Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 7.73

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Hermokrates in Syrakus aber vermutete ihre Absicht und
hielt es für gefährlich, wenn ein so zahlreiches Heer zu Lande
abzöge und sich irgendwo in Sizilien festsetzte, um von dort
den Krieg gegen Syrakus wieder aufzunehmen. Er wandte
sich deshalb an die Regierung und stellte ihr vor, man dürfe
die Athener nicht bei Nacht abziehen lassen, wie er das ja
vermutete, sondern die Syrakuser und ihre Verbündeten müßten
mit dem ganzen Heere ausrücken, ihnen die Wege durch Ver
haue sperren und die Pässe verlegen. Dort war man zwar
derselben Meinung und hielt es ebenfalls für zweckmäßig, so
zu verfahren, fürchtete jedoch, daß die Leute, welche froh wären,
sich nach der großen Schlacht erst mal auszuruhen, dafür
schwerlich zu haben sein würden, zumal grade Feiertag wäre.
(An dem Tage wurde nämlich das HerakleSfest in Syrakus
gefeiert.) Denn die säßen im Feste meist alle nach ihrem Siege
fröhlich beim Becher, und man würde ihnen wahrscheinlich
alles eher ansinnen können, als in diesem Augenblick das Ge
wehr aufzunehmen und auszurücken. Da die Herren von der
Regierung die Sache unter diesen Umständen nicht für aus
führbar hielten und auch Hermokrates nichts weiter bei ihnen
ausrichtete, verfiel er nunmehr seinerseits auf folgende List.
Weil er besorgte, die Athener möchten in der Nacht in aller
Stille abziehen und über die gefährlichsten Stellen glücklich
hinausgelangen, schickte er bei Eintritt der Dunkelheit einige
seiner Freunde mit einer Anzahl Reiter an das athenische Lager,
welche auf Sprechweite hinanritten. Hier riefen sie sich ein
paar Leute heraus, und da Nikias damals Freunde in der
Stadt hatte, die ihm von dort Nachrichten zutrugen, gaben sie
sich ihnen als Freunde der Athener zu erkennen und trugen
ihnen auf, Nikias zu sagen, er möge diese Nacht mit dem
Heere nicht aufbrechen, weil die Syrakuser die Wege besetzt
hätten, sondern damit lieber warten und bei Tage in guter
Ordnung abziehen. Nachdem sie ihnen das gesagt, ritten sie
wieder weg. Die Leute aber, denen sie es gesagt hatten,
meldeten es den Feldherren der Athener.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.73.1 focus

[1] καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς κατὰ γῆν ἀναχωρήσοντες ἤδη ξύμπαντες τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, Ἑρμοκράτης δὲ ὁ Συρακόσιος ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ νομίσας δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ τοσαύτη στρατιὰ κατὰ γῆν ὑποχωρήσασα καὶ καθεζομένη ποι τῆς Σικελίας βουλήσεται αὖθις σφίσι τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι, ἐσηγεῖται ἐλθὼν τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσιν ὡς οὐ χρεὼν ἀποχωρῆσαι τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοὺς περιιδεῖν, λέγων ταῦτα ἃ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει, ἀλλὰ ἐξελθόντας ἤδη πάντας Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τάς τε ὁδοὺς ἀποικοδομῆσαι καὶ τὰ στενόπορα τῶν χωρίων προδιαλαβόντας φυλάσσειν.

[2] οἱ δὲ ξυνεγίγνωσκον μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ταῦτα ἐκείνου, καὶ ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄρτι ἀσμένους ἀπὸ ναυμαχίας τε μεγάλης ἀναπεπαυμένους καὶ ἅμα ἑορτῆς οὔσης (ἔτυχε γὰρ αὐτοῖς Ἡρακλεῖ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν θυσία οὖσα) οὐ δοκεῖν ἂν ῥᾳδίως ἐθελῆσαι ὑπακοῦσαι· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ περιχαροῦς τῆς νίκης πρὸς πόσιν τετράφθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἐλπίζειν ἂν σφῶν πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἢ ὅπλα λαβόντας ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐξελθεῖν.

