Plutarch, De sollertia animalium, Harold Cherniss (Translator), William C. Helmbold (Translator), 3

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[3]

AUTOBULUS.

¹ But who ever, my dear Soclarus, maintained that, while rationality exists in the universe, there is nothing irrational ? For there is a plentiful abundance of the irrational in all things that are not endowed with a soul; we need no other sort of counterpart for the rational: everything that is soulless, since it has no reason or intelligence, is by definition in opposition to that which, together with a soul, possesses also reason and understanding. Yet suppose someone were to maintain that nature must not be left maimed, but that that part of nature which, is endowed with a soul should have its irrational as well as its rational aspect, someone else is bound to maintain that nature endowed with a soul must have both an imaginative and an unimaginative part, and both a sentient part and an insentient. They want nature, they say, to have these counteractive and contraposed positives and negatives of the same kind counterbalanced, as it were. But if it is ridiculous to require an antithesis of sentient and insentient within the class of living things, or an antithesis of imaginative and unimaginative, seeing that it is the nature of every creature with a soul to be sentient and imaginative from the hour of its birth, so he, also, is unreasonable who demands a division of the living into a rational and an irrational part - and that, too, when he is arguing with men who believe that nothing is endowed with sensation which does not also partake of intelligence and that there is no living thing which does not naturally possess both opinion and reason, just as it has sensation and appetite. For nature, which, they² rightly say, does everything with some purpose and to some end, did not create the sentient creature merely to be sentient when something happens to it. No, for there are in the world many things friendly to it, many also hostile; and it could not survive for a moment if it had not learned to give the one sort a wide berth while freely mixing with the other. It is, to be sure, sensation that enables each creature to recognize both kinds; but the acts of seizing or pursuing that ensue upon the perception of what is beneficial, as well as the eluding or fleeing of what is destructive or painful, could by no means occur in creatures naturally incapable of some sort of reasoning and judging, remembering and attending. Those beings, then, which you deprive of all expectation, memory, design, or preparation, and of all hopes, fears, desires, or griefs - they will have no use for eyes or ears either, even though they have them. Indeed, it would be better to be rid of all sensation and imagination that has nothing to make use of it, rather than to know toil and distress and pain while not possessing any means of averting them.

There is, in fact, a work of Strato,³ the natural philosopher, which proves that it is impossible to have sensation at all without some action of the intelligence. Often, it is true, while we are busy reading, the letters may fall on our eyes, or words may fall on our ears, which escape our attention since our minds are intent on other things; but later the mind recovers, shifts its course, and follows up every detail that had been neglected; and this is the meaning of the saying⁴:

Mind has sight and Mind has hearing;

Everything else is deaf and blind,

indicating that the impact on eyes and ears brings no perception if the understanding is not present. For this reason also King Cleomenes, when a recital made at a banquet was applauded and he was asked if it did not seem excellent, replied that the others must judge, for his mind was in the Peloponnesus. So that, if we are so constituted that to have sensation we must have understanding, then it must follow that all creatures which have sensation can also understand.

AUTOBULUS.

But let us grant that sensation needs no help of intelligence to perform its own function; nevertheless, when the perception that has caused an animal to distinguish between what is friendly and what is hostile is gone, what is it that from this time on remembers the distinction, fears the painful, and wants the beneficial ? And, if what it wants is not there, what is there in animals that devises means of acquiring it and providing lairs and hiding-places - both traps for prey and places of refuge from attackers ? And yet those very authors⁵ rasp our ears by repeatedly defining in their Introductions⁶ purpose as an indication of intent to complete, design as an impulse before an impulse, preparation as an act before an act, and memory as an apprehension of a proposition in the past tense of which the present tense has been apprehended by perception.⁷ For there is not one of these terms that does not belong to logic; and the acts are all present in all animals as, of course, are cognitions which, while inactive, they call notions, but when they are once put into action, concepts. And though they admit that emotions one and all are false judgements and seeming truths,⁸ it is extraordinary that they obviously fail to note many things that animals do and many of their movements that show anger or fear or, so help me, envy or jealousy. They themselves punish dogs and horses that make mistakes, not idly but to discipline them; they are creating in them through pain a feeling of sorrow, which we call repentance.

Now pleasure that is received through the ears is a means of enchantment, while that which comes through the eyes is a kind of magic: they use both kinds against animals. For deer and horses⁹ are bewitched by pipes and flutes, and crabs¹⁰ are involuntarily lured from their holes by lotus pipes e; it is also reported that shad will rise to the surface and approach when there is singing and clapping.¹¹ The horned owl,¹² again, can be caught by the magic of movement, as he strives to twist his shoulders in delighted rhythm to the movements of men dancing before him.

