Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 7.8

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Als Nikias das erfuhr und sah, wie die Macht der Feinde
täglich größer, die Lage der Athener aber immer schwieriger
wurde, sandte auch er nach Athen. Er hatte schon bisher
häufig dahin berichtet und hielt das jetzt um so mehr für ge
boten, weit er seine Lage für äußerst bedenklich ansah und sich
für verloren hielt, wenn man das Heer nicht unverzüglich aus
Sizilien zurückzöge oder ihm ansehnliche Verstärkungen schickte.
Da er aber fürchtete, seine Abgesandten könnten, etwa weil sie
nicht redegewandt genug wären, oder aus Vergeßlichkeit oder
auch um den Leuten nach dem Munde zu reden, die Sache
vielleicht nicht richtig darstellen, so verfaßte er einen schrift
lichen Bericht in der Meinung, die Athener auf diese Weise
am besten in den Stand zu setzen, seine wahre, durch den
Boten nicht entstellte Auffassung kennen zu lernen und bei ihren
Beratungen nicht von falschen Voraussetzungen auszugehen.
Darauf machten sich seine Abgesandten mit dem Schreiben
und den ihnen erteilten mündlichen Aufträgen auf den Weg.
Er aber war jetzt schon mehr darauf bedacht, sich im Lager
gegen feindliche Angriffe zu behaupten als selbst angriffsweise
vorzugehen.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.8.1 focus

[1] ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο καὶ ὁρῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐπιδιδοῦσαν τήν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἀπορίαν, ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε, νομίζων ἐν δεινοῖς τε εἶναι καί, εἰ μὴ ὡς τάχιστα ἢ σφᾶς μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ ἄλλους μὴ ὀλίγους ἀποστελοῦσιν, οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν.

[2] φοβούμενος δὲ μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ καὶ μνήμης ἐλλιπεῖς γιγνόμενοι ἢ τῷ ὄχλῳ πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀπαγγέλλωσιν, ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολήν, νομίζων οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην μηδὲν ἐν τῷ ἀγγέλῳ ἀφανισθεῖσαν μαθόντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

[3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ᾤχοντο φέροντες, οὓς ἀπέστειλε, τὰ γράμματα καὶ ὅσα ἔδει αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν· ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι’ ἑκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπεμέλετο.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.8.1 focus

[1] Nicias perceiving this and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own necessities daily increasing, he also sent messengers to Athens, both at other times and often, upon the occasion of every action that passed, and now especially, as finding himself in danger, and that unless they quickly sent for those away that were there already, or sent a great supply unto them, there was no hope of safety.

[2] And fearing lest such as he sent, through want of utterance or judgment or through desire to please the multitude, should deliver things otherwise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter, conceiving that thus the Athenians should best know his mind, whereof no part could now be suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore enter into deliberation upon true grounds.

[3] With these letters and other their instructions, the messengers took their journey. And Nicias, in the meantime having a care to the well guarding of his camp, was wary of entering into any voluntary dangers.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.8.1 focus

[1] Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens . He had before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they were in a critical position, and that unless speedily recalled or strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety.

[2] He feared, however, that the messengers, either through inability to speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the multitude, might not report the truth, and so though it best to write a letter, to insure that the Athenians should know his own opinion without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts of the case.

[3] His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary danger.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 7.8 focus

Nikias aber, als er dieß bemerkte und sah, wie die Macht
der Feinde und seine eigene Verlegenheit von Tag zu Tag wuchs,
schickte auch seinerseits Boten nach Athen, wie er denn auch sonst
bei allen Gelegenheiten und Vorfällen Meldung that, und jetzt um
so mehr, da er sich für sehr gefährdet hielt und an keine Rettung
mehr glaubte, wenn nicht jene entweder seine Armee abholten oder
zahlreiche Verstärkung schickten. Weil er aber fürchtete, daß seine
Abgesandten, sei es nun aus Mangel des Vortrags oder aus
Vergeßlichkeit oder auch in der Absicht, dem Volke nach dem Munde zu
reden, nicht den wahren Verhalt darstellen möchten, so schrieb er
selbst einen Brief, in der Meinung, daß so die Athener ohne
Entstellung von Seiten des Boten seine wirkliche Ansicht von der
Sachlage erfahren und einen der Wirklichkeit entsprechenden Beschluß
fassen würden. Seine Abgesandten nun gingen mit diesem Briefe
und den sonstigen Aufträgen ab, Nikias selbst aber nahm seine Pflicht
wahr, indem er sich lieber mit aller Vorsicht im Lager hielt, als daß
er seinerseits die Gefahr einer Schlacht gesucht hätte.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.8 focus

VIII. Nicias le savait, et voyait chaque jour ajouter à la force des ennemis et aux difficultés de sa propre situation. Il envoyait de son côté des messages à Athènes; bien des fois déjà il en avait fait passer dans d’autres circonstances pour tenir au courant de chaque événement; mais il les multiplia alors, persuadé qu’il était dans une position critique, et que, si on ne se hâtait soit de rappeler l’armée, soit de lui envoyer des renforts considérables, il n’y avait aucune chance de salut. Comme il craignait que ses messagers ne fissent pas connaître le véritable état des choses, soit faute de savoir s’exprimer, soit par défaut de mémoire, ou même pour ¹ faire quelque rapport agréable à la multitude, il écrivit une lettre; il crut que c’était le meilleur moyen de faire connaître exactement sa pensée aux Athéniens, sans qu’elle fût dénaturée par le messager, et de les mettre en état de délibérer sur la situation réelle des affaires. Les envoyés partirent, chargés de cette lettre et de tout ce qu’ils devaient dire eux-mêmes; quant à lui, il se borna à la garde de son camp, évitant désormais de chercher volontairement le danger².

