Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 1.332

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[332] I must admit, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.¹ But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit² to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited 332a is due to him in a sense, is it not? Yes. But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind. True, said he. It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due. Something else in very deed, he replied, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil. I see, said I; you mean that³ he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold 332b if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means? Quite so. But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due? By all means, he said, what is due⁴ and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil.
It was a riddling⁵ definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, 332c it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due. What else do you suppose? said he. In heaven’s name! said I, suppose⁶ someone had questioned him thus: Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.⁷ What do you take it would have been his answer? Obviously, he said, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks. And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art? 332d Seasoning to meats. Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice. If we are to follow the previous examples,⁸ Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies. To do good to friends and evil to enemies,⁹ then, is justice in his meaning? I think so. Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health? The physician. 332e And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea? The pilot. Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies? In making war and as an ally, I should say. Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them. True. And so to those who are not at sea the pilot. Yes. Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 1.332 focus

[332]
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀπιστεῖν—σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ—τοῦτο μέντοι ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὁτῳοῦν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι 332a ἀποδιδόναι. καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν τότε ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ;
ἀληθῆ, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
ἄλλο δή τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι.
ἄλλο μέντοι νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἴεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μέν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν.
μανθάνω, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ—ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν ὃς ἄν τῳ χρυσίον ἀποδῷ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἡ ἀπόδοσις 332b καὶ ἡ λῆψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὦσιν ὅ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδούς—οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῂς τὸν Σιμωνίδην;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ ὀφειλόμενον;
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς, ὀφείλεται δέ γε οἶμαι παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι.
ἠινίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς 332c τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἴη. διενοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτʼ εἴη δίκαιον, τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον.
ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; ἔφη.
ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο· ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἴει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι;
δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἡ σώμασιν φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά.
ἡ δὲ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται; 332d
ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα.
εἶεν· ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;
εἰ μέν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα.
τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει;
δοκεῖ μοι.
τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν;
ἰατρός. 332e
τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον;
κυβερνήτης.
τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώτατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;
ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
εἶεν· μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἰατρὸς ἄχρηστος.
ἀληθῆ.
καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης.
ναί.
ἆρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος;
οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.
χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. Apology 22 A-B, Ion 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the wise men must be true. Theaetetus 152 B, Phaedrus 260 A, Laws 888 E, Euthydemus 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. Protagoras 347 E, Meno 71 D, Lysis 214-215, Hippias Minor 365 D.

2. Owing to the rarity of banks reddere depositum was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal Satire 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, De spec. leg. 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἃ παραλαμβάνει: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is iustissima tellus because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology:

ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere,

Cicero De fin. iii. 18.

3. Adam insists that the meaning of μανθάνω ὅτι here and everywhere is it is because.

4. In the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker.

5. Cf. Lysis 214 D, Charmides 162 A, Theaetetus 152 C, 194 C, Alc. II. 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is inspired, but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, Tim. 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato.

6. Socrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, Gorgias 451 B, Hippias Major 287 B ff., Thompson on Meno 72 B.

7. Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. Gorgias 451 A, Protagoras 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s Pickwick examination:

Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big?

8. Similarly Protagoras 312 A.

9. Simonides’ defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the Republic infra, 335 D-336 A, but in the Crito 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon ( Memorabilia ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 85, Aeschylus Choeph. 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles Ajax, p. xxxix, Thumser, Staats-Altertumer, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on Meno 71 E.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

ἀποδοτέον ‐‐ ἀπαιτοῖ : ‘well, but we were not on any account to make restoration at the time when the claimant is’—according to the Greek idiom ‘was’ —‘mad.’ Socrates, as in ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, is appealing to the admissions made by the πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου (in 331 C), as he is justified in doing when addressing his heir. ὁπότε is not—as τότε shews —the particle of ‘indefinite frequency,’ but stands for ὅτε of the direct: the whole clause τότε ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ is thus in the oratio obliqua of self-quotation and exactly corresponds to εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ in 331 C. Madvig's ἀπαιτεῖ for ἀπαιτοῖ is therefore unnecessary. Goodwin MT. p. 213 explains the optative otherwise, but not (I think) rightly.

ἀγαθὸν μέν τι δρᾶν sc. αὐτούς, for τοῖς φίλοις depends on ὀφείλειν, to which τοὺς φίλους is the subject.

μανθάνω ‐‐ ὅτι . ὅτι is ‘because,’ not ‘that,’ as always (I believe) in Plato's use of this phrase: cf. Euthyph. 3 B , 9 B and infra III 402 E, VIII 568 E. For the sentiment cf. (with J. and C.) Xen. Mem. IV 2 17 ff.

