analysis of (ep)otrunō in its connections with menos and memona

analysis of Enuō in the Iliad in the context of discussing the Mykenaean war goddess found in “Tsountas’ House”

analysis of Apollo’s anger at Diomedes

analysis of the etymology of Neleus and how it was understood in Homer, connection with nēleēs and the underworld, and in this context also Pylos as equated with the “gates” of Hades

analysis of the nostoi and that of Diomedes’ in particular, with reference to his wife’s Aigialeia’s being called periphrōn, characteristic epithet of Penelope

analysis of Apollo’s anger at Diomedes

analysis of Apollo’s anger at Diomedes

analysis of Apollo’s anger at Diomedes

analysis of the meaning of Hector’s name (from ekhō) and how it is evoked in the Iliad (as here)

analysis of (ep)otrunō in its connections with menō

example of laos as referring to one’s own in contexts where there is a contrast between “leader(s)” and those who “follow”

The momentum of the war is spirited, and the fighting mood of the warriors verges on overreaching. An outstanding example is Diomedes, who already owns a glorious past as a conquering hero in the epic tradition known as the Sons of the Seven against Thebes or Epigonoi. Now in the epic present of the Iliad he has a chance to outdo himself, performing deeds so glorious that they would outshine perhaps even the deeds of Achilles, who is now out of the picture. The successes of Diomedes reach the point where he is capable of feats that are superhuman, as when he lifts a rock that even two humans today could not budge—or as when he wounds the god of war himself, Ares, and then, shortly thereafter, the goddess of love and sexuality, Aphrodite. But such momentum is not to last, and the antagonism of Diomedes toward divinities will have its consequences.

“Aeneas and Diomedes.” Wenceslaus Hollar (Bohemian, 1607–1677). Image via Wikimedia Commons.

Here the verb eukhesthai ‘declare’ expresses a hero’s superiority not overall but only in a one given area of heroic endeavor, archery.

This is the first occurrence of the noun hēni-okhos ‘chariot driver’ in the Iliad. Literally, the word means ‘he who holds the reins’.

The genealogy of the Trojan Dardanidai is appropriated here into the genealogy of Athenian kings, and the references to a four-horse chariot team at I.05.271 is an Athenian signature. In the present action, however, at I.05.272–273, the four-horse team is reduced to a two-horse team, which is the canonical number for chariot teams in the Iliad.

lemmatizing: θήλεας ἵππους

In the combination θήλεας ἵππους, the first-declension accusative plural in -as, positioned before a vowel, is scanned here as a short rather than long syllable. The attestation of such a form -ăs reflects not dialectal variation but formulaic simplification: an earlier complementary distribution of prevocalic -ăns (which becomes -ās*) and preconsonantal -ăs is simplified, resulting in occasional instances of prevocalic -ăs*.

At the moment of his death here, the hero’s menos ‘mental power’ is released from his body, and this moment of release is expressed metaphorically by way of the verb luein ‘release’. Just as a horse is released from being harnessed to the chariot that it draws, as at I.05.369, so too the menos is released from the body. On metaphor, see the inventory of Words and Ideas. In the present context, the noun psūkhē ‘spirit’ is used as a synonym of menos.

The epithet Dios thugatēr / thugatēr Dios ‘daughter of Zeus’, applied here to Aphrodite, can signal the beneficence of such goddesses toward privileged heroes like, in this case, Aeneas.

The function of Aphrodite as Dios thugatēr / thugatēr Dios ‘daughter of Zeus’, as at I.03.374, is reinforced here at I.05.370–371 by the designation of this same goddess as the daughter of Diōnē, which is a feminized version of the name Zeus.

The wounding of the god Hādēs here with an arrow shot by Hēraklēs is associated with the place-name Pylos, Pulos, which is figured at I.05.397 here as a ‘gateway’ of the sun as it passes at sunset into the underworld. The name of Pylos as a place that can serve as a setting for ritual can stand for the name of a mythical place that is associated with the given ritual. Such a mythical place is the ‘Gates of the Sun’. By implication, the setting sun passes through the same gates as do the psūkhai ‘spirits’ of the dead who are entering the underworld.

