Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. Henry Stuart Jones, 4.92

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[1] ‘χρῆν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Βοιωτοί, μηδ’ ἐς ἐπίνοιάν τινα ἡμῶν ἐλθεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίοις, ἢν ἄρα μὴ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι καταλάβωμεν αὐτούς, διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν. τὴν γὰρ Βοιωτίαν ἐκ τῆς ὁμόρου ἐλθόντες τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι μέλλουσι φθείρειν, καὶ εἰσὶ δήπου πολέμιοι ἐν ᾧ τε ἂν χωρίῳ καταληφθῶσι καὶ ὅθεν ἐπελθόντες πολέμια ἔδρασαν.

[2] νυνὶ δ’ εἴ τῳ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μεταγνώτω. οὐ γὰρ τὸ προμηθές, οἷς ἂν ἄλλος ἐπίῃ, περὶ τῆς σφετέρας ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται λογισμὸν καὶ ὅστις τὰ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει, τοῦ πλέονος δὲ ὀρεγόμενος ἑκών τινι ἐπέρχεται.

[3] πάτριόν τε ὑμῖν στρατὸν ἀλλόφυλον ἐπελθόντα καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πέλας ὁμοίως ἀμύνεσθαι. Ἀθηναίους δὲ καὶ προσέτι ὁμόρους ὄντας πολλῷ μάλιστα δεῖ.

[4] πρός τε γὰρ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πᾶσι τὸ ἀντίπαλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καθίσταται, καὶ πρὸς τούτους γε δή, οἳ καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγύς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄπωθεν πειρῶνται δουλοῦσθαι, πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος ἐλθεῖν (παράδειγμα δὲ ἔχομεν τούς τε ἀντιπέρας Εὐβοέας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος τὸ πολὺ ὡς αὐτοῖς διάκειται), καὶ γνῶναι ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις οἱ πλησιόχωροι περὶ γῆς ὅρων τὰς μάχας ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐς πᾶσαν, ἢν νικηθῶμεν, εἷς ὅρος οὐκ ἀντίλεκτος παγήσεται;

[5] ἐσελθόντες γὰρ βίᾳ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἕξουσιν. τοσούτῳ ἐπικινδυνοτέραν ἑτέρων τὴν παροίκησιν τῶνδε ἔχομεν. εἰώθασί τε οἱ ἰσχύος που θράσει τοῖς πέλας, ὥσπερ Ἀθηναῖοι νῦν, ἐπιόντες τὸν μὲν ἡσυχάζοντα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμυνόμενον ἀδεέστερον ἐπιστρατεύειν, τὸν δὲ ἔξω ὅρων προαπαντῶντα καί, ἢν καιρὸς ᾖ, πολέμου ἄρχοντα ἧσσον ἑτοίμως κατέχειν.

[6] πεῖραν δὲ ἔχομεν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐς τούσδε· νικήσαντες γὰρ ἐν Κορωνείᾳ αὐτούς, ὅτε τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στασιαζόντων κατέσχον, πολλὴν ἄδειαν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ μέχρι τοῦδε κατεστήσαμεν.

[7] ὧν χρὴ μνησθέντας ἡμᾶς τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πρὶν ἔργοις, τούς τε νεωτέρους πατέρων τῶν τότε ἀγαθῶν γενομένων παῖδας πειρᾶσθαι μὴ αἰσχῦναι τὰς προσηκούσας ἀρετάς, πιστεύσαντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἔσεσθαι, οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀνόμως τειχίσαντες νέμονται, καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἃ ἡμῖν θυσαμένοις καλὰ φαίνεται, ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖσδε καὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι ὧν μὲν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνομένους ἐπιόντες κτάσθων, οἷς δὲ γενναῖον τήν τε αὑτῶν αἰεὶ ἐλευθεροῦν μάχῃ καὶ τὴν ἄλλων μὴ δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως, ἀνανταγώνιστοι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπίασιν.’

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. ed. Henry Stuart Jones. Oxford. 1910.

