Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.72

[1] With this mind they went to winter at Naxos and Catana. The Syracusians, after they had buried their dead, called an assembly;

[2] and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to any in wisdom, and in war both able for his experience and eminent for his valour, standing forth gave them encouragement and would not suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. Their courage, he said, was not overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt.

[3] And yet in that they were not so far inferior as it was likely they would have been, especially being (as one may say) homebred artificers, against the most experienced in the war of all the Grecians.

[4] That they had also been hurt by the number of their generals and commanders—for there were fifteen that commanded in chief—and by the many supernumerary soldiers under no command at all. Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful leaders, and prepare armour this winter for such as want it, to increase as much as might be the number of their men of arms, and compel them in other things to the exercise of discipline, in all reason they were to have the better of the enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep their order would be learnt by practice; and both of these would still grow greater: skill, by practising with danger; and their courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of skill.

[5] And for their generals, they ought to choose them few and absolute, and to take an oath unto them to let them lead the army wheresoever they thought best. For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the better be concealed and all things would be put in readiness with order and less tergiversation.

[1] With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the winter. Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead, and then held an assembly,

[2] in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability of the first order had given proofs of military capacity and brilliant courage in the war, came forward and encouraged them, and told them not to let what had occurred make them give way,

[3] since their spirit had not been conquered, but their want of discipline had done the mischief. Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have been expected, especially as they were, one might say, novices in the art of war, an army of artisans opposed to the most practised soldiers in Hellas .

[4] What had also done great mischief was the number of the generals (there were fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, combined with the disorder and insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have a few skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them as numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their training generally, they would have every chance of beating their adversaries, courage being already theirs and discipline in the field having thus been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities would improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline, while their courage would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill inspires.

[5] The generals should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath should be taken to leave them entire discretion in their command: if they adopted this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all preparations would be properly made, and there would be no room for excuses.

Mit. diesen Absichten also gingen die Athener ans ihren
Schiffen nach Naxos und Katana zurück, um dort zu.überwintern;
die Syrakusaner.aber, nachdem sie ihre Todten begraben hatten,
beriefen eine Volksversammlung. Da trat nun Hermokrates aus, des
Hermon Sohn, ein Mann, der überhaupt Keinem anMnsicht nach-
stand und ein-erfahrner-und.tüchtiger Soldat und durch Tapferkeit
ausgezeichnet war, Der nun richtete sie wieder auf und hieß sie-'sich
des Geshcehenen wegen nicht schwach und nachgiebig zu zeigen; denn
nicht ihr Eifer und Muth sei besiegt worden, sondern ihre Unordnung
habe sie in? Schaden gebracht. Sie.seien nicht einmal in der-Weise
Hintere.den Feinden zurückgeblieben, als man.hätte vermuthen sollen, ^{1 2}
zumal sie den allererfahrensten Kriegsleuten unter den Hellenen
gegenübergestanden hätten, — sie, sozusagen nur Laien gegenüber
Soldaten vom Handwerk. Sehr geschadet habe auch die große Zahl der
Feldherrn und das Vielkommandiren — sie hatten nämlich fünfzehn
Feldherrn — und dann die Unbändigkeit der großen Masse, die sich
der Ordnung nicht fügen wolle. Wenn sie jetzt nur wenige, aber
erfahrene Feldherrn wählten und den Winter über schweres Fußvolk
ausbilden und denen, welche keine schwere Rüstung hätten, solche
verschaffen wollten, damit sie möglichst zahlreich wären, und sie
überhaupt zu allen Kriegsübungen zwingen, so würden sie nach aller
Wahrscheinlichkeit über ihre Feinde siegen, denn Tapferkeit hätten sie
schon, und schöne Ordnung, wie man sie im Kampf brauche, werde
auf diese Weise dazukommen. So würden sie in zweierlei Hinsicht
gewinnen, indem ihre Disciplin durch Uebung unter Gefahren sich
verbessere, und selbst ihr Muth in Folge des Vertrauens auf die
gewonnene Erfahrung sich noch stärke. Zu Feldherrn aber dürfe man
nur Wenige machen und diesen unumschränkte Vollmacht geben und
selber einen Eid leisten, daß sie jene nach ihrem besten Wissen
ungehindert wollten schalten und walten lassen. Denn so werde das, was
geheim gehalten werden müsse, leichter verschwiegen bleiben, und alles
Uebrige der Ordnung gemäß und ohne Ausflüchte durchgeführt werden.