ὀφείλεται δέ . See cr. n. In explanatory clauses of this kind δέ and not δέ γε is the correct usage: cf. infra 337 D, 344 A. I therefore follow Bekker in reading δέ.

προσήκει . ὀφειλόμενον has thus been equated with προσῆκον by means of the special cases τὸ τοῖς φίλοις ὀφειλόμενον and τὸ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὀφειλόμενον. τὸ προσῆκον is a more general term and is the regular word in classical Greek for ‘proper conduct’ or ‘duty’ (as the Greeks conceived it), the Stoic καθῆκον being very rarely used in this sense by good authors.

ᾐνίξατο ‐‐ ποιητικῶς . Theaet. 194 C τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα. The present passage is no more serious than that in the Theaetetus: Plato knew that Simonides merely meant to say ‘it is just to render what you owe.’

ἀλλὰ τί ὄει ; is a rhetorical question, which needs and receives no answer, like τί μήν; and τί μὴν δοκεῖς; ( Theaet. 162 B ). It is equivalent to ‘of course.’ For the use of τί Stallbaum compares Gorg. 480 B τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν; to which there is also no reply. This explanation is preferable to that of Madvig, who gives ἀλλὰ τί οἴει to Socrates, and takes ἔφη as equivalent to συνέφη— a harsh usage in a narrated dialogue, and not likely to have been intended by Plato, because sure to be misunderstood. Liebhold's ἄλλο τι οἴει; <οὐκ> ἔφη has everything against it.

ὦ πρὸς Διὸς κτλ. ‘In the name of heaven, said I, if any one then had asked him’ etc. ‘what reply do you think he would have made to us?’ ὦ before πρὸς Διός is (as Schanz holds) an interjection, and does not require a vocative to follow it: cf. Euthyd. 287 A , 290 E. It is tempting (with Tucker) to take ὦ πρὸς Διός as part of the address to Simonides (cf. Euthyd. 294 B ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε—αὐτὼ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπίστασθον). But on this view the presence of εἰ οὖν—ἤρετο forms a difficulty, and ὦ πρὸς Διός may very well go with τί ἂν οἴει— ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον . It is characteristic of Plato to combine the thing explained and the explanation itself in this way: see my note on Prot. 314 A . Here ὀφειλόμενον is necessary to enable Simonides to recognise his own saying.

ἰατρικὴ ‐‐ μαγειρική . In Gorg. 463 A ff. Plato refuses the name of ‘art’ to ὀψοποιική: it is but an ἐμπειρία or τριβή, a sort of bastard adjunct to ἰατρική, as κομμωτική is to γυμναστική. Here, where less precision is required, both are regarded as τέχναι.

εἶεν according to Timaeus ( Lexicon s. v.) expresses συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. It rarely expresses συγκατάθεσις (‘assent’) and no more: see on IV 436 C. The word was pronounced εἶἑν with intervocalic aspiration (Uhlig in Fl. Jahrb. 1880 pp. 790 ff.) and may possibly be a compound of εἷα and ἕν (used as in ἓν μὲν τόδ’ ἤδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων Aesch. Eum. 589 ). εἶἑν is the usual orthography in Paris A, and has left some traces also in the Bodleian MS e.g. Gorg. 466 C .

τέχνη δικαιοσύνη . The Socratic view that Justice is an art—a view that dominates the whole of the conversation w<*> Polemarchus—is thus introduced quite incidentally.

τὸ ‐‐ λέγει . Cf. Xen. Hiero II 2 (cited above on 331 E).

τί δέ; ὁ δίκαιος κτλ. This punctuation throws more emphasis on ὁ δίκαιος than τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; which appears in some editions. It is therefore to be preferred in introducing the application of the two illustrations. So also below in 333 A τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην κτλ.

προσπολεμεῖν explains ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν as ξυμμαχεῖν explains φίλους ὠφελεῖν. Ast's προπολεμεῖν (a conjecture of Stephanus) would leave ἐχθ<*>οὺς βλάπτειν unrepresented. Stephanus' conjecture was natural enough with the wrong reading καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν, which Ast also followed. For

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ Hartman demands ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν; but cf. 333 B, Crito 43 D, Phaed. 108 D , Menex. 236 B . These cases shew that δοκεῖ can be used without ὡς: and ἐμοὶ ( ἔμοιγε) δοκεῖν does not occur in the Republic (Grünenwald in Schanz's Beitr. <*>ur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3 p. 12).

Plato Republic 1.332

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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