[1] After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should be kept in bonds till there should be made some agreement; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them.

[2] They took order also [in the same assembly] for the settling of the garrison at Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country (for Pylus is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians), infested Laconia with robberies and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language.

[3] The Lacedaemonians, not having in times past been acquainted with robberies and such war as that, and because their Helotes ran over to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country, took the matter much to heart; and though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylus and of their men.

[4] But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, yet were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylus.

[1] Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in prison until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their country in the interval, to bring them out and put them to death.

[2] Meanwhile the defence of Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians from Naupactus sent to their old country, to which Pylos formerly belonged, some of the likeliest of their number, and began a series of incursions into Laconia , which their common dialect rendered most destructive.

[3] The Lacedaemonians, hitherto without experience of incursions or a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to be seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness to betray this to the Athenians began to send envoys to Athens , and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners.

[4] The Athenians, however, kept grasping at more, and dismissed envoy after envoy without their having effected anything. Such was the history of the affair of Pylos .

[1] When the captives were brought to Athens, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison until some agreement should be reached, but if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, to bring them out and put them to death.

[2] They also placed a garrison in Pylos, and the Messenians at Naupactus, regarding this territory as their fatherland—for Pylos belongs to the country that was once Messenia—sent thither such of their own number as were best fitted for the task and proceeded to ravage the Laconian territory, and they did a great deal of damage, since they were men of the same speech as the inhabitants.

[3] As for the Lacedaemonians, they had never before experienced predatory warfare of this kind, and therefore, when the Helots began to desert and there was reason to fear that the revolutionary movement might gain still further headway in their territory, they were uneasy, and, in spite of their desire not to betray their alarm to the Athenians, kept sending envoys to them in the endeavour to recover Pylos and the prisoners.

[4] But the Athenians constantly made greater demands and the envoys, although they came again and again, were always sent home unsuccessful. Such were the events at Pylos.

[1] On the arrival of the men, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison, fill some arrangement should be made; and if the Lacedaemonians should before that invade their territory, to take them out and put them to death.

[2] They also arranged for the defence of Pylus; and the Messenians of Naupactus sent to the place, as to the land of their fathers, (for Pylus is a part of what was formerly the Messenian country,) such of their men as were most fit for the service, and plundered Laconia, and annoyed them most seriously by means of their common dialect.

[3] The Lacedaemonians having had no experience aforetime in such a predatory kind of warfare, and finding their Helots deserting, and fearing that they might see their country revolutionized to even a still greater extent, were not easy under it; but, although unwilling to show this to the Athenians, they sent ambassadors to them, and endeavoured to recover Pylus and the men.

[4] They, however, were grasping at greater advantages, and though they often went to them, sent them back without effecting any thing. These then were the things that happened about Pylus.

[1] Quum autem captivi Athenas delati essent, Athenienses eos in vinculis asservare decreverunt, donec aliquam compositionem facerent; sed si Peloponnesii prius in agrum suum irrupissent, eos eductos occidere.

[2] In Pylo autem praesidium collocarunt, et Messenii, qui Naupacti erant, huc ut in patriam suam (Pylus enim est in eo agro, qui quondam Messeniorum fuit) ex suorum civium numero missis, qui maxime idonei erant, agrum Laconicum latrociniis infestabant, maximisque damnis alliciebant, quod eadem lingua uterentur.

[3] Lacedaemonii vero, quod superiore tempore latrociniorum et hujusmodi belli nescii erant, simul etiam quod Helotes ad hostem transfugiebant, et veriti, ne gravior aliqua rerum novarum molitio contra se in suo agro fieret, haec non facile ferebant, sed quamvis Atheniensibus manifesti esse nollent, tamen legatos ad eos mittebant, et Pylum et captivos recipere conabantur.

[4] At illi majora affectabant, et quum saepius ad eos proficiscerentur, ipsos re infecta remittebant. Atque haec quidem circa Pylum gesta sunt

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ² , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ³ , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ⁴