Socrates.
Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honorable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men,
49b
seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not?
Socrates.
Then we ought not to do wrong at all.
Socrates.
And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.
49c
Socrates.
Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?
Crito.
Certainly not, Socrates.
Socrates.
Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?
Crito.
Not right, certainly.
Socrates.
For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.
Socrates.
Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us.
49d
And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent
49e
to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point.
Crito.
I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on.
Socrates.
Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this:
ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?
Crito.
He ought to do it.
