Ἀπολογία φόνου ἀκουσίου

[1] νῦν δὴ φανερόν μοι ὅτι αὐταὶ αἱ συμφοραὶ καὶ χρεῖαι τούς τε ἀπράγμονας εἰς ἀγῶνας καταστῆναι¹ τούς τε ἡσυχίους τολμᾶν τά τε ἄλλα παρὰ φύσιν λέγειν καὶ δρᾶν βιάζονται. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἥκιστα τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ βουλόμενος εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πολύ γε ἔψευσμαι, ὑπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς συμφορᾶς ἠναγκάσθην νῦν παρὰ τὸν ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὲρ πραγμάτων ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὧν ἐγὼ χαλεπῶς μὲν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἔγνων, ἔτι δὲ ἀπορωτέρως διάκειμαι ὡς χρὴ ὑμῖν ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα.

[2] ὑπὸ δὲ σκληρᾶς ἀνάγκης βιαζόμενος, καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς τὸν ὑμέτερον ἔλεον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καταπεφευγὼς δέομαι ὑμῶν, ἐὰν ἀκριβέστερον ἢ ὡς σύνηθες ὑμῖν δόξω εἰπεῖν, μὴ διὰ τὰς προειρημένας τύχας δυσχερῶς² ἀποδεξαμένους μου τὴν ἀπολογίαν δόξῃ καὶ μὴ ἀληθείᾳ τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσασθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα τῶν πραχθέντων πρὸς τῶν λέγειν δυναμένων ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια πρὸς τῶν δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πρασσόντων.

[3] ἐδόκουν μὲν οὖν³ ἔγωγε ταῦτα παιδεύων τὸν υἱὸν ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα τὸ κοινὸν ὠφελεῖται, ἀμφοῖν τι ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀποβήσεσθαι· συμβέβηκε δέ μοι πολὺ παρὰ γνώμην τούτων. τὸ γὰρ μειράκιον οὐχ ὕβρει οὐδὲ ἀκολασίᾳ, ἀλλὰ μελετῶν μετὰ τῶν ἡλίκων ἀκοντίζειν ἐν⁴ τῷ γυμνασίῳ ἔβαλε μέν, οὐκ ἀπέκτεινε δὲ οὐδένα κατά γε τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὧν ἔπραξεν, ἄλλου δʼ εἰς αὑτὸν ἁμαρτόντος εἰς ἀκουσίους αἰτίας ἦλθεν.

[4] εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀκόντιον ἔξω τῶν ὅρων τῆς αὑτοῦ πορείας ἐπὶ τὸν παῖδα ἐξενεχθὲν ἔτρωσεν αὐτόν, οὐδεὶς ἂν⁵ ἡμῖν λόγος ὑπελείπετο μὴ φονεῦσιν⁶ εἶναι· τοῦ δὲ παιδὸς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ ἀκοντίου φορὰν ὑποδραμόντος καὶ τὸ σῶμα προστήσαντος, ὁ μὲν ἐκωλύθη⁷ τοῦ σκοποῦ τυχεῖν, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀκόντιον ὑπελθὼν ἐβλήθη, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ἡμετέραν οὖσαν προσέβαλεν ἡμῖν.

[5] διὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδρομὴν βληθέντος τοῦ παιδός, τὸ μὲν μειράκιον οὐ δικαίως ἐπικαλεῖται, οὐδένα γὰρ ἔβαλε τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἀφεστώτων· ὁ δὲ παῖς εἴπερ ἑστὼς φανερὸς ὑμῖν ἐστι μὴ βληθείς, ἑκουσίως δʼ⁸ ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν τοῦ ἀκοντίου ὑπελθών, ἔτι σαφεστέρως δηλοῦται διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτίαν ἀποθανών· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐβλήθη ἀτρεμίζων καὶ μὴ διατρέχων.

[6] ἀκουσίου δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὑμῖν ὁμολογουμένου γενέσθαι, ἐκ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὁποτέρου αὐτῶν ἐστίν, ἔτι γε⁹ σαφέστερον ἂν¹⁰ ὁ φονεὺς ἐλεγχθείη. οἵ τε γὰρ ἁμαρτάνοντες ὡς¹¹ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσί τι¹² δρᾶσαι, οὗτοι πράκτορες τῶν ἀκουσίων εἰσίν· οἵ τε¹³ ἑκούσιόν τι δρῶντες ἢ πάσχοντες, οὗτοι τῶν παθημάτων αἴτιοι γίγνονται.