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Current edition Perseus

Ἱστορίαι (Greek) (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).)

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 4.92 focus

[1] Men of Boeotia, it ought never to have so much as entered into the thought of any of us the commanders that, because we find not the Athenians now in Boeotia, it should therefore be unfit to give them battle. For they out of a bordering country have entered Boeotia and fortified in it with intent to waste it, and are indeed enemies in whatsoever ground we find them, or whencesoever they come doing the acts of hostility.

[2] But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him henceforth be of another opinion. For providence, in them that are invaded, endureth not such deliberation concerning their own as may be used by them who, retaining their own, out of desire to enlarge, voluntarily invade the estate of another.

[3] And it is the custom of this country of yours, when a foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him both on your own and on your neighbour's ground alike; but much more you ought to do it against the Athenians when they be borderers.

[4] For liberty with all men is nothing else but to be a match for the cities that are their neighbours. With these, then, that attempt the subjugation not only of their neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not try the utmost of our fortune? We have for example the estate that the Euboeans over against us, and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece, do live in under them. And you must know that though others fight with their neighbours about the bounds of their territories, we, if we be vanquished, shall have but one bound amongst us all, so that we shall no more quarrel about limits.

[5] For if they enter, they will take all our several states into their own possession by force. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians than of other people. And such as upon confidence in their strength invade their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, use to be bold in warring on those that sit still, defending themselves only in their own territories; whereas they be less urgent to those that are ready to meet them without their own limits, or [also] to begin the war when opportunity serveth.

[6] We have experience hereof in these same men. For after we had overcome them at Coroneia, at what time through our own sedition they held our country in subjection, we established a great security in Boeotia, which lasted till this present.

[7] Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our former acts there, and the younger sort, who are the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue of their houses; but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple fortified they unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, the sacrifices we offered him appearing fair, to march against them, and let them see that though they may gain what they covet when they invade such as will not fight, yet men that have the generosity to hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfoughten.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 4.92 focus

[1] ‘Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the Athenians unless we came up with them in Boeotia , is one which should never have entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was to annoy Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in our country; and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever we may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to act as enemies do.

[2] And if any one has taken up with the idea in question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change his mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can scarcely discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking of attacking a neighbour in order to get more.

[3] It is your national habit, in your country or out of it, to oppose the same resistance to a foreign invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives upon your frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so.

[4] As between neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold ones own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to enslave near and far alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out to the last. Look at the condition of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of Hellas , and be convinced that others have to fight with their neighbours for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means one frontier for the whole country, about which no dispute can be made, for they will simply come and take by force what we have.

[5] So much more have we to fear from this neighbour than from another. Besides, people who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours, usually march most confidently against those who keep still, and only defend themselves in their own country, but think twice before they grapple with those who meet them outside their frontier and strike the first blow if opportunity offers.

[6] The Athenians have shown us this themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea , at the time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country, has given great security to Boeotia until the present day.

[7] Remembering this, the old must equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the sons of the heroes of that time, must endeavor not to disgrace their native valour; and trusting in the help of the god whose temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims which in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he wants by attacking some one who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it is to be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their own country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let him go without a struggle.’