[3] ὡς δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ταῦτα λογιζομένοις ἐφαίνετο ἄπορα καὶ οὐκέτι ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης, αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε μηχανᾶται, δεδιὼς μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καθ’ ἡσυχίαν προφθάσωσιν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ διελθόντες τὰ χαλεπώτατα τῶν χωρίων. πέμπει τῶν ἑταίρων τινὰς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ἱππέων πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ἡνίκα ξυνεσκόταζεν· οἳ προσελάσαντες ἐξ ὅσου τις ἔμελλεν ἀκούσεσθαι καὶ ἀνακαλεσάμενοί τινας ὡς ὄντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτήδειοι (ἦσαν γάρ τινες τῷ Νικίᾳ διάγγελοι τῶν ἔνδοθεν) ἐκέλευον φράζειν Νικίᾳ μὴ ἀπάγειν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ στράτευμα ὡς Συρακοσίων τὰς ὁδοὺς φυλασσόντων, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἡσυχίαν τῆς ἡμέρας παρασκευασάμενον ἀποχωρεῖν.

[4] καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες ἀπῆλθον, καὶ οἱ ἀκούσαντες διήγγειλαν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων·

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.73.1 focus

[1] But Hermocrates of Syracuse, suspecting their purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous that so great an army, going away by land and sitting down in some part or other of Sicily, should there renew the war, repaired unto the magistrates and admonished them that it was not fit, through negligence, to suffer the enemy in the night time to go their ways (alleging what he thought best to the purpose), but that all the Syracusians and their confederates should go out and fortify in their way and prepossess all the narrow passages with a guard.

[2] Now they were all of them of the same opinion no less than himself and thought it fit to be done; but they conceived withal that the soldier now joyful and taking his ease after a sore battle, being also holiday (for it was their day of sacrifice to Hercules), would not easily be brought to obey. For through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of them, being holiday, be drinking, and look for anything rather than to be persuaded at this time to take up arms again and go out.

[3] But seeing the magistrates upon this consideration thought it hard to be done, Hermocrates, not prevailing, of his own head contrived this. Fearing lest the Athenians should pass the worst of their way in the night and so at ease out-go them, as soon as it grew dark he sent certain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, to the Athenian camp; who, approaching so near as to be heard speak, called to some of them to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians (for Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence) and bade them to advise Nicias not to dislodge that night for that the Syracusians had beset the ways;

[4] but that the next day, having had the leisure to furnish their army, they might march away.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.73.1 focus

[1] Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land. Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates suspecting their intention, and impressed by the danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to retire by land, establish itself in some other part of Sicily , and from thence renew the war, went and stated his views to the authorities, and pointed out to them that they ought not to let the enemy get away by night, but that all the Syracusans and their allies should at once march out and block up the roads and seize and guard the passes.

[2] The authorities were entirely of his opinion, and thought that it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt sure that the people, who had given themselves over to rejoicing and were taking their ease after a great battle at sea, would not be easily brought to obey; besides, they were celebrating a festival, having on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of them in their rapture at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival, and would probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and march out at that moment.

[3] For these reasons the thing appeared impracticable to the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself unable to do anything further with them, had now recourse to the following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the Athenians might quietly get the start of them by passing the most difficult places during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as it was dusk, some friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen who rode up within earshot and called out to some of the men, as though they were well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to tell Nicias (who had in fact some correspondence who informed him of what went on inside the town), not to lead off the army by night as the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to make his preparations at his leisure and to retreat by day.

[4] After saying this they departed; and their hearers informed the Athenian generals,

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 7.73 focus

Hermokrates aber, der Syrakusier, vermuthete ihre Ab- ¹
ficht, und da er es für sehr gefährlich hielt, wenn ein so zahlreiches
Heer zu Lande sich zurückziehe und, sich irgendwo auf Sieilien
festsetzend, von Neuem den Krieg gegen sie beginne, so ging er zu den
Behörden und hielt ihnen vor, daß man nicht ruhig zusehen dürfe,
wenn jene zur Nachtzeit abzögen; vielmehr, sagte er in Darlegung
feiner Ansicht, sollten sämmtliche Syrakusaner und die
Bundesgenossen ausziehen und die Wege verbauen und die Engpässe noch
vorher rechtzeitig besetzen und bewachen. Jene nun waren auch schon
für sich derselben Meinung und hielten dafür, man sollte dieß Alles
thun; aber, meinten sie, die Leute, die jetzt nach der großen Seeschlacht
froh wären sich ausruhen zu können, würden nicht gern gehorchen
wollen, zumal auch ein Festtag sei — es wurde nämlich am selben
Tag ein Heraklesopser gefeiert.