[7] τὸ μὲν τοίνυν μειράκιον περὶ οὐδένα οὐδὲν ἥμαρτεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀπειρημένον ἀλλὰ προστεταγμένον ἐξεμελέτα, οὔτε ἐν γυμναζομένοις ἀλλʼ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀκοντιζόντων τάξει ἠκόντιζεν, οὔτε τοῦ σκοποῦ ἁμαρτών, εἰς τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας ἀκοντίσας, τοῦ παιδὸς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὀρθῶς ὡς ἐπενόει δρῶν ἔδρασε μὲν οὐδὲν ἀκούσιον, ἔπαθε δὲ διακωλυθεὶς τοῦ σκοποῦ τυχεῖν.

[8] ὁ δὲ παῖς βουλόμενος προδραμεῖν, τοῦ καιροῦ¹⁴ διαμαρτὼν ἐν ᾧ διατρέχων οὐκ ἂν ἐπλήγη, περιέπεσεν οἷς οὐκ ἤθελεν, ἀκουσίως δὲ ἁμαρτὼν εἰς ἑαυτὸν οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς κέχρηται, τῆς δʼ ἁμαρτίας τετιμωρημένος ἑαυτὸν ἔχει τὴν δίκην, οὐ συνηδομένων μὲν οὐδὲ συνεθελόντων ἡμῶν, συναλγούντων δὲ καὶ συλλυπουμένων.

τῆς δὲ ἁμαρτίας εἰς τοῦτον¹⁵ ἡκούσης, τό τʼ¹⁶ ἔργον οὐχ ἡμέτερον ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐξαμαρτόντος ἐστί, τό τε πάθος εἰς τὸν δράσαντα ἐλθὸν ἡμᾶς μὲν ἀπολύει τῆς αἰτίας, τὸν δὲ δράσαντα δικαίως ἅμα τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ τετιμώρηται.

[9] ἀπολύει δὲ καὶ ὁ νόμος ἡμᾶς, ᾧ πιστεύων, εἴργοντι μήτε ἀδίκως μήτε δικαίως ἀποκτείνειν, ὡς φονέα με διώκει. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αὐτοῦ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος ἁμαρτίας ὅδε ἀπολύεται μηδὲ ἀκουσίως ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτόν· ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ διώκοντος οὐδʼ ἐπικαλούμενος ὡς ἑκὼν ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀμφοῖν ἀπολύεται τοῖν ἐγκλημάτοιν, μήτʼ ἄκων¹⁷ μήθʼ ἑκὼν ἀποκτεῖναι.

[10] ἀπολυόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν πραχθέντων ὑπό τε τοῦ νόμου καθʼ ὃν διώκεται, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἕνεκα δίκαιοι τοιούτων κακῶν ἀξιοῦσθαί ἐσμεν. οὗτός τε γὰρ ἀνόσια πείσεται τὰς οὐ προσηκούσας φέρων ἁμαρτίας, ἐγώ τε μᾶλλον μὲν οὐδέν, ὁμοίως δὲ τούτῳ ἀναμάρτητος ὤν, εἰς πολλαπλασίους τούτου συμφορὰς ἥξω· ἐπί τε γὰρ τῇ τούτου διαφθορᾷ ἀβίωτον τὸ λειπόμενον τοῦ βίου διάξω, ἐπί τε τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπαιδίᾳ ζῶν ἔτι κατορυχθήσομαι.¹⁸

[11] ἐλεοῦντες οὖν τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ νηπίου τὴν ἀναμάρτητον συμφοράν, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦ γηραιοῦ καὶ ἀθλίου τὴν ἀπροσδόκητον κακοπάθειαν, μὴ καταψηφισάμενοι δυσμόρους ἡμᾶς καταστήσητε, ἀλλʼ ἀπολύοντες εὐσεβεῖτε. ὅ τε γὰρ ἀποθανὼν συμφοραῖς περιπεσὼν οὐκ ἀτιμώρητός ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς τε οὐ δίκαιοι τὰς τούτων ἁμαρτίας συμφέρειν ἐσμέν.

[12] τήν τε οὖν εὐσέβειαν τούτων τῶν πραχθέντων καὶ τὸ δίκαιον αἰδούμενοι ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως ἀπολύετε ἡμᾶς, καὶ μὴ ἀθλιωτάτω δύο, πατέρα καὶ παῖδα, ἀώροις συμφοραῖς περιβάλητε.¹⁹

Reply to a Charge of Accidental Homicide

[1] I now see that sheer misfortune and necessity can force those who hate litigation to appear in court and those who love peace to show boldness¹ and generally belie their nature in word and deed; for I myself, who, unless I am sorely mistaken, am very far from finding or wanting to find such a task congenial, have today been forced by sheer misfortune to depart from my habits and appear as defendant in a case in which I found it hard enough to arrive at the exact truth, but which leaves me still more perplexed when I consider how I should present it to you.

