Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 323

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[323]

ΣΩ.

ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς 323 323a ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.
ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴῃ ἀπατᾶσθαι ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φῇ ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην ἣν μή ἐστιν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν 323b ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, ἐὰν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθʼ αὑτοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγῃ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καί φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, ἐάντε ὦσιν ἐάντε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον 323c οὐδένα ὅντινʼ οὐχὶ ἁμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντʼ ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι 323d φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, 323e ἐάν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τούτων κακά, ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἵ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις.

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 323 focus

Soc.

but when they meet for a consultation on civic art, 323a where they should be guided throughout by justice and good sense, they naturally allow advice from everybody, since it is held that everyone should partake of this excellence, or else that states cannot be. This, Socrates, is the explanation of it. And that you may not think you are mistaken, to show how all men verily believe that everyone partakes of justice and the rest of civic virtue, I can offer yet a further proof. In all other excellences, as you say, when a man professes to be good at flute-playing or any other art in which he has no such skill, they either laugh him to scorn or are annoyed with him, and his people come and reprove him for being so mad: 323b but where justice or any other civic virtue is involved, and they happen to know that a certain person is unjust, if he confesses the truth about his conduct before the public, that truthfulness which in the former arts they would regard as good sense they here call madness. Everyone, they say, should profess to be just, whether he is so or not, and whoever does not make some pretension to justice is mad; since it is held that all without exception 323c must needs partake of it in some way or other, or else not be of human kind.
Take my word for it, then, that they have good reason for admitting everybody as adviser on this virtue, owing to their belief that everyone has some of it; and next, that they do not regard it as natural or spontaneous, but as something taught and acquired after careful preparation by those who acquire it,—of this I will now endeavor to convince you. 323d In all cases of evils which men deem to have befallen their neighbors by nature or fortune, nobody is wroth with them or reproves or lectures or punishes them, when so afflicted, with a view to their being other than they are; one merely pities them. Who, for instance, is such a fool as to try to do anything of the sort to the ugly, the puny, or the weak? Because, I presume, men know that it is by nature and fortune that people get these things, the graces of life and their opposites. But as to all the good things that people are supposed to get by application and practice and teaching, 323e where these are lacking in anyone and only their opposite evils are found, here surely are the occasions for wrath and punishment and reproof.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης—ἰέναι . The antecedent to ἥν is συμβουλήν not ἀρετῆς : cf. Laws, I. 632C (quoted by Heindorf) κατιδὼν δὲ ὁ θεὶς τοὺς νόμους ἅπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν (sc. φύλακας ) διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δῑ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας . The phrase διὰ δικαιοσύνης ἰέναι is equivalent to δικαίαν εἶναι as διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι to φίλον εἶναι .

ἅπαντος . Schanz reads παντός on account of παντί following: but Plato frequently interchanges ἅπας and πᾶς ; see on Euthyphr. 9E . It is natural that the more emphatic form ἅπαντος should come first.

ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. ἤ= alioquin is regular with δεῖ, προσήκει , and the like, in the preceding clause: cf. below 323c ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις and 325A

αὕτη—τούτου αἰτία : asyndeton as in 318A τοσοῦτος ὅ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος .

ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται . The presence of τῷ ὄντι , as Sauppe remarks, shows that ὡς depends on τεκμήριον in l. 42: cf. below, 324C ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται—ἀποδέδεικταί σοι .

προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην : elsewhere in Plato προσποιεῖσθαι takes the infinitive. Thuc. 1. 137. 7 has ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο .

ὡς ἀναγκαῖον· ὄνneed not be added, as Heindorf shows: cf. Rep. V. 449C ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται.

τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀναντία τοὐτοις . This, the MSS. reading, retained by Heindorf, and recently by Kral, is, we think, right. παῦτα in l. 12 does not have its antecedent in the previous sentence, but is explained by τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις . Protagoras in fact divides ‘goods’ into two classes, viz. (1) goods φύσει , (2) goods ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς , and calls the former καλά , the implied examples being personal beauty, stature and health. Schanz's rejection of τὰ καλά is therefore needless.

συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον—ἀρετῆς . We have here the first hint of the unity of the different vices and (by implication) virtues: cf. below, 329C

Plato Protagoras 323

ed. John Burnet

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