Plutarch, Septem sapientium convivium, Frank Cole Babbitt (Translator), 9

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[9] After this second reading, there was silence for a time, and then Thales asked Neiloxenus if Amasis had approved the answers. When Neiloxenus replied that Amasis had accepted some, but was much dissatisfied with others, Thales said, As a matter of fact there is not a thing in them that cannot be impugned, but they all contain gross errors and evidences of ignorance. For instance, in the very first one, how can time be the oldest thing if a part of it is past, a part present, and a part future? ¹ For the time which is to come would clearly be younger than events and persons that now are. And to hold that truth is wisdom seems to me no different from declaring that light is the eye. If he thought the light beautiful, as it really is, how did he come to overlook the sun itself? Among the others the answer about gods and evil spirits evinces boldness and daring, but the one about Fortune contains much bad logic; for Fortune would not be so fickle about abiding with one if it were the mightiest and strongest thing in existence. Nor is death, in fact, the most common thing; for it does not affect the living.² But, to avoid giving the impression of merely passing judgement upon the statements of others, let us compare answers of our own with his. And I offer myself as the first, if Neiloxenus so desires, to be questioned on each topic; and taking the questions in the order given,³a I will repeat them, together with my answers⁴:

(a) What is the oldest thing? God, said Thales, for God is something that has no beginning.

(b) What is greatest? Space; for while the universe contains within it all else, this contains the universe.

(d) What is wisest? Time; for it has discovered some things already, and shall discover all the rest.

(e) What is most common? Hope; for those who have nothing else have that ever with them.

(f) What is most helpful? Virtue; for it makes everything else helpful by putting it to a good use.

(g) What is most harmful? Vice; for it harms the greatest number of things by its presence.

(h) What is strongest? Necessity; for that alone is insuperable.

(i) What is easiest? To follow Nature’s course; because people often weary of pleasures.

Septem sapientium convivium. Plutarch. Frank Cole Babbitt (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1928.

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Current edition Perseus

The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men (English) (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. II. Babbitt, Frank Cole, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πων επτά σοφών συμπόσιον Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol I. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N,, editor. Leipzig. Teubner, 1888.) — 9 focus

[9] τούτων πάλιν ἀναγνωσθέντων, ὦ Νίκαρχε, γενομένης σιωπῆς Θαλῆς ἠρώτησε τὸν Νειλόξενον εἰ προσήκατο τὰς λύσεις ὁ Ἄμασις. ἐκείνου δʼ εἰπόντος 153b ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἀπεδέξατο ταῖς δʼ ἐδυσκόλαινε, καὶ 20 μὴν οὐδὲν εἶπεν ὁ Θαλῆς ἀνεπίληπτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἔχει πάντα διαμαρτίας μεγάλας καὶ ἀγνοίας. οἷον εὐθὺς ὁ χρόνος πῶς ἂν εἴη πρεσβύτατον, εἰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ γεγονὸς τὸ δʼ ἐνεστώς ἐστι τὸ δὲ μέλλον; ὁ γὰρ μεθʼ ἡμᾶς ἐσόμενος χρόνος καὶ πραγμάτων τῶν 25 νῦν καὶ ἀνθρώπων νεώτερος ἂν φανείη. τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν τοῦ τὸ φῶς ὀφθαλμὸν ἀποφαίνειν. εἰ δὲ τὸ φῶς καλόν ὥσπερ ἐστὶν¹ ἐνόμιζε, πῶς τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν παρεῖδε; τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἡ μὲν περὶ θεῶν καὶ 153c δαιμόνων ἀπόκρισις θράσος ἔχει καὶ κίνδυνον, ἀλογίαν δὲ καὶ πολλὴν ἡ περὶ τῆς τύχης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν 5 μετέπιπτε ῥᾳδίως οὕτως, ἰσχυρότατον οὖσα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ῥωμαλεώτατον. οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ὁ θάνατος κοινότατόν ἐστιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας. ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν εὐθύνειν τὰς τῶν ἑτέρων ἀποφάσεις, τὰς οἰκείας² ταῖς ἐκείνου παραβάλωμεν· ἐμαυτὸν 10 δὲ παρέχω πρῶτον, εἰ βούλεται Νειλόξενος, ἐρωτᾶν καθʼ ἕκαστον. ὡς οὖν ἐγένοντο τότε, κἀγὼ νῦν διηγήσομαι τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις. τί πρεσβύτατον; θεός ἔφη Θαλῆς· ἀγέννητον γάρ ἐστι. τί μέγιστον; 15 153d τόπος· τἄλλα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κόσμος, τὸν δὲ κόσμον οὗτος περιέχει τί κάλλιστον; κόσμος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ τάξιν τούτου μέρος ἐστί. τί σοφώτατον; χρόνος· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εὕρηκεν οὗτος ἤδη, τὰ δʼ εὑρήσει. τί κοινότατον; ἐλπίς· καὶ 20 γὰρ οἷς ἄλλο μηδέν, αὕτη πάρεστι. τί ὠφελιμώτατον; ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τἄλλα τῷ χρῆσθαι καλῶς ὠφέλιμα ποιεῖ. τί βλαβερώτατον; κακία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ πλεῖστα βλάπτει παραγενομένη τί ἰσχυρότατον; ἀνάγκη· μόνον γὰρ ἀνίκητον. τί ῥᾷστον; 25 τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἡδονάς γε πολλοὶ³ πολλάκις ἀπαγορεύουσιν. 153e

