Plutarch, De cohibenda ira, ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, 16

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[16]

ΦΟΥΝΔ.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅσοις γε συμβαίνει διὰ μισοπονηρίαν ἀληθῶς ἁλίσκεσθαι πολλάκις ὑπʼ ὀργῆς, τὸ ἄγαν ἀφαιρετέον αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἄκρατον ἅμα τῇ σφοδρᾷ πίστει περὶ τῶν συνόντων. αὕτη γὰρ αὔξει 25 μάλιστα τῶν αἰτιῶν τὸν θυμόν, ὅταν ἢ χρηστὸς ὑποληφθεὶς¹ ἀναφανῇ μοχθηρὸς ἢ φιλεῖν δόξας ἐν 463c διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ μέμψει γένηται. τὸ δʼ ἐμὸν ἦθος οἶσθα δήπουθεν ἡλίκαις ῥοπαῖς φέρεται πρὸς εὔνοιαν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πίστιν· ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ κατὰ κενοῦ βαίνοντες, ὅσῳ² μᾶλλον ἐπερείδω τῷ φιλεῖν ἐμαυτόν, 5 ἁμαρτάνω μᾶλλον καὶ σφαλλόμενος ἀνιῶμαι· καὶ τοῦ μὲν φιλεῖν ἀπαρύσαι τὸ ἐμπαθὲς ἄγαν καὶ πρόθυμον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δυνηθείην τοῦ δὲ πιστεύειν σφόδρα χρησαίμην ἂν ἴσως χαλινῷ τῇ Πλάτωνος;³ εὐλαβείᾳ. καὶ γὰρ Ἑλίκωνα τὸν μαθηματικὸν οὕτως ἐπαινεῖν 10 463d φησιν, ὡς φύσει εὐμετάβολον ζῷον, καὶ τοὺς τεθραμμένους ἐν τῇ πόλει· καλῶς δεδιέναι, μὴ ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπέρματα ἀνθρώπων ὄντες ἐκφήνωσί που τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀσθένειαν. ὁ δὲ Σοφοκλῆς⁴ λέγων ὅτι

τὰ πλεῖστα φωρῶν αἰσχρὰ φωράσεις βροτῶν

15 ἄγαν ἔοικεν ἡμῖν ἐπεμβαίνειν καὶ κολούειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ δύσκολον τοῦτο τῆς κρίσεως καὶ φιλαίτιον εὐκολωτέρους ποιεῖ ταῖς ὀργαῖς ἐκστατικὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἄφνω καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον δεῖ δʼ, ὥς που καὶ Παναίτιος ἔφη, χρῆσθαι τῷ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, καὶ καθάπερ 20 ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ παιδὸς εἶπεν ᾔδειν ὅτι 463e θνητὸν ἐγέννησα τοῦτο τοῖς παροξύνουσιν ἕκαστον⁵ ἐπιφωνεῖν ἁμαρτήμασιν ᾔδειν ὅτι σοφὸν οὐκ ἐπριάμην δοῦλον ᾔδειν ὅτι ἀπαθῆ τὸν φίλον οὐκ ἐκτησάμην ᾔδειν ὅτι τὴν γυναῖκα γυναῖκʼ εἶχον. ἂν 25 δὲ κἀκεῖνό τις ἐπιφθεγγόμενος ἀεὶ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μήπου⁶ ἄρʼ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος; ἔξωθεν εἴσω τὸν λογισμὸν ἀναστρέφῃ καὶ παρεμβάλλῃ ταῖς μέμψεσι τὴν εὐλάβειαν, οὐ πολλῇ χρήσεται μισοπονηρίᾳ πρὸς ἑτέρους πολλῆς ὁρῶν ἑαυτὸν συγγνώμης δεόμενον. νῦν δʼ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὀργιζόμενος καὶ κολάζων Ἀριστείδου 5 φωνὰς ἐπιφέρει καὶ Κάτωνος μὴ κλέπτε μὴ ψεύδου διὰ τί ῥᾳθυμεῖς; καὶ ὃ δὴ πάντων 463f αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὀργιζομένοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν μετʼ ὀργῆς καὶ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡμαρτημένα θυμῷ κολάζομεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἰατροί 10

πικρῷ πικρὰν⁷ κλύζουσι φαρμάκῳ χολήν,

⁸ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνοντες καὶ προσεκταράττοντες 464a ὅταν οὖν ἐν τούτοις γένωμαι τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς, ἅμα τι πειρῶμαι καὶ τοῦ πολυπράγμονος ἀφαιρεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἐξακριβοῦν ἅπαντα καὶ φωρᾶν καὶ πᾶσαν ἕλκειν 15 εἰς μέσον ἀσχολίαν οἰκέτου καὶ πρᾶξιν φίλου καὶ διατριβὴν υἱοῦ καὶ ψιθυρισμὸν γυναικός, ὀργὰς φέρει πολλὰς καὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ καθημερινάς, ὧν δυσκολία τρόπου καὶ χαλεπότης τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θεός, ὡς Εὐριπίδης⁹ φησί, 20

