Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 6.37

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„Hätte eS aber wirklich mit der Behauptung, daß sie
kämen, seine Richtigkeit, so wäre Sizilien meiner Meinung
nach eher imstande, einen Krieg durchzuführen als der Pelo
ponnes, weil es dafür in jeder Beziehung besser versehen ist;
ja, unsere Stadt würde schon allein der angeblich jetzt im
Anzüge befindlichen Macht, selbst wenn sie nochmal so stark
wäre, weit überlegen sein. Pferde, das weiß ich, haben sie
nicht bei sich, und die würden sie sich bis auf ein paar aus
Egesta auch hier nicht verschaffen können. Auch bringen sie
aus der Flotte nicht genug schweres Fußvolk mit, um uns
damit gewachsen zu sein. Eine solche Fahrt hierher ist ja
schon für leichte Schiffe keine Kleinigkeit, und nun gar der
ungeheure Troß, den sie zum Kriege gegen eine solche Stadt
mitschleppen müssen. Ja, ich bin sogar der Ansicht, daß sie
selbst dann, wenn sie bei ihrer Ankunft hier in der Nähe
eine andere Stadt, so groß wie Syrakus fänden, in der sie
sich für den Krieg einrichten könnten, schwerlich der Vernich
tung entgehen würden, und nun vollends, wenn sie ganz
Sizilien, daS doch zusammenhalten wird, gegen sich haben
und sich, nur mit dem Notdürftigsten versehen, von ihrem,
von den Schiffen aus geschlagenen Zeltlager aus Furcht vor
unserer Reiterei nicht weit vorwagen dürften. Kurz und
gut, ich glaube, sie werden hier im Lande nicht einmal festen
Fuß fassen können; so sehr sind wir ihnen, meiner Über
zeugung nach, an Streitkräften überlegen.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.37.1 focus

[1] εἰ δὲ δή, ὥσπερ λέγονται, ἔλθοιεν, ἱκανωτέραν ἡγοῦμαι Σικελίαν Πελοποννήσου διαπολεμῆσαι ὅσῳ κατὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐξήρτυται, τὴν δὲ ἡμετέραν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῆς νῦν στρατιᾶς, ὥς φασιν, ἐπιούσης, καὶ εἰ δὶς τοσαύτη ἔλθοι, πολὺ κρείσσω εἶναι, οἷς γ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι οὔθ’ ἵππους ἀκολουθήσοντας, οὐδ’ αὐτόθεν πορισθησομένους εἰ μὴ ὀλίγους τινὰς παρ’ Ἐγεσταίων, οὔθ’ ὁπλίτας ἰσοπληθεῖς τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐπὶ νεῶν γε ἐλθόντας (μέγα γὰρ τὸ καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶ κούφαις τοσοῦτον πλοῦν δεῦρο κομισθῆναι), τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὅσην δεῖ ἐπὶ πόλιν τοσήνδε πορισθῆναι, οὐκ ὀλίγην οὖσαν.

[2] ὥστε, παρὰ τοσοῦτον γιγνώσκω, μόλις ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, εἰ πόλιν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην ὅσαι Συράκουσαί εἰσιν ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες καὶ ὅμορον οἰκίσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖντο, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι διαφθαρῆναι, ἦ πού γε δὴ ἐν πάσῃ πολεμίᾳ Σικελίᾳ (ξυστήσεται γάρ) στρατοπέδῳ τε ἐκ νεῶν ἱδρυθέντι καὶ ἐκ σκηνιδίων καὶ ἀναγκαίας παρασκευῆς οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱππέων ἐξιόντες. τό τε ξύμπαν οὐδ’ ἂν κρατῆσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς γῆς ἡγοῦμαι· τοσούτῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν παρασκευὴν κρείσσω νομίζω.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.37.1 focus

[1] "And if indeed they come, as these men say they will, I think Sicily more sufficient to dispatch the war than Peloponnesus, as being in all respects better furnished, and that this our own city is much stronger than the army which they say is now coming, though it were twice as great as it is. For I know they neither bring horses with them nor can they get any here, save only a few from the Egestaeans, nor have men of arms so many as we, in that they are to bring them by sea. For it is a hard matter to come so far as this by sea, though they carried no men of arms in their galleys at all, if they carry with them all other their necessaries, which cannot be small against so great a city.