Translations (1)

The Banquet of the Seven Wise Men Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. II. Goodwin, William W., editor; Davis, Roger, translator. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company, 1874.) — 9 focus

[9] When Niloxenus had read out these answers, there was a short silence among them; by and by Thales desires Niloxenus to inform him if Amasis approved of these answers. Niloxenus said, he liked some and disliked others. There is not one of them right and sound, quoth Thales, but all are full of wretched folly and ignorance. As for instance, how can that be most ancient whereof part is past, part is now present, and part is yet to come; every man knows it is younger than ourselves and our actions. As to his answer that truth is the most wise thing, it is as incongruous as if he had affirmed the light to be an eye; if he judged the light to be the most beautiful, how could he overlook the sun; as to his solutions concerning the Gods and evil geniuses, they are full of presumption and peril. What he saith of Fortune is void of sense, for her inconstancy and fickleness proceeds from want of strength and power. Nor is death the most common thing; the living are still at liberty, it hath not arrested them. But lest we be censured as having a faculty to find fault only, we will lay down our opinions of these things, and compare them with those of the Ethiopian; and I offer myself first, if Niloxenus pleases, to deliver my opinion on every one singly, and I will relate both questions and answers in that method and order in which they were sent to Ethiopia and read to us. What is most ancient? Thales answered, God, for he had no beginning. What is greatest? Place; the world contains all other things, this surrounds and contains the world. What is most beautiful? The world; for whatever is framed artificially and methodically is a part of it. What is most wise? Time; for it has found out some things already, it will find out the rest in due time. What is most common? Hope; for they that want other things are masters of this. What is most profitable? Virtue; for by a right managery of other things she makes them all beneficial and advantageous. What is most pernicious? Vice; for it depraves the best things we enjoy. What is the most strong? Necessity; for this alone is insuperable. What is most easy? That which is most agreeable to nature; for pleasures themselves are sometimes tedious and nauseating.

Notes on the current edition

The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men

1. Plutarch, Moralia, 1081 C-1082 D, argues at some length about the Stoic conception of time.

2. Probably an adaptation of one of Epicurus’s leading principles ο θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, death is nothing to us, who are alive. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, x. 129, and Plutarch, Moralia, 37 A.

3. Either Thales or a copyist has transposed ( c) and ( d).

4. Most of these sentiments are attributed to Thales in works of other authors, as wel as in other places in the Moralia. It may suffice here to refer, for example, to Diogenes Laertius, i. 35. The two numbered ( f) and ( g) are rather suggestive of the Stoic school of philosophy.

Plutarch Septem sapientium convivium 9

Frank Cole Babbitt (Translator)

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