τῶν ἄγαν ἅπτεται,

τὰ μικρὰ δʼ εἰς τύχην ἀφεὶς¹⁰ ἐᾷ

ἐγὼ δὲ τῇ τύχῃ μὲν οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖν ἐπιτρέπειν οὐδὲ παρορᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, πιστεύειν δὲ καὶ χρῆσθαι τὰ μὲν γυναικὶ· τὰ δʼ οἰκέταις τὰ δὲ φίλοις 25 464b οἷον ἄρχοντʼ,¹¹ ἐπιτρόποις τισὶ καὶ λογισταῖς καὶ διοικηταῖς, αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων ὄντα τῷ λογισμῷ· καὶ μεγίστων. ὡς γὰρ τὰ λεπτὰ γράμματα τὴν ὄψιν, οὕτω τὰ μικρὰ πράγματα μᾶλλον ἐντείνοντα νύττει καὶ ταράττει τὴν ὀργήν, ἔθος πονηρὸν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζονα λαμβάνουσαν. ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοίνυν τὸ 5 μὲν τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους¹² μέγα καὶ θεῖον ἡγούμην, τὸ νηστεῦσαι κακότητος· ἐπῄνουν δὲ κἀκείνας ὡς οὐκ ἀχαρίστους οὐδʼ ἀφιλοσόφους τὰς ἐν εὐχαῖς ὁμολογίας, ὁμιλίας ἀφροδισίων ἐνιαυτὸν ἁγνεῦσαι καὶ οἴνου, τιμῶντας ἐγκρατείᾳ τὸν θεόν· ἢ ψευδολογίας 10 πάλιν ἀπέχεσθαι χρόνον ὡρισμένον, αὑτοῖς προσέχοντας 464c πῶς ἀληθεύσομεν ἔν τε παιδιᾷ καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἁπάσης. εἶτα ταύταις τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ παρέβαλλον εὐχὴν¹³ ὡς οὐχ ἧττον θεοφιλῆ καὶ ἱεράν· ἡμέρας πρῶτον ὀλίγας ἀοργήτους ἔγνων οἷον ἀμεθύστους 15 καὶ ἀοίνους διαγαγεῖν ὥσπερ νηφάλια καὶ μελίσπονδα θύων· εἶτα μῆνʼ ἕνα¹⁴ καὶ δύο πειρώμενος ἐμαυτοῦ κατὰ μικρόν, οὕτω τῷ χρόνῳ προύβαινον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τῆς ἀνεξικακίας, ἐγκρατῶς προσέχων καὶ διαφυλάττων μετʼ εὐφημίας ἵλεων καὶ ἀμήνιτον ἐμαυτόν, 20 ἁγνεύοντα καὶ λόγων πονηρῶν καὶ πράξεων 464d ἀτόπων καὶ πάθους ἐφʼ ἡδονῇ μικρᾷ καὶ ἀχαρίστῳ ταραχάς τε μεγάλας καὶ μεταμέλειαν αἰσχίστην φέροντος. ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ θεοῦ τι συλλαμβάνοντος, ἐσαφήνιζεν ἡ πεῖρα τὴν κρίσιν ἐκείνην, ὅτι τὸ ἵλεων 25 τοῦτο καὶ πρᾶον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐδενὶ τῶν συνόντων εὐμενές ἐστιν οὕτω καὶ φίλον καὶ ἄλυπον ὡς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔχουσιν.

De cohibenda ira. Plutarch. ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs. Leipzig. 1891.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

Περὶ ἀοπγησίας (Greek) (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol III. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1891.)

Translations (2)

On the Control of Anger Perseus (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. VI. Helmbold, William Clark, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1936 (printing).) — 16 focus

[16]

FUNDANUS.

