Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 6.34

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„Also nur Mut! Wir müssen nicht nur hier zum Kriege
rütsen, sondern auch zu den Sikelern senden, um die, welche
schon zu uns halten, noch fester an uns zu knüpfen, und die
anderen womöglich zu einem Bündnis zu bewegen, auch an
die übrigen Mischen Städte Gesandte schicken, um ihnen über
die auch ihnen drohende Gefahr die Augen zu öffnen; ebenso
nach Italien, damit man sich dort zu Bündnissen mit uns
versteht oder doch den Athenern die Häfen verschließt. Ich
meine, wir sollten auch nach Karthago schicken. Denn die
Karthager müssen darauf gefaßt sein und leben in beständiger
Furcht, daß die Athener eines schönen Tags vor ihrer Stadt
erscheinen. Vielleicht sagen sie sich, daß es ihnen übel be
kommen könnte, wenn sie uns bei dieser Gelegenheit im Stich
ließen, und entschließen sich, uns irgendwie, sei es offen
oder wenigstens unterderhand, zu unterstützen. Dazu sind die
Karthager, wenn sie wollen, augenblicklich mehr als andere
imstande. Denn sie haben Gold und Silber in Hülle und
Fülle, was ja im Kriege wie überall so wesentlich mitspricht.
Auch nach Lakedämon und Korinth müssen wir schicken und
bitten, uns nicht nur hier schleunigst zu Hilfe zu kommen,
sondern auch dort die Feindseligkeiten wieder aufzunehmen.
Was ich aber zurzeit für das Wichtigste halte, will ich euch
doch auch sagen, obgleich ich dabei, ruhselig, wie ihr nun
einmal seid, wohl am wenigsten schon jetzt auf eure Zustim
mung rechnen kann. Wenn wir sizilischen Griechen sämtlich
oder doch möglichst viele mit uns alles, was wir an Schiffen
haben, flott machen und auf zwei Monate mit Lebensmitteln
versehen wollten und damit den Athenern bis nach Tarent
oder an das Japygische Vorgebirge entgegenführen, so würden
wir ihnen zeigen, daß es mit ihrem sizilischen Kriege nichts
ist, ehe sie nicht glücklich über das Ionische Meer sind. Da
durch würden wir sie kopfscheu machen und ihnen zu Gemüte
führen, daß wir auf dem Posten sind und uns dabei auf
Freundesland stützen können; denn Tarent wird uns auf
nehmen. Während sie mit Sack und Pack die weite Fahrt
über See machen müssen, wobei sie auf die Dauer die Ord
nung schwerlich aufrechterhalten könnten, hätten wir die beste
Gelegenheit, ihre langsam und bei kleinem herankommende
Flotte anzugreifen. Auch wenn sie ihre Kriegsschiffe erleich
terten, sich aufs Rudern legten und damit geschlossen gegen
uns vorgingen, würden wir es nur mit überanstrengten Leuten
zu tun haben, und wenn uns auch daS bedenklich schiene, uns
immer nach Tarent zurückziehen können. Sie aber würden,
wollten sie, um eine Schlacht zu liefen, ihre Fahrt ohne
reichliche Lebensmittel fortsetzen, an Orten, wo es nichts zu
leben gäbe, Hunger leiden oder, wenn sie dort liegen blieben,
entweder von uns eingeschlossen werden oder, wenn sie ver
suchen sollten, durchzubrechen, ihre Transportflotte im Stich
lassen müssen und in Ermangelung von Städten, wo sie mit
Sicherheit auf Verpflegung rechnen könnten, ihren Plan auf
geben. Mit Rücksicht darauf, glaube ich, werden sie, wenn
wir ihnen den Weg versperren, gar nicht von Kerkyra auf
brechen, sondern sich die Sache erst überlegen und Nachrichten
einziehen, wie stark und wo wir sind, und dadurch bis in den
Winter aufgehalten werden oder, verblüfft durch die uner
wartete Wendung der Dinge, die Fahrt überhaupt aufgeben,
zumal, wie ich höre, ihr erfahrenster Feldherr den Oberbefehl
nur ungern übernommen hat und sehr geneigt sein wird, sich
hinter jedes ernste Hindernis von unserer Seite zurückzuziehen.
Und so viel weiß ich, das Gerücht würde daraus noch mehr
machen. Die Stimmung der Menschen aber richtet sich nach
dem, was sie hören. Man fürchtet niemand mehr als einen
Gegner, der zuerst den Degen zieht oder wenigstens keinen
Zweifel darüber läßt, daß er bereit ist, dem Angreifer die
Spitze zu bieten, weil man überzeugt ist, daß auch er seinen
Mann stehen wird. So wird es jetzt wahrscheinlich auch den
Athenern gehen. Sie kommen hierher in dem Glauben, wir
würden uns nicht wehren, und haben guten Grund, so gering
schätzig von uns zu denken, weil wir den Lakedämoniern nicht
geholfen haben, sie niederzukämpfen. Wenn sie nun sehen,
daß es uns dazu an Mut nicht fehlt, so wird dies unerwartete
Ereignis mehr Eindruck auf sie machen als unsere wirkliche
Macht. Folgt also meinem Rat und entschließt euch zu diesem
kühnen Schritt, oder wenn das nicht, so richtet euch wenigstens
sonst auf den Krieg ein. Davon aber könnt ihr alle über
zeugt sein, daß mutiges Auftreten der beste Beweis ist, man
fürchte den Feind nicht; und daß auch wir am sichersten gehen,
wenn wir uns angesichts der kommenden Gefahr beizeiten
wappnen, wie wenn der Feind schon vor den Toren wäre.
Die Herren Athener wollen uns zu Kleide und sind, wie ich
bestimmt weiß, schon unterwegs: sie werden nicht lange auf
sich warten lassen."

