[1] "Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city nor of the most afflicted with war that am now to speak and to deliver the opinion which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily.

[2] Touching war, how calamitous a thing it is, to what end should a man, particularising the evils thereof, make a long speech before men that already know it? For neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to enter into war, nor the fear of them divert any man from it, when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it so falls out that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger; and the other prefers danger before present loss.

[3] But lest they should both the one and the other do it unseasonably, exhortations unto peace are profitable, and will be very much worth to us if we will follow them at this present.

[4] For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure their own, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which if it succeed not so well that we may depart satisfied every man with reason, we will be at wars again.

[1] ‘If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my city is the least in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war, but in order to state publicly what appears to me to be the best policy for the whole island.

[2] That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to every one that it would be tedious to develop it. No one is forced to engage in it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the gain appears greater than the danger, while he latter would rather stand the risk than put up with any immediate sacrifice.

[3] But if both should happen to have chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way, advice to make peace would not be unserviceable;

[4] and this, if we did but see it, is just what we stand most in need of at the present juncture.
  I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first, in order to serve our own several interests, that we are now, in view of the same interests, debating how we can make peace; and that if we separate without having as we think our rights, we shall go to war again.

[1] "The city which I represent, Siceliots, is not the weakest, nor is it suffering most in the war; but I propose to speak in the general interest, declaring the opinion which seems to me the best for Sicily as a whole.

[2] As for the miseries which war entails, why should one by expressly stating all that can be said make a long harangue in the presence of those who know? For no one is either forced to make war through ignorance of what it is, or deterred from making it by fear, if he thinks he will get some advantage from it. What really happens is this, that to one side the gains appear greater than the terrors, while the other deliberately prefers to undergo the dangers rather than submit to a temporary disadvantage;

[3] but if it should turn out that these two lines of action are both inopportune, each for the side which adopts it, then some profit may come from exhortations which advise a compromise.

[4] And so with us at the present time, if we could be persuaded of the wisdom of this course it would be to our great advantage; for each of us began the war in the first place because we desired to promote our private interests. So now let us endeavour by setting forth our conflicting claims to become reconciled with each other; and then, if we do not after all succeed in securing, each of us, what is fair and just before we part, we shall go to war again.

[1] "It is not because I am of a city that is either the least powerful, or the most distressed by hostilities, that I shall address you, Sicilians, but in order publicly to state what appears to me the best policy for the whole of Sicily.

[2] And now with regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need one particularize all the evil involved in it, and so make a long speech before those who are acquainted with it? For no one is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, deterred From it fear, should he think that e will gain any advantage; but it is the lot of the former to imagine the gains greater than the dangers; and the latter will lace the perils rather than put up with any present loss.

[3] But if both should happen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace would be useful And this would be most serviceable to us too at the present time, if we did but believe it.

[4] For it was surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests that we both went to war at first, and are endeavouring by means of conference to come to terms again with each other; and if each one should not succeed in going away with what is fair, we shall proceed to hostilities again.

[1] « Non ex ea civitate, viri Sicilienses, quae aut minima sit, aut bello maxime lahorel, egoortus verba faciam, sed sententiam proponens eam, quae in totius Siciliae commune bonum optima esse mihi videtur.

[2] Ac bellum quidem quam tristis sit res, cur quis omnia mala, quae in eo insunt, inter scientes enumerans oratione prolixa utatur? Nemo enim aut propter imperitiam hoc agere cogitur, aut metu deterretur, si quid amplius commodi se adepturum speret. Sed usu venit, ut bis quidem lucra majora, quam pericula esse videantur, illi vero quodvis discrimen adire, quam ullam in praesenti jacturam facere malunt;

[3] haec ipsa autem si non forte alterutri opportune faciant, admonitiones de facienda gratiae reconciliatione sunt utiles.

[4] De quo si nobis quoque in praesentia persuadeatur, plurimi faciendum erit; quod enim suis quique rebus privatim bene consulere meditabamur, et prius bellum suscepimus, et nunc inter nos disceptando operam damus, ut in pristinam gratiam redeamus, et, si non successerit, ut unusquisque nostrum suum jus obtinens hinp discedat, iterum ad arma redibimus.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ² , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ³ , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ⁴