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 4.92 focus

„Es hätte, ihr Böotischen Männer, keinem unserer
Feldherrn auch nur der Gedanke kommen dürfen, daß wir uns mit den
Athenern, wenn wir sie nicht mehr auf Böotifchem Grund und Boden
anträfen, nicht in eine Schlacht einlassen sollten. Denn sie sind aus
dem Gränzland herübergekommen, haben auf unserem Gebiet eine
Verschanzung erbaut und schicken sich an, Böotien zu verheeren. Sie
sind doch wohl also unsere Feinde, an welchem Orte sie auch von uns
getroffen werden, und woher sie auch gekommen sein mögen, um sich
als Feinde zu betragen. Wenn aber jetzt Einer dafür halten sollte,
daß jene Ansicht größere Sicherheit geweihre, so ändere er nur seine
Meinung! Denn die Klugheit läßt bei denen, welchen ein Anderer
zu Leibe geht, in Betreff des eigenen Landes nicht solche ängstliche
Ueberlegung zu, wie bei demjenigen, der, im Besitze des eigenen
Grundes und Bodens, von Habgier getrieben, einen Andern aus freien
Stücken angreist. Es ist aber von euren Vätern ererbte Weise, das
Heer eines fremden Angreifers, sei es nun aus dem eigenen, oder auf
fremdem Boden, wieder anzugreifen, und das muß den Athenern
gegenüber, die dazu noch unsere Gränznachbarn sind, am allermeisten
geschehen. Denn darauf, daß man seinen Nachbarn gewachsen ist,
beruht sür Alle die Freiheit; und wie sollte man es gegenüber solchen,
die nicht nur ihre Nachbarn, sondern sogar weit Abgelegene zu knechten
trachten, im Kampfe nicht auf's Aeußerste ankommen lassen! Als
warnendes Beispiel haben wir das vor uns liegende Euböa, wie es
da und auch im größten Theil des übrigen Hellas aussieht. Wir
müssen einsehen, daß, während anderwärts Nachbarn um ihre
Gränzgebiete sich Schlachten liefern, bei uns, wenn wir erst besiegt sind, für
unser ganzes Land unwiderruflich Eine Gränze gesteckt ist; denn sind
sie erst eingedrungen, so werden sie uns mit Gewalt Alles abnehmen.
So viel größer ist die Gefahr, als anderwärts, die uns aus solcher
Nachbarschaft droht! Wer, wie die Athener jetzt, im pochenden Ver- ¹
trauen auf seine Macht Andere angreift, verpflegt denjenigen, der sich
nicht viel rührt und sich nur aus eigenem Boden zur Wehr setzt, um
so ungescheuter mit Krieg zu überziehen, dagegen dem, der ihm über
seine eigenen Gränzen entgegenrückt und, wenn die Gelegenheit es
gibt, selbst angriffsweise verfährt, weniger kräftig zu widerstehen.
Einen Beweis hievon haben wir grade an den Athenern. Denn
dadurch, daß wir sie bei Koronea angegriffen und besiegt haben, damals,
als sie bei unserer inneren Entzweiung die Herrn in unserem Lande
spielten, haben wir dem böotischen Gebiete bis auf diese Tage Ruhe
vor ihnen verschafft. In der Erinnerung daran sollen wir Aelteren
unsern eigenen früheren Thaten wieder gleichkommen, die Jüngeren
aber, als Söhne der Väter, die damals sich als Tapfere gezeigt, sollen
streben, den Tugenden ihres eigenen Blutes keine Schande zu machen.
Vertrauen müssen wir auch, daß der Gott auf unserer Seite stehen
werde, dessen Heiligthum jene gegen göttliches Recht befestigt haben
und wie in ihrem Eigenthume darin schalten, — vertrauen auch auf
die heiligen Opferzeichen, die uns Glück verheißen, und so diese
angreifen und ihnen zeigen, daß, wonach sie streben, sie sich anderwärts
holen sollen, bei Solchen, die nicht zu fechten wissen; daß sie aber bei
Männern, denen es ererbte Pflicht ist, für die Freiheit ihres eigenen
Landes immer im Kampfe einzustehen, fremdes aber nicht mit Unrecht
zu knechten, nicht ohne Kampf davonkommen."

