Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.81

[1] In the meantime the Syracusians and their confederates, as soon as day appeared and that they knew the Athenians were gone, most of them accusing Gylippus as if he had let them go with his consent, followed them with speed the same way, which they easily understood they were gone, and about dinner time overtook them.

[2] When they were come up to those with Demosthenes, who were the hindmost and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night, they fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian horsemen hemmed them in and forced them up into a narrow compass, the more easily now because they were divided from the rest.

[3] Now the army of Nicias was gone by this time one hundred and fifty furlongs further on. For he led away the faster because he thought not that their safety consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily, but rather in a speedy retreat, and then only fighting when they could not choose.

[4] But Demosthenes was both in greater and more continual toil, in respect that he marched in the rear and consequently was pressed by the enemy; and seeing the Syracusians pursuing him, he went not on but put his men in order to fight, till by his stay he was encompassed and reduced, he and the Athenians with him, into great disorder. For being shut up within a place enclosed round with a wall, and which on either side had a way [open] amongst abundance of olive trees, they were charged from all sides at once with the enemy's shot.

[5] For the Syracusians assaulted them in this kind, and not in close battle, upon very good reason. For to hazard battle against men desperate was not so much for theirs as for the Athenians' advantage. Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves somewhat, because they were loth to wear themselves out before the end of the business, and thought by this kind of fight to subdue and take them alive.

[1] Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that the Athenians were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let them escape on purpose, and hastily pursuing by the road which they had no difficulty in finding that they had taken, overtook them about dinner-time.

[2] They first came up with the troops under Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in disorder, owing to the night-panic above referred to, and at once attacked and engaged them, the Syracusan horse surrounding them with more ease now that they were separated from the rest, and hemming them in on one spot.

[3] The division of Nicias was five or six miles on in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking that under the circumstances their safety lay not in staying and fighting, unless obliged, but in retreating as fast as possible, and only fighting when forced to do so.

[4] On the other hand, Demosthenes was, generally speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear left him the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order to form his men for battle, and so lingered until he was surrounded by his pursuers and himself and the Athenians with him placed in the most distressing position, being huddled into an enclosure with a wall all round it, a road on this side and on that, and olive-trees in great number, where missiles were showered in upon them from every quarter.

[5] This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good reason adopted in preference to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a struggle with desperate men was now more for the advantage of the Athenians than for their own; besides, their success had now become so certain that they began to spare themselves a little in order not to be cut off in the moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was, they would be able in this way to subdue and capture the enemy.

Als es nun Tag geworden war und die Syrakusaner und
ihre Bundesgenossen sahen, daß die Athener entwischt seien, so
beschuldigten die Meisten von ihnen den GylippoS', er habe sie
absichtlich entkommen lassen. Doch machten sie sich allsogleich zur
Verfolgung auf, und da leicht zu sehen war, wo jene marschirt seien, so
trafen sie um die Zeit des Frühmahls auf sie. Als sie nun mit den
Leuten des Demosthenes zusammenstießen, welche die Nachhut hatten
und langsamer und unordentlicher marschirten, da sie in der Nacht in
Verwirrung gerathen waren, so fielen sie dieselben allsogleich mit den
Waffen an, und die Reiterei der Syrakusaner schloß sie mit leichter
Mühe ein, da sie von den Vorderen getrennt waren, und trieb sie auf
einen Platz zusammen. Das Heer des Nikias indeß hatte einen
Vorsprung von fünfzig Stadien (1Meile), denn Nikias führte sie in
größerer Schnelle, indem er glaubte, ihre Rettung liege jetzt nicht ¹
darin, freiwillig Stand zu halten und zu fechten, sondern darin,
möglichst rasch weiter zu ziehen und sich nur so weit in Gefechte
einzulassen, als man durchaus dazu gezwungen werde. Demostyenes aber
hatte größere und ununterbrochene Anstrengungen gehabt, da er die
Nachhut bildete und die Feinde über ihn zuerst herfielen, und als er
jetzt sah, daß die Syrakusaner ihn verfolgten, so stellte er sich,
anstatt weiter zu marshciren, in Schlachtordnung, bis er über diese
Verzögerung von jenen ganz eingeschlossen wurde und nun mit sammt
seinen Athenern in die größte Bestürzung gerieth. Sie sahen sich
nämlich abgeschnitten und auf einen Platz zusammengedrängt, den
ringsum eine Mauer einschloß, mit Ausgängen aus beiden Seiten,
und der mit vielen Oelbäumen bepflanzt war, und von allen Seiten
wurden sie beschossen. Solcher Angriffe nämlich bedienten sich die
Syrakusaner anstatt des Kampfes Fuß an Fuß, und mit Recht, denn
einen Nahkampf mit verzweifelten Menschen zu wagen, mußte eher
zum Nutzen der Athener ausfallen, als zum ihrigen; und dann
wollten sie auch, weil sie schon ganz entschieden im Glück waren, ihre
Leute schonen und nicht noch zu guter Letzt aufreiben lassen, da sie
ohnehin auf diese Art die Athener gänzlich aufreiben und in ihre
Gewalt bringen würden.