As for those who foolishly affirm that animals do not feel pleasure or anger or fear or make preparations or remember, but that the bee as it were¹³ remembers and the swallow as it were prepares her nest and the lion as it were grows angry and the deer as it were is frightened-I don’t know what they will do about those who say that beasts do not see or hear, but as it were hear and see; that they have no cry but as it were; nor do they live at all but as it were. For these last statements (or so I believe) are no more contrary to plain evidence than those that they have made.

De sollertia animalium. Plutarch. Harold Cherniss (Translator), William C. Helmbold (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1957.

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Current edition Perseus

Whether land or sea animals are cleverer (English) (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. XII. Cherniss, Harold, and Helmbold, William C., translators. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1957 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πότερα τῶν ζῴων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol. VI. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1895.) — 3 focus

[3]

ΑΥΤ.

Τίς δέ, ὦ φίλε Σώκλαρε, τοῦτʼ ἠξίωσεν, ὄντος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τοῦ λογικοῦ, μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἄλογον; πολὺ γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἄφθονον ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ψυχῆς ἀμοιροῦσι καὶ οὐδὲν ἑτέρας δεόμεθα πρὸς τὸ λογικὸν ἀντιθέσεως ἀλλὰ πᾶν εὐθὺς τὸ 25 ἄψυχον ὡς ἄλογον καὶ ἀνόητον ἀντίκειται τῷ μετὰ ψυχῆς λόγον ἔχοντι καὶ διάνοιαν. εἰ δέ τις ἀξιοῖ 960d μὴ κολοβὸν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔμψυχον φύσιν ἔχειν τὸ μὲν λογικὸν τὸ δʼ ἄλογον, ἕτερος ἀξιώσει τὴν ἔμψυχον φύσιν ἔχειν τὸ μὲν φανταστικὸν τὸ δʼ ἀφαντασίωτον, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν τὸ δʼ ἀναίσθητον ἵνα δὴ τὰς ἀντιζύγους ταύτας καὶ 5 ἀντιθέτους ἕξεις καὶ στερήσεις περὶ ταὐτὸν ἡ φύσις ἔχῃ γένος οἷον ἰσορροπούσας. εἰ δʼ ἄτοπος ὁ ζητῶν τοῦ ἐμψύχου τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν τὸ δʼ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν φαντασιούμενον τὸ δʼ ἀφαντασίωτον, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικὸν εὐθὺς εἶναι 10 καὶ φανταστικὸν πέφυκεν οὐδʼ οὗτος ἐπιεικῶς ἀπαιτήσει τὸ μὲν λογικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐμψύχου τὸ δʼ ἄλογον, πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διαλεγόμενος μηδὲ ἓν οἰομένους αἰσθήσεως μετέχειν ὃ μὴ καὶ συνέσεως, 960e μηδʼ εἶναι ζῷον μὴ δόξα τις καὶ λογισμὸς ὥσπερ 15 αἴσθησις καὶ ὁρμὴ κατὰ φύσιν πάρεστιν. ἡ γὰρ φύσις, ἣν ἕνεκά του καὶ πρός τι πάντα ποιεῖν ὀρθῶς, λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψιλῷ τῷ πάσχον τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικὸν ἐποίησεν· ἀλλʼ ὄντων μὲν οἰκείων πρὸς αὐτὸ πολλῶν ὄντων δʼ ἀλλοτρίων, 20 οὐδʼ ἀκαρὲς ἦν περιεῖναι μὴ μαθόντι τὰ μὲν φυλάττεσθαι τοῖς δὲ συμφέρεσθαι. τὴν μὲν οὖν γνῶσιν 960f ἀμφοῖν ὁμοίως ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστῳ παρέχει τὰς δʼ ἑπομένας τῇ αἰσθήσει τῶν μὲν ὠφελίμων λήψεις καὶ διώξεις, διακρούσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς τῶν ὀλεθρίων 25 καὶ λυπηρῶν, οὐδεμία μηχανὴ παρεῖναι τοῖς μὴ λογίζεσθαί τι καὶ κρίνειν καὶ μνημονεύειν καὶ προσέχειν πεφυκόσιν ἀλλʼ ὧν ἂν ἀφέλῃς παντάπασι προσδοκίαν μνήμην πρόθεσιν παρασκευὴν τὸ ἐλπίζειν τὸ δεδοικέναι τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν τὸ ἀσχάλλειν, οὔτʼ 5 ὀμμάτων ὄφελος οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς παρόντων οὔτʼ ὤτων· αἰσθήσεώς τε πάσης καὶ φαντασίας τὸ χρώμενον οὐκ ἐχούσης ἀπηλλάχθαι βέλτιον ἢ πονεῖν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι 961a καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ᾧ διακρούσεται ταῦτα μὴ παρόντος. καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, 10 ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἶτʼ αὖθις ἐπανῆλθε καὶ 15 μεταθεῖ καὶ διώκει τῶν προϊεμένων ἕκαστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ᾗ καὶ λέλεκται

νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ καὶ ἀκούει, τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά·

ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ 961b παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος. διὸ καὶ 20 Κλεομένης ὁ βασιλεύς, παρὰ πότον εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἀκροάματος, ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ μὴ φαίνεται σπουδαῖον, ἐκέλευσεν ἐκείνους σκοπεῖν, αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχειν. ὅθεν ἀνάγκη πᾶσιν, οἷς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ τῷ νοεῖν αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφύκαμεν. ἔστω δὲ μὴ δεῖσθαι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρὸς τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἀλλʼ ὅταν γε τῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τάλλότριον ἡ αἴσθησις ἐνεργασαμένη διαφορὰν ἀπέλθῃ, τί τὸ 5 μνημονεῦόν ἐστιν ἢδη καὶ δεδιὸς τὰ λυποῦντα καὶ ποθοῦν τὰ ὠφέλιμα καί, μὴ παρόντων, ὅπως παρέσται 961c μηχανώμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ παρασκευαζόμενον ὁρμητήρια καὶ καταφυγὰς καὶ θήρατρα πάλιν αὖ τοῖς ἁλωσομένοις καὶ ἀποδράσεις τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων; 10 καὶ ταυτί γε κἀκεῖνοι λέγοντες ἀποκναίουσιν, ἐν ταῖς εἰσαγωγαῖς ἑκάστοτε τὴν πρόθεσιν ὁριζόμενοι σημείωσιν ἐπιτελειώσεως, τὴν δʼ ἐπιβολὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸ ὁρμῆς, παρασκευὴν δὲ πρᾶξιν πρὸ πράξεως, μνήμην δὲ κατάληψιν ἀξιώματος παρεληλυθότος, 15 οὗ τὸ παρὸν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως κατελήφθη. τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ λογικόν ἐστι, καὶ πάντα τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὰ περὶ 961d τὰς νοήσεις, ἃς ἐναποκειμένας μὲν ἐννοίας καλοῦσι κινουμένας δὲ διανοήσεις. τὰ δὲ πάθη σύμπαντα 20 κοινῶς κρίσεις φαύλας καὶ δόξας ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν ὅτι δὴ παρορῶσιν ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἔργα καὶ κινήματα πολλὰ μὲν θυμῶν πολλὰ δὲ φόβων καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία φθόνων καὶ ζηλοτυπιῶν αὐτοὶ δὲ καὶ κύνας ἁμαρτάνοντας καὶ ἵππους κολάζουσιν, οὐ 25 διὰ κενῆς ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ σωφρονισμῷ, λύπην διʼ ἀλγηδόνος ἐμποιοῦντες αὐτοῖς, ἣν μετάνοιαν ὀνομάζομεν. ἡδονῆς δὲ τῆ μὲν διʼ ὤτων ὄνομα κήλησίς ἐστι τῇ δὲ διʼ ὀμμάτων γοητεία· χρῶνται δʼ ἑκατέροις ἐπὶ τὰ 961e θηρία. κηλοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἔλαφοι καὶ ἵπποι σύριγξι καὶ αὐλοῖς καὶ τοὺς παγούρους ἐκ τῶν χηραμῶν 5 ἀνακαλοῦνται βιαζόμενοι ταῖς φώτιγξι, καὶ τὴν θρίσσαν ᾀδόντων καὶ κροτούντων ἀναδύεσθαι καὶ προϊέναι λέγουσιν. ὁ δʼ ὦτος αὖ πάλιν ἁλίσκεται γοητευόμενος, ὀρχουμένων ἐν ὄψει μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἅμα ῥυθμῷ γλιχόμενος τοὺς ὤμους εὖ διαφέρειν. οἱ 10 δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀβελτέρως λέγοντες μήθʼ ἥδεσθαι μήτε θυμοῦσθαι μήτε φοβεῖσθαι μήτε παρασκευάζεσθαι μήτε μνημονεύειν, ἀλλʼ ὡσανεὶ μνημονεύειν τὴν μέλιτταν καί ὡσανεὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι τὴν χελιδόνα καὶ ὡσανεὶ θυμοῦσθαι τὸν λέοντα καὶ ὡσανεὶ 15 961f φοβεῖσθαι τὴν ἔλαφον, οὐκ οἶδα τί χρήσονται τοῖς λέγουσι μήτʼ βλέπειν μήτʼ ἀκούειν ἀλλʼ ὡσανεὶ βλέπειν αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσανεὶ ἀκούειν μηδὲ φωνεῖν ἀλλʼ ὡσανεὶ φωνεῖν, μηδʼ ὅλως ζῆν ἀλλʼ ὡσανεὶ ζῆν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκείνων οὐ μᾶλλόν ἐστι λεγόμενα παρὰ 20 τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὡς ἐγὼ πείθομαι.

