Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 312

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[312]

ΣΩ.

εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο· 312 312a αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχῃ παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν;—καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας, ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι— εἰ μέν τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστὴς γενησόμενος.—σὺ δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων;— νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.—ἀλλʼ ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν 312b ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλʼ οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.— πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.
οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἤ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.— τοῦ πέρι;—ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν 312c θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς φῄς, σοφιστῇ· ὅτι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστιν, θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτʼ ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτʼ εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτʼ εἰ κακῷ πράγματι.— οἶμαί γʼ, ἔφη, εἰδέναι.—λέγε δή, τί ἡγῇ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν;— ἐγὼ μέν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὥσπερ τοὔνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλʼ 312d εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες, εἴποιμεν ἄν που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν; τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης;— τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν;—ἴσως ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν· ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς 312e δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως· ἦ γάρ;— ναί.—εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;— δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι;—εἰκός γε. τί δή ἐστιν τοῦτο περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ;— μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 312 focus

Soc.

Now suppose someone asked you this further question: 312a And what is it that you yourself hope to become when you go to Protagoras?
To this he replied with a blush—for by then there was a glimmer of daylight by which I could see him quite clearly— If it is like the previous cases, obviously, to become a sophist.
In Heaven’s name, I said, would you not be ashamed to present yourself before the Greeks as a sophist?
Yes, on my soul I should, Socrates, if I am to speak my real thoughts.
Yet after all, Hippocrates, perhaps it is not this sort of learning that you expect to get from Protagoras, but rather the sort you had 312b from your language-master, your harp-teacher, and your sports-instructor; for when you took your lessons from each of these it was not in the technical way, with a view to becoming a professional, but for education, as befits a private gentleman.
I quite agree, he said; it is rather this kind of learning that one gets from Protagoras.
Then are you aware what you are now about to do, or is it not clear to you? I asked.
To what do you refer?
I mean your intention of submitting your soul 312c to the treatment of a man who, as you say, is a sophist; and as to what a sophist really is, I shall be surprised if you can tell me. And yet, if you are ignorant of this, you cannot know to whom you are entrusting your soul,—whether it is to something good or to something evil.
I really think, he said, that I know.
Then tell me, please, what you consider a sophist to be.
I should say, he replied, from what the name implies, that he is one who has knowledge of wise matters.
Well, I went on, we are able to say this of painters also, and of carpenters,—that they are the persons who have knowledge of wise matters; 312d and if someone asked us for what those matters are wise, of which painters have knowledge, I suppose we should tell him that they are wise for the production of likenesses, and similarly with the rest. But if he should ask for what the matters of the sophist are wise, how should we answer him? What sort of workmanship is he master of?
How should we describe him, Socrates,—as a master of making one a clever speaker?
Perhaps, I replied, we should be speaking the truth, but yet not all the truth; for our answer still calls for a question, as to the subject on which the sophist makes one a clever speaker: just as the harp player 312e makes one clever, I presume, at speaking on the matter of which he gives one knowledge, namely harp-playing,—you agree to that?
Yes.
Well, about what does the sophist make one a clever speaker?
Clearly it must be the same thing as that of which he gives one knowledge.
So it would seem: now what is this thing, of which the sophist himself has knowledge and gives knowledge to his pupil?
Ah, there, in good faith, he said, I fail to find you an answer.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας. ὑποφαίνει ἡμέραis used, as Heindorf says, de die illucescente. Here τι ἡμέρας = ‘something of day’, ‘some daylight’.

εἰ μέν τι—ἔοικεν . Heindorf remarks that Stephanus' conjecture τοῦτο ἔοικεν is needless, the vague indefinite subject being frequently omitted. Cf. Crat. 387D εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι; Phaedo, 99E ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὧ? εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν.

εἰς τοὑς Ἕλληνας σαυτόν. εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληναςgoes with παρέχων : cf. Symp. 179B ἱκανὴν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται—εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Young men of fashion were fond of looking to Greek, as opposed to Athenian, public opinion. The MSS. have αὑτόν , but the use of the third personal reflexive pronoun for the first and second in the singular number does not seem to be certain in Plato; and it is simplest to suppose that ς fell out after Ἕλληνας : Schanz, VII, xii.

ἀλλ’ ἄρα—μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην. οὐgoes closely with τοιαύτην , and μή is virtually ‘perhaps’ (originally ‘lest’ as in ὅρα μή Theaet. 145B ): ‘but perhaps after all ( ἄρα ) this is not the kind of learning which etc.’ Cf. Euthyd. 290E ἀλλ’ ἄρα—μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ’ εἰπώνand Apol. 25A ἀλλ’ ἄρα—μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησία?, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους ; Meno, 89C μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν . In all of these passages it is better to take μή in this way than as equivalent to Latin num. From this use of μή grew up the use of μήποτε = ‘perhaps’, frequent in Aristotle and later, e.g. Eth. Nic. X. 2. 1173 a . 22 μή ποτ’ οὐ λέγουσιν το αἴτιον .

οἵαπερ ἡ παρἀ is the reading of T: B has οἵα περὶ . The γραμματισταί of Athens were schoolmasters, who besides teaching reading and writing (cf. below, 326D translated ( ἑρμηνεύειν ) Homer and interpreted his γλῶτται . They were distinct from the γραμματικοί or κριτικοί who pursued more scientific literary and grammatical studies. The κιθαριστής and γραμματιστής between them taught μουσική , and the παιδοτρίβης γυμναστική ; and μουσική and γυμναστική were the two parts of παιδεία or liberal education: Rep. II. 376E .