[2] So that I am so far from the opinion of these others that I think the Athenians, though they had here another city as great as Syracuse, and confining on it, and should from thence make their war, yet should not be able to escape from being destroyed, every man of them, much less now, when all Sicily is their enemy. For in their camp, fenced with their galleys, they shall be cooped up and from their tents and forced munition never be able to stir far abroad without being cut off by our horsemen. In short, I think they shall never be able to get landing, so much above theirs do I value our own forces.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.37.1 focus

[1] However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better able to go through with the war than Peloponnese , as being at all points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large again. I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity.

[2] In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse , and settled down and carried on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents and bare necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for fear of our cavalry.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.37 focus

„Und wenn sie dennoch, wie man behauptet, wirklich
kämen, so ist meiner Meinung nach Sieilien besser im Stande, als der
Peloponnes, sie mit den Waffen gänzlich zu besiegen, da es ja in
allen Stücken mit besseren Mitteln dazu versehen ist; ja diese unsere
eigene Stadt für sich allein halte ich für weit überlegen, selbst wenn
die Heeresmacht, die gegen uns im Anzug sein soll, noch einmal so
stark wäre, als man sie angibt. Denn so viel ich verstehe, werden
sie weder selbst Pferde mitbringen, noch sich solche von hier verschaffen
können, außer einige wenige von den Egestanern; und auch die
Schwerbewaffneten, die auf Schiffen mitkommen, können den
unsrigen an Zahl nicht gewachsen sein. Denn eS wäre schon ein großes
Ding, mit den Schiffen allein ohne die schwere Mannschaft eine so
weite Fahrt hieher zu unternehmen, da ja auch die sonstige Rüstung
nicht gering ist, die man gegen eine so große Stadt doch mitnehmen
muß. Und davon bin ich so fest überzeugt, daß ich sogar glaube, die
Athener würden selbst dann kaum völliger Vernichtung entgehen,
wenn sie noch eine zweite, ebenso große Stadt wie Syrakus, besäßen
und hier im Land ansässig, als unsere Nachbarn, aus nächster Nahe
den Krieg gegen unS führten, geschweige denn jetzt, wo sie ganz
Sicilien sich feindlich gegenüber haben, — denn es wird
zusammenhat ten gegen sie — und von ihrem Schiffslager mit Zeltchen und nur ¹
notydurftlgem Gerathe sich unserer Reiter wegen nicht einmal weit
entfernen könnten. Ja, ich glaube überhaupt nicht einmal, daß sie
sich nur am Lande werden behaupten können..Für so überlegen halte
ich unsere Macht."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.37 focus

XXXVII. « Et quand ils viendraient, comme on le dit, je crois la Sicile plus en état que le Péloponnèse de les combattre avec succès, d’autant qu’elle est mieux pourvue sous tous les rapports; je crois que notre ville seule est plus forte de beaucoup que l’armée qui, dit-on, s’avance maintenant, fût-elle deux fois plus nombreuse encore. Ce que je sais, c’est qu’ils n’amèneront pas de cavalerie, et qu’à part un très-petit nombre de chevaux levés chez les Égestains, ils ne pourront en tirer d’ici : ils ne pourront pas davantage, venant sur des vaisseaux, amener une armée d’hoplites égale à la nôtre; car le transport est une grande affaire lorsqu’il faut tout à la fois avoir des bâtiments légers pour une traversée aussi longue, et amener l’immense matériel nécessaire pour attaquer une ville de cette importance. Aussi, telle est ma conviction à cet égard, que je crois difficile qu’ils ne soient pas anéantis, quand même ils auraient pour base d’opérations une autre ville aussi grande que Syracuse et seraient maîtres d’un pays frontière, d’où ils pussent nous faire la guerre : à plus forte raison quand ils auront toute la Sicile pour ennemie, — car elle se lèvera tout entière, — quand il leur faudra se retrancher au sortir de leurs vaisseaux, sans autre point d’appui que de mauvaises tentes et des dispositions faites à la hâte, en présence de notre cavalerie qui ne leur permettra pas de s’écarter. En un mot, je suis persuadé qu’ils ne pourront pas même tenir la campagne, tant je crois nos forces supérieures!