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 4.92 focus

„Hätte es doch keinem unserer Feldherren in den Sinn
kommen sollen, Böotier, daß wir uns mit den Athenern nicht
zu schlagen brauchten, wenn wir sie nicht mehr in Böotien
träfen. Sind sie uns doch über die Grenze ins Land gekommen,
haben hier eine Festung gebaut und wollen Böotien zur Wüste
machen. Folglich sind sie unsere Feinde, kommen sie als solche,
woher sie wollen, wo immer wir sie antreffen. Und wer es
früher auch für richtiger gehalten, sie ziehen zu lassen, möge
sich jetzt eines besseren besinnen. Wenn man sich im eigenen
Lande seiner Haut wehren muß, hat man nicht Zeit zu langer
Überlegung wie der habgierige Nachbar, der sich zu Hause in
aller Ruhe auf einen Raubzug vorbereitet. Seit den Tagen
unserer Väter ist es bei uns immer Grundsatz gewesen, einem
auswärtigen Feinde, der uns angreift, gleichviel ob im eigenen
oder in fremdem Lande unbedingt zu Leibe zu gehen. Und
unseren Nachbarn, den Athenern, gegenüber haben wir um so
mehr Grund, darnach zu verfahren. Die Widerstandskraft den
Nachbarn gegenüber ist ja doch für alle die erste Bedingung
der Freiheit. Und wie sollten wir nicht im Kampfe mit ihnen,
die nicht nur ihre Nachbarn, sondern auch ferne Länder zu
unterjochen suchen, unsere letzte Kraft einsetzen? An Euboia
hier gegenüber haben wir ja das Beispiel; wie sieht eS da
aus, und was herrschen in Griechenland auch sonst fast überall
für Zustände! Und wenn andere mit ihren Nachbarn um
Landesgrenzen Krieg führen, so müssen wir uns klarmachen,
daß, wenn wir besiegt werden, unserem Lande unwiderruflich
nur eine Grenze gezogen werden wird; denn haben sie sich
unseres Landes erst bemächtigt, so werden sie es ganz behalten.
Darum sind die Athener unsere allergefährlichsten Nachbarn.
Ein Feind, der, wie jetzt die Athener, im Vertrauen auf seine
Macht seinen Nachbar angreift, wird, wenn dieser sich zugibt
und höchstens im eigenen Lande wehrt, nun immer anspruchs
voller auftreten, wenn man ihm aber schon jenseits der Grenze
entgegengehkund bei Gelegenheit selbst den Angreifer macht,
schon eher klein beigeben. Wir haben das ja an ihnen selbst
erlebt; denn seitdem wir sie damals, wo sie hier infolge unserer
inneren Zwistigkeiten Herren im Lande waren, bei Koroneia
besiegt, haben sie uns bis jetzt in Ruhe gelassen. Eingedenk
dessen müssen wir Alten wieder so tapfer draufgehen wie da
mals, die Jüngeren aber als Söhne ihrer mutigen Väter sich
bestreben, der alten böotischen Tapferkeit keine Schande zu
machen, und so wollen wir im Vertrauen auf den Beistand
des Gottes, dessen Tempel sie sich so ruchlos zur Festung ge
macht haben, und auf unsere Glück verheißenden Opfer ihnen
zu Leibe gehen, um ihnen zu zeigen, daß sie sich, wenn sie
Eroberungen machen wollen, Leute suchen müssen, die nicht zu
fechten verstehen, sich aber bei uns, die wir zwar nicht dabei
hergekommen sind, fremde Länder zu unterjochen, wohl aber
die Freiheit unseres eigenen Landes mit den Waffen in der
Hand zu verteidigen, nur blutige Köpfe holen."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 4.92 focus

XCII. « Braves Béotiens, il ne devait venir à la pensée d’aucun de nous, chefs de l’armée, qu’il ne convient point de combattre les Athéniens, du moment que nous ne pouvons les atteindre en Béotie ; car c’est la ruine delà Béotie qu’ils poursuivent ; c’est dans ce but qu’ils sont venus, d’un pays voisin, construire ici une forteresse ; ce sont des ennemis, enfin, en quelque lieu que nous les joignions, de quelque part qu’ils viennent faire chez nous acte d’hostilité. Si cependant quelqu’un croit plus prudent de ne pas agir, je veux le dés- abuser. Les calculs de prévoyance qui conviennent quand, sans être inquiété chez soi, on s’en va de propos délibéré et par ambition attaquer autrui, ne sont plus de mise quand on est attaqué et qu’on défend sa patrie. D’ailleurs, c’est pour vous une loi héréditaire, quand l’étranger envahit votre pays, de le combattre indifféremment chez vous ou chez vos voisins. C’est surtout avec les Athéniens, dont le pays confine au nôtre, qu’il est nécessaire d’en agir ainsi, car ce n’est qn’en maintenant hautement son droit à l’égard de ses voisins qu’on assure sa liberté ; surtout lorsque ces voisins aspirent à asservir non-seulement ce qui est sous leur main, mais même les peuples les plus éloignés : comment alors ne pas combattre à outrance ? Nous avons pour exemple l’état d’asservissement où ils tiennent et l’Eubée en face de nous, sur la côte opposée, et la plus grande partie de la Grèce. D’ordinaire, les voisins se font la guerre pour une question de frontière ; mais nous, si nous sommes vaincus, sachons qu’une seule borne sera plantée, qui embrassera sans contestation tout notre territoire¹. Une fois entrés chez nous, ils nous dépouilleront violemment ; tant il est vrai que nous ne saurions avoir de plus dangereux voisinage.