Translations (1)

Which are the most crafty, water-animals or those creatures that breed upon the land? Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. V. Goodwin, William W., editor; Philips, John, translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1874.) — 3 focus

[3]

AUTOBULUS.

Good now, friend Soclarus, who was he that maintained that, because there are certain beings endued with reason, therefore there is nothing void of reason? For we abound with examples in all things that are destitute of a soul; nor do we want any other antithesis to irrational, but only to oppose whatever is deprived of a soul—as being void of reason and understanding—to that which is endued with reason and understanding together with a soul. But if any one will assert, that Nature is not defective, and that therefore animated Nature is partly rational, partly without reason; another may at the same time allege, that animated Nature is partly endued with imagination, partly deprived of it; partly sensible, partly insensible; to the end that Nature may not want these opposite habits and privations, as it were, equally balanced in the same kind. For, as it would be absurd to expect to find some living creatures sensible and others without sense, and equally ridiculous to grant imagination to some living creatures and not alllow it to others,—since there is no living creature that comes into the world but what is presently endued with sense and imagination,— thus would he be as much out of the way, who should require one living creature to be rational and another void of reason, and that too when he is disputing with men who hold that nothing whatever can partake of sense which does not also partake of understanding, and that there is no animal not endued by Nature with opinion and ratiocination, as well as with sense and instinct. For Nature, which, as they truly say, made all things for the sake of something and to some end, did not make a sensible creature to be merely sensible of barely suffering something; but since there are many things familiar and agreeable, and other things as baneful and pernicious, no one of them could survive for a moment, did they not learn to avoid some things and covet the use and benefit of others. Sense it is, therefore, that affords to every creature the knowledge both of useful and hurtful; but the discretion which accompanies the said sense, choosing and seizing upon things profitable, and discerning and avoiding things pernicious or troublesome, can never be thought to reside in any creature not capable to reason, to judge, remember, and consider. Therefore, if you will deprive the creatures of expectation, memory, design, preparation, hope, fear, desire, and grief, you must at the same time deny them the use either of eyes or ears, and indeed of all sense and imagination; which it is better for them to be without, since they cannot make use of them, than to labor under grief and pain, with no means present of averting them.

There is an oration of Strato the philosopher, demonstrating that without sense there can be no understanding. For many times letters cursorily glanced upon by the eye, and speeches little regarded by the ear, escape our knowledge, our minds being intent on other matters. Afterwards by recollection the same things return into our mind, for us to run through and pursue them in our thoughts as we please. Whence we say proverbially, The mind sees, the mind hears; all other things are deaf and blind, in regard there can be no sense in the eyes and ears, if understanding be wanting. Therefore King Cleomenes, after great commendations given to a copy of verses recited at a banquet where he was present, being asked whether it were not an admirable piece, bid them that heard it give their judgment, for that his mind was in the Peloponnesus. Therefore of necessity, whatever creatures are capable of sense must also be capable of understanding, if we can no otherwise be sensible than by the force of understanding.

