Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 8.46

[1] Moreover, he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end of the war, nor to fetch in the Phoenician fleet which was making ready, nor take more men into pay, whereby to put the whole power both by sea and land into the hands of one, but to let the dominion remain divided into two, that the king, when one side troubled him, might set upon it with the other;

[2] whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one, he will want by whom to pull down those that hold it unless with great danger and cost he should come and try it out himself; but thus the danger would be less chargeable, he being but at a small part of the cost; and he should wear out the Grecians one against another and himself in the meantime remain in safety.

[3] He said further that the Athenians were fitter to partake dominion with him than the other for that they were less ambitious of power by land and that their speeches and actions tended more to the king's purpose; for that they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, that is to say, for themselves as touching the dominion by sea, and for the king as touching the Grecians in the king's territories; whereas the Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, were come to set them free; and it was not likely but that they that were come to deliver the Grecians from the Grecians will, if they overcome the Athenians, deliver them also from the barbarians.

[4] He gave counsel therefore, first to wear them out both and then, when he had clipped, as near as he could, the wings of the Athenians, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his country.

[5] And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accordingly, as far as by his actions can be conjectured. For hereupon he gave himself to believe Alcibiades as his best counsellor in these affairs, and neither paid the Peloponnesians their wages nor would suffer them to fight by sea; but pretending the coming of the Phoenician fleet, whereby they might afterwards fight with odds, he overthrew their proceedings and abated the vigour of their navy, before very puissant, and was in all things else more backward than he could possibly dissemble.

[1] Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same hands; but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of one element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to call in the other.

[2] For if the command of the sea and land were united in one hand, he would not know where to turn for help to overthrow the dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and go through with the struggle at great expense and hazard. The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of the expense and without risk to himself.

[3] Besides, he would find the Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as they did not aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon principles and with a practice most advantageous to the king; being prepared to combine to conquer the sea for Athens , and for the king all the Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them also from the barbarian Mede , unless overthrown by him in the meanwhile.

[4] Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them both out at first, and after docking the Athenian power as much as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians.

[5] In the main Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept the Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea, but ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds in their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war that was too plain to be mistaken.

Dem Tissaphernes redete er zu, er solle sich doch nicht
allzusehr beeilen, den Krieg zur Entscheidung zu bringen, und nicht
durch Herbeirufung einer Phönikischen Flotte, welche er ausrüsten
ließ, oder durch Soldzahlungen an noch mehr Hellenen einer und
derselben Hellenischen Macht die Obmacht zu Land und zu Wasser
absichtlich in die Hände spielen; er möge vielmehr zwischen beiden
Parteien die Herrschaft gleich getheilt sein lassen; denn so habe der
König immer die Möglichkeit, wenn der eine Theil ihm lästig werde, den
andern gegen jenen aufzuhetzen. Würde aber die Herrschaft zu Land
und zu Wasser in Einer Hand vereinigt, so werde er in Verlegenheit
sein, mit .wessen Mithilfe er die Herrschenden bezwingen könne; er
müßte denn mit großen Kosten nnd unter großen Gefahren selber
auftreten und wieder einmal einen Entscheidungskampf wagen wollen.
Viel einfacher sei es, mit einem geringen Theil desselben Aufwandes
und zugleich mit vollkommener eigener Sicherheit die Hellenen sich
unter einander aufreiben zulassen. Vortheilhafter für den König sei eS
aber, wenn die Athener Theilhaber an seiner Herrschaft würden; denn
sie strebten weniger nach Eroberung des festen Landes, und der
ausgesprochene Zweck und die Art ihrer Kriegführung stimmten besser
zum Vortheil der Perser. Denn sie gingen darauf aus, sich selbst
einen Theil der Inseln zu unterwerfen und damit zugleich auch dem
Tissaphernes diejenigen Hellenen, welche in des Königs Gebiet
wohnten; jene aber seien im Gegentheil als Befreier gekommen, und eS
habe doch keine Wahrscheinlichkeit für sich, daß die Lakedämonier jetzt
Hellenen von der Herrschaft der Athener, die doch auch Hellenen seien,
befreien, und nicht auch von der der Barbaren freimachen, wenn nicht
gar einmal deren ganze Macht vernichten wollten. Er rieth ihm
also sür's Erste, beide Theile sich schwächen zu lassen und beide mög- ¹
lichst zu verkürzen, bis er schließlich auch die Peloponnefier selbst
wieder heimschicken könne. Und in der That stimmte dieß Alles zu den
Absichten des Tissaphernes,sofern wenigstens aus dem wirklich
Geschehenen darauf zu schließen ist. Er glaubte deßhalb auch, daß
AlkibiadeS in diesen Dingen ihm den besten Rath ertheilt habe, und im
Vertrauen auf ihn lieferte er den Peloponnesiern die Verpflegung nur
kärglich und ließ eS nicht nur nicht-zu einer Seeschlacht kommen,
sondern schadete ihnen auch dadurch, daß er fälschlich vorgab, die
Pbönikischen Schiffe würden kommen, und sie würden so mit
überlegener Macht kämpfen. Auf diese Weise benahm er der
peloponnesischen Seemacht/die bereits einen so großen Aufschwung genommen
hatte, die Möglichkeit, sich auf's Glänzendste zu entwickeln, und auch
im Uebrigen war seine lässige Theilnahme am Kriege viel zu
ausfallend, als daß es nicht hätte bemerkt werden sollen..