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.37 focus

a Et quand ils viendraient, comme on le prétend, je crois la Sicile plus en état que le Péloponèse de leur tenir tête ; car elle possède de plus amples ressources à tous égards. Notre seule ville est incomparablement plus forte que l’armée qu’on dit en marche, celle-ci fût-elle double de ce qu’elle peut être. Ce dont je suis certain, c’est qu’ils n’amèneront point de chevaux, et qu’ils ne s’en procureront ici qu’un petit nombre, à Egeste. Leurs hoplites ne peuvent pas être non plus aussi nombreux que les nôtres, car ils viendront sur ides vaisseaux ; or c’est déjà pour eux une grande affaire que de se transporter à une telle distance avec leufs seuls bâtiments légers, sans parler de l’énorme matériel dont ils devront se faire suivre pour attaquer une cité aussi considérable qoe la nôtre. a Je suis donc bien éloigné de partager ces terreurs. Non, non; eussent-ils fondé dans notre voisinage une ville aussi grande que Syracuse et leur servant de base d’opérations contre nous, à peine, selon moi, éviteraient-ils une destruction totale ; à plus forte raison au milieu de la Sicile toute ennemie, car elle se coalisera contre eux, avec des troupes obligées de se cantonner au sortir des vaisseaux, qui n’auront que de misérables tentes, un appareil insuffisant, et que nos cavaliers empêcheront de s’étendre. Bref, je ne crois pas même qu’ils puissent prendre pied, tant nos forces leur sont supérieures.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.37.1 focus

[1] "If, however, they should come, as it is reported, I think Sicily more competent to carry the war through than the Peloponnesus, inasmuch as it is better provided in all respects, and that our city by itself is much stronger than this army which now, as they say, is coming on—aye, even if it should come in twice the number. For I know that neither horses will accompany them—and from here also none will be provided, except a few from Egesta— nor hoplites equal in number to ours, since they have to come on ships; for it is a great thing to make the long voyage to Sicily even with their ships alone, lightly laden. And the rest of the equipment which must be provided against so large a city as ours is not small.

[2] So much, then, do I differ in my judgment from these men that it seems to me, if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse and settling here on our borders should wage the war, they would hardly fail to be utterly destroyed; much less, then, when all Sicily is hostile—for it will be united—and they are in a camp pitched just after landing from the ships and cannot venture far from their wretched tents and meagre supplies by reason of our cavalry. In short, I think they would not even get a foothold on the land; so much do I judge our forces to be superior.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.37.1 focus

[1] "But, indeed, if they should come, as they are said to be coming, I consider Sicily more competent to bring the war to a termination than the Peloponnese, (inasmuch as it is better provided in all respects,) and our city by itself far stronger than the army which is now, as they say, coming against us, even though it came twice as large as it is. For I know that neither will any horses accompany them, or be provided for them here, except some few from the Segestans, nor heavy-armed equal in number to our own, coming, as they must have done, on board ship. For it is a great thing for even the ships themselves, lightly laden, to perform so long a voyage hither; and for all the other provisions required against such a city, (which will be no few,) to be furnished.

[2] So far then am I from believing this, that I think if they came with another city as large as Syracuse in their possession, and living there on our borders carried on the war, they would hardly avoid utter ruin: much less then, surely, with the whole of Sicily hostile to them, (for it will league together;) and with an army established in the country from on board ship; and while they are not permitted by our cavalry to advance far from their wretched tents, and such poor equipments as they are compelled to put up with. In short, I do not think they would even effect a landing; so far superior do I consider our forces to be.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.37.1 focus

[1] «Jam vero etiam si venerint, ut fertur, existimo Siciliam plus virium habere ad eos debellandos, quam Peloponnesum , quo est omnis generis apparatu instructior, nostramque civitatem solam boc exercitu, qui, ut dirunt, nunc coutra nos venit, vel si bis tantus esset, longe superiorem esse, quippe quos intelligo neque equitatum secum adducturos, neque ex hac ipsa regione comparaturos, nisi perexiguum quemdam ab Egestaeis, neque gravis armaturae militum numerum nostro parem, quia navibus vecti sunt; arduum enim fuerit vel solis navibus expeditis tantum navigationis cursum huc usque conficere, et ceterum apparatum , quantum adversus tantam civitatem oportet, suppeditare , qui profecto non parvus est.