ἐπὶ τέχνῃ—ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ : cf. 315A ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς ἐσόμενος . The distinction between professional and liberal ( ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει ) education is frequently emphasised by Plato (see especially Laws, I. 643D ): his word for the latter is always παιδεία , cf. Gorg. 485A , Rep. VI. 492C . The ‘arts’ are throughout the Republic looked on as βάναυσοι , and unfit for men whose souls are free.

παρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρἱ σοφιστῇ . The word παρέχω is often used of putting oneself in the hands of a doctor: cf. Gorg. 456B φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῶ? ἰατρῷ. ἀνήρis regularly used (mostly in a complimentary sense, real or feigned) with words which denote one's profession, standing or the like, e.g. ἀνὴρ μάντις, ἀνὴρ νομεύς, ἄνδρες δικασταί ; cf. Euthyphr. 15D . For παρασχεῖν Cobet reads παρέχειν , but if MSS. can be trusted, Plato used the aorist infinitive with μέλλω tolerably often: see Schanz, Preface to Symposium, p. vii.

οὔτ’ εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ’ εἰ κακῷ πράγματι . So in Gorgias 520B οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι (their pupils) ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν . Here Socrates uses the most general form of expression because ex hypothesi nothing is yet known as to the sophist: cf. below, 330C ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα ; Cases like Crito, 53D οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα ;are somewhat different and contain a slight admixture of contempt: see the Editor's note in loc.

οἶμαί γ’ εἰδέναι . Hippocrates οἴεται εἰδέναι μὴ εἰδώς : he is thus, according to Socrates, in the worst of all states: cf. Apol. ch. VI ff. Socrates now proceeds to convict him of ignorance.

ὥσπερ τοὔνομα λέγει—τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα . Hippocrates derives σοφιστής from σοφός and ( ἐπ ) ίστ ( αμαι ) ‘quasi sit ὁ τῶν σοφῶν ἴστης ’ (Heindorf, comparing the derivation of Ἥφαιστος in Crat. 407C from Φάεος ἵστωρ ). The correct derivation is perhaps given by Suidas s.v.: σοφιστὴς καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος ὡς σοφίζων (cf. σωφρονίζω =make σώφρων ), but ‐ίζω is very elastic in meaning, and σοφίζω may very well mean ‘play the σοφός ’.

τῶν τί σοφῶν. τῶν πρὸς τί σοφῶνwould be more precise, but the accusative of reference is preferred for brevity. For the construction Kroschel compares Theages, 125C τῶν τί σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ φὴ|ς σοφοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους , where, however, σοφῶν is masculine. The neuter of σοφός is not here used ironically as in Theaet. 157C παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν . Heusde suggested ἐπιστήμων after ἐστιν , but the sense can be supplied out of the ‐ιστής of σοφιστής , according to the derivation of the word just given: the full sense is as it were ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν ( σοφ ) ιστής .

τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ . There is no need to change the verb to ἀποκριναίμεθα , as was done by Bekker to suit ἔροιτο : cf. below, 354A εἰ ἐροίμεθα—φαῖεν ἄν and Phaedr. 259A εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν—δικαίως ἂν καταγελῷεν.

ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης . These words are not of course part of the imaginary questioner's interrogation, but are spoken by Socrates to help out Hippocrates' answer. Socrates suggests that Hippocrates should say that the sophist is ἐπιστάτης of some sort of ἐργασία , but in order that the answer should come from Hippocrates himself, he substitutes for the desired answer: ‘(The sophist is) ἐπιστάτης —of what kind of ἐργασία ?’ Hippocrates then replies by explaining the ἐργασία , viz. τὸ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν . The full grammatical construction would be ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης ( ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀποκριναίμεθα ἂν αὐτῷ ) ; If we take this view, it is not necessary to insert ἐστίν after ἐπιστάτης (with Hirschig).

τί ἂν εἴποιμεν—ὦ Σώκρατες ; Hippocrates is on the verge of ἀπορία , and merely throws out his suggestion ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν for what it is worth. The words ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν are strictly speaking a reply to the question of Socrates ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης ; for τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν answers ποίας ἐργασίας , and but for the intervening clause ( τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι ; ) the word ἐπιστάτην would have been in the nominative.

ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 449E and 451A ff., where much the same reasoning is employed to discover τί ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται ( Gorg. 451D ). Rhetoric and Sophistic were regarded by Plato as sisters: cf. Gorg. 464B ff. The clause ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς κτλ. is logically the protasis to εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς κτλ. : see on 311E above.

εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστής . For εἶεν and δὲ δή see on 311C above.

δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι . Stahl's emendation ( ἐπίστασθαι for ἐπίσταται ), which had occurred to us independently, seems to be certain. Most editions read ἢ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπίσταται ; inserting ἤ before δῆλον (with Heindorf) and giving the words to Socrates, but it is surely more natural to regard them as giving Hippocrates' reply to Socrates' question, in which case δῆλον ὅτι is right. The MS. reading ἐπίσταται gives a non sequitur ; for the harpist makes one δεινὸς λέγειν περὶ οὖπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα i.e. περὶ οὖπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι , not περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμων‐ἐστὶν i.q. ἐπίσταται . The next sentence τί δή ἐστι τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ (sc. ἐπίστασθαι ); in no way invalidates the reading ἐπίστασθαι : it is everywhere assumed in the Platonic writings that he who makes others know has knowledge himself: see for example Alcib. I, 111B οὐκ οἶσθ’ ὅτι χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὁτιοῦν αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἢ οὔ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; and ibid. 113C, 118C.

οὐκέτι . See below on οὐκέτι in 321D

Plato Protagoras 312

ed. John Burnet

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