In this context, Paiēōn (from Paiāwōn) is still distinct from rather than identical to Apollo.

Although Diomedes is recognized as aristos Akhaiōn ‘best of the Achaeans’ here at I.05.416, in the present moment of his aristeiā or ‘epic high point’, this hero’s epic momentum is about to peak, and his martial superiority will soon recede. Further, the present verses at I.05.406–415 imply that something sinister will happen to Diomedes after he comes back home from the Trojan War. His wounding of Aphrodite, goddess of sexuality and love, will have its consequences. As we read in the scholia for I.05.412, there is a myth that tells how Aphrodite punished Diomedes: the goddess induced his wife, Aigialeia, to cheat on him back home by taking many lovers.

The adjective thoós ‘running, swift’ is derived from the verb theein ‘run’. The god Ares is traditionally pictured as thoós ‘running, swift’; by implication, he is as swift as a violent wind.

Apollo is engaged here with Diomedes in a deadly form of antagonism between immortal and mortal.

“The Combat of Diomedes” (1776). Jacques-Louis David (French, 1748–1825). Image via Wikimedia Commons.

Diomedes is daimoni īsos ‘equal to a superhuman force [daimōn]’ when this hero dares to attack the god Apollo. Ultimately, he backs off. The use of this expression daimoni īsos ‘equal to a superhuman force [daimōn]’ here at I.05.438, and also again at I.05.459, goes to the core of the central idea of ritualized antagonism between immortal and mortal.

These verses show the fatally serious difficulties encountered in differentiating between mortals and immortals, in the context of similes comparing mortals to immortals by way of words like hoios ‘such as’ and enalinkios ‘looking like’; of special relevance are these two words: īsos ‘equal to’ and atalantos ‘equal to’. The idea of being īsos ‘equal to’ a divinity, as expressed already at I.05.338, is made parallel here at I.05.440–442 with the idea of thinking ‘in ways that are equal’, īsa, to divine ways of thinking, as expressed at I.05.441. These ideas are part of the larger idea, centering on a basic pattern of antagonism between immortal and mortal.

As the god Apollo says at I.05.441–442, the immortals as a ‘grouping’, phūlon, are different from mortals as a ‘grouping’, phūlon. So, he goes on to say, immortals and mortals are not the same. In the Greek, the ‘grouping’ of immortals and mortals is not homoio-, I.05.441. In terms of this negative context, then, the meaning of homoio- can be interpreted to be ‘the same as’. Meanwhile, the meaning of this same word homoio- in non-negative contexts can be interpreted to be ‘similar to’. In non-negative or let us say positive contexts, homoio- exemplifies the making of comparisons in the form of metaphors and similes.

In the case of metaphors, Aristotle himself actually uses the word homoio- in his own definition of metaphor, Poetics 1459a5–8:

πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν

But the greatest use of words is the use of metaphor [tò metaphorikon ‘that which is transferable’]. This is the only thing that cannot be learned from someone else; and it is also a sign [sēmeion] of a-good-quality-that-is-inborn [euphuia], since the making of good metaphors [eu metapherein ‘good transference’] is the same thing as the contemplation [theōreîn] of what is similar [homoion] to what.

