Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. Henry Stuart Jones, 6.47.1

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[1] καὶ Νικίου μὲν ἦν γνώμη πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σελινοῦντα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ’ ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμφθησαν, καὶ ἢν μὲν παρέχωσι χρήματα παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι Ἐγεσταῖοι, πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσίν, ὅσασπερ ᾐτήσαντο, ἀξιοῦν διδόναι αὐτοὺς τροφήν, καὶ παραμείναντας Σελινουντίους ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ξυμβάσει διαλλάξαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὕτω παραπλεύσαντας τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ἐπιδείξαντας μὲν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, δηλώσαντας δὲ τὴν ἐς τοὺς φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους προθυμίαν, ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε, ἢν μή τι δι’ ὀλίγου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀδοκήτου ἢ Λεοντίνους οἷοί τε ὦσιν ὠφελῆσαι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ πόλεων προσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ τῇ πόλει δαπανῶντας τὰ οἰκεῖα μὴ κινδυνεύειν.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. ed. Henry Stuart Jones. Oxford. 1910.

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Current edition Perseus

Ἱστορίαι (Greek) (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).)

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.47.1 focus

[1] Nicias was of this opinion: that it was best to go presently with the whole fleet to Selinus, against which they were chiefly set forth, and if the Egestaeans would furnish them with money for the whole army, then to deliberate further upon the occasion; if not, then to require maintenance for the sixty galleys set forth at their own request, and staying with them by force or composition to bring the Selinuntians and them to a peace; and thence passing along by other of those cities, to make a show of the power of the Athenian state, and of their readiness to help their friends and confederates; and so to go home, unless they could light on some quick and unthought-of means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some of the other cities to their own league; and not to put the commonwealth in danger at her own charges.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.47.1 focus

[1] Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus , the main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state by wasting its home resources.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.47 focus

Die Feldherren aber beriethen sich, was nun zu thun sei,
und Nikias war der Meinung, man solle mit der ganzen Macht gegen
Selinus steuern, zu welchem Zwecke sie ja auch hauptsächlich
ausgeschickt worden seien, und wenn die Egestaner für das ganze Heer
die nöthigen Geldmittel leisteten, so könne man sich dann weiter
berathen; wenn aber nicht, so solle man von ihnen verlangen, daß sie
die Erhaltungskosten für die sechzig Schiffe, um welche sie ja auch
gebeten hätten, tragen sollten. So könne man bleiben und die
Selinuntier entweder durch Gewalt, oder vermöge eines Vertrags, zum
Frieden mit jenen bewegen, und danach bei den andern Städten vor- ¹
überfahren,' um ihnen die Macht des Athenischen Staates und dessen l
Eifer zur Unterstützung seiner Freunde und Bundesgenossen zu zeigen,
und dann wieder nach Haufe fahren, falls sie nicht binnen Kurzem
durch irgend ein unerwartetes Ereigniß in den Stand gesetzt-würden,
für die Leontiüer etwas zu thun oder einige der andern Städte auf
ihre Seite zu ziehen. Der Staat dürfe aber nicht seine Macht/aus's
Spiel setzen und dabei auch noch aus cigeNem.Säckel zahlen.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 6.47 focus

Nikias war dafür, mit der ganzen Flotte nach Selinus
zu fahren, gegen das sie ja zunächst ausgesandt seien. Wenn
die Egester die Kosten für daS Ganze bestreiten wollten, so
könnte man sich danach einrichten; anderenfalls müsse man
verlangen, daß sie die Verpflegung für die von ihnen erbetenen
sechzig Schiffe übernähmen, und so lange vor Selinus bleiben,
bis es sich entweder aus freien Stücken zum Frieden mit
Egesta verstehen oder dazu gezwungen sehen würde; ebenso
solle man auch die anderen Städte anlaufen, um ihnen die
Macht der Athener zu zeigen und deren Eifer für ihre Freunde
und Bundesgenossen zu beweisen, dann aber wieder nach Hause
fahren, es sei denn, daß sich alsbald unverhofft Gelegenheit
böte, etwas für Leontinoi zu tun oder eine der anderen Städte
auf seine Seite zu ziehen; die eigene Stadt aber dürfe man
nicht in Gefahr und Kosten stürzen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.47 focus

XLVII. L’avis de Nicias était de faire voile, avec toute l’armée, vers Sélinonte, but principal de l’expédition : si les Égestains fournissaient une solde pour toute l’armée, on se déciderait en conséquence; sinon, on réclamerait d’eux des vivres pour les soixante vaisseaux qu’ils avaient demandés; on s’arrêterait pour réconcilier avec eux, de gré ou de force, les habitants de Sélinonte; puis on côtoierait les autres villes, et, après leur avoir montré la puissance des Athéniens, leur zèle à servir leurs amis et leurs alliés, on reviendrait à Athènes; à moins cependant qu’il ne s’offrît promptement, et d’une manière inattendue, quelque occasion de servir les Léontins, ou de s’attacher quel- que autre ville, mais sans compromettre les intérêts de la république en laissant peser sur elle toutes les dépenses.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.47 focus