XLVI En même temps il conseillait à Tissaphernes de ne pas trop se hâter de terminer la guerre, de bien se garder de donner à un même peuple l’empire sur terre et sur mer, soit en faisant venir, comme il s’y disposait, des vaisseaux phéniciens, soit en prenant à sa solde un plus grand nombre de Grecs; mais de laisser au contraire la puissance partagée entre les deux peuples, afin que le Roi, inquiété par l’un, pût toujours lui opposer l’autre. Que si au contraire l’empire de la terre et de la mer se trouvait concentré dans les mêmes mains, il ne saurait à quels alliés recourir pour abattre la puissance prépondérante; à moins qu’il ne voulût s’engager lui-même contre elle dans une lutte coûteuse et périlleuse; que ce serait, au contraire, amoindrir les risques, réduire la dépense à peu de chose et assurer sa propre sécurité que de détruire les Grecs les uns par les autres. Il ajouta qu’il n’y aurait pas autant d’inconvénients à associer à sa puissance les Athéniens, dont les prétentions portaient bien moins sur le continent, et dont les principes et les actes à la guerre étaient mieux en harmonie avec ses intérêts; qu’ils soumettraient la mer à leur propre domination, et aideraient le Roi à établir son autorité sur tous les Grecs qui habitaient son empire; que les Lacédémoniens s’annon- çaient au contraire comme libérateurs; qu’il n’était pas vraisemblable, dès lors, que, venant maintenant pour affranchir les Grecs du joug des Grecs, ils ne voulussent pas aussi les délivrer de celui des barbares, si l’on ne parvenait un jour à les écarter eux-mêmes. Il l’engagea donc à affaiblir d’abord les deux peuples l’un par l’autre, à entamer ensuite le plus possible la puissance athénienne, et à expulser alors les Péloponnésiens du pays.

Tissaphernes, du reste, partageait la plupart de ces vues, à en juger du moins par sa conduite. Enchanté de ces conseils d’Alcibiade, il lui donna toute sa confiance, pourvut mal à la subsistance des Péloponnésiens et ne les laissa pas combattre sur mer. Tout en leur disant que la flotte phénicienne allait arriver, et qu’on combattrait alors avec des forces plus que suffisantes, il ruina leurs affaires, épuisa leur marine, arrivée alors à une remarquable puissance, et en tout ne prit plus part à la guerre qu’avec une froideur trop manifeste pour n’être pas remarquée.