What follows is epitomized from MoM 2§§6–7. Now we turn to similes. This term simile is derived from the neuter form of the Latin adjective similis meaning ‘similar’, from which the English word similar is in turn derived. In English, a simile is signaled by expressions such as like or as or similar to. As for Greek, the primary word for signaling a simile is homoio- in the sense of ‘similar to’. But the etymology of homoio- shows that the meaning ‘similar’ derives from a more basic meaning, ‘same as’. From the standpoint of Indo-European linguistics, the Greek adjective homoio- (ὁμοῖο-) derives from homó- (ὁμό-) ‘same as’, which in turn derives from a prototypical form somo-, meaning ‘same as’. The English adjective same is derived from this same prototypical form. Another derivative is the Latin adjective similis, meaning ‘same as’ or ‘similar to’. In the usage of both Latin similis and Greek homoio*- (ὁμοῖο-), the same semantic principle applies: for A2 to be similar to A1, it has to be the same as A1 in some respect, which is X. Further, for A2 to be the same as A1, it has to be one with A1 in respect to X. That is because the Indo-European root som- of somo- ‘same as’ means ‘one’, as we see in such forms as the Latin adverb semel ‘one time’. And the idea of ‘one’ in words like English same has to do with an act of comparing. When we compare things, what is the ‘same as’ something else in some respect becomes ‘one with’ that something in that respect. That is how a word like Latin similis, deriving from the concept of ‘one’, means ‘similar to’ in the sense of ‘one with’. What is similis ‘similar’ to something else in some respect is ‘one with’ that something in that respect. Similarly in the case of the Greek adjective homoio- (ὁμοῖο-), it refers to something that is ‘one with’ and therefore ‘the same as’ something else in some respect. And, as we will see in the comment on O.16.172–212, if something else is not the same, then it is alloio- (ἀλλοῖο-) ‘a different kind’, which is the opposite of homoio- (ὁμοῖο-) or ‘the same kind’. As we will also see in that same comment, the extension -io- (-ιο-) of the two adjectives homoio- (ὁμοῖο-) ‘the same kind’ and alloio- (ἀλλοῖο-) ‘a different kind’ is parallel to the extension -io- (-ιο-) of the adjectives hoio- (oἷο-) ‘what kind’ and toio- (τοῖο-) ‘that kind’.

Here we loop back to what the god Apollo says at I.05.441–442: in a negative sense, immortals cannot be the same as mortals. Still, in a special positive sense, mortals can momentarily become the same as immortals when their identities merge in contexts of ritual. Such a special positive sense applies in situations of ritualized antagonism between immortal and mortal. In such situations, the mortal becomes one with the immortal—and can die as a consequence. That is what almost happens to Diomedes, but then he backs off.

The word phūlon marks a given group as distinct from another group. In this case, the grouping of mortals is marked as distinct from the grouping of immortals as superhumans. Comparable is the word phūlē, which I have translated as ‘subdivision’ in the contexts of I.02.655–656 and I.02.668.

Retrospectively, Apollo in his own words is saying that Diomedes was daimoni īsos ‘equal to a daimōn’ when this hero dared to attack the god. The use of this expression daimoni īsos ‘equal to a daimōn’ here at I.05.459, and also before at I.05.438, goes to the core of the central idea of antagonism between immortal and mortal. Most relevant are the intervening verses at I.05.440–442.

The “speaking name” (nomen loquens) of Hector, Hék-tōr, is morphologically an agent noun derived from the verb ekhein ‘hold’, which can have the specialized sense of ‘uphold’ or ‘protect’ or ‘guard’, as in the present context. The expected role of Hector is to protect the city of Troy, and the direct object of ekhein ‘uphold, protect, guard’ here at I.05.473 is polis ‘city, citadel’, referring to Troy.

The goddess Demeter is the only divinity in Homeric poetry who is described by the epithet xanthē ‘golden’ (with reference to hair).

analysis of other gods’ interference in the fighting after Ares has withdrawn on Athena’s urging as only to restrain and defend

analysis of Diomedes’ behavior as parallel to Ares’

analysis of divine mēnis at sexual transgressions (regarding amphadiēn as “with the knowledge of Zeus”)

analysis of the interconnections of statements of physical prowess, prestige, and identity, in the context of establishing the contextual unity of eukhesthai einai + superlative/comparative and their relationship to the genos eukhesthai einai contexts [MRBTP: 'ff']

comparison of the verse with eukhomai einai + superlative with a similar construction attested in the Rig-Veda, in the context of analyzing the etymology of eukhesthai

in a list of examples of eukhesthai einai + comparative/superlative (regarding physical prowess, physical beauty, prestige)

analysis of the interconnections of statements of physical prowess, prestige, and identity, in the context of establishing the contextual unity of eukhesthai einai + superlative/comparative and their relationship to the genos eukhesthai einai contexts

analysis of references to divine mēnis against Trojans in the context of an Achaean warrior’s efforts