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.34.1 focus

[1] ‘θαρσοῦντες οὖν τά τε αὐτοῦ παρασκευαζώμεθα καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελοὺς πέμποντες τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον βεβαιωσώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πειρώμεθα ποιεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν πέμπωμεν πρέσβεις δηλοῦντες ὡς κοινὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὅπως ἢ ξυμμαχίαν ποιώμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους.

[2] δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, ὥστε τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως νομίσαντες, εἰ τάδε προήσονται, κἂν σφεῖς ἐν πόνῳ εἶναι, ἐθελήσειαν ἡμῖν ἤτοι κρύφα γε ἢ φανερῶς ἢ ἐξ ἑνός γέ του τρόπου ἀμῦναι. δυνατοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἆλλα εὐπορεῖ.

[3] πέμπωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον δεόμενοι δεῦρο κατὰ τάχος βοηθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν.

[4] ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον ὑμεῖς τε διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε, ὅμως εἰρήσεται. Σικελιῶται γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν ξύμπαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι πλεῖστοι μεθ’ ἡμῶν, καθελκύσαντες ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ναυτικὸν μετὰ δυοῖν μηνοῖν τροφῆς ἀπαντῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις ἐς Τάραντα καὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν, καὶ δῆλον ποιῆσαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας πρότερον ἔσται ὁ ἀγὼν ἢ τοῦ ἐκείνους περαιωθῆναι τὸν Ἰόνιον, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήξαιμεν καὶ ἐς λογισμὸν καταστήσαιμεν ὅτι ὁρμώμεθα μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας φύλακες (ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς Τάρας), τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μῆκος ἐν τάξει μεῖναι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἂν εὐεπίθετος εἴη, βραδεῖά τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγον προσπίπτουσα.

[5] εἰ δ’ αὖ τῷ ταχυναυτοῦντι ἁθροωτέρῳ κουφίσαντες προσβάλοιεν, εἰ μὲν κώπαις χρήσαιντο, ἐπιθοίμεθ’ ἂν κεκμηκόσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ δοκοίη, ἔστι καὶ ὑποχωρῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐς Τάραντα· οἱ δὲ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἐφοδίων ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ περαιωθέντες ἀποροῖεν ἂν κατὰ χωρία ἐρῆμα, καὶ ἢ μένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἂν ἢ πειρώμενοι παραπλεῖν τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀπολείποιεν ἂν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέβαια ἔχοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, ἀθυμοῖεν.

[6] ὥστ’ ἔγωγε τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἡγοῦμαι ἀποκλῃομένους αὐτοὺς οὐδ’ ἂν ἀπᾶραι ἀπὸ Κερκύρας, ἀλλ’ ἢ διαβουλευσαμένους καὶ κατασκοπαῖς χρωμένους, ὁπόσοι τ’ ἐσμὲν καὶ ἐν ᾧ χωρίῳ, ἐξωσθῆναι ἂν τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐς χειμῶνα, ἢ καταπλαγέντας τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ καταλῦσαι ἂν τὸν πλοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμπειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω, ἄκοντος ἡγουμένου καὶ ἀσμένου ἂν πρόφασιν λαβόντος, εἴ τι ἀξιόχρεων ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ὀφθείη.