« Quand un peuple attaque ses voisins avec l’insolence de la force, comme aujourd’hui les Athéniens, d’ordinaire il marche avec plus de confiance contre ceux qui restent en repos et se contentent de se défendre chez eux ; mais il est moins disposé à chercher querelle à ceux qui vont l’attendre au delà de leurs frontières, et qui, à l’occasion, commencent la guerre. Nous en avons fait l’expérience avec eux : la victoire que nous avons remportée sur eux à Coronée, lorsqu’ils occupaient ce pays à la faveur de nos dissensions, a procuré depuis lors une entière sécurité à la Béotie. Gardonsen donc le souvenir ; les vieillards pour ne pas rester au-dessous de leurs précédents exploits ; les jeunes gens, les fils de ceux qui se sont alors signalés par leur bravoure, pour ne pas déshonorer des vertus qui sont leur apanage. Mettons notre confiance dans la protection du Dieu dont ils occupent, par un sacrilège, l’enceinte sacrée transformée en forteresse ; ayons foi dans les sacrifices que nous avons offerts, et qui se montrent favorables. Marchons à leur rencontre, et apprenons-leur que, s’ils veulent satisfaire leur cupidité, il leur faut s’attaquer à qui ne se défend pas ; mais qu’avec un peuple généreux, qui s’est toujours fait gloire de défendre son indépendance les armes à la main, sans jamais attenter injustement à celle des autres, ils ne s’en tireront pas sans combat. »

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 4.92 focus

« Il n’aurait dû entrer dans la pensée d’aucun de nos généraux qu’il fallût renoncer à combattre les Athéniens du moment que nous n’avions pu les joindre en Béotie. C’est bien la Béotie qu’ils se préparent à ravager ; c’est chez nous qu’ils sont venus construire une forteresse; enfin ils sont toujours nos ennemis, quel que soit le lieu où nous les atteignions et celui d’où partent leurs attaques.

« Si quelqu’un a pu croire plus prudent de ne pas agir, qu’il se détrompe. Les règles de la prudence ne sont pas les mêmes pour des gens à qui l’on dispute leur territoire, ou pour un peuple qui, maître du sien, attaque sans provocation et par esprit de conquête. Nos pères nous ont appris, en cas digression étrangère, à combattre indifféremment sur notre sol ou sur celui d'autrui.

« Cela est surtout nécessaire à l’égard des Athéniens, dont le pays touche le nôtre. Entre nations limitrophes, l’équilibre des forces maintient seul la liberté. Et comment ne pas lutter à outrance contre des hommes qui prennent à tâche d’asservir tous ceux qu’ils peuvent atteindre de près ou de loin ? Que leur conduite envers nos voisins de l’Eubée et envers la plupart des Grecs nous serve de leçon. Communément c’est pour des limites territoriales que s’élèvent les guerres entre peuples voisins; mais pour nous, si nous succombons, il n’y aura plus dans tout notre pays une seule limite solidement plantée. Une fois chez nous, ils nous dépouilleront violemment: tant il est vrai que leur voisinage est pour nous le pire de tous.

