Plutarch, De sollertia animalium, Harold Cherniss (Translator), William C. Helmbold (Translator), 4

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[4]

SOCLARUS.

Well, Autobulus, you may count me also as one who believes your statements; yet on comparing the ways of beasts with human customs and lives, with human actions and manner of living, I find not only many other defects in animals, but this especially: they do not explicitly aim at virtue,¹ for which purpose reason itself exists; nor do they make any progress in virtue or have any bent for it; so that I fail to see how Nature can have given them even elementary reason, seeing that they cannot achieve its end.

AUTOBULUS.

But neither does this, Soclarus, seem absurd to those very opponents of ours; for while they postulate that love of one’s offspring² is the very foundation of our social life and administration of justice, and observe that animals possess such love in a very marked degree, yet they assert and hold that animals have no part in justice. Now mules³ are not deficient in organs; they have, in fact, genitals and wombs and are able to use them with pleasure, yet cannot attain the end of generation. Consider another approach: is it not ridiculous to keep affirming that men like Socrates and Plato⁴ are involved in vice no less vicious than that of any slave you please, that they are just as foolish and intemperate and unjust, and at the same time to stigmatize the alloyed and imprecise virtue of animals as absence of reason rather than as its imperfection or weakness ? And this, though they acknowledge that vice is a fault of reason and that all animals are infected with vice: many, in fact, we observe to be guilty of cowardice and intemperance, injustice and malice. He, then, who holds that what is not fitted by nature to receive the perfection of reason does not even receive any reason at all is, in the first place, no better than one who asserts that apes are not naturally ugly or tortoises naturally slow for the reason that they are not capable of possessing beauty or speed. In the second place, he fails to observe the distinction which is right before his eyes: mere reason is implanted by nature, but real and perfect reason⁵ is the product of care and education. And this is why every living creature has the faculty of reasoning; but if what they seek is true reason and wisdom, not even man may be said to possess it.⁶ For as one capacity for seeing or flying differs from another (hawks and cicadas do not see alike, nor do eagles and partridges fly alike), so also not every reasoning creature has in the same way a mental dexterity or acumen that has attained perfection. For just as there are many examples in animals of social instincts and bravery and ingenuity in ways and means and in domestic arrangements, so, on the other hand, there are many examples of the opposite: injustice, cowardliness, stupidity.⁷ And the very factor which brought about our young men’s contest to-day provides confirmation. It is on an assumption of difference that the two sides assert, one that land animals, the other that sea animals, are naturally more advanced toward virtue. This is clear also if you contrast hippopotamuses⁸ with storks⁹: the latter support their fathers, while the former kill them¹⁰ in order to consort with their mothers. The same is true if you compare doves¹¹ with partridges¹²; for the partridge cock steals the eggs and destroys them since the female will not consort with him while she is sitting, whereas male doves assume a part in the care of the nest, taking turns at keeping the eggs warm and being themselves the first to feed the fledglings; and if the female happens to be away for too long a time, the male strikes her with his beak and drives her back to her eggs or squabs. And while Antipater¹³ was reproaching asses and sheep for their neglect of cleanliness, I don’t know how he happened to overlook lynxes and swallows¹⁴; for lynxes dispose of their excrement by concealing and doing away with it, while swallows teach their nestlings to turn tail and void themselves outward.

AUTOBULUS.

Why, moreover, do we not say that one tree is less intelligent than another, as a sheep is by comparison with a dog; or one vegetable more cowardly than another, as a stag is by comparison with a lion ? Is the reason not that, just as it is impossible to call one immovable object slower than another, or one dumb thing more mute than another, so among all the creatures to whom Nature has not given the faculty of understanding, we cannot say that one is more cowardly or more slothful or more intemperate ? Whereas it, is the presence of understanding, of one kind in one animal, of another kind in another, and in varying degree, that has produced the observable differences.

De sollertia animalium. Plutarch. Harold Cherniss (Translator), William C. Helmbold (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1957.

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Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

Whether land or sea animals are cleverer (English) (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. XII. Cherniss, Harold, and Helmbold, William C., translators. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1957 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πότερα τῶν ζῴων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol. VI. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1895.) — 4 focus

[4]

ΣΩΚΛ.