[7] ἀγγελλοίμεθα δ’ ἂν εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον· τῶν δ’ ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι ἵστανται, καὶ τοὺς προεπιχειροῦντας ἢ τοῖς γε ἐπιχειροῦσι προδηλοῦντας ὅτι ἀμυνοῦνται μᾶλλον πεφόβηνται, ἰσοκινδύνους ἡγούμενοι.

[8] ὅπερ ἂν νῦν Ἀθηναῖοι πάθοιεν. ἐπέρχονται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀμυνουμένοις, δικαίως κατεγνωκότες ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐφθείρομεν· εἰ δ’ ἴδοιεν παρὰ γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ μᾶλλον ἂν καταπλαγεῖεν ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει.

[9] ‘πείθεσθε οὖν μάλιστα μὲν ταῦτα τολμήσαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι τάχιστα τἆλλα ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ παραστῆναι παντὶ τὸ μὲν καταφρονεῖν τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐν τῶν ἔργων τῇ ἀλκῇ δείκνυσθαι, τὸ δ’ ἤδη τὰς μετὰ φόβου παρασκευὰς ἀσφαλεστάτας νομίσαντας ὡς ἐπὶ κινδύνου πράσσειν χρησιμώτατον ἂν ξυμβῆναι. οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ ἐπέρχονται καὶ ἐν πλῷ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἤδη εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσον οὔπω πάρεισιν.’

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.34.1 focus

[1] Let us therefore with courage put in readiness our own forces; let us send to the Siculi to confirm those we have, and to make peace and league with others; and let us send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily to show them that it is a common danger, and into Italy to get them into our league, or at least that they receive not the Athenians.

[2] And in my judgment it were our best course to send also to Carthage, for even they are not without expectation of the same danger. Nay, they are in a continual fear that the Athenians will bring war upon them also, even to their city. So that upon apprehension that if they neglect us the trouble will come home to their own door, they will perhaps, either secretly or openly or some way assist us. And of all that now are, they are the best able to do it, if they please. For they have the most gold and silver, by which the wars and all things else are the best expedited.

[3] Let us also send to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, praying them not only to send their succours hither with speed, but also to set on foot the war there.

[4] But that which I think the best course of all, though through an habit of sitting still you will hardly be brought to it, I will nevertheless now tell you what it is. If the Sicilians all together, or if not all, yet if we and most of the rest, should draw together our whole navy, and with two months' provision go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, and let them see that they must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf before they fight for Sicily, it would both terrify them the most and also put them into a consideration that we, as the watchmen of our country, come upon them out of an amicable territory (for we shall be received at Tarentum), whereas they themselves have a great deal of sea to pass with all their preparations and cannot keep themselves in their order for the length of the voyage; and that for us it will be an easy matter to assail them, coming up slowly as they do and thin.

[5] Again, if lightening their galleys, they shall come up to us more nimbly and more close together, we shall charge upon them already wearied, or we may, if we please, retire again into Tarentum. Whereas they, if they come over but with a part of their provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of victuals in those desert parts, and either staying be there besieged, or, attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest of their provision, and be dejected, as not assured of the cities whether they will receive them or not.

[6] I am therefore of opinion that dismayed with this reckoning they will either not put over at all from Corcyra, or whilst they spend time in deliberating and in sending out to explore how many and in what place we are, the season will be lost and winter come; or deterred with our unlookedfor opposition, they will give over the voyage. And the rather for that as I hear the man of most experience amongst their commanders hath the charge against his will and would take a light occasion to return if he saw any considerable stop made by us in the way.

[7] And I am very sure we should be voiced amongst them to the utmost. And as the reports are, so are men's minds; and they fear more such as they hear will begin with them than such as give out that they will no more but defend themselves, because then they think the danger equal.

[8] Which would be now the case of the Athenians. For they come against us with an opinion that we will not fight, deservedly contemning us because we joined not with the Lacedaemonians to pull them down.