« D’ordinaire ceux qui, à leur exemple, se confient en leur force attaquent avec hardiesse un peuple tranquille, qui se borne à défendre ses foyers; mais ils sont moins ardents contre celui qui va à leur rencontre hors des frontières et qui sait prendre l’offensive dans un moment donné. Nous Pavons éprouvé avec ces mêmes Athéniens. La victoire que nous remportâmes sur eux à Coronée, à une époque ou nos dissensions leur avaient ouvert notre pays, a procuré jusqu’à ce jour une profonde sécurité à la Béotie.

« Que ce souvenir nous excite, nous autres qui sommes âgés, à nous montrer les mêmes que jadis, et les jeunes gens, ceux dont les pères déployèrent alors tant de vaillance, à ne pas ternir des vertus héréditaires. Confions-nous dans la protection de ce dieu, dont leur sacrilège a converti le temple en forteresse; confions-nous dans les victimes qui nous présagent la victoire. Marchons droit aux ennemis, et apprenons-leur que, s’ils veulent assouvir leur convoitise, ils doivent s’attaquer à des peuples qui ne se défendent pas ; mais qu’avec des hommes accoutumés à combattre pour leur liberté sans jamais attenter à celle des autres, ils ne se retireront pas sans avoir soutenu le combat. »

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 4.92 focus

[1] “It should never, men of Boeotia, have even entered the mind of any of us who are in command that we ought not to come to battle with the Athenians unless we should overtake them while still on Boeotian soil. For it was to ravage Boeotia that they came from across the frontier and built a fort in our territory, and they are assuredly equally our enemies wherever they may be caught, and especially on that soil from which they advanced to do the work of enemies.

[2] But as matters stand, if anyone did indeed think that course safer, let him change his mind. For where men are attacked prudence does not admit of such nice calculation regarding their own land as is permitted to those who, secure in their own possessions, in their greed for more wantonly attack others.

[3] Furthermore, it is hereditary with you when an alien army comes against you to ward it off, alike in your own land and in that of your neighbours; and most of all when the invaders are Athenians and moreover upon your borders.

[4] For in dealing with neighbours, it is always equality of force that guarantees liberty; and when the contest is against men like these, who are trying to enslave not only those near by but those far away, is it not necessary to fight to the very last? We have as a warning example their policy toward the Euboeans across the strait as well as toward the greater part of Hellas, and must realize that, whereas others make war with their neighbours about territorial boundaries, for us, if we are conquered, one boundary beyond dispute will be fixed for our whole land; for they will come and take by force all that we have.

[5] So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians than that of others. Besides, people who in the confidence of strength attack their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, are wont to march more fearlessly against one who keeps quiet and defends himself only in his own land, but are less ready to grapple with him who meets them outside of his own boundaries and, if opportunity offers, makes the first attack.

[6] We have a proof of this in these Athenians; for at Coronea,¹ when owing to our internal dissensions they had occupied our land, we defeated them and won for Boeotia great security which has lasted to this day.

[7] Remembering these things, let the older men among us emulate their former deeds, and the younger, sons of fathers who then were brave, try not to disgrace the virtues which are their heritage. Trusting that the god whose sanctuary they have impiously fortified and now occupy will be on our side, and relying on the sacrifices, which appear to be propitious to us, who have offered then, let us advance to meet them and show that if they would get what they covet they must attack those who will not defend themselves, but that men whose noble spirit impels them always to fight for the liberty of their own land and not to enslave that of others unjustly will never let them depart without a battle.”

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 4.92 focus

[1]

Men of Boeotia, it should not have even entered the thoughts of any of us your commanders, that it would not be right to engage with the Athenians, in case we found them no longer in Boeotia. For it is Boeotia that they intend to ravage, after coming from the border territory, and building a fortress in it: and so they are surely our enemies, wherever they may be found, and from whatever country they may have come to act as enemies would.

[2]

But now, if any one has thought this the safer course, let him change his mind on the question. For prudence, in the case of men attacked by others, does not admit of such nice calculation as in the case of those who are enjoying their own, and yet wilfully attack others through coveting more. The custom of your country, too, is to repel alike a foreign force that has invaded you, whether in your own or in your neighbour's territory.