Alcibiade exhortait encore Tissapherne à ne pas trop se hâter de terminer la guerre, et à ne pas donner au même peuple l’empire de la terre et de la mer, soit en faisant venir, comme il en avait l’intention, la flotte phénicienne, soit en soudoyant un plus grand nombre de Grecs. Il valait mieux, lui disait-il, laisser la prépondérance indécise, afin que le roi, lorsqu’il aurait à se plaindre de l’un des deux partis, pût toujours lui opposer l’autre ; si au contraire la force continentale et la force maritime étaient concentrées dans les mêmes mains, il ne saurait plus à quels alliés recourir pour abattre la puissance prédominante , à moins qu’il ne voulût un jôur s’engager lui-même dans une lutte dispendieuse et pleine de périls; il était bien plus simple, moins coûteux et plus sûr pour lui de laisser les Grecs s’entre-détruire. Mieux vaut, ajoutait-il, partager l’empire avec les Athéniens ; moins ambitieux du côté de la terre ferme et plus accommodants soit en actions soit en paroles , ils soumettent la mer à leur autorité, mais ils abandonnent au roi les Grecs qui habitent son empire ; les Lacédémoniens au contraire se posent en libérateurs ; dès lors il n’est pas à croire que, venant pour affranchir les Grecs de la domination d’autres Grecs, ils ne veuillent pas aussi les délivrer de celle des Barbares, à moins qu’on ne les empêche de terrasser les Athéniens. Il lui conseillait donc de les affaiblir les uns au moyen des autres ; puis, lorsqu’il aurait autant que possible amoindri la puissance athénienne, de se tourner alors contre les Péloponésiens et d’en débarrasser le pays.

Tissapherne entra en grande partie dans ces vues, à en juger du moins par sa conduite. Charmé des avis d’Alcibiade, il lui donna toute sa confiànce, fournit irrégulièrement la solde aoi Péloponésiens, et ne leur permit pas de livrer une bataille navale. En affirmant que la flotte phénicienne allait venir et qu'on aurait alors des forces de reste, il ruina leurs affaires et paralysa leur marine, si florissante jusqu’à ce moment. Enfin, dans toute la part qu’il prit à cette guerre, il manifesta trop d’inertie pour qu'on pût méconnaître ses véritables intentions.

[1] Alcibiades also urged Tissaphernes not to be too eager to bring the war to an end, nor to take such a course, either by bringing there the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping or by providing pay for a larger number of Hellenes, as would give the command of both the land and the sea to the same people, but to let the dominion be divided between the two sides, so that it would be possible for the King to lead the one party or the other against those that were troublesome to him.

[2] But if the dominion of both land and sea were united, the King himself would have no one with whom he could co-operate in destroying the stronger, and would have no alternative but sooner or later to rise up himself ¹ and, at great expense and risk, fight a decisive struggle. The cheaper course was this—at a small fraction of the expense and at the same time with security to himself to wear the Hellenes out one upon the other.

[3] The more suitable partners, he said, with whom to share the sovereignty were the Athenians; for they were less desirous of possessions on land and both their principles and practice in carrying on war were most consistent with his interests; for whereas the Athenians would co-operate with him in making subject to themselves the department of the sea and to him such of the Hellenes as lived in the King's country, the Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, had come to liberate these. It was not reasonable, he added, to suppose that the Lacedaemonians would now be liberating the Hellenes from men who, like themselves, were Hellenes, and would not liberate them from the Persians who were Barbarians, unless these sooner or later got them out of the way.

[4] He therefore urged him, first to wear out both sides, then to curtail the power of the Athenians as much as possible, and finally to get the Peloponnesians out of his country.

[5] And Tissaphernes was more inclined to this course, so far as it was possible to conjecture from what he was doing. For he consequently gave his support and confidence to Alcibiades, as though he thought his advice in the matter good, and not only furnished wretched maintenance to the Peloponnesians, but also would not allow them to fight at sea; instead, he kept telling them that the Phoenician ships would come and that they would then contend with superabundant strength; and thus he injured their cause and diminished the vigour of their fleet, which had been very strong; and in general it was too evident to escape notice that he was not zealously co-operating in the war.

[1] He likewise advised Tissaphernes

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5] Tissaphernes adopted these views in the main, so far at least as might be conjectured from his actions. For having on this account placed himself in the confidence of Alcibiades, as of one who had given him good advice on the subject, he both scantily supplied the Peloponnesians with money, and would not allow them to fight by sea; but by telling them that the Phoenician fleet should come to them, and that so they should contend with superabundant strength, he greatly injured their cause, and took off the vigour of their navy, which had been very great; and in all other respects, too evidently to escape observation, he wanted hearty zeal in cooperating with them.

[1] Suadebat tamen etiam Tissapherni, ne nimium properaret bellum finire, neve vel accitis Phoenicum navibus, quas instruere statuerat, vel majori Graecorum numero mercede concessa iisdem et terrae et maris imperium tradere vellet, sed sineret utrosque separatim imperium habere, et regi licere in eos, a quibus quoque tempore offenderetur, alteros immittere.

[2] Si vero in unum coisset terras marisque imperium, non habiturum eum, quorum auxilio opprjmeret eos, qui rerum polerenlur, nisi vellet ipsemet aliquando copiis adductis cum ingenti et impensa et periculo inire certamen. Minoris autem pericula constare, si tenui sumptus particula et simul sine ullo suo periculo, ipsos Graecos inter se attereret.

[3] Addebat etiam, Athenienses imperii socios illi commodiores fore; eos enim minus terrestris imperii appetentes esse et rerum gerendarum rationem regi maxime convenientem verbis faclisque sequi; nam hos quidem servitutem propagantes una cum eo et sibi ipsis prosus portione mare subjecturos, et illi eos, quotquot in terra-regis Graeci incolerent; alteros vero contra libertatem ferentes adesse, nec consentaneum videri, hoc agere Lacedaemonios, ut a se ipsis quidem [Graecis] nunc Graecos liberent, ab illis vero [barbaris] eosdem non liberent, nisi forte si illos (Athenienses) non everterint.

[4] Suadebat igitur illi, ut primo utrosque attereret, et ubi quam maxima ab Atheniensium rebus resecuisset, tunc demum Peloponnesios, abigeret ex sua regione.

[5] Atque Tissaphernes magna ex parte hanc rationem sequebatur, quantum ex iis, quae fiebant, conjicere licebat. Alcibiadi enim ob haec, ut de his bene monenti, cum fiducia totum se committens et stipendium Peloponnesiis parce dabat, neque navale praelium committere sinebat, sed etiam dicendo, naves Phoenicum venturas, et ex abundanti certaturos, res evertit, et navalem eorum potentiam in ipso summo flore constitutam, quum vel maxime firma extitisset, abstulit et alioqui manifestius quam ut latere posset, animum parum promptum in bello communiter gerendo prodebat.

Inoltre Alcibiade consigliava Tissaferne che non si desse troppa pena di terminare la guerra ; nè, col far venire le navi fenicie che andava lentamente preparando, e pagar cosi gli stipendii a un maggior numero, volesse riunire in un sol popolo l' imperio marittimo e terrestre ; lasciasse anzi che fosse diviso tra due , acciocché il re potesse spingere l’uno contro l'altro che gli fosse molesto. Gonciossiachè riunito che sia in un solo il dominio di terra e di mare , egli non avrà con chi associarsi ad abbatterne il possessore ; a meno che non voglia , quando che sia , moversi da per sè a quell’ impresa con suo gran dispendio e pericolo. Ma i pericoli ai quali si va incontro con tenue spesa sono più leggeri ; e di più il re potrà con sua sicurezza lasciare i Greci logorarsi tra loro. A partecipar poi con lui dell’ imperio , mostrava gli Ateniesi esser più a proposito, perchè meno aspiravano al dominio di terra , e guerreggiavano con mire e modi ad esso confacentissimi.

Imperocché essi vorranno assoggettarsi le terre marittime, e lasceranno in potere del re quanti Greci abitano ne’suoi stati; laddove i Lacedemoni all’opposto verrebbero per liberarli : e non era da credere che costoro i quali intendon di liberare i Greci dai Greci, non vogliano sottrarli dal giogo dei barbari Persiani, quand’ anche non riescano a cacciare i barbari stessi : però lo consigliava a lasciare primieramente logorarsi le due Repubbliche tra loro ; e tarpate l’ali più che potesse agli Ateniesi, allora finalmente rimandar da’suoi stati i Peloponnesi. E così, più che altro, la pensava Tissaferne , almeno per quanto si poteva conghietturare dal suo operare. Poiché abbandonatosi per queste ragioni alla fede di Alcibiade, come di buono consigliatore , teneva scarsi nelle paghe i Peloponnesi , nè consentiva che venissero a battaglia navale ; ma col dire che doveano arrivare le navi fenicie, e che allora combatterebbero con forze superiori , rovinò le cose loro, tolse all7 armata quel vigore grandissimo che ella avea acquistato, c nel resto mostrassi contrario anche troppo apertamente per potersi celare.