However, those of whom it is true that righteous indignation causes them frequently to be overwhelmed by anger should get rid of its excessive and violent form, together with their extreme confidence in those with whom they live.¹ For such confidence more than any other cause increases the spirit of wrath, when, for example, one who has been accounted honourable proves to be base,² or one whom we have supposed a true friend quarrels and finds fault with us. As for my own temperament, you doubtless know how strong are the impulses which incline it to be of goodwill toward my fellowmen and to trust them. Consequently, like men who attempt to walk on empty air, the more I give myself up to loving a person the more I go astray, and when I stumble and fall, the greater my distress; and although I may no longer be able to reduce my too great propensity and eagerness to love, yet I may perhaps be able to use Plato’s³ caution as a curb against excessive trust. For Plato says that he praises Helicon the mathematician in such terms as he uses⁴ because man is by nature an animal readily subject to change; and that he does well to fear those who have been educated in the city lest, being men and the seeds of men,⁵ they may reveal somewhere the weakness inherent in their nature. But when Sophocles⁶ says

Search out most human traits; you’ll find them base,

he seems to go too far in trampling upon and belittling us. This peevish and censorious judgement does, however, tend to make us more considerate in our outbursts of temper; for it is the sudden and the unexpected that throw men off their bearings.⁷ But we should, as Panaetius also has somewhere remarked, make use of the precept of Anaxagoras,⁸ and just as he, at the death of his son, said, I knew that I had begotten a mortal; so on each occasion we should remark with reference to the faults which exasperate us: I knew that I had not bought a philosopher for a slave, I knew that the friend I had made was not incapable of error, I knew that my wife was a woman. And if we keep repeating to ourselves Plato’s question, Can it be that I am like that?⁹ and turn our reason inward instead of to external things, and substitute caution for censoriousness, we shall no longer make much use of righteous indignation toward others when we observe that we ourselves stand in need of much indulgence. But as it is, everyone of us, when we are angry and inflicting punishment, brings out the injunctions of an Aristeides or a Cato: Do not steal! Do not lie! Why are you so lazy?; and - what is most disgraceful of all - while angry we chide others for being angry and punish by rage faults which have been committed in a rage, not like physicians, who

With bitter drugs can purge the bitter bile¹⁰;

but rather make more intense the malady and aggravate it.

FUNDANUS.

Whenever, therefore, I have become engaged in these reflections, at the same time I try to do away with some part of my inquisitiveness. For to search I out with great precision and detect and drag into the light every little concern of a slave, every action of a friend, every pastime of a son, every whisper of a wife, produces frequent, or rather continual and daily, fits of anger, of which the sum total is a morose and intractable disposition. It may be, as Euripides¹¹ says, that God

Will intervene in matters grown too great,

But small things he lets pass and leaves to Fate;

but I am of the opinion that a man of sense should commit nothing to Fate, nor overlook anything at all, but should trust and use for some things his wife, for others servants, for others friends, as a ruler makes use of overseers and accountants and administrators, but himself keeps under his own control the most important and weighty matters by the use of reason. For as small writing strains the eyes, so do trifling matters, by causing a greater strain, prick and stir up anger,¹² which becomes a bad habit that affects more important matters.

FUNDANUS.

Accordingly, in addition to all these considerations,¹³ I have been wont to regard as great and divine that saying of Empedocles,¹⁴ Fast from evil, and to applaud also those other vows made in prayer as being neither ungracious nor inappropriate to a philosopher: to abstain from love and wine for a year, honouring God by continence; or again to refrain from lying for a stated time, paying close heed to ourselves that we shall be truthful always whether In jest or earnest. Then with these I compared my own vow, thinking it no less sacred and pleasant in the sight of God: first, to pass a few days without anger, sober and wineless days, as it were, as though I were offering a sacrifice of honey unmixed with wine¹⁵; then I would do so for a month or two, and so, making trial of myself little by little, in time I made some progress in my forbearance, continently observing and keeping myself courteous in speech, placid, and free from anger, and pure of the taint of evil words and offensive actions and of passion which, at the price of a little unsatisfying pleasure, brings great perturbations of spirit and the most shameful repentance. By such means, I think - and God also gave me help - experience has shown the truth of that judgement: this placid and gentle and humane spirit is not so agreeable and pleasant and free from sorrow to any of those brought in contact with it as it is to those who themselves possess it.

Concerning the cure of anger: a dialogue Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. I. Goodwin, William W., editor; Dillgham, William, translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874.) — 16 focus

[16]

FUNDANUS.

And even those who, out of a real hatred of wickedness, often happen to be surprised with anger, can abate the excess and vehemence of it so soon as they give up their excessive confidence in those with whom they converse. For of all causes this doth most increase anger, when one proves to be wicked whom we took for a good man, or when one who we thought had loved us falls into some difference and chiding with us.