In ihrer großen Freude über den Sieg hätten sich die Meisten
an dem festlichen Tage zu Trinkgelagen gewendet und würden sich eher
zu allem Andern verstehen, als augenblicklich die Waffen zu ergreifen
und auszuziehen. Da nun den Behörden die Sache aus diesen
Ueberlegungen unthunlich erschien, so redete ihnen Hermokrates nicht
weiter zu, sondern setzte ans eigene Faust die folgende List in's Werk.
Weil er fürchtete, die Athener möchten während der Nacht in aller
Stille einen Vorsprung gewinnen und die schwierigsten Stellen hinter
sich bringen, so schickte er einige seiner Genossen, von Reitern
begleitet, als es anfing zu dunkeln, zum Lager der Athener. Diese ritten
so nahe heran, daß man sie hören konnte, und riesen einige Leute an,
als ob sie Freunde der Athener wären — denn Nikias hatte unter
den Syrakusanern seine Zuträger — und befahlen ihnen, dem Nikias
zu sagen, er solle das Heer nicht zur Nachtzeit abführen, da die
Syrakusaner die Wege besetzt hielten, sondern ruhig seine Anstalten treffen
und bei Tage abziehen. Jene, nachdem sie dieß ausgerichtet, ritten
wieder davon, und die sie gehört hatten, meldeten es den Feldherrn
der Athener, die denn auch auf diese Meldung hin die Nacht über
stehen blieben, indem sie an einen Betrug nicht glaubten.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.73 focus

LXXIII. Cependant Hermocrates de Syracuse avait soupçonné leurs desseins : pensant que, si une armée aussi nombreuse se retirait par terre et s’établissait sur quelque point de la Sicile, il était à craindre qu’elle ne voulût recommencer la guerre contre eux, il va trouver les magistrats et leur expose, en donnant ses motifs, qu’on ne doit pas laisser l’ennemi s’échapper pendant la nuit; qu’il faut sortir en masse, Syracusains et alliés, barricader les routes, occuper à l’avance les défilés et les garder. Les magistrats étaient entièrement d’accord avec lui sur ce point, et jugeaient la mesure opportune; mais ils ne croyaient pas qu'il fût aisé d’amener à l’obéissance des hommes qui, après une grande bataille navale, s’abandonnaient avec bonheur au repos, surtout au milieu d’une fête; — car il se trouvait qu’on célébrait chez eux, ce jour-là, un sacrifice à Hercule. — La plupart, dans la joie de la victoire et l’animation de la fête, s’étaient mis à boire, et on leur persuaderait tout au monde plutôt que de prendre les armes et de faire une sortie à ce moment. Cette difficulté parut insurmontable aux magistrats, et Hermocrates ne put les convaincre. Il eut donc recours au stratagème suivant : craignant que les Athéniens ne prissent les devants et ne franchissent librement pendant la nuit les passages les plus difficiles, il envoya, une fois la nuit venue, quelques-uns de ses amis et des cavaliers vers le camp des ennemis. Une fois arrivés à portée de la voix, ils appelèrent quelques personnes, en se donnant pour amis des Athéniens; — car Nicias recevait de la ville des avis sur la situation intérieure. — Ils firent dire à Nicias de ne pas mettre son armée en mouvement la nuit, les routes étant gardées par les Syracusains, et de faire ses préparatifs à loisir pour partir au jour. Après cet avis ils se retirèrent. Ceux qui l’avaient entendu en informèrent les généraux athéniens.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.73 focus

Hermocratès de Syracuse pénétra ce dessein. Sentant le danger qu’il y aurait à ce qu’une si grande armée allât s’établir sur quelque point de la Sicile, d’où elle voudrait peut-être éterniser la guerre, il se rendit auprès des magistrats et leur représenta qu’on ne devait pas laisser les ennemis partir pendant la nuit, mais qu’il fallait à l’instant même sortir en masse, Syracusains et alliés, pour couper les routes et s’assurer des défilés. Les généraux approuvèrent cette idée; mais ils ne crurent pas qu’il fût possible d’obtenir obéissance de gens qui commençaient à goûter le repos après un terrible combat, d’autant que ce jour se trouvait être une époque de fête et de sacrifice à Hercule, et que la plupart des soldats, dans les transports de la victoire, célébraient leur triomphe en buvant. A leur avis, la dernière chose à leur persuader était de prendre les armes et de sortir en ce moment.

