Plutarch, De sollertia animalium, ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, 6

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[6]

ΣΩΚΛ.

. ὀρθῶς μοι δοκεῖς ὑπονοεῖν· οἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ Περιπάτου μάλιστα πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐντείνονται τῷ λόγῳ, τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἑτέραν γένεσιν οὐκ ἐχούσης, ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν 10 964a ἀσυστάτου καὶ ἀνυπάρκτου γιγνομένης, εἰ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις λόγου μέτεστι γίγνεται γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀφειδοῦσιν αὐτῶν, ἢ μὴ χρωμένων αὐτοῖς τὸ ζῆν ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄπορον· καὶ τρόπον τινὰ θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα, τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν θηρίων προέμενοι 15 χρείας. ἀφίημι γὰρ Νομάδων καὶ Τρωγλοδυτῶν ἀνεξευρέτους ἀριθμῷ μυριάδας, οἳ τροφὴν σάρκας ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν ἴσασιν ἀλλʼ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἡμέρως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ζῆν δοκοῦσι ποῖον ἔργον ἀπολείπεται γῆς, ποῖον ἐν θαλάττῃ, τίς ἐν ὄρεσι 20 964b τέχνη, τίς κόσμος διαίτης, ἂν, ὡς προσήκει, λογικοῖς καὶ ὁμοφύλοις πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις οὖσιν ἀβλαβῶς καὶ μετʼ εὐλαβείας προσφέρεσθαι μάθωμεν, ἔργον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν. οὐδὲν οὖν φάρμακον οὐδʼ ἴαμα ἢ τὸν βίον ἀναιρούσης ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀπορίας 25 ἔχομεν, ἂν μὴ τὸν ἀρχαῖον ὅρον καὶ νόμον φυλάττωμεν, ᾧ καθʼ Ἡσίοδον ὁ τὰς φύσεις διελὼν καὶ θέμενος ἰδίᾳ τῶν γενῶν ἑκάτερον

ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς

ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἔστι μετʼ αὐτοῖς, 5

ἀνθρώποισι δʼ ἔδωκε δίκην

πρὸς ἀλλήλους. οἷς δʼ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς·, οὐδʼ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα γίγνεται τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὡς οἵ γε τοῦτον προέμενοι τὸν λόγον 964c οὔτʼ εὐρεῖαν ἄλλην οὔτε λιτὴν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ παρεισελθεῖν 10 ὁδὸν ἀπολελοίπασι.

De sollertia animalium. Plutarch. ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs. Leipzig. 1895.

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Current edition Perseus

Πότερα τῶν ζῴων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα (Greek) (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol. VI. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1895.)

Translations (2)

Whether land or sea animals are cleverer Perseus (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. XII. Cherniss, Harold, and Helmbold, William C., translators. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1957 (printing).) — 6 focus

[6]

SOCLARUS.

Your inference seems quite justified. For the Stoics¹ and Peripatetics strenuously argue on the other side, to the effect that justice could not then come into existence, but would remain completely without form or substance, if all the beasts partake of reason. For² either we are necessarily unjust if we do not spare them; or, if we do not take them for food, life becomes impracticable or impossible; in a sense we shall be living the life of beasts once we give up the use of beasts.³ I omit the numberless hosts of Nomads and Troglodytes who know no other food but flesh. As for us who believe our lives to be civilized and humane, it is hard to say what pursuit on land or sea, what aerial art,⁴ what refinement of living, is left to us if we are to learn to deal innocently and considerately with all creatures, as we are bound to if they possess reason and are of one stock with us. So we have no help or cure for this dilemma which either deprives us of life itself or of justice, unless we do preserve that ancient limitation and law by which, according to Hesiod,⁵ he who distinguished the natural kinds and gave each class its special domain:

To fish and beasts and winged birds allowed

Licence to eat each other, for no right

Exists among them; right, he gave to men

for dealing with each other. Those who know nothing of right action toward us can receive no wrong from us either.⁶ For those who have rejected this argument have left no path, either broad or narrow, by which justice may slip in.

Which are the most crafty, water-animals or those creatures that breed upon the land? Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. V. Goodwin, William W., editor; Philips, John, translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1874.) — 6 focus

[6]

SOCLARUS.

You seem to me to be very much in the right, for the Stoics and Peripatetics are led to affirm the contrary upon this supposition, that justice could have no certain original, but would be altogether incomprehensible and inexistent if all brute creatures should partake of reason. For either of necessity we must do a very great piece of injustice when we devour and feed upon them; or if we forbear the use of them, it will be impossible for us to live, or rather we shall in some measure live the lives of beasts, rejecting the use of brute creatures. I pass by those innumerable myriads of nomades and Troglodytes that know no other food but flesh. But as for us that seem to live lovingly and in friendship together, what necessity would there be of laboring on the earth, toiling upon the sea, or mining in the mountains, what ornament would there be in our life, if it were so that we must be bound to live, as it would then become us, not only without injury but rather with all civility and humanity toward all the sorts of beasts, as being our fellow rational creatures? We have no cure, no remedy for an unquestionable necessity that deprives us either of life or justice, unless we observe that ancient bound and dispensation which, according to Hesiod, distinguishing natures and separating every kind by themselves, commands

The fish, wild beasts, and all the winged fowl,

To prey upon their kinds without control,

For among them no law nor justice reigns;

Only by justice man from man abstains.

And therefore, as brutes can extend no act of justice to us, so neither can we commit any act of injustice against them. Which argument they who reject have left us no benefit of life, nor any the smallest entrance for justice into the world.

Plutarch De sollertia animalium 6

ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs

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