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.8 focus

Nicias ne l’ignorait pas; chaque jour il voyait grandir les forces des ennemis, pendant que ses embarras ne faisaient que s’accroître. IL envoyait donc message sur message à Athènes, afin de tenir les oitoyens au courant de ce qui se passait. Cette fois il crut nécessaire d’entrer dans plus de détails, persuadé que sa position était Critique et à peu près désespérée, à moins qu'on ne rappelât l’armée expéditionnaire ou qu’on ne lui envoyât de puissants secours. Comme il craignait que ses délégués n'exposassent pas le véritable état des choses faute de talent ou de mémoire, peut-être aussi pour copiplaire à la multitude, il consigna ses observations par écrit. C’était, selon lui, le meilleur moyen de faire connaître aux Athéniens toute sa pensée, sans qu’elle fût affaiblie en passant par l’organe d’un messager, et de les mettre à même de délibérer en pleine connaissance de cause. Ces envoyés partirent donc, chargés de sa dépêche et des explications orales qu’ils devaient ajouter. Quant à lui, il faisait bonne garde dans son camp, évitant dès lors de s’exposer volontairement.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.8.1 focus

[1] Nicias, perceiving this and seeing the enemy's strength and his own perplexities increasing day by day, on his part also sent word to Athens on many occasions, giving detailed reports of what was happening, and especially now, because he thought that they were in a critical situation and that there was no hope of safety unless the Athenians, with all possible speed, should either recall them or send out reinforcements in no small numbers.

[2] But fearing that his messengers might not report the actual facts, either through inability to speak or from lapse of memory,¹ or because they wanted to please the crowd, wrote a letter, thinking that in this way the Athenians would best learn his own view, obscured in no way by any fault on the part of the messenger, and could thus deliberate about the true situation.

[3] So the messengers whom he sent departed, bearing the letter and the verbal reports which they were to deliver; but as regards the camp, the object of his care was now rather to keep on the defensive than to run voluntary risks.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.8.1 focus

[1] Nicias observing this, and seeing that the enemy's strength and their own difficulties were every day increasing, sent, on his side also, to Athens; having, indeed, on many other occasions sent messengers at the time of their several operations, but doing so then especially, because he thought that they were in a perilous condition, and that unless those at home recalled them as quickly as possible, or sent out no small reinforcement, there was no hope of preservation for them.

[2] Fearing, however, that those who were sent by him, either through incapacity for speaking, or through being deficient ¹ in sense, or from a wish to say something to please the multitude, should not report the real facts of the case, he wrote a letter, thinking that by this means, more than any other, the Athenians would learn his own sentiments, without their being at all obscured by the messenger, and so would deliberate on the true state of the case.

[3] Accordingly, those whom he sent departed with the letter and all that they were to say; while he himself attended to the affairs of the armament, being engaged now in precautionary measures, rather than in perils voluntarily incurred.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.8.1 focus

[1] Nicias vero, quum hoc intellexisset, et hostium quidem potentiam, suam vero penuriam in dies crescere videret, mittebat et ipse Athenas saepe quidem et alias nunrians de singulis rebus, quae gerebantur, sed tunc vel maxime, quod existimaret res suas in maximum discrimen adductas esse, et nisi primo quooue tempore aut se revocarent, aut alios non paucos mitterent, nullam super-esse spem salutis.

[2] Veritus autem, ne ii, qui mittebantur, vel propter facundis inopiam, vel etiam memoria destituti, vel aliquid ad populi voluntatem dicentes, non quod res esset, renunciarent, epistolam scripsit, existimans fore, ut hoc potissimum modo suam sententiam per nun-cium minime occultatam Athenienses cognoscerent, et de rebus veris deliberarent.

[3] Atque illi quidem, quos misit, cum literis, quas ferebant, et cum mandatis, quae eos exponere oportebat, abierunt. Nicias vero castris jam magis custodiam agendo quam sua sponte pericula adeundo prospiciebat.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.8 focus

Nicia sentendo ciò, e vedendo giornalmente crescere la forza del nemico ed il proprio intrigamento, benché spesso anche per l' innanzi spedisse ad Atene per dar ragguaglio d’ogni fatto in particolare, tanto più il fece allora, essendoché credevasi ridotto in grave fortuna, e se noi richiamassero senza aspetto colle sue genti, o non ne mandassero dell’altre in buon numero, non ci vedeva scampo veruno. E perché temeva che i mandatari, o per insufficienza nel parlare, o per mancanza di spirito, od auche per dir qualche cosa a grado della moltitudine, non riferissero il vero, scrisse una lettera, stimando che così gli Ateniesi, infor- mali con esattezza della mente sua non travisata dal reJatore, delibererebbero intorno al vero. Pertanto gli spediti ^ da lui partirono colla lettera e colle commissioni che doveano esporre a bocca ; ed egli, tenendo ormai il campo : sotto guardia, vegliava contro i non cerchi pericoli.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.8

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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