Hermocratès, n’ayant pu les gagner à un projet qui leur . semblait inexécutable, imagina un stratagème pour parvenir à ses fins. Dans la crainte que les ennemis ne profitassent de l’obscurité pour franchir les plus mauvais pas, il envoya, sur le soir, quelques affidés avec des cavaliers vers le camp des Athéniens. Ils’s’approcnèrent à portée de la voix, et, se donnant pour des Syracusains amis de Nicias, ils firent dire à ce général de ne pas remuer cette nuit, vu que les routes étaient gardées, mais d’attendre qu’il fît jour pour se mettre en marche, après s’être paisiblement préparé. Là-dessus ils se retirèrent. Leur communication fut transmise aux généraux athéniens.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.73.1 focus

[1] But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their intention and thinking that it would be a serious matter if so large an army, retreating overland, should settle somewhere in Sicily and be disposed to renew the war upon Syracuse, went to those in authority and explained that they ought not to permit the Athenians to withdraw during the night—giving the reason which led him to this opinion—but that the Syracusans and their allies should immediately march out in full force and build barricades across the roads and forestall the enemy by guarding the narrow passes.

[2] Now the officials were as firmly of this opinion as Hermocrates and thought that these steps should be taken, but since the soldiers had as yet hardly had the rest they so eagerly desired after the great battle and, besides, there was a festival—for the Syracusans happened on this day to be offering a sacrifice to Heracles—they believed it would be no easy matter to induce the men to answer the summons; for in their great joy over the victory most of them had taken to drinking at the festival; and “We expect,” they said, “that they would obey any orders from us rather than to take up arms and march out.” So when it was clear to the officials, considering all these things, that the plan was impracticable, and Hermocrates was no longer making any impression upon them, he himself thereupon devised the following plan:

[3] fearing that the Athenians might leave quietly during the night and get through the most difficult places before they could prevent this, he sent certain of his own friends with some horsemen to the Athenian camp when it was growing dark. These rode up close enough to be heard and called upon certain persons by name, as though they were friends of the Athenians—for there were some who regularly reported to Nicias all that went on in Syracuse¹—and bade them tell Nicias not to lead his army away that night, since the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to withdraw at his leisure, in the daytime, after having made full preparations.

[4] After saying this these men departed, and those who had heard reported it to the Athenian generals.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.73.1 focus

[1] But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their purpose, and thinking that it would be a dreadful thing, if so large a force, after retreating by land and settling any where in Sicily, should choose again to carry on the war with them, went to the authorities, and explained to them that they ought not to suffer them to retreat during the night, (stating what he ¹ himself thought,) but that all the Syracusans and allies should at once go out, and block up the roads, and keep guard beforehand at the narrow passes.

[2] But though the magistrates also agreed with him in thinking this, no less than himself, and were of opinion that it ought to be done, yet they thought that the people, in their recent joy and relaxation after the labours of a great sea-fight, especially, too, as it was a time of feasting, (for they happened to celebrate on this day a sacrifice to Hercules,) would not easily be induced to listen to them; as the majority, from excessive gladness at their victory, had fallen to drinking during the festival, and would, they expected, rather obey them in any thing than in taking arms, just at present, and marching out.

[3] When, on consideration of this, it appeared a difficulty to the magistrates, and Hermocrates could not then prevail upon them to attempt it, he afterwards devised the following scheme. Being afraid that the Athenians might get the start of them by quietly passing during the night the most difficult points of the country, he sent certain of his own friends with some cavalry to the Athenian camp, as soon as it grew dark. These, riding up to within hearing, and calling to them certain individuals, as though they were friends of the Athenians, (for there were some who sent tidings to Nicias of what passed within the city,) desired them to tell that general not to lead off his army by night, as the Syracusans were guarding the roads; but to retire leisurely by day after making his preparations.

