Soc.
And if he did not acquire them in this present life, is it not obvious at once
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that he had them and learnt them during some other time?
Men.
Apparently.
Soc.
And this must have been the time when he was not a human being?
Men.
Yes.
Soc.
So if in both of these periods—when he was and was not a human being—he has had true opinions in him which have only to be awakened by questioning to become knowledge, his soul must have had this cognizance throughout all time? For clearly he has always either been or not been a human being.
Men.
Evidently.
Soc.
And if the truth of all things that are is always
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in our soul, then the soul must be immortal; so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at present—that is, what you do not remember—you must endeavor to search out and recollect?
Men.
What you say commends itself to me, Socrates, I know not how.
Soc.
And so it does to me, Meno. Most of the points I have made in support of my argument are not such as I can confidently assert; but that the belief in the duty of inquiring after what we do not know will make us better and braver and less helpless than the notion that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know,
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nor any duty of inquiring after it—this is a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am able, both in word and deed.
Men.
There also I consider that you speak aright, Socrates.
Soc.
Then since we are of one mind as to the duty of inquiring into what one does not know, do you agree to our attempting a joint inquiry into the nature of virtue?
Men.
By all means. But still, Socrates, for my part I would like best of all to examine that question I asked at first, and hear your view as to whether in pursuing it we are to regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature to mankind,
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or as arriving to them in some other way which I should be glad to know.
Soc.
Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be taught until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control yourself—you are so fond of your liberty— and both attempt and hold control over me,
1
I will yield to your request—what else am I to do?
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So it seems we are to consider what sort of thing it is of which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and allow the question—whether virtue comes by teaching or some other way—to be examined by means of hypothesis.
Meno. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
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