Second Speech for the Prosecution
[1] It is an outrage to
misfortune that he should use it to cloak his crime, in the hope of concealing his defilement. Neither does he deserve your
pity
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he did not consult his victim’s wishes
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in bringing doom upon him: whereas he did consult his own before exposing himself to danger. We proved in our first speech that he is the murderer; we shall now endeavor to show by examination that his defense was unsound.
[2] Assume that the murderers hurried off, leaving their victims before they had stripped them, because they noticed the approach of passers-by. Then even if the persons who came upon them found the master dead, they would have found the slave still conscious, as he was picked up alive and gave evidence. They would have questioned him closely and have informed us who the criminals were; so that the defendant would not have been accused. Or assume, on the other hand, that others, who had been seen by the two committing some similar outrage, had murdered them to keep the matter dark. Then news of that outrage would have been published at the same time as the news of the present murder, and suspicion would have fallen on those concerned in it.
[3] Again, how persons whose position was not so serious should have plotted against the dead man sooner than persons who had more to fear, I fail to understand. The fears and sense of injury of the second were enough to put an end to caution; whereas with the first the risk and disgrace involved, to which their resentment could not blind them, were sufficient to sober the anger in their hearts, even if they had intended to do the deed.
[4] The defense are wrong when they say that the evidence of the slave is not to be trusted; where evidence of this sort is concerned, slaves are not tortured; they are given their freedom. It is when they deny a theft or conspire with their masters to keep silence that we believe them to tell the truth only under torture.
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[5] Again, the probabilities are not in favor of his having been absent from the scene of the crime rather than present at it. In remaining absent he was going to run the same risks as he would run if present, as any of his confederates if caught would have shown that it was he who had originated the plot. And not only that; he was going to dispatch the business on hand less satisfactorily, as not one of the criminals taking part would have felt the same enthusiasm for the deed.
[6] Further, he did not believe the danger threatened by the indictment to be less serious than that in which he now stands, but much more so, as I will prove to you. Let us assume that his expectations of conviction or acquittal were the same in the one suit as in the other.
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Now he had no hope of the indictment being dropped as long as his enemy was alive; his entreaties would never have been listened to. But he did not, on the other hand, expect to be involved in the present trial, as he thought that he could commit the murder without being found out.
[7] Again, in claiming an acquittal on the ground that he could foresee that he would be suspected, he is arguing falsely. If the defendant, whose position was desperate could be deterred from violence by the knowledge that suspicion would fall on himself, nobody at all would have planned the crime. Every one who stood in less danger than he would have been more frightened by the certainty of being suspected than by that danger, and would therefore have been less ready than he to use violence.
[8] His contributions to the Treasury and his provision of choruses may be satisfactory evidence of his wealth; but they are anything but evidence of his innocence. It was precisely his fear of losing his wealth which drove him to commit the murder; though an unscrupulous crime, it was to be expected of him. He objects that murderers are not those who were to be expected to commit murder, but those who actually did so. Now he would be quite right, provided that those who did commit it were known to us; but as they are not, proof must be based on what was to be expected; and that shows that the defendant, and the defendant alone, is the murderer. Crimes of this kind are committed in secret, not in front of witnesses.
[9] As he has been proved guilty of the murder so conclusively from his own defense, he is simply asking you to transfer his own defilement to yourselves. We make no requests; we merely remind you that if neither inferences from probability nor the evidence of witnesses prove the defendant guilty today, there remains no means of proving any defendant guilty.
[10] As you see, there is no doubt about the circumstances of the murder; suspicion points plainly to the defendant;
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and the evidence of the slave is to be trusted so how can you in fairness acquit him? And if you acquit him unfairly, it is not upon us that the dead man’s curse will lie; it is upon you that he will bring disquiet.
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[11] So with this in mind come to the victim’s aid, punish his murderer, and cleanse the city. Do this, and you will do three beneficial things; you will reduce the number of deliberate criminals; you will increase that of the godfearing; and you will yourselves be rid of the defilement which rests upon you in the defendant’s name.
The First Tetralogy. Antiphon. ed. Kenneth John Maidment. London. 1941.
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