analysis of recurrent aspects of the mēnis theme, here that group offences incur mēnis

in the list of offenses that (threaten to) incur mēnis

in a list of passages exemplifying the complementary metrical distribution of eukhos and kudos

analysis of the contrast between unmarked phanai and marked eukhesthai in contexts where the latter is associated with asserting superiority [MRBTP: 'ff']

comment on the etiquette of naming conventions, the omission of one’s own name in geneē-speeches vs. mentioning another’s name in such contexts, and stating one’s own name as a sign of special fame (in the context of analyzing genos eukhesthai einai formulas)

in a list of attestations of genos eukhesthai einai and its transformations

comment on the etiquette of naming conventions, the omission of one’s own name in geneē-speeches vs. mentioning another’s name in such contexts, and stating one’s own name as a sign of special fame (in the context of analyzing genos eukhesthai einai formulas)

comment on the etiquette of naming conventions, the omission of one’s own name in geneē-speeches vs. mentioning another’s name in such contexts, and stating one’s own name as a sign of special fame (in the context of analyzing genos eukhesthai einai formulas)

in a list of attestations of genos eukhesthai einai and its transformations

analysis of the divergent attestations of eukhesthai in the context of genos specification, namely, Aeneas’ specification of both of his parents, with eukhesthai ekgegamen instead of genos eukhesthai einai

in a list of passages exemplifying the complementary metrical distribution of eukhos and kudos

analysis of other gods’ interference in the fighting after Ares has withdrawn on Athena’s urging as only to restrain and defend

analysis of philotēs and timē going together with this passage as an example

analysis of Athena’s interruption to get Ares to withdraw from the fighting to avoid Zeus’ mēnis (emphasis on his inactivity)

example in analysis of the language of binding as metaphoric for the “killing” of an immortal [MRBTP: 'ff']

analysis of the etymology of Neleus and how it was understood in Homer, connection with nēleēs and the underworld, and in this context also Pylos as equated with the “gates” of Hades

analysis of the development of Greek posis compared with Vedic pati-

analysis of the Diomedes-Ares identification/antagonism [MRBTP: 'ff']

analysis of the Diomedes-Ares identification/antagonism and Diomedes’ shunning Apollo’s mēnis

comment on tutthon as a distance retreated by Diomedes and its relation to his respect for the boundary the transgression of which would incur mēnis (in contrast to Patroklos)

in the list of offenses that (threaten to) incur mēnis

analysis of Apollo’s call to Ares to return to fighting as referring to and contravening Athena’s earlier request that he refrain, and beginning with the same line as Athena’s request

analysis of miaiphonos as an epithet of Ares and as applied to Patroklos

analysis of teichesiplēta as an epithet of and metaphor for Ares’ tendency to reach the limits of behavior (and application to Patroklos)

analysis of the Diomedes-Ares identification/antagonism and variant theme of mēnis

analysis of the Diomedes-Ares identification/antagonism and thematic linkage between the mēnis of Apollo against Diomedes and that of Zeus against Ares

analysis of the Diomedes-Ares identification/antagonism and thematic linkage between the mēnis of Apollo against Diomedes and that of Zeus against Ares

Sarpedon's rebuke of Hektor in Book 5 is later labeled a muthos (5.471 and 5.493). The then/now contrast opens his attack, followed immediately by a reference to Hektor's earlier boasts: "Hektor, where has your strength gone, which you previously used to have? You used to say at some point that you would hold the city alone, without troops and allies, with your brothers and brothers-in-law. I cannot see any of them now or notice any, but they all cower like dogs around a lion" (5.471-76). The speech is noteworthy for its insistent criticism of Hektor's verbal behavior, charging him with failing to give orders (5.485) and advising him to supplicate the allied leaders for help in order to deflect verbal abuse (kraterēn apothesthai enipēn, 5.492). The foil technique recurs when Glaukos later uses Sarpedon's own career as a contrast to Hektor's passivity (17.152). Hektor has not learned (Martin 1993:72-73).

For the broader analysis of the flyting genre, see the comment on Iliad 4.336-421.

References

Martin, R. P. 1993. The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad. Ithaca.