Les généraux tinrent conseil sur les circonstances présentes. L’opinion de Nicias était de cingler avec toute la fiotte contre Sélinonte, principal but de l’expédition; et, si les Égestains fournissaient de l’argent à toute l’armée, d’aviser là-dessus; sinon, d’exiger des vivres pour les soixante vaisseaux qu’ils avaient demandés; dô^ rester le temps nécessaire ponr les réconcilier de gré ou de force avec les Sélinqptins; de passer ensuite devant les autres villes pour leur montrer la puissance d’Athènes, son dévouement à ses amis et aljiés; enfin de rentrer en Attique, à moins qu’il ne s’offrît bientôt une occasion imprévue de secourir les Léontins ou de s’attacher quelque autre ville, sans entraîner Athènes dans des dépenses qu’elle aurait seule à supporter.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.47.1 focus

[1] It was the judgment of Nicias that they should sail with their whole armament against Selinus, which was the object for which they had chiefly been sent out, and if the Egestaeans should furnish money for the whole army, they should then determine accordingly; otherwise, they should demand that they give maintenance for sixty ships, the number they had asked for, and remaining there they should reconcile the Selinuntians to the Egestaeans, either by force or by agreement. This being accomplished, the Athenians should sail along by the other cities, displaying the power of the city of Athens and making manifest their zeal towards their friends and allies, and then should sail back home—unless perchance they should be able quickly and unexpectedly either to aid the Leontines, or to bring over some of the other cities—and not imperil the safety of the state at the expense of their own resources.¹

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.47.1 focus

[1] The generals now took counsel on the present state of affairs. The opinion of Nicias was, that they should sail to Selinus with all their forces, that being the object for which they had, most of all, been sent: and in case of the Segestans supplying money for the whole armament, that then they should determine accordingly; otherwise, that they should beg them to give provisions for their sixty ships, the number which they had asked for; and remaining there should bring the Selinuntines to terms with them, either by force or by treaty; and so, after coasting along by the other cities, and displaying the power of the Athenian state, as well as proving their zeal in the cause of their friends and allies, they should sail back home;—(unless they should be able, on a sudden, and without expecting it, either to do the Leontines service, or to bring over some of the other cities;)—and not expose their state to danger by spending its own resources.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.47.1 focus

[1] et Niciae quidem sententia erat, ut cum omnibus copiis adversus Selinuntem navigaretur, cujus rei causa potissimum missi essent, et si quidem Egestaei pecunias universo exercitui suppeditarent, pro pecuniae summa consilium caperetur; sin minus, ab iis postularetur, ut sexaginta navibus, quas petissent, cibaria suppeditarent, atque permanerent, donec SeUnuntios cum illis vel vi vel pactione reconciliassenl, et ita ceteras civitates obirent, et ubi Atheniensis reipublicae potentiam iis ostendissent, et suum in amicos sociosque studium demonstrassent /domum redirent, nisi forte brevi et ex inopinato facultas aliqua offerretur, vel Leontinos juvandi vel aliquam reliquarum civitatum sibi adjungendi, neque facultates domesticas consumentes rempublicam in periculum adducerent.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.47 focus

La mente di Nicia era doversi navigare con tutta Tarmata a Selinunte, ove principalmente erano inviati ; e se gli Egestei somministrassero il denaro per tutto l’esercito governarsi secondo quello ; altrimenti esiger da loro il foraggio per le sessanta navi richieste , fermarsi a Selinunte, riconciliarla con gli Egestei o per forza o per accordo, e allora scorrere per le costiere delle altre città, e mostrare così la potenza della Repubblica ateniese. Quindi, fatto conoscere il proprio zelo per gli amici e confederati, tornare a casa ; salvo che nel caso di potere in breve tempo e per qualche imprevista opportunità recar giovamento ai Leontini, o farsi amica alcuna delle altre città ; e così non spendere del suo con pericolo della Repubblica.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

Νικίου . γνώμη —(1) to reconcile Selinus and Segesta, (2) then to sail round the coast—but to risk nothing.

ἐφ) ὅπερ —‘for which object.’ Thuc. often uses the neut. thus in a parenthesis.

μάλιστα —the primary object, at least nominally. In VII. 11 Nicias says Συρακοσίονς ἐφ) οὒς ἐπέμφθημεν . ἠτήσαντο—Ἐγεσταῖοι. See c. 8, 1.

δἰ ὀλίγου —of time; c. 11, 4.

τῇ πόλει —with κινδυνεύειν, which depends on ἦν γνώμη.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.47.1

ed. Henry Stuart Jones

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