LXXII. Ce fut dans ce dessein qu’ils firent voile pour ¹ Naxos et Catane ² , afin d’y passer l’hiver. Les Syracusains, après avoir enseveli leurs morts, se réunirent en assemblée. Hermocrate, fils d’Hermon, s’avança : c’était un homme qui, sous aucun rapport, ne le cédait à personne eri habileté, distingué d’ailleurs par l’expérience qu’il avait acquise dans la guerre et par sa valeur. Il les encouragea et mit en garde contre l’abattement d’un premier échec. Ce n’était pas le courage, dit-il, qui avait été vaincu chez eux; le désordre avait fait tout le mal; et cependant ils ne s’étaient pas montrés aussi inférieurs qu’on devait s’y attendre, surtout ayant à lutter, eux simples particuliers, simples artisans pour ainsi dire, contre les plus habiles soldats de la Grèce. Ce qui avait nui beaucoup aussi, c’était la multitude des généraux (ils en avaient quinze), la division du commandement, le défaut de discipline et de subordination dans la multitude. Si, au contraire, il y avait un petit nombre de généraux expérimentés; si, dans le cours de l’hiver, on formait un corps d’hoplites; si on fournissait des armes à ceux qui n’en avaient pas, afin d’avoir le plus d’hommes possible, en ayant soin de rendre tous les exercices obligatoires, on aurait probablement, disait-il, l’avantage sur l’ennemi; car, ayant déjà le courage, on y joindrait la discipline dans la pratique, et ces deux qualités s’accroîtraient réciproquement : la discipline se fortifierait par l’exercice au milieu des dangers, la bravoure deviendrait plus sûre d’elle-même de toute la confiance que donne l’expérience. Il fallait donc choisir un petit nombre de généraux investis de pleins pouvoirs, et s’engager par serment envers eux à ³ les laisser suivre leurs propres inspirations dans l’exercice du commandement : de cette façon, le secret serait mieux gardé pour les mesures qui l’exigeaient, et tous les préparatifs se feraient avec ordre et sans tergiversations.

Les Syracusains, après avoir enterré leurs morts, tinrent une assemblée. Ou y entendit Hermocratès filsd’ffennon, l’homme qui, à l’intelligence la plus rare, joignait le plus de talents militaires et d’éclatante valeur. Il chercha à relever les esprits et à prévenir l’abattement résultant d’un premier échec. Selon lui, ce n’était pas le courage des Syracusains qui avait été vaincu ; tout le mal venait du désordre; et encore ne s’é-taient-ils pas montrés aussi inférieurs qu’on pouvait s'y attendre dans une lutte avec les plus habiles des Grecs, où ils avaient eu affaire, eux novices et apprentis, pour ainsi dire, avec des ennemis consommés dans l’art de la guerre ¹ . Ce qui nuisait surtout, c’était la multiplicité des généraux — il n’y en avait pas moins de quinze — jointe à l’insubordination de la multitude. Avec un petit nombre de chefs expérimentés, en profitant de l’hiver pour recruter les hoplites, pour fournir des armes à ceux qui en manquaient et les astreindre à des exercices réguliers, on finirait selon toute apparence par triompher des ennemis, puisqu’au courage qu’on possédait déjà s’ajouterait la discipline, deux qualités qui s’accroîtraient naturellement, la discipline par l’habitude des dangers, le courage par le savoir qui double la confiance. Il fallait donc élire peu de généraux, les revêtir d’un pouvoir absolu, et s’engagér envers eux par serment à les laisser gouverner à leur guise. Par là il y aurait plus de secret, d’unité et de vigueur dans le commandement.

[1] With this purpose they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their own dead, called an assembly.

[2] And there came before them Hermocrates son of Hermon, ¹ a man who was in general second to none in point of intelligence, and had shown himself in this war both competent by reason of experience and conspicuous for courage. He encouraged them and protested against their giving way because of what had happened:

[3] their spirit, he told them, was not defeated; it was their lack of discipline that had done mischief. They had not, however, been so much inferior as might have been expected, especially as they had been pitted against troops who were the foremost among the Hellenes in experience, mere tiros so to speak against skilled craftsmen.

[4] Much mischief had also been caused by the large number of the generals and the division of command—for they had fifteen generals—and the disorder and anarchy among the troops. If only a few men of experience should be chosen as generals, and during this winter they should get the hoplite-force ready, providing arms for those who had none, in order that the number might be as large as possible, and enforcing the general training, in all likelihood, he said, they would get the better of the enemy, if to courage, which they had already, discipline were added when it came to action. For both these things would improve of themselves; their discipline would be practised in the midst of dangers, and their courage, in proportion as their confidence in their skill increased, would prove more self-reliant than ever.