. κἀμὲ τοίνυν, ὦ Αὐτόβουλε, ταῦτὰ γε τίθει πειθόμενον τῷ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις ἤθεσι 962a καὶ βίοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ διαίταις τὰ τῶν ζῴων παρατιθέναι ἄλλην τε πολλὴν ἐνορῶν φλαυρότητα καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς 1, πρὸς ἣν ὁ λόγος γέγονε, μηδένα ἐμφανῆ στοχασμὸν αὐτῶν μηδὲ προκοπὴν μηδʼ ὄρεξιν, ἀπορῶ πῶς ἡ φύσις ἔδωκε τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς, ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἐξικέσθαι μὴ δυναμένοις. 5

ΑΥΤ.

Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδʼ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις, ὦ Σώκλαρε, τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἄτοπον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὴν γοῦν πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργίαν ἀρχὴν μὲν ἡμῖν κοινωνίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης τιθέμενοι, πολλὴν δὲ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ ἰσχυρὰν ὁρῶντες παροῦσαν, οὔ φασιν 10 962b αὐτοῖς οὐδʼ ἀξιοῦσι μετεῖναι δικαιοσύνης. ἡμιόνοις δὲ τῶν γεννητικῶν μορίων οὐδὲν ἐνδεῖ· καὶ γὰρ αἰδοῖα καὶ μήτρας καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι μεθʼ ἡδονῆς τούτοις ἔχουσαι πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ ἐξικνοῦνται τῆς γενέσεως. σκόπει δʼ ἄλλως, μὴ καὶ καταγέλαστόν ἐστι 15 τοὺς Σωκράτας καὶ τοὺς Πλάτωνας οὐδὲν ἐλαφροτέρᾳ κακίᾳ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδραπόδου συνεῖναι φάσκειν, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως ἄφρονας εἶναι καὶ ἀκολάστους καὶ ἀδίκους, εἶτα τῶν θηρίων αἰτιᾶσθαι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν μηδʼ ἀπηκριβωμένον πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὡς 20 στέρησιν οὐχὶ φαυλότητα λόγου καὶ ἀσθένειαν, καὶ ταῦτα τὴν κακίαν ὁμολογοῦντας εἶναι λογικήν, 962c ἧς πᾶν θηρίον ἀναπέπλησται καὶ γὰρ δειλίαν πολλοῖς καὶ ἀκολασίαν ἀδικίαν τε καὶ κακόνοιαν ὁρῶμεν ἐνυπάρχουσαν. ὁ δʼ ἀξιῶν τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς ὀρθότητα 25 λόγου δέχεσθαι μηδὲ λόγον δέχεσθαι φύσει πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ μήτε πίθηκον αἴσχους φύσει μετέχειν μήτε χελώνην βραδυτῆτος ἀξιοῦντος, ὅτι μηδὲ κάλλους ἐπιδεκτικὰ μηδὲ τάχους ἐστίν· ἔπειτα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐμποδὼν οὖσαν οὐ 5 συνορᾷ· λόγος μὲν γὰρ ἐγγίγνεται φύσει, σπουδαῖος δὲ λόγος καὶ τέλειος ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ διδασκαλίας 962d διὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐμψύχοις μέτεστιν. ἣν δὲ ζητοῦσιν ὀρθότητα καὶ σοφίαν οὐδʼ ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν κεκτημένον ἔχουσιν. ὡς γὰρ ὄψεώς ἐστι 10 πρὸς ὄψιν διαφορὰ καὶ πτήσεως πρὸς πτῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἱέρακες βλέπουσι καὶ τέττιγες οὐδʼ ἀετοὶ πέτονται καὶ πέρδικες· οὕτως οὐδὲ παντὶ λογικῷ μέτεστιν ὡσαύτως τῆς εὑρομένης τὸ ἄκρον εὐστροφίας καὶ ὀξύτητος· ἐπεὶ δείγματά γε πολλὰ 15 κοινωνίας καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τοῦ πανούργου περὶ τοὺς πορισμοὺς καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀδικίας δειλίας ἀβελτερίας, ἔνεστιν 962e αὐτοῖς. καὶ μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νυνὶ πεποιηκὸς ἐν τοῖς νεανίσκοις τὴν ἅμιλλαν· ὡς γὰρ οὔσης τινὸς διαφορᾶς, 20 οἱ μὲν τὰ χερσαῖά φασιν οἱ δὲ τὰ θαλάσσια μᾶλλον προῆχθαι φύσει πρὸς ἀρετήν· ὃ δὴ καὶ δῆλόν ἐστι, παραβαλλομένων πελαργοῖς ἵππων ποταμίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τρέφουσι τοὺς πατέρας οἱ δʼ ἀποκτιννύουσιν ἵνα τὰς μητέρας ὀχεύωσι καὶ περιστεραῖς 25 περδίκων οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφανίζουσι τὰ ᾠὰ καὶ διαφθείρουσι, τῆς θηλείας, ὅταν ἐπῳάζῃ, μὴ προσδεχομένης τὴν ὀχείαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διαδέχονται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ἐν μέρει θάλποντες τὰ ᾠά καὶ ψωμίζουσι 962f πρότεροι τὰ νεόττια, καὶ τὴν θήλειαν, ἐὰν πλείονα χρόνον ἀποπλανηθῇ, κόπτων ὁ ἄρρην εἰσελαύνει πρὸς 5 τὰ ᾠὰ καὶ τοὺς νεοττούς. ὄνοις δὲ καὶ προβάτοις Ἀντίπατρος ἐγκαλῶν ὀλιγωρίαν καθαριότητος οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως παρεῖδε τὰς λύγκας καὶ τὰς χελιδόνας, ὧν αἱ μὲν ἐκτοπίζουσι παντάπασι κρύπτουσαι καὶ ἀφανίζουσαι τὸ λυγκούριον, αἱ δὲ χελιδόνες ἔξω 10 στρεφομένους διδάσκουσι τοὺς νεοττοὺς; ἀφιέναι τὸ περίττωμα. καίτοι διὰ τί δένδρου δένδρον οὐ λέγομεν ἀμαθέστερον, ὡς κυνὸς πρόβατον οὐδὲ λαχάνου λάχανον ἀνανδρότερον, ὡς ἔλαφον λέοντος; 963a ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἕτερον ἑτέρου βραδύτερον 15 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ μικροφωνότερον ἐν τοῖς ἀναύδοις, οὕτως οὐδὲ δειλότερον οὐδὲ νωθρότερον οὐδʼ ἀκρατέστερον, οἷς μὴ φύσει πᾶσιν ἡ τοῦ 1 φρονεῖν δύναμις, ἄλλοις δʼ ἄλλως κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον παροῦσα τὰς ὁρωμένας διαφορὰς πεποίηκεν; 20

