Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.90

[1] "Thus stands the matter touching my own accusation. And concerning what we are to consult of, both you and I, if I know anything which you yourselves do not, hear it now.

[2] We made this voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue the Sicilians, after them the Italians, after them, to assay the dominion of Carthage, and Carthage itself.

[3] If these or most of these enterprises succeeded, then next we should have undertaken Peloponnesus, with the accession both of the Greek forces there and with many mercenary barbarians, Iberians and others of those parts, confessed to be the most warlike of the barbarians that are now. we should also have built many galleys besides these which we have already (there being plenty of timber in Italy); with the which besieging Peloponnesus round, and also taking the cities thereof with our land forces, upon such occasions as should arise from the land, some by assault and some by siege, we hoped easily to have debelled it and afterwards to have gotten the dominion of all Greece.

[4] As for money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places we should have conquered there, besides what here we should have found, would sufficiently have furnished us.

[1] So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can call your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak.

[2] We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of Carthage .

[3] In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese , bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy ; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name.

[4] Money and corn meanwhile for the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries, independently of our revenues here at home.

„Von der Art sind die Thatsachen, auf welchen die
Verunglimpfungen meiner Person beruhen; und nun höret, was ihr in
Berathung zu ziehen habt, und worüber ich euch, sofern ich genauere
Kenntniß habe, einige Anweisung geben kann. Wir sind gegen
Sieilien ausgefahren, um fürs Erste wo möglich die Sicilianer zu
unterjochen, und nach diesen die Jtalioten, und um dann einen Versuch
gegen das Gebiet der Karthager und sie selber zu machen^). Und
wenn dieß in allen Stücken, oder doch in der Hauptsache gelänge, so
hatten wir im Sinne, den Peloponnes anzugreifen, wozu wir die
gesammte uns von dort zugewachsene Macht der Hellenen mitgeführt
und zahlreiche Barbaren in Sold genommen hätten, Iberer und
Andere, welche heutzutage allgemein für die Tapfersten der dortigen
Barbaren gehalten werden. Und zu unseren vorhandenen
Kriegsschiffen hätten wir noch viele andere gebaut, da Italien großen
Reichthum an Holz besitzt, um mit denselben den ganzen Peloponnes
ringsum abzusperren, und mit unserem Heere hätten wir durch
Angriffe von der Landseite her die Städte theils mit Gewalt genommen,
theils mit Schanzen eingeschlossen. Auf diese Weise hofften wir den
Krieg leicht zu Ende zu führen und dann über die gesammte
Hellenische Welt zu herrshcen. Und um diese Pläne leichter auszuführen,
würden uns jene neugewonnenen Gebiete Geld und LebenSmittel in
genügender Menge liefern, so daß wir die hiesigen Einkünfte nicht
anzugreifen brauchten." ¹

XC. « Telle est la vérité sur les faits qui ont motivé les préventions contre moi : j’arrive maintenant à l’objet spécial de votre délibération, afin de vous transmettre les renseignements particuliers que je puis posséder : notre but, en faisant voile pour la Sicile, était de soumettre, s’il était possible, les Siciliens d’abord; puis, après eux, les Italiens; et ensuite de faire une tentative contre les peuples soumis aux Carthaginois et contre Carthage elle-même. Ces tentatives couronnées de succès, en tout ou du moins en grande partie, nous devions alors attaquer le Péloponnèse. Nous y arrivions renforcés par tous les Grecs que nous eût soumis la conquête, avec un grand nombre de barbares mercenaires, des Ibères ¹ et d’autres barbares de ces contrées, de ceux qui passent pour les plus braves. Avec les nombreuses galères que nous eussions ajoutées aux nôtres, grâce aux bois que l’ltalie fournit en abondance, nous aurions enveloppé et assiégé le Pélo- ² ponnèse : en même temps notre infanterie faisait une invasion par terre; prenant une partie des villes de vive force, entourant les autres de murailles, nous espérions réduire aisément le pays, et ensuite étendre notre domination sur le monde grec tout entier. Quant à l’argent et aux vivres qui devaient faciliter l’accomplissement de nos desseins, nous en aurions tiré suffisamment des villes mêmes de Sicile ajoutées à notre empire, sans compter nos revenus de la Grèce.

« Telle a été la source des préventions répandues contre moi. Maintenant il faut aborder la question qui vous est soumise, et sur laquelle mon expérience peut vous guider utilement.

« Nous nous sommes rendus en Sicile pour subjuguer, s’il se pouvait, les Grecs de ce pays, ensuite ceux d’Italie, finalement les sujets des Carthaginois et Carthage elle-même. Si ce projet eût réussi en totalité ou en majeure partie, nous comptions dès lors nous rabattre sur le Péloponèse, avec l’adjonction de tous ces peuples, et en prenant à notre solde une foule de Barbares, Ibériens ou autres, réputés les plus belliqueux de ces contrées.

