Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 360

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[360]

ΣΩ.

ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. 360 360a ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φῂς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὂν καὶ ἀγαθόν;— τοὺς δειλούς, ἦ δʼ ὅς.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ;— ὡμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη.—ἆρʼ οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον;— ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας.—τί δʼ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἔρχεται;— ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν.—οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ 360b ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;— ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.—εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἆρʼ οὐ καλά;—ὡμολόγει.—εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά;— ναί.—οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι τοὐναντίον αἰσχρούς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;—ὡμολόγει.—θαρροῦσιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ διʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ διʼ ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν;— οὕτως 360c ἔχει, ἔφη.—τί οὖν; τοῦτο διʼ ὃ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;— δειλίαν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.—δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες;— πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.—διὰ ταύτην ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοί εἰσιν;—ὡμολόγει.—διʼ ὃ δὲ δειλοί εἰσιν, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ;—συνέφη.—οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη;—ἐπένευσε.—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐναντίον 360d ἀνδρεία δειλίᾳ.—ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ ἐστίν;—καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν.—ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία;—πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν.—ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὖσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ;—οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτʼ ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε.—καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φῂς ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφῃς;— αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.—ἕν γʼ, ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον 360e ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μέν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ.— φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.
οὔτοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος πῶς ποτʼ ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή.

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 360 focus

Soc.

You are right to do so, I said. 360a But which sort of men do you say are not willing to go to war, that being an honorable and good thing to do?
The cowardly, he replied.
Then, I went on, if it is honorable and good, is it also pleasant?
That certainly has been admitted, he said.
Now do the cowards wittingly refuse to go to what is more honorable, better, and pleasanter?
Well, if we admit that too, he replied, we shall undo our previous admissions.
But what of the courageous man? Does he not go to the more honorable and better and pleasanter? 360b
I am forced to admit that, he said.
Now, in general, courageous men do not feel base fears, when they fear, nor is there anything base in their boldness?
True, he said.
And if not base, then it must be honorable?
He admitted this.
And if honorable, then good?
Yes.
And the cowardly and the bold and the mad, on the contrary, feel base fears and base boldness?
He agreed.
Do they feel base and evil boldness solely through stupidity and ignorance? 360c
Just so, he said.
Well now, the cause of cowards being cowardly, do you call this cowardice or courage?
Cowardice, I call it, he replied.
And were they not found to be cowards through ignorance of what is dreadful?
Certainly, he said.
And so they are cowards because of that ignorance?
He agreed.
And the cause of their being cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
He assented.
Then ignorance of what is dreadful and not dreadful will be cowardice?
He nodded assent.
But surely courage, I went on, 360d is the opposite of cowardice.
Yes.
Then the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
To this he could still nod assent.
And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
To this he nodded very reluctantly.
So the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is courage, being opposed to the ignorance of these things?
Here he could no longer bring himself to nod agreement, and remained silent. Then I proceeded: Why is it, Protagoras, that you neither affirm nor deny what I ask you?
Finish it, he said, by yourself. 360e
I must first ask you, I said, just one more question: Do you still think, as at the beginning, that there are any people who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?
I see, Socrates, you have set your heart on making me your answerer; so, to oblige you, I will say that by what we have admitted I consider it impossible.
My only motive, I then said, in asking all these questions has been a desire to examine the various relations of virtue and its own special nature.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

κάλλιόν τε . The MSS. read καλόν τε . Stephanus made the necessary change.

καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι . In 350B ff. those who are θαρραλέοι without ἐπιστήμη are called μαινόμενοι by an expressive metaphor. Here the μαινόμενοι — which is suggested, but no more—by the μαινόμενοι in 350B mdash; are treated as a distinct class: the word is to be understood of literal madmen like Ajax in the play of Sophocles. The word θρασεῖς has an evil connotation as in Laws, I. 630B θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἁπάντων: Plato could not have said θαρραλέοι here since θαρραλέοι throughout the dialogue is applied also to ἀνδρεῖοι . It would be better to reject (with Kral) both καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς and καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι than only καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς with Sauppe and Schanz; we should then—as throughout this chapter—have only one negative to ἀνδρεῖοι , viz. δειλοί , but we may allow some latitude of expression to Socrates, and καί after οὐκοῦν is slightly in favour of supposing that other classes follow οἱ δειλοί , though it may go with the whole sentence.

ἐπένευσεν : Protagoras dies hard: see on Euthyphr. 8A .

οὔτε—τε : see on 309B

αὐτός—πέρανον . Gorg. 506C λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέρανον.

φιλονικεῖν—τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι . For the orthography of φιλονικεῖν see note on 336E above. Apparently φιλονικεῖν is not elsewhere used in Plato with the accusative, but the construction is a natural one and occurs in Thucydides: in Rep. I. 338A we have προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον .

Plato Protagoras 360

ed. John Burnet

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