[4] They then, after delivering this message, returned; while those who heard it, reported the same to the Athenian generals.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.73.1 focus

[1] Hermocrates vero Syracusanus, suspicatus, quid illi in animo haberent, et ratus, atrocem rem fore, si tantus exercitus itinere terrestri sese reciperet, et in aliqua Siciliae parte subsideret, unde rursus bellum sibi facere vellet, magistratus adit, eosque monet, hostibus minime permittendum esse, ut noctu abirent, dicens haec, quae ipsi videbantur; sed omnibus Syracusanis sociisque jam exeundum, et vias obstruendas, et locorum angustias partilis copiis custodiendas.

[2] Illi vero haec et ipsi non minus, quam ille, sentiebant, et facienda censebant; sed vixdum homines laetos et ex navali magno proelio quiescentes, et simul etiam diem festum agentes (forte enim tunc apud eos hoc die Herculi sacra fiebant), haud facile videri paratos fore imperata facere; nam prae ingenti victoriae gaudio plerosque per eum diem festum sese ad potationem convertisse et se existimare, illis omnia potius a se persuaderi posse, quam ut in praesentia sumptis armis exirent

[3] Sed quum magistratibus haec reputantibus difficilia factu esse viderentur, et Hermocrates iis persuadere non posset, postea ipse haec machinatur, veritus, ne Athenienses nullo prohi-bente difficillima loca noctu transeundo praeverterent Mittit nonnullos e suis sodalibus cum equitibus, quum jam advesperasceret, ad Atheniensium castra; qui eo usque provecti, unde quis exaudiri posset, et quibusdam evocatis, quasi Atheniensium essent amici (erant enim nonnulli internuntii, qui Niciam de rebus urbanis certiorem faciebant imperabant, ut Niciae significarent, ne ea node copias abduceret, quod Syracusani vias obsedissent, sed postridie copiis per otium instructis abiret.

[4] Atque illi quidem quum haec dixissent, discesserunt, et qui ea audierant, ducibus Atheniensium renuntiarunt;

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.73 focus

Del qual divisamento venuto in sospetto Ermocrate siracusano , e stimando esservi gran pericolo che esercito sì grande ritiratosi per la via di terra si fermasse in qualche luogo di Sicilia, e volesse rinnovar loro la guerra, va dai magistrati ; e tra l’altre cose che gli parvero da dirsi, dichiarò ad essi che non doveansi lasciar partire gli Ateniesi nella notte , ma uscire tutti immantinente, Siracusani ed alleati, e serrar loro le strade, e preoccupare e guardare i passaggi più angusti. Non dissentivano punto i magistrati da Ermocrate iu quella risoluzione, e giudicavano esser da recare ad effetto : contuttociò avvisavano che siccome i soldati di recente pigliavano volenterosi respiro della gran battaglia navale, e di più ricorreva per avventura la festa (per cui in quel giorno facevansi sacrifizi ad onore di Ercole), così non vorrebbero agevolmente obbedirli. Conciossiachè per la soverchia gioia della vittoria la maggior parte dì essi nell’occasione della festa essendosi dati a sbevazzare, tutt’altro era spcrabile che il persuaderli al presente di pigliare le armi ed uscire contro il nemico. Per queste considerazioni parendo ai magistrati ineseguibile quel disegno, e non avendo Ermocrate potuto indurveli, immaginò egli per ripiego quest’astuzia. Per la tema che gli Ateniesi a bell’agio e senza esser disturbati riuscissero a valicar nella notte i luoghi più difficili, manda sull’ imbrunire del giorno verso il campo ateniese pochi suoi amici con dei cavalieri , che , avvicinandosi tanto da potere esser sentiti, chiamassero alcuni ; e fingendosi amici degli Ateniesi ordinassero di dire a Nicia (il quale invero aveva di quelli da cui risapeva lo stato interno di Siracusa ) che non levasse il campo nella notte, perchè i Siracusani guardavano le strade ; ma che preparatosi a suo bell’agio partisse di giorno. Ciò detto, coloro tornarono indietro ; e quei che li sentirono ne porsero avviso ai generali ateniesi.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.73

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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