Soc.
If one should be present when any of the public speakers were dealing with
329a
these same subjects, one could probably hear similar discourses from Pericles or some other able speaker: but suppose you put a question to one of them—they are just like books, incapable of either answering you or putting a question of their own; if you question even a small point in what has been said, just as brazen vessels ring a long time after they have been struck and prolong the note unless you put your hand on them, these orators too, on being asked a little question,
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extend their speech over a full-length course.
1
But Protagoras here, while able to deliver, as events have shown, a long and excellent speech, is also able when questioned to reply briefly, and after asking a question to await and accept the answer—accomplishments that few can claim. And now, Protagoras, there is one little thing wanting to the completeness of what I have got, so please answer me this. You say that virtue may be taught, and if there is anybody in the world who could convince me, you are the man: but there was a point in your speech
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at which I wondered, and on which my spirit would fain be satisfied. You said that Zeus had sent justice and respect to mankind, and furthermore it was frequently stated in your discourse that justice, temperance, holiness and the rest were all but one single thing, virtue: pray, now proceed to deal with these in more precise exposition, stating whether virtue is a single thing, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts,
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or whether the qualities I have just mentioned are all names of the same single thing. This is what I am still hankering after.
Why, the answer to that is easy, Socrates, he replied: it is that virtue is a single thing and the qualities in question are parts of it.
Do you mean parts, I asked, in the sense of the parts of a face, as mouth, nose, eyes, and ears; or, as in the parts of gold, is there no difference among the pieces, either between the parts or between a part and the whole, except in greatness and smallness?
In the former sense, I think, Socrates; as the parts of the face 329e are to the whole face.
Well then, I continued, when men partake of these portions of virtue, do some have one, and some another, or if you get one, must you have them all?
By no means, he replied, since many are brave but unjust, and many again are just but not wise.
Why, the answer to that is easy, Socrates, he replied: it is that virtue is a single thing and the qualities in question are parts of it.
Do you mean parts, I asked, in the sense of the parts of a face, as mouth, nose, eyes, and ears; or, as in the parts of gold, is there no difference among the pieces, either between the parts or between a part and the whole, except in greatness and smallness?
In the former sense, I think, Socrates; as the parts of the face 329e are to the whole face.
Well then, I continued, when men partake of these portions of virtue, do some have one, and some another, or if you get one, must you have them all?
By no means, he replied, since many are brave but unjust, and many again are just but not wise.
Protagoras. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
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