Translations (1)

Which are the most crafty, water-animals or those creatures that breed upon the land? Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. V. Goodwin, William W., editor; Philips, John, translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1874.) — 4 focus

[4]

SOCLARUS.

Well then, Autobulus, suppose me to be one of those that affirm these things. For it is great folly for men to compare the actions of beasts with the customs, actions, and manner of living men, and above all, to deny that beasts have the least inclination or aim at any progress towards virtue, to which we bent our discourse. Indeed, I doubt whether Nature gave them a beginning or no, since they are so incapable to attain the end.

AUTOBULUS.

Why truly, Soclarus, this is not a thing that seems so absurd to those men. For that while they assert the extreme love of parents towards their children to be the principle of society and justice, and find at the same time this virtue apparent and surpassing in brute animals, yet they will not allow them in the least to partake of justice; like mules, which, though they are furnished with genital parts, as wanting neither privities nor wombs, and mixing with delight and pleasure, yet cannot attain the end of generation. But then again I would have you consider, whether they be not ridiculous, that affirm Socrates or Plato to be no less vicious than the meanest of slaves,— nay more, that they were fools, intemperate, and unjust,— and then find fault with the nature of beasts, as being impure and no way accurately framed for the reception of virtue; as if this were proof of utter want of reason, and not of depravedness and imbecility of reason. And all the while, they acknowledge that there are vices of reason, of which all brute beasts are guilty; many of which we plainly find to be intemperate, fearful, malicious, and unjust. Therefore he that denies that reason exists by Nature in a creature, because it is not framed by Nature to attain to the perfection of reason, little differs from one that should deny a monkey to partake of deformity by Nature, or a tortoise of slowness, as being neither susceptible of beauty or swiftness. Nor do they observe the distinction that lies before their eyes. For reason is in the creature by Nature, but right and perfect reason is attained by industry and education; so that naturally all creatures may be said to be rational. But if they look for perfection of reason and true wisdom, they will hardly find those perfections in any man whatever. For as there is a difference between sight and sight, and between flight and flight, —for hawks and grasshoppers do not see alike, neither do eagles and partridges fly with equal swiftness,—so neither in all rational creatures is there to be found the same perfection of cunning and acuteness. For as there are many examples to be produced of several brute creatures, excelling in the observance of society; fortitude, and foresight as to their particular economy and making provision for themselves; so on the other side, there may be found among them as many of injustice, cowardice, and folly. Which is evident from the present contest wherein these young gentlemen have engaged themselves, while the one has undertaken to maintain that land-animals, the other that creatures bred in the sea, are most inclined to virtue. Which is plainly demonstrated by comparing river-horses with storks. For the one support and cherish their fathers, the others kill them that they may enjoy their dams. So likewise, if you compare doves with partridges. For the cock partridge will not suffer the hen to sit, but breaks her eggs and throws them out of the nest if she refuses to be trod. But the cock pigeon takes upon him part of the female’s duty, in brooding over the eggs and feeding the young ones; and if the hen happens to be too long absent, he corrects her with his bill, till he forces her to return to her nest. So that, while Antipater found fault with sheep and asses for their nastiness, I wonder how he came to pass by lynxes and swallows, of which the one are so cleanly that they always remove and hide their excrements, the others teach their young ones to turn their tails out of their nest, before they let fall their defilement. And indeed, why may we not say that one tree is more docible than another, as dogs are more docible than sheep; or one pot-herb more timorous than another, as harts are more fearful than lions? Or otherwise, as among things immovable, there is not one thing slower in motion than another; nor among things that are mute, one thing more vocal than another; so neither, among things to which Nature has not afforded a faculty of understanding, is there one thing more timorous, more slothful, or more intemperate than another. But as to those creatures where that faculty is present, the difference is manifest in the degrees of more or less.

Notes on the current edition

Whether land or sea animals are cleverer

1. On animals possessing aretê see Aelian’s preface to the first book of De Natura Animal.; cf. also Mor. 986 f infra; al.

2. See Mor. 495 c and the whole fragment, De Amore Prolis (493 a - 497 e).

3. Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione Animal. ii, 7 (746 b 15 ff.), ii. 8 (747 a 23 ff.); for Aristotle’s criticism of Empedocles’ theory see H. Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of the Presocratics, p. 143, n. 573. Pliny, Nat. Hist. viii. 173, mentions some cases of the fertility of mules, see also Cicero, De Divinatione, i. 36; ii. 49; Herodotus, iii. 151 ff.

4. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus, iv. 21.

5. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii. 54.

6. Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, ii. 13. 34.

7. Cf. 992 d infra.

8. Cf. Herodotus, ii. 71; Aristotle, Historia Animal. ii. 7 (502 a 9-15), though the latter passage may be interpolated. Porphyry reads contrast river-horses with land-horses.

9. Cf. Aristotle, op. cit. ix. 13 (615 b 23 ff.); Aelian, De Natura Animal. iii. 23; Philo, 61 (p. 129).

10. And eat them: Aelian, De Natura Animal. vii. 19.

11. Cf. Aristotle, Historia Animal. vi. 4 (562 b 17); Aelian, De Natura Animal. iii. 45.

12. Cf. Aristotle, Historia Animal. ix. 8 (613 b 27 ff.); Aelian, De Natura Animal. iii. 16, and Cf. iv. 1. 16; of peacocks in Pliny, Nat. Hist. x. 161.

13. Von Arnim, S.V.F. iii, p. 251, Antipater of Tarsus, frag. 47. We know from Plutarch’s Aetia Physica, 38 that Antipater wrote a book on animals. On the other hand, Dyroff ( Blätter f. d. bay. Gymn. xxiii, 1897, p. 403) argued for Antipater of Tyre; he believed, in fact, that the present work was mainly directed against this Antipater. Schuster, op. cit. p. 77, has shown this to be unlikely.

14. Cf. Aristotle, Historia Animal. ix. 7 (612 b 30 f.); Plutarch, Mor. 727 d-e; Pliny, Nat. Hist. x. 92; Philo, 22 (p. 111).

Plutarch De sollertia animalium 4

Harold Cherniss (Translator), William C. Helmbold (Translator)

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SOCLARUS.

AUTOBULUS.

AUTOBULUS.

Current edition Perseus

ΣΩΚΛ.

ΑΥΤ.

SOCLARUS.

AUTOBULUS.

Notes on the current edition

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