But suppose we should grant that sense has no need of the understanding for the performance of the duty incumbent upon it; nevertheless, when that same sense which has shown an animal the difference between what is grateful and what is averse to Nature has departed, where is that faculty which retains this difference in the memory, —dreading things that are abominable, and longing after things that are useful, and if they are wanting, seeking means to compass them,—which provides animals receptacles and places of refuge, that they may look out after their prey, and avoid the snares and gins of the hunters? And yet those very authors inculcate these things in their introductions, even to the teasing our ears: defining purpose to be an indication that something is to be brought to completion; design to be an impulse before an impulse; preparation to be an action before an action; memory to be the comprehension of some certain past impression, which at first was apprehended by sense. In all which things there is nothing which may not rightly be said to partake of reason, and yet all these things are common to all creatures; as indeed are certainly all cogitations; which, while they lie concealed in the brain, we call thoughts, but when they come to be in motion, we name conceptions. In the mean time they acknowledge all passions and perturbations of the mind to be false judgments and erroneous opinions; so that it is a wonder to me, that the same men should oversee so many operations and motions, some of desire, others of fear, nay, by Jupiter, many times of envy and emulation itself. And many times they themselves punish their dogs and horses when they commit a fault, and this not to no purpose, but to chastise them by causing in them through pain that trouble of mind which we call repentance. Now the tickling the ear by pleasing sounds is called enchantment, but the bewitching the eye is called bewitching; both which we make use of in the domesticating of wild beasts. Harts and horses are allured by the sounds of pipes and flutes. And there are a sort of crabs which are charmed out of their holes by fifes; and it is reported that the shadfish are drawn to show themselves above water by singing and clapping of hands. The otus also, which is a bird not much unlike a night-raven, is taken by allurement of the sight; for that while he stands staring upon the fowlers dancing before him in measure and figure, and out of affection will be striving to act his part by aping their motions with his wings and shoulders, he is frequently surprised and taken.

But as for those that more foolishly affirm that beasts are not affected with joy or anger or fear, that the swallow does not build, that the bee does not remember, that the lion is not angry, that the hart is not timorous, but that they do all these things only as it were and apparently; I would fain know what answer they will make to those who say, that beasts neither see nor hear, but as it were see and as it were hear; that they neither neigh nor bleat, but as it were send forth a certain sound; lastly, that they do not absolutely live, but live as it were? For, in my opinion, to aver this is as contrary to plain demonstration as the rest.

Notes on the current edition

Whether land or sea animals are cleverer

1. There seems to be a great deal more anti-Stoic polemic in the following speeches than von Arnim has admitted into his compilation. See especially the notes on 961 c ff. infra.

2. Aristotle and Theophrastus passim; cf. also Mor. 646 c, 698 b.

3. Frag. 112, ed. Wehrli ( Die Schule des Aristoteles, v, p. 34).

4. A frequently occurring quotation, attributed to Epicharmus in Mor. 336 b (Kaibel, Com. Graec. Frag. i, p. 137, frag. 249; Diels, Frag. der Vorsok. i, p. 200, frag. 12); see also Mor. 98 c and 975 b infra. The fullest interpretation is that of Schottlaender, Hermes, lxii, pp. 437 f.; and see also Wehrli’s note, pp. 72 f.

5. The Stoics again; von Arnim, S.V.F. iii, p. 41, Chrysippus, frag. 173 of the Ethica.

6. Or elementary treatises: titles used by Chrysippus (von Arnim, op. cit. ii, pp. 6 f.; iii, p. 196).

7. That is, by sensation we apprehend the proposition Socrates is snub-nosed, by memory the proposition Socrates was snub-nosed. The literature on this complicated subject has been collected and analysed in Class. Rev. lxvi (1952), pp. 146 f.

8. Cf. von Arnim, op. cit. i, pp. 50 f; iii, pp. 92 ff.; see also Mor. 449 c.

9. Cf. Aelian, De Natura Animal. xii. 44, 46; Antigonus, Hist. Mirab. 29.

10. Dolphins also are caught by music: Pliny, Nat. Hist. xi. 137.

11. Cf. Aelian, De Natura Animal. vi, 32; Athenaeus, 328 f, on the trichis, which is a kind of thrissa ( cf. Athenaeus, 328 e); and see Mair on Oppian, Hal. i. 244 (L.C.L.).

12. Cf. Mor. 52 b (where the L.C.L., probably wrongly, reads the ape); 705 a; Athenaeus, 390 f; Aelian, De Natura Animal. xv. 28; Pliny, Nat. Hist. x. 68; Aristotle, Historia Animal. viii. 13 (597 b 22 ff.) and the other references of Hubert at Mor. 705 a and Gulick on Athenaeus, 629 f. Contrast Aelian, De Natura Animal. i, 39, on doves. Porphyry omits this sentence.

13. A favourite expression of Aristotle’s; but it is the Stoics who are being reproved here ( cf. von Arnim, S.V.F. ii, p. 240, Chrysippus, frag. 887). This seems to be the only appearance of the word in Plutarch, unless Pohlenz is right in conjecturing it at Mor. 600 f, or Rasmus at 1054 c in other Stoic quotations.

Plutarch De sollertia animalium 3

Harold Cherniss (Translator), William C. Helmbold (Translator)

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