the English idiom would expect τὴν τιμὴν ταύτης) in II 371 E. In spite of εἰς κρουμάτων and εἰς ἀργυρίου, it is not necessary to read (with Richards) τίνος.

παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι . The double expression is necessary to explain κοινῇ χρῆσθαι: the κοινωνία arises because one deposits the money and by the other it is kept safe.

ἄχρηστον ‐‐ χρήσιμος . ἄχρηστος fluctuates between ‘unused’ and ‘useless’: the latter sense is predominant here and gives an epigrammatic tone to the sentence (cf. ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος in D). It is noticeable that Plato does not take into account the possibility of money being deposited at interest: in this case the money could not be said to be useless.

καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ : not ‘to the individual and to the state,’ but ‘both in dealings with others, and in personal concerns.’ The words καὶ ἰδίᾳ are, strictly speaking, irrelevant, for it is with κοινωνήματα (in the widest sense) that we are concerned. They are to be regarded merely as a rhetorical amplification for the sake of emphasis: cf. infra 350 A, 351 A notes

οὐκ ἂν οὖν κτλ. See cr. n. Some may think that we should read οὐκοῦν (with the majority of MSS) and cancel εἴη after σπουδαῖον (so also Vind. D), understanding ἐστι. The accidental omission of ἄν is however not uncommon in Plato's MSS: see on IV 437 B.

οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι . Because knowledge of anything implies knowledge also of its opposite, according to the usual Socratic view. See Phaed. 97 D οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἄνθρωπον—ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι, Charm. 166 E , Hipp. Min. 367 A ff. See also Stewart's Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics Vol. I p. 378.

φυλάξασθαι κτλ. See cr. n. With the emendation in the text, the argument is as follows: (1) he who can πατάξαι, can φυλάξασθαι: (2) he who can φυλάξασθαι ( νόσον), can λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας ( νόσον): (3) he who can κλέψαι ( τὰ τῶν πολεμίων), is a good φύλαξ of an army. Thus the predicate of each step in the argument corresponds to the subject of the step next following: for λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας ( νόσον) is to be taken as parallel to κλέψαι ( τὰ τῶν πολεμίων). The argument is unsound, and not intended to be serious: it is enough that it suffices to bewilder Polemarchus. For a further discussion on this passage see App. II.

Plato Republic 1.333

Paul Shorey (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition Perseus

Notes on the current edition

Commentary

Stable identifiers