[9] But if they should see us once bolder than they looked for, they would be terrified more with the unexpectedness than with the truth of our power itself. Be persuaded therefore, principally to dare to do this, or if not this, yet speedily to make yourselves otherwise ready for the war, and every man to remember that though to show contempt of the enemy be best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations are the surest that are made with fear and opinion of danger. As for the Athenians, they come; and I am sure are already in the way and want only that they are not now here.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.34.1 focus

[1] Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance of others, and despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians.

[2] I also think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like everything else, flourishes.

[3] Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth , and ask them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas .

[4] But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of our actual navy with two months' provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across the Ionian sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our defensive—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments.

[5] On the other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast sailors and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we could retire to Tarentum ; while they, having crossed with few provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive them.

[6] In my opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra ; and what with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours.

[7] We should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men's minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack, or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack, inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the emergency.

[8] This would just be the case with the Athenians at present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual power.

[9] I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present the best course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage, and all but here—this is what I am sure of.’

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.34 focus

„So laßt uns also Muth fassen und sowohl hier am Platz
das Nöthige vorbereiten,.als auch zu den Sikulern schicken, um uns
der Einen noch .mehr zu versichern und mit den Andern Freundschaft
und Bundesgenossenschast zu schließen versuchen. Und in das übrige
Sieilien wollen wir Gesandte schicken, um Alle zu belehren, daß die
Gefahr gemeinsam ist, und nach Italien, um entweder ihre
Bundesgenossenschast zu gewinnen, oder doch zu bewirken, daß sie die Athener
nicht aufnehmen. Es scheint mir auch vortheilhaft zu sein, wenn
wir nach Karthago schicken; denn die Sache kommt ihnen dort nicht
unerwartet, sondern sie sind ununterbrochen in Angst, die Athener
möchten einmal gegen ihre eigene Stadt heranziehen, und sie müssen
leicht die Ueberzeugung gewinnen, daß wenn sie unser Schicksal
übersehen, auch sie selbst wohl in Gefahr wären. Es ist also zu glauben,
daß sie uns entweder heimlich oder offen oder auf irgend eine Weise
zu unterstützen geneigt sind. Und die Macht dazu haben sie jetzt von
Allen am meisten, wenn sie nur wollten; denn Gold und Silber,
woraus, wie alles Andere, so auch der Krieg Nahrung und Gedeihen
zieht, besitzen sie in der größten Menge. Aber auch nach Lakedämon
und Korinth wollen wir Gesandte schicken und sie bitten, in aller
Eile uns hieher zu Hülse zu kommen und dort im Lande den Krieg
noch kräftiger zu führen."

„Was ich aber für das Allervortheilhafteste und Angenehmste
halte, woraus ihr jedoch, weil ihr an beständige Ruhe gewöhnt seid,
gleichwohl nicht sehr eifrig eingehen werdet, soll trotzdem gesagt
werden. Denn wenn wir sieilische Griechen insgesammt, oder wenn schon
das nicht, doch die Mehrzahl derselben im Anschlüsse an uns, mit
allen vorhandenen Schiffen und Lebensmitteln auf zwei Monate
¹ausliefen und den Athenern nach Tarent und dem Japygischen
Vorgebirge entgegen segelten und ihnen so zeigten, daß sie zuerst um die
Uebersahrt über den Ionischen Busen zu kämpfen haben, bevor es
zum Kampf um Sieilien kommt, so würden wir sie wohl am meisten
in Schrecken setzen, denn so würden wir es ihnen einleuchtend machen,
daß wir in einem befreundeten Gebiete — Tarent nimmt uns ja
auf — als Wächter unserer Heimat einen Anker - und Waffenplatz
finden, während sie selbst mit ihrer ganzen Schiffsmenge über ein
weitgedehntes Meer fahren müssen, so daß eS ihnen schwer ist, bei
der Länge der Fahrt in Ordnung zu bleiben, während das langsame
und allmälige Anfahren ihrer Schiffe uns den Angriff sehr leicht
macht. Wenn sie aber den schnellsegelnden Theil ihrer Flotte mehr
zusammenhalten und nach Erleichterung der Schiffe uns angreifen
sollten und sich dabei der Ruder bedienten, so könnten wir über sie
herfallen, nachdem sie sich abgemüdet hätten; und sollten wir das
nicht für gut finden, so können wir uns auch nach Tarent
zurückziehen. Sie aber würden in diesem Fall, da sie nur mit wenig
Lebensmitteln versehen, wie zur Seeschlacht übergefahren wären, in
den verlassenen Gegenden Mangel leiden und, wenigste daselbst
blieben, ^von unsern Schiffen^ eingeschlossen werden; oder wenn sie
es versuchen sollten, längs der Küste hin weiter zu fahren, so müssen
sie wohl ihre übrige Belastung zurücklassen und den Muth verlieren,
da sie hinsichtlich der Städte nicht sicher wären, ob sie von denselben
ausgenommen würden. Durch diesen Plan, glaube ich, würden sie
sich zurückhalten lassen und wohl nicht einmal von Kerkyra absegeln,
sondern sich lang hin und her berathen und Kundschafter ausschicken,
um unsere Zahl und Standort zu erfahren, und so über die gute
Jahreszeit hinaus bis zum Winter aufgehalten werden; oder sie
werden aus Bestürzung über die unerwartete Hemmung die Fahrt
ganz aufgeben, zumal auch der erfahrenste ihrer Feldherren, wie ich
höre, nur ungern die Anführung übernommen hat und den Vorwand
sehr gern ergreifen würde, wenn unserseits sich eine ansehnliche
Macht zeigte. Auch weiß ich gewiß, daß die Zahl unserer Schiffe
ihnen vergrößert berichtet wurde; die Meinungen der Menschen aber
richten sich nach dem, was sie hören, und diejenigen werden immer
mehr gefürchtet, welche den Angreifenden zuvorkommen, oder ihnen
doch wenigstens schon vorher zeigen, daß sie sich zuwehren entschlossen ²
sind, denn so erkennen jene doch, daß die Gefahr gleich getheilt ist. >