[3]

But against Athenians, and borderers besides, this is far more necessary than against any others. For, with respect to their neighbours, equality in the case of all men constitutes liberty;

[4]

and against these men, most especially, who endeavour to make vassals not only of those who are near them, but of those also who are far away, how can it fail to be our duty to struggle to the very utmost? (for in the Euboeans across the strait, and in the greater part of the rest of Greece, we have an example of ¹ the position in which they stand towards them;) and to be convinced, that with others their neighbours fight about the boundaries of their land, but that in our case there will be fixed for the whole of it, if we are conquered, one boundary, not to be controverted; for they will invade it and take by force whatever we have.

[5]

So much more dangerous neighbours have we in these men than in any others. It is usual, also, with such as through confidence in their power attack those who are near them, as the Athenians are now doing, to march more fearlessly against those who remain quiet, and only defend themselves in their own territory; but to be less ready to grapple with those who meet them beyond their borders, and strike the first blow, if they have an opportunity. And we have had a proof of this in the case of these very men;

[6]

for by conquering them at Coronaea, when they got possession of our country through our own divisions, we won great security for Boeotia, which has lasted up to the present time.

[7]

Remembering which, we ought, the older part of us, to come up to our former deeds, and the younger, as sons of fathers who then behaved so bravely, to strive not to disgrace the noble qualities that by birth belong to them; but to trust that the gods will be on our side, whose sanctuary they have lawlessly fortified, and are using, and to rely on the omens, which, after sacrificing, appear favourable to us; and so to meet these men in battle, and show them that what they want they must go and get by attacking such as will not resist them; but that from those who deem it noble ever to secure by their arms the liberty of their own country, and not to enslave unjustly that of other people, they shall not go away without a struggle.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 4.92 focus

[1] « Debebat quidem, viri Boeoti, ne in mentem qnidem venire cuiquam nostrum, qui magistratum gerimus , non esse rationi consentaneum, nos cum Atheniensibus confligere, si eos non in Boeotia adhuc deprehenderimus. Boeotiam enim, munitionibus ib ea exstructis, ex agro finitimo profecti, sunt vastaturi, atque opinor hostes sunt, quocunque in loco deprehensi fiierint, et undecunque profecti hostilia facinora patrarunt.

[2] Nunc vero si cui non pugnare tutius esse videbatur, is mutet sententiam. Nec enim providentia considerationem aeque patitur in iis, quos alius invadit, et quorum ager in discrimen vocatur, atque in eo, qui sua quidem possidet, sed plura affectans ultro bellum aliis infert.

[3] Vobisque patrium est externum exercitum vos invadentem pariter et in vestro et in alieno solo propulsare. Athenienses vero, qui praeterea finitimi sunt, multo magis propulsare necesse est.

[4] Nam si adversus finitimos libertas omnibus in eo posita est, ut illis aemula virtute obsistant, adversus hos utique, qui etiam non modo finitimos, sed et remotos in servitutem redigere conantur,quo modo non vel in extremam dimicationem descendendum sit? (Exemplum autem ob oculos positum habemus quum Euboenses trans fretum sitos, tum etiam celere Graeciae magnam partem,quo modo erga eos sil affecta) et intelligendum, ceteros quidem de agri finibus cum gentibus finitimis dimicare, nobis vero si vincamur, unicum minime dubium finem de universa terra statutum iri. Nam in eam ingressi, rebus nostris per vim potientur.

[5] Tanto istorum accolarum propinquitas nobis magis, quam aliis, est periculosa. Qui enim potentiae confidentia, ut nunc Athenienses , arma vicinis inferunt, illum quidem, qui est quietus et qui in suo agro tantum se defendit, confidentius invadere consueverunt, eum vero, qui extra fines occurrit, et qui, si occasio fuerit, belli facit initium, minus prompte bello premere.

[6] Hqjus autem rei experimentum adversus istos habemus; quum enim eos ad Coroneam vicissemus, quo tempore propter nostras seditiones agrum nostram occupatum tenebant, magnam Boeotiae securitatem ad boc usque tempus praestitimus.