« Indépendamment des trirèmes que nous possédons, nous en aurions construit une infinité d’autres, à l’aide des bois que Fltalie fournit en abondance. Par ce moyen , nous aurions bloqué tout le Péloponèse; en même temps nos troupes de terre, faisant des invasions sur le continent, auraient pris de force une partie des villes et cerné tout le reste. Ainsi nous espérions réduire sans difficulté ce pays et dominer ensuite sur la Grèce entière. t Quant à l’argent et aux munitions nécessaires pour l’accomplissement de ce projet, il suffisait des pays conquis pour en fournir une source intarissable, sans compter nos propres revenus.

[1] "With regard, then, to the prejudices against me, that is how things fell out; but with reference to the matters about which you must take counsel and which I, if I have any superior knowledge, must bring to your notice, give me now your attention.

[2] We sailed to Sicily, first, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could, and after them the Italiots also; and then to make an attempt upon the empire of the Carthaginians and upon the city itself.

[3] If these things, either all, or at least the greater part of them, succeeded, then we intended to attack the Peloponnesus, bringing here the whole Hellenic force that had joined us there, hiring besides many barbarians, both Iberians and others of the peoples there that are admittedly the most warlike of the barbarians at the present day, and building many triremes in addition to our own, as Italy has timber in abundance. Laying a blockade with these triremes round the Peloponnesus, and at the same time attacking it with our infantry by land, having thus taken some of its cities by assault and walled in others, we expected easily to reduce it, and after that to have sway over the whole Hellenic race.

[4] As to money and food, for making any of these projects more feasible, the additional territory acquired in Sicily would of itself furnish these in sufficient quantity, independently of our home revenues.

[1] "With regard then to your prejudices against me, such were the facts: but with regard to what you must deliberate upon, and I, on whatever point I am better informed, muss advise, now learn from me.

[2] We sailed to Sicily, in the first place, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could; after them, again, the Italiots; and then also to make an attempt on the dominion of the Carthaginians, and on their own city.

[3] If either all or most of these schemes proved successful, then we intended to attack the Peloponnese, after bringing here the united force of the Greeks that had joined us in those parts, taking many barbarians into our pay—both Iberians and others of those nations, confessedly ¹ the most warlike barbarians at the present day—and building many triremes in addition to what we have, (since Italy contains timber in abundance). Blockading the Peloponnese with these round its coasts, and at the same time attacking it with our soldiers on the land side, after taking some of the cities by storm, and walling in others, we hoped with ease to reduce it, and after that to enjoy the sovereignty of the whole Grecian race.

[4] And as for money and provisions, to render each of these measures more practicable, the newly acquired places in those quarters would by themselves supply sufficient, independently of our revenues from these parts.

[1] « Quae igitur ad meas criminationes pertinent, talia exstiterunt; jam vero ea de quibus et vobis est consultandum, et mihi, si quid melius novi, sententia proponenda, cognoscite.

[2] In Siciliam eo animo trajecimus, primum quidem, ut Sicilienses, si possemus, in nostram potestatem redigeremus, mox vero post illos, et Italos, deinde ut etiam illos, qui Carthaginiensium imperio parent, atque adeo ipsos temptaremus.

[3] Quod si haec nobis successissent aut omnia aut etiam pleraque, tunc vero Peloponnesum aggredi statueramus, universis Graecorum copiis, quas nobis illinc abjunxissemus, adductis, mullisque barbaris mercede conductis, et Iberis et aliis, qui omnium [barbarorum] in illis regionibus habitantium sine controversia bellicosissimi nunc habentur, aedificatis etiam permultis tnremibus, praeter nostras, quod Italia magnam materiae copiam habet, quibus Peloponnesum circumcirca obsidentes, et peditatu pariter a terra impetu facto, urbium aliis quidem per vim captis, aliis vero circumvallatis, sperabamus fore, ut eam facile debellaremus, postea vero totius etiam Gratiae imperio potere-mur.

[4] Pecuniam autem et commeatum, ut res illas commodius perageremus, ipsa regionum illarum oppida nobis adjuncta, sine hujus regionis proventu, nobis erant abunde suppeditatura.

« Tali sono le cause concorse a questo mio di« scredito. Udite ora quello di che voi dovete deliberare, ed io esporvi se pur nulla ne so di più. Primieramente navigammo in Sicilia con animo di soggiogare , potendo, i Siciliani f e dopo loro anche gl' Itali ; e quindi per tentare eziandio gli stati di Cartagine e Cartagine stessa. Riuscendo tutte o la maggior parte di queste imprese , allora volevamo assaltare il Peloponneso conducendovi tutte le forze de’Greci di Sicilia che si sarebbero aggiunte a noi, e molti barbari presi a soldo, e gl' Iberi, ed altri dei barbari di quei luoghi, che oggi sono a confession di tutti i più guerreschi. Dipoi fabbricate molte triremi oltre le nostre (giacché l'Italia abbonda di legname) volevamo con esso assediare intorno il Peloponneso, e al tempo stesso investirlo colla fanteria dalla parte di terra ; e cosi espugnacido a forza alcune città, ed altre serrandone con tauro, speravamo di agevolmente debellarlo, ed in ultimo aver impero sull’universale de’Greci. Quanto al denaro ed ai viveri, perchè più facilmente ci riuscisse ciascuna di queste cose, li avrebbero somministrati abbastanza le città ivi conquistate, senza toccare le entrate che qui abbiamo.