„Und das würde jetzt auch bei den Athenern der Fall sein.
Denn sie ziehen so gegen uns daher, als ob wir uns gar nicht wehren
wollten; und diese Geringschätzung haben wir von ihnen verdient,
weil wir den Lakedämoniern nicht geholfen haben, ihre Macht zu
stürzen. Wenn sie nun aber sähen, daß wir ganz wider ihr Erwarten
uns kühn und wagend zeigen, so würden sie durch diese Ueberraschung
in größere Bestürzung gerathen, als wie unsere wirkliche Macht sie
verdiente. Folgt mir also und wagt vor Allem dieses! Wenn aber
das nicht, so trefft so rasch als möglich alle sonstigen Vorkehrungen
zum Krieg, und es glaube Jeder, daß die Verachtung gegen den
Angreisenden sich in der Herzhaftigkeit der Vertheidigung zeigt; und
in der Ueberzeugung, daß behutsame Gegenrüstung uns die meiste
Sicherheit verbürgt, müssen wir es für das Nützlichste halten, sofort
zu handeln, wie es bei drohender Gefahr geboten ist. Denn die
Athener kommen wirklich, und ich weiß gewiß, daß sie schon auf der
Fahrt begriffen sind, ja sie sind fast schon so gut wie da."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.34 focus

XXXIV. « Faisons donc ici nos préparatifs avec confiance; en même temps envoyons chez les Sicèles pour raffermir encore les bonnes dispositions des uns, et contracter avec les autres, s’il est possible, amitié et alliance. Envoyons aussi des ambassadeurs aux aûtres villes de Sicile pour leur démontrer que le danger nous est commun à tous, et aux peuples d’ltalie pour qu’ils fassent alliance avec nous, ou du moins n’accueillent pas les Athéniens. Il serait bon même, je crois, de députer aussi à Carthage; car elle n’est pas sans inquiétude; tout au contraire, elle redoute sans cesse que les Athéniens ne viennent un jour l’attaquer. Peut- être saisiront-ils avec empressement cette occasion, dans la pensée qu’en la laissant échapper, ils pourront se trouver dans l’embarras; et alors ils nous viendront en aide de façon ou d’autre, secrètement du moins, si ce n’est ouvertement; car, s’ils le veulent, personne aujourd’hui n’est mieux en position de le faire : ils possèdent en or et en argent d’immenses richesses, gage du succès à la guerre et en toutes choses. Envoyons enfin à Lacédémone et à Corinthe, avec prière de nous secourir ici et de reprendre les hostilités en Grèce.