[7] Quorum nos memores operam dare oportet, ut et majores natu rebus olim gestis pares simus, et minores natu patrum illorum, qui tunc viri fortes fuerunt, filii, ne domesticas virtutes dedecorent, sed persuasum habentes, deum a nobis futurum, cujus fanum isti nefarie muro septum tenent, et sacrificiis freti, quae nobis immolantibus laetum ac felicem rerum eventum promittunt, adversus hos tendamus, et demonstremus, ut ea, quae concupiscunt, bellum non propulsantibus inferendo comparent, illos vero, quorum patria generositas fert, ut et suum ipsorum agrum semper liberent pugnando, nec alienum in servitutem injuste redigant, non permissuros, ut isti e suis finibus sine certamine discedant.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 4.92 focus

« Valorosi Beozii , egli iacea di mestieri che a nissuno noi magistrati non venisse pure in pensiero , che non voleasi venire a battaglia con gli Ateniesi, eccetto che se li trovassimo tuttora nella Beozia. Imperciocché con quel riparo da essi piantato ai conGni della Beozia vogliono avere un luogo onde muoversi a rovinarla : ond’é che ci sono certamente nemici ove che si trovino e dovunque partano per commettere ostilità. Che se ancora vi è cui sembri più sicuro il non combatterli, costui muti pensiero : attesoché la prudenza in chi è assalito da altri con perìcolo di perdere il proprio non ammette una ponderazione così esatta , come in chi ritenendo le proprie cose, ma bramandone delle maggiori, invade altrui per mero capriccio. Inoltre è vostra patria costumanza far fronte agli assalti di straniero esercito nelle vostre terre del pari che nelle altrui : ciò che dovete fare con assai maggior sollecitudine contro gli Ateniesi che vi confinano. Conciossiaché se, trattandosi di confinanti, la libertà consiste nella parità delle forze ; come non dovrassi venire fino all'ultimo Ar\ cimento contro costoro che non solo i vicini ma anche i lontani si brigano di fare schiavi ? Ci sia d’ esempio Io stato a che son da loro ridotti gli Eubeesi dell’ opposto lido , e la maggior parte degli altri Greci. Dobbiamo altresì persuaderci che laddove gli altri battagliano coi loro vicini per i termini del territorio, noi all’opposto , se restiam vinti, non potremo piantare in tuuo il nostro dominio un sol termine incontrastabile : perocché entrati costoro nelle nostre terre vorranno a fora insignorirsi di tutto ; cotanto la vicinanza di costoro più che degli altri, è per noi pericolosa. Considerate poi che quelli i quali (siccome ora gli Ateniesi ) baldanzosi di loro forze assaltano altrui, sogliono portar con più audacia le armi contro chi stia a sè , e solo si difenda nel proprio paese ; ma insistono con meno ardore contro chi si faccia innanzi ad incontrarli fuori dei confini, e ad attaccarli se l’occasione si presenti. Ne abbiamo contro di loro l’esperienza ; allorché per sedizione insorta avendo essi occupato il nostro suolo, noi li vincemmo a Cheronea e ristabilimmo in Beozia quella sicurezza che dura anche adesso. Le quali cose rammemorando noi più vecchi sforziamoci di imitare i fatti d’allora, e voi giovanetti figli di padri già valorosi procurate di non profanare quelle virtù che per retaggio vi appartengono. Pertauto affidati al Nume che sarà per noi, il cui santuario ritengono sacrilegamente afforzato , ed alle vittime che nei nostri sacrifizi ci si mostrano propizie , corriamo tutti ad affrontarli, e mostriamo loro che assalendo gente che non sappiano respingerli, potranno appagare le proprie voglie ; ma trattandosi di un popolo che per innata generosità vuole combattendo mantener sempre libera la sua patria, e non assoggettare ingiustamente l’altrui, e’ non torneranno indietro senza venire al paragone dell'armi ».

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.92

ed. Henry Stuart Jones

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