[2] Quamobrem ab hac opinione ego adeo dissentio, ut, si venirent aliam urbeui tantam, quantae sunt Syracusae, bic obtinentes et si eant finitimam nobis incolentes bellum facerent, vix videantur mihi impedire posse, quin internecione caedantur, atque multo certe minus, ubi in hostili tota Sicilia (conspirabit enim contra illos) et castra posuerint, qualia rebus ad id e navibus adductis fieri possunt, et ubi a tentoriolis necessarioque apparata propter equites nostros non longe procedant. In summa, ne terra quidem eos potituros puto; tanto nostrum I apparatum praestantiorem duco.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.37 focus

« Se poi, siccome è fama, ci verranno, credo che la Sicilia tanto più del Peloponneso sia sufficiente a debellarli, in quanto é meglio fornita di tutto ; e che la città nostra da sé sia molto più potente dell’armata che ora, siccome dicono, c’ invade, foss’ella due cotanti. Io so infatti che non avranno seco cavalli (fc non potranno procacciarli d' qui tranne pochi dagli Egestei), nè soldatesca grave numerosa al par della nostra, dovendo essi venire sulle navi« Imperciocché è di per sé stesso gran cosa il condursi qua per sì lungo tragitto colle sole navi leggere, e trasportare tutti gli altri apparati che abbisognano contro sì fatta città, i quali certo non denno esser pochi. Laonde tanto discorda dagli altri colla mia opinione, da pensare anzi, che qualora pure venissero qua possedendo città di egual potenza eoa Siracusa, e ci facessero guerra abitando a confine, appena potrebbero non esser totalmente disfatti. Quanto più poi lo saranno trovando nemica tutta Sicilia che si unirà contro loro , i quali dovranno usare solo di accampamenti piantati colle navi e di meschine trabacche e del solo necessario apparecchio, donde non potranno molto scostarsi perché impediti dai nostri cavalli. Insomma io stimo che non potranno nemmeno pigliar terra, tanta è a mio credere , la superiorità di nostre forze.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

τῆς . . ἐπιούσης = τῆς νῦν ἐπιούσης ς. Thuc. often places an attributive partic. after a noun when there are other modifications.

οἷς γε —antecedent στρατιᾶς.

οὔθ) . . οὐδ’ . . οὔθ) ὁπλίτας . . τήν τε ἄλλην —this series really consists of οὔτε . . οὔτε . . τε, with an οὐδέ clause inserted as a climax to the first.

ὁπλίτας —sc. άκολουθήσοντας. They will not have a large force of hoplites, as the hoplites will have come by sea.

αὐταῖς —‘alone’;

κούφαις ‘without lading.’

παρὰ τοσοῦτον γιγνώσκω —the Schol. explains ‘So much do I differ from my opponents.’ But lit. ‘to such an extent I know,’ i.e. ‘so confident am I’ that they are inferior to us. Cf. § 1 ἱκανωτέραν ἡγοῦμαι Σικελίαν κτλ., and below τοσούτῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν παρασκευὴν κρείσσω νομίζω.

μόλις ἄν —with οὐκ ἂν διαφθαρῆναι.

εἰ πόλιν . . ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες —‘if they brought with them a city great as Syracuse, and set it up upon our borders, and carried on the war from it, scarcely so could they escape utter ruin.’ By πόλις he means, of course, the men and the things necessary to make a permanent hostile settlement.

οἰκίσαντες for οἰκήσαντες is necessary, because the sense required is not ‘settle in’ a place already existing, hut ‘found’ a new settlement. With this change there is no need to bracket ἔλθοιεν or ἔ. ἔχοντες.

ἦ πού γε δὴ κτλ —(the γε only adds further emphasis to ἦ που δή—‘of course, then’;) sc. μόλις δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ἂν διαφθαρῆναι.

ἐν πάσῃ πολεμίᾳ —cf. c. 21, 2 ἐς άλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν.

ξυστήσεται γάρ —‘for Sieily will unite’ against them.

στρατοπέδῳ τε —‘and in (sc. ἐν from above) a camp which they form with what their ships bring.’ στρατοπέδῳ is in contrast with πόλιν above, ἱδρυθέντι with οἰκίσαντες. Stahl gets into endless difficulties (1) by supplying εἰ πόλεμον ποιοῖντο to ἐν πάσῃ π. Σικελίᾳ, (2) by rendering τε ‘both’ instead of ‘and,’ (3) by totally misunderstanding ἐκ νεῶν ἱδρυθέντι .

καὶ ἐκ σκηνιδίων κτλ —‘and when they depend on mere tents and supplies of the barest, while our cavalry prevents them from moving for any distance.’

τό τε ξύμπαν —sums up the whole argument.

κρατῆσαι . . τῆς γῆς — i.e. obtain possession of so much land as is necessary for the στρατόπεδον. Cf. c. 23, 2 εὐθὺς κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.37

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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