[5] The generals, then, whom they should elect ought to be few in number and clothed with full powers and they should give them their oath that they would in very truth allow them to command according to their judgment; for in this way whatever ought to be kept secret would be better concealed, and their preparations in general would be made in an orderly way and without evasions.

[1] They, then, with these intentions sailed off to Naxos and Catana, for the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their dead, held an assembly.

[2] And now came forward to them Hermocrates son of Hermon, a man at once second to none in general intelligence, and who had proved himself able in war through his experience, and a person of signal bravery. He encouraged them, and told them

[3]

[4]

[5]

[1] Atque hi quidem Itoc consilio Naxum et Catanam navigarunt, ut illic hibernarent; Syracusani vero suis mortuis sepultis concionem cogebant.

[2] Atque in medium progressae Hermocrates, Hermonis filius, vir quum celeris in rebus prudentia nulli secundus, tum etiam rerum Mli-carum jientia satis instructus et fortitudine insignis confirmabat cos, neque propter id, quod acciderat, animum despondere sinebat;

[3] non enim animum eorum Kuiwalum esse, sed ordinum confusionem nocuisse. Neque tainen eos adeo superatos esse, ut verisimile fuerit, praesertim quod idiotae ac propeinodum operarii cum iis pugnassent, qui rei militaris peritia primi Graecorum censerentur.

[4] Magnum vero damnum attulisse etiam ducum multitudinem et imperatorum turbam (erant enim iis quindecim duces) et confusam multorum manum, nullius imperio parentem. Quod si pauci iique periti imperatores essent, atque per eam hiemem gravis armaturae milites praepararent, et arma subministrantes iis, quibus deessent, ut quam maximus esset militum gravis armaturae numerus, et iu ceteris rei bellica: studiis cos sese exercere cogerent, affirmabat, ipsos verisimile esse adversariis superiores futuros, quod fortitudo quidem iis jam adesset, ordinis vero conservatio in rebus gerendis esset accessura; haec enim ambo progressus esse factura, tianc quidem, quod inter pericula addisceretur, animi vero praesentiam conjunctam cum fiducia scientiae confidentiornu quani antea fore.

[5] Imperatores vero et paucos et cum summa potestate creandos, et religioso jurejurando promittendum iis, tore, ut populus eos imperare sinat ita, ut ipsorum intelligentia ferret; sic enim et ea, quae sint celanda, facibus celatum iri, et celera recte atque ordine et sine ulla tergiversatione praeparatum iri.

Con questa intenzione navigarono a Nasso e Catana per isvernarvi. I Siracusani sepolti i loro morti tennero adunanza, ove presentatosi Ermocrate di Ermone, personaggio che in prudenza non era del resto addietro a nissun altro, e che in guerra si era mostrato per esperienza sufficiente e per valore illustre, li inanimiva e non lasciava che per l’accaduto invilissero. Poiché diceva che non era stato vinto il loro animo ma avea nociuto ad essi il disordine; che sebbene essi rozzi artigiani, per così dire, si fossero messi in lizza co’primi e più esperti Greci, nondimeno non erano andati al disotto quanto era da aspettarsi ; che di gran nocumento era stata loro la moltiplicità de’ duci e comandanti ( perchè avevano quindici generali), e la non governabile turba disordinata. Che se pochi, proseguiva, e pratici saranno i generali, e in quest’ inverno prepareranno le milizie gravi, e procacceranno le armi a chi non le ha, acciocché sieno in grandissimo numero, e le astringeranno ad ogni altro guerresco esercizio , certamente e potrebbero superare i nemici ; attesoché all’attual loro coraggio aggiungeranno il buon ordine che si richiede nelle azioni. Imperocché queste due cose verranno crescendo : la disciplina perchè praticata tra i pericoli : il coraggio perchè avvalorato dalla fiducia del sapere, da per sé stesso diverrà più animoso. In ultimo poi soggiungeva che bisognava scegliere pochi generali ma con autorità illimitata , e prestare ad essi giuramento di lasciarli comandare comunque sapranno ; avvegnaché in questo modo starebbero più coperte le cose che voglionsi celare , e le altre verrebbero con ordine apprestate inescusabilmente.