« Mais il y aurait, suivant moi, une mesure décisive entre toutes; aussi, quoique votre apathie habituelle me laisse peu de chances de vous persuader, j’en parlerai néanmoins. Ces erait de nous entendre avec tous les Siciliens, ou du moins avec la plus grande partie, de mettre en mer tous les bâtiments disponibles, avec deux mois de vivres, d’aller à la rencontre des Athéniens à Tarente et au cap d’lapygie, et de leur montrer qu’avant la lutte pour la Sicile, ils en auront une autre à soutenir pour le passage de la mer lonienne. Rien ne serait plus propre à les frapper de terreur : par là nous leur donnerions à penser que nous avons pour base d’opérations un pays ami dont nous sommes les gardiens (car Tarente nous accueillerait); qu’ils ont eux-mêmes une vaste étendue de mer à traverser avec tout leur appareil; qu’il est difficile, dans une traversée aussi longue, de rester en bon ordre; enfin, qu’il nous sera facile d’attaquer leur flotte quand elle s’avancera lentement et par petites divisions. Supposons au contraire que leur flotte se masse, et qu’allégée des bâtiments de charge, elle prenne l’avance pour nous attaquer; s’ils naviguent à la rame, nous tomberons sur eux quand ils seront fatigués; si nous ne le voulons pas, Tarente nous offrira un refuge. Mais eux qui, en vue de livrer un combat, se seront avancés avec peu de provisions, en manqueront sur des plages désertes; s’il y restent, nous les tiendrons en échec; s’ils tentent d’avancer, il leur faudra laisser en arrière leurs bagages; les dispositions douteuses des villes, l’incertitude de l’accueil les jetteront dans l'abattement. Aussi suis-je convaincu qu’arrêtés par ces réflexions, ils ne partiront même pas de Corcyre; occupés à délibérer, à envoyer des reconnaissances pour savoir notre nombre et notre position, ils se laisseront gagner par l’hiver, ou bien, effrayés de cette attitude imprévue, ils renonceront à l’expédition. D’ailleurs le plus expérimenté de leurs généraux ne commande qu’à regret, à ce qu’on m’assure; et, si nous faisons quelque démonstration sérieuse, il saisira avec joie ce prétexte. On exagérera nos forces, j’en suis persuadé : les opinions des hommes se règlent sur les ouï-dire; quand on attaque les premiers, ou du moins quand on montre d’avance aux agresseurs qu’on les attend de pied ferme, on inspire plus de terreur, parce qu’on paraît à la hauteur du danger. Telle sera, en cette circonstance, l’impression des Athéniens; ils nous attaquent avec la pensée que nous ne résisterons pas; ils nous méprisent à juste titre, parce que nous ne les avons pas écrasés de concert avec les Lacédémoniens; mais s’ils nous voient déployer une audace sur laquelle ils ne comptent pas, ils seront plus frappés de cette attitude imprévue que de nos forces réelles.

« Croyez-moi donc : avant tout, osez prendre ce parti; sinon, faites du moins en toute hâte vos préparatifs de guerre. Que cette pensée vous soit présente à tous, que c’est dans la chaleur de l’action qu’il faut mépriser les agresseurs; mais que, pour le moment, le meilleur parti est de regarder les préparatifs dictés par la crainte comme les plus sûrs, et d’agir comme en vue du danger. L’ennemi s’avance, déjà il est en mer, je le sais, il va paraître. »

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.34 focus

« Ayons donc bon courage. Sans ralentir nos préparatifs , envoyons chez les Sicules, pour raffermir les uns et nous attacher les autres. Envoyons, soit dans le reste de la Sicile pour signaler le danger commun, soit vers les peuples d’Italie pour les engager à se joindre à nous ou tout au moins à ne pas recevoir les Athéniens, soit enfin à Carthage. Cette ville n’est pas sans inquiétude à l’égard des Athéniens, dont elle appréhende sans cesse une attaque. Il se peut donc que les Carthaginois, dans la pensée que, s’ils négligent cette occasion, leur propre sûreté sera compromise , soient disposés à nous aider d’une manière quelconque, ou bien ouvertement ou bien en secret. S’ils en ont l’intention, cela leur est plus facile qu’à personne ; car ils possèdent en abondance l’or et l’argent, qui sont l’âme de la guerre comme de toute chose. Envoyons aussi à Lacédémone et à Corinthe , avec prière de nous secourir sans retard et de renouveler en Grèce les hostilités.