As for my own disposition, thou knowest very well with how strong inclinations it is carried to show kindness to men and to confide in them; and therefore, like those who miss their step and tread on nothing, when I most of all trust to men’s love and, as it were, prop myself up with it, I do then most of all miscarry, and, finding myself disappointed, am troubled at it. And indeed I should never succeed in freeing myself from this too great eagerness and forwardness in my love; but against excessive confidence perhaps I can make use of Plato’s caution for a bridle. For he said that he so commended Helicon, the mathematician, because he thought him a naturally versatile animal; but that he had a jealousy of those who had been well educated in the city, lest, being men and the offspring of men, they should in something or other discover the infirmity of their nature. But when Sophocles says, If you search the deeds of mortals, you will find the most are base, he seems to insult and disparage us over much. Still even such a harsh and censorious judgment as this may make us more moderate in our anger; for it is the sudden and the unexpected which do most drive us to frenzy. But we ought, as Panaetius somewhere said, to imitate Anaxagoras; and as he said upon the death of his son, I knew before that I had begotten but a mortal, so should every one of us use expressions like these of those offences which stir up to anger: I knew, when I bought my servant, that I was not buying a philosopher; I knew that I did not get a friend that had no passions; I knew that I had a wife that was but a woman. But if every one would always repeat the question of Plato to himself, But am not I perhaps such a one myself? and turn his reason from abroad to look into himself, and put restraint upon his reprehension of others, he would not make so much use of his hatred of evil in reproving other men seeing himself to stand in need of great indulgence. But now every one of us, when he is angry and punishing, can bring the words of Aristides and of Cato: Do not steal, Do not lie, and Why are ye so slothful? And, what is most truly shameful of all, we do in our anger reprove others for being angry, and what was done amiss through anger we punish in our passion, therein not acting like physicians, who

Purge bitter choler with a bitter pill,

but rather increasing and exasperating the disease which we pretend to cure.

While therefore I am thus reasoning with myself, I endeavor also to abate something of my curiosity; because for any one over curiously to enquire and pry into every thing, and to make a public business of every employment of a servant, every action of a friend, every pastime of a son, every whispering of a wife, causes great and long and daily fits of anger, whereof the product and issue is a peevish and morose disposition. Wherefore God, as Euripides says,

Affairs of greatest weight himself directeth,

But matters small to Fortune he committeth.

But I think a prudent man ought not to commit any thing at all to Fortune, nor to neglect any thing, but to trust and commit some things to his wife, some things to his servants, and some things to his friends (as a prince to certain vicegerents and accountants and administrators), while he himself is employing his reason about the weightiest matters, and those of greatest concern.

For as small letters hurt the sight, so do small matters him that is too much intent upon them; they vex and stir up anger, which begets an evil habit in him in, reference to greater affairs. But above all the rest, I look on that of Empedocles as a divine thing, To fast from evil. And I commended also those vows and professions made in prayers, as things neither indecent in themselves nor unbecoming a philosopher,—for a whole year to abstain from venery and wine, serving God with temperance all the while; or else again, for a certain time to abstain from lying, minding and watching over ourselves, that we speak nothing but what is true, either in earnest or in jest. After the manner of these vows then I made my own, supposing it would be no less acceptable to God and sacred than theirs; and I set myself first to observe a few sacred days also, wherein I would abstain from being angry, as if it were from being drunk or from drinking wine, celebrating a kind of Nephalia and Melisponda³ with respect to my anger. Then, making trial of myself little by little for a month or two, I by this means in time made some good progress unto further patience in bearing evils, diligently observing and keeping myself courteous in language and behavior, free from anger, and pure from all wicked words and absurd actions, and from passion, which for a little (and that no grateful) pleasure brings with itself great perturbations and shameful repentance. Whence experience, not without some divine assistance, hath, I suppose, made it evident that that was a very true judgment and assertion, that this courteous, gentle, and kindly disposition and behavior is not so acceptable, so pleasing, and so delightful to any of those with whom we converse, as it is to those that have it.

Notes on the current edition

Περὶ ἀοπγησίας

1. ὑποληφθείς τις?

2. ὅσῳ R: ὅπου

3. Πλάτωνος] Epist. 13 p. 360 d

4. Σοφοκλῆς] Bauck. p. 311

5. ἕκαστον] ἑκάστοτʼ Stegmannus

6. μήπου *: ἦπου

7. πικρὰν πικρῷ idem ex p. 923 f.

8. Nauck p. 312

9. Εὐριπίδης] Nauck. p. 675

10. ἀφεὶς] ἀνεὶς p. 811 d

11. ἄρχοντα Emperius: ἄρχοντα ἀρχόντων

12. Ἐμπεδοκλέους] Mullach. 1 p. 13 vs. 454

13. εὐχὴν W: ψυχὴν

14. ἕνα Herwerdenus

Plutarch De cohibenda ira 16

ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs

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ΦΟΥΝΔ.

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FUNDANUS.

FUNDANUS.

FUNDANUS.

FUNDANUS.

Notes on the current edition

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