[2] I am driven by pitiless necessity: and I, like my opponents, gentlemen of the jury, seek refuge in your sympathy. I beg of you: if my arguments appear more subtle than those generally presented to you, do not allow the circumstances already mentioned² so to prejudice you against my defence as to make you base your verdict upon apparent fact instead of upon the truth; apparent fact puts the advantage with the clever speaker, but truth with the man who lives in justice and righteousness.

[3] In training my son in those pursuits from which the state derives most benefit I imagined that both of us would be rewarded; but the result has sadly belied my hopes. For the lad—not from insolence or wantonness, but while at javelin-practice in the gymnasium with his fellows—made a hit, it is true, but killed no one, if one considers his true part in the matter³: he accidentally⁴ incurred the blame for the error of another which affected that other’s own person.

[4] Had the boy been wounded because the javelin had traveled in his direction outside the area appointed for its flight, we should be left unable to show that we had not caused his death. But he ran into the path of the javelin and placed his person in its way. Hence my son was prevented from hitting the target: while the boy, who moved into the javelin’s path, was struck, thereby causing us to be blamed for what we did not do.

[5] It was because he ran in front of the javelin that the boy was struck. The lad is therefore accused without just cause, as he did not strike anyone standing clear of the target. At the same time, since it is plain to you that the boy was not struck while standing still, but was struck only after deliberately moving into the path of the javelin, you have still clearer proof that his death was due to an error on his own part. Had he stood still and not run across, he would not have been struck.

[6] Both sides are agreed, as you see, that the boy’s death was accidental; so by discovering which of the two was guilty of error, we should prove still more conclusively who killed him. For it is those guilty of error in carrying out an intended act who are responsible for accidents⁵: just as it is those who voluntarily do a thing or allow it to be done to them who are responsible for the effects suffered.

[7] Now the lad, on his side, was not guilty of error in respect of anyone: in practising he was not doing what he was forbidden but what he had been told to do, and he was not standing among those engaged in gymnastics when he threw the javelin, but in his place among the other throwers: nor did he hit the boy because he missed the target and sent his javelin instead at those standing clear. He did everything correctly, as he intended; and thus he was not the cause of any accident, but the victim of one, in that he was prevented from hitting the target.

[8] The boy, on the other hand, who wished to run forward, missed the moment at which he could have crossed without being hit, with results which he by no means desired. He was accidentally guilty of an error which affected his own person, and has thus met with a disaster for which he had himself alone to thank. He has punished himself for his error, and is therefore duly requited; not that we rejoice at or approve of it—far from it: we feel both sympathy and sorrow.

It is thus the dead boy who proves to have been guilty of error; so the act which caused his death is to be attributed not to us, but to him, the party guilty of error: just as the recoiling of its effects upon the agent not only absolves us from blame, but has caused the agent to be punished as he deserved directly his error was committed.

[9] Furthermore, our innocence is attested by the law upon which my accuser relies in charging me with the boy’s death, the law which forbids the taking of life whether wrongfully or otherwise. For the fact that the victim himself was guilty of error clears the defendant here of having killed him by accident: while his accuser does not even suggest that he killed him deliberately. Thus he is cleared of both charges, of killing the boy by accident and of killing him deliberately.

[10] Not only do the true facts of the case and the law under which he is being prosecuted attest my son’s innocence; but our manner of life is equally far from justifying such harsh treatment of us. Not only will it be an outrage, if my son is to bear the blame for errors which he did not commit; but I myself, who am equally innocent, though assuredly not more so, will be visited with woes many times more bitter. Once my son is lost, I shall pass the rest of my days longing for death: once I am left childless, mine will be a life within the tomb.

[11] Have pity, then, on this child, the victim of calamity, though guilty of no error: and have pity on me, an old man in distress, stricken thus suddenly with sorrow. Do not bring a miserable fate upon us by condemning us: but show that you fear God by acquitting us. The dead boy is not unavenged for the calamity which befell him: nor ought we ourselves to share the responsibility for errors due to our accusers.

[12] So respect the righteousness which the facts before you have revealed: respect justice: and acquit us as godly and just men should. Do not bring upon a father and a son, two of the most wretched of beings, sorrows which the years of neither can well bear.

Antiphon The Second Tetralogy 2

ed. Kenneth John Maidment

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Ἀπολογία φόνου ἀκουσίου

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Reply to a Charge of Accidental Homicide

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