« Il y aurait, à mon sens, une mesure plus efficace encore. Votre apathie habituelle vous empêchera de l’adopter ; cependant je ne laisserai pas de vous la soumettre. Ce serait de vous concerter avec tous les Grecs de Sicile, ou du moins avec la plupart ; de mettre en mer avec tous les navires disponibles et des vivres pour deux mois ; puis d’aller à la rencontre des Athéniens jusqu’à Tarente et à la pointe d’Iapygie. Par là nous leur montrerions qu’avant de nous disputer la Sicile, ils auront à lutter pour la traversée du golfe Ionien. Rien ne serait plus capable de les frapper de terreur. Ils verraient que nous ayons pour point de départ une terre amie — car Tarente nous a©- ' cueillera, —tandis qu’ils'ont eux-mêmes à franchir la grande mer avec un attirail de guerre; la longueur du trajet ne leur permettrait pas de rester en ordre, et nous aurions bon marché d’une flotte manœuvrant sans ensemble et avec lenteur.

« Supposons qu’ils allègent leurs navires¹ et ne s’avancent qu’avec les plus mobiles : s’ils naviguent à la rame, nous les trouverons fatigués, ou , dans l’hypothèse la moins favorable, Tarente nous servira de refuge. Pour eux, n’ayant que peu de vivres et cinglant en vue d’un combat naval, ils se verront dénués de tout sur des plages désertes. S’ils y séjournent, ils seront bloqués; s’ils essayent de ranger la côte, ils ne pourront se faire suivre de leur matériel ; enfin l’incertitude où ils seront sur l’accueil que les villes leur réservent achèvera de les démoraliser.

« Aussi suis-je convaincu qu’arrêtés par ces considérations, ils ne partiront pas même de Gorcyre, mais qu’ils se donneront le temps de délibérer et de s’enquérir de nos forces et de nos positions par des reconnaissances multipliées ; ce qui les poussera jusqu’à la mauvaise saison ; à moins qu’intimidés par notre attitude inopinée, ils ne renoncent définitivement à leur projet. Cela est d’autant plus probable que, si j’en crois mes informations, le plus expérimenté de leurs généraux n’a accepté qu’à contre-cœur le commandement, et ne demanderait pas mieux que de trouver un prétexte dans une démonstration sérieuse de notre part. La renommée, qui grossit tout, ne manquerait pas d’exagérer nos forces. L’opinion se règle sur les ouï-dire. Celui qui prend l’offensive, ou qui du moins se montre fermement résolu à se défendre, est craint davantage, parce qu’on le croit en mesure de résister. C’est là sans aucun doute ce qu’éprouveront les Athéniens. Ils s’avancent contre nous dans l’idée que nous n’oserons pas leur tenir tête. Ils nous méprisent à juste titre, parce que nous ne nous sommes pas joints aux Lacédémoniens pour les attaquer ; mais, s’ils nous voient déployer une audace inattendue, ils en seront plus effrayés que de nos forces réelles.

« Suivez donc mes conseils ; prenez hardiment le parti que je vous propose ; autrement, hâtez-vous de faire vos préparatifs de défense. C’est quand l’action est engagée qu’il faut témoigner du mépris pour son adversaire ; jusque-là, le mieux est de s’entourer de précautions méticuleuses-, comme si l’on était à la veille du danger. Or Tenoemi s’approche; tenez pour certain qu’il est déjà en mer et qu’au premier jour il va paraître. »

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.34.1 focus

[1] "With confidence, then, let us make our preparations here, but also send envoys to the Sicels, to confirm the allegiance of some and to endeavour to make friendship and alliance with others; and let us despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to show that the danger is a common one, and to Italy, that we may either secure their alliance for ourselves or else prevent their receiving the Athenians.

[2] And to me it seems best to send also to Carthage. For the Carthaginians are not without expectation, or rather they are always in fear, that some time the Athenians may come against their city; and so they will probably feel that if they shall leave things here to their fate, they may be in trouble themselves, and therefore will be inclined to assist us, secretly perhaps, or openly, or by some means or other. And they, of all men of the present day, are the most able to do so, if they will; for they have an abundance of gold and silver, by which war and everything else is expedited.

[3] And let us send also to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, begging them to bring aid here with all speed, and to stir up the war over there.

[4] And now the measure which I think would be most opportune, but which you on account of your habitual love of ease would be least likely to adopt promptly, shall nevertheless be proposed If we Siceliots—all together, or, in default of this, as many as will join us—were