LXXXI. Cependant les Syracusains et leurs alliés s’étaient aperçus, dès qu’il fit jour, du départ des Athéniens. La plupart accusaient Gylippe de les avoir à dessein laissés échapper. Ils reconnurent aisément la route qu’ils avaient suivie, se mirent vivement à leur poursuite et les atteignirent à l’heure du dîner. La division de Démosthènes était restée en arrière, marchant plus lentement et avec moins d’ordre, par suite dé la confusion qui s’y était mise pendant la nuit; dès qu’ils l’eurent jointe; ils fondirent sur elle et engagèrent le combat. La cavalerie syracusaine enveloppa sans peine cette multitude disséminée, et la refoula à l’étroit sur elle-même. La division de Nicias était en avant, à une distance de cinquante stades. Nicias, en effet, avait fait presser la marche, persuadé qu’en pareil cas le moyen d’échapper n’est pas d’attendre volontairement l’ennemi et de le combattre, mais bien de se soustraire le plus vite possible, en ne combattant qu’à la dernière extrémité. Démosthènes, au contraire, s’était trouvé plus exposé et d’une manière plus continue : car, marchant le dernier, il avait été le premier assailli par l’ennemi; d’un autre côté, au moment où il apprit que les Syracusains le poursuivaient, il avait moins songé à gagner du terrain qu’à se mettre en bataille, et, pendant qu’il perdait ainsi les instants, l’ennemi l’avait enveloppé. Général et soldats furent frappés de stupeur : refoulés dans un clos entouré d’un petit mur, bordé de part et d’autre par une route, et couvert d’oliviers, ils étaient de toutes parts accablés de traits. Les Syracusains préféraient, avec raison, ce genre d’attaque à une lutte corps à corps; car un combat en règle contre des hommes au désespoir était tout à l’avantage des Athéniens. D’ailleurs, le succès désormais assuré faisait que chacun se ménageait pour n’en pas perdre à l’avance le fruit, persuadé que cette tactique suffisait pour réduire l’ennemi et s’en rendre maître.

Dès qu’il fit jour et que les Syracusains et leurs alliés se furent aperçus de la disparition des Athéniens, ils accusèrent pour la plupart Gylippe de les avoir volontairement laissé échapper. Ils n’eurent pas de peine à reconnaître la route qu’ils avaient prise, et se mirent en toute hâte à leur poursuite; ils les rejoignirent avant l’heure du dîner. Le corps de Démosthène, formant J’arrière-garde, avait marché lentement et sans ordre, par suite du trouble de la nuit ; ils l’attaquèrent sur-le-champ, et l’action s’engagea. La cavalerie syracusaine eut bientôt enveloppé et resserré sur un même point ce corps isolé. La division de Nicias avait cinquante stades d’avance. Nicias hâtait le pas, sentant qu’il s’agissait, si l'on voulait être sauvé, de gagner de rapidité, sans s’arrêter à combattre, à moins d’y être forcé. Démosthène était plus exposé et d’une manière plus continue ; comme il formait l’arrière-garde, il était le premier assailli. Se voyant serré de près par les Syracusains, il songea moins à faire du chemin qu’à se ranger en bataille, jusqu'à ce qu’enfin sa lenteur permît aux ennemis de le cerner complètement et de jeter ses soldats dans une affreuse confusion. Confinés sur un terrain tout entouré de clôtures, bordé de part et d’autre par une route et couvert d’olivîfers, ils se trouvèrent en butte à une grêle de traits. Les Syracusains préféraient, comme de raison, ce genre d’attaque à une lutte de pied ferme, car ils n'avaient aucun intérêt à se risquer contre des gens au désespoir. Désormais assurés de la victoire, ils voulaient s’épargner des sacrifices inutiles, et jugeaient cette manœuvre suffisante pour faire tomber leurs ennemis en leur pouvoir.

[1] Meanwhile, when day came ¹ and the Syracusans and their allies realized that the Athenians had gone away, most of them blamed Gylippus, saying that he purposely had let the Athenians get away; and pursuing them in hot haste, following the road which they could readily see that the enemy had taken, they overtook them about dinnertime.

[2] And when they came up with the troops under Demosthenes, which were far in the rear and proceeding in a rather leisurely and disorderly fashion, due to the confusion into which they had fallen the night before, they fell upon them at once and began a battle; and since they were separated from the others the Syracusan cavalry found it easier to surround them and drive them together.

[3] The division of Nicias was about fifty stadia ahead; for Nicias marched his men more rapidly, thinking that in the circumstances safety lay, not in standing firm and fighting of their own choice, but in retreating as rapidly as possible, fighting only as they were forced to do so.

[4] But it was the fortune of Demosthenes to be for the most part in more continual trouble because, being far in the rear on the retreat, the enemy pressed upon him first, and now also, when he saw the Syracusans in pursuit, he was more taken up with ordering his troops for battle than with pressing forward, and so wasted time until he was surrounded by the enemy and both he and his men were in a state of utter confusion. For huddled together in a plot of ground surrounded by a wall, on either side of which a road passed, there being inside the wall a considerable number of olive trees, they were pelted with missiles from every side.

[5] And the Syracusans had good reason to adopt attacks of this kind rather than contests at close quarters; for to risk their lives against men in despair was not now to their advantage, so much as to that of the Athenians. Besides, they considered that success was already assured; therefore everyone spared himself somewhat, not wishing to throw away his life before the end, and they all thought that even as it was, and following this manner of fighting, they would subdue and capture the enemy.

[1] In the mean time the Syracusans and allies, as soon as it was day, and they found that the Athenians had departed, most of them charged Gylippus with having purposely let them escape; and pursuing with all haste by the route which they had no difficulty in finding they had taken, they overtook them about dinner-time.

[2] When they came up with the troops under Demosthenes, which were behind the rest, and marching more slowly and disorderly, ever since they had been thrown into confusion during the night, at the time we have mentioned, they immediately fell upon and engaged them; and the Syracusan horse surrounded them with greater ease from their being divided, and confined them in a narrow space.

[3] The division of Nicias was as much as fifty stades off in advance; for he led them on more rapidly, thinking that their preservation depended, under such circumstances, not on staying behind, if they could help it, and on fighting, but on retreating as quickly as possible, and only fighting as often as they were compelled.

[4] Demosthenes, on the other hand, was, generally speaking, involved in more incessant labour, (because, as he was retreating in the rear, he was the first that the enemy attacked,) and on that occasion, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he was not so much inclined to push on, as to form his men for battle; until, through thus loitering, he was surrounded by them, and both himself and the Athenians with him were thrown into great confusion. For being driven back into a certain spot which had a wall all round it, with a road on each side, and many olive trees growing about, they were annoyed with missiles in every direction. This kind of attack the Syracusans naturally adopted, instead of close combat;

[5] for to risk their lives against men reduced to despair was no longer for their advantage, so much as for that of the Athenians. Besides, after success which was now so signal, each man spared himself in some degree, that he might not be cut off before the end of the business. They thought too that, even as it was, they should by this kind of fighting subdue and capture them.

[1] Interea vero Syracusani ac socii, ubi dies illuxit, et Athenienses abisse cognoverunt, plerique Gylippum insimulabant, quod Athenienses de industria dimisisset, et celeriter persequentes, qua eos progressos haud difficile senlicbant, deprehendunt eos circa prandii horam.

[2] Et quum assequuli essent Demosthenis milites, qui postremi erant, et tarde cl incomposite iter faciebant, quod noctu, ut dixi, perluibati erant, confestim impetu facto pugnam conserebant, et equites Syracusanorum eos facilius circumveniebant quippe disjunctos, et in unum cogebant.

[3] Nicia; autem exercitus ulterius progressus aberat vel quinquaginta stadia; Nicias enim agmen odns ducebat, quod existimaret, minime salutare esse, in hujusmodi tempore cunctari ultro et dimicare, sed quam celerrime sese recipere, non saepius pugnantes, quam cogerentur.

[4] Demosthenes vero et frequentius labore magis continuo preme, balur, quod posterius digressum eum priorem urgebant hostes, et tunc, quum Syracusanos insequi animadvertisset, non tam progrediebatur, quam ad proelium ordines instruebat , donec cunctatus ab iis circumvenitur; atque et ipse et Athenienses eum sequentes in magna perturbatione erant; compressi enim inlra quemdam locum, qui muro circumdatus erat, et viam bine et inde, et non paucas oleas habebat, missilibus undique petebantur.

[5] Hujusmodi autem assultibus , non autem stataria pugna haud abs re Syracusani utebantur; nam adversus homines desperatos periculum subire, non amplius tam e re illorum quam Atheniensium erat, et simul etiam Syracusani nonnihil iis parcebant, ne in manifesto jam rei successo, ante tempus illi absume- rentur, et existimabant, vel sic hoc pugnae genere Uios a se perdomitos captum iri.

Intanto i Siracusani e gli alleati, poiché venne il giorno e si avvidero esser partiti gli Ateniesi, davano quasi tutti la colpa a Gilippo che a bella posta li avesse lasciati andare ; e messisi in fretta ad inseguirli per dove agevolmente seppero che si erano inviati, li raggiungono verso l’ora del desinare. Incontratisi in quelli di Demostene che erano gli ultimi e marciavano lenti e sbandati, perchè perturbati nella passata notte, subito li assaltano e vengono a battaglia ; ed i cavalli siracusani più agevolmente li circondarono perchè bipartiti, e li rinserrarono tutti insieme. Le genti di Nicia si erano già dilungate in avanti da centocinquanta stadii, perciocché egli le conduceva più sollecitamente, avvisando che in quello stato la loro salvezza dipendeva non già dal fermarsi volontariamente a combattere, ma dal ritirarsi il più presto possibile, pugnando soltanto quando vi fossero astretti; laddove Demostene essendo l’ultimo a retrocedere, e però avendo alle spalle i nemici, trovavasi in moltiplice e continovato travaglio. E sapendo allora che i Siracusani lo perseguitavano, non che cercasse di progredire si metteva piuttosto in ordine per la battaglia ; finché in quel tanto da essi accerchiato, era in gran perturbazione insieme co’suoi Ateniesi ; conciossiachè rinchiusi in un tal luogo cui intorniava un muretto, e che avea quinci e quindi uno sbocco e non pochi ulivi, erano da quel cerchio saettati. E bene avean ragione i Siracusani a far di queste assembra glie invece che battaglie campali ; perchè il cimentarsi con gente disperata non tanto metteva lor conto quanto agli Ateniesi. Inoltre, essendo già manifesta la prosperità dell' impresa , si risparmiavano , onde non trovarsi essi medesimi distrutti per qualche caso prima di compierla ; e pensavano che anche con quel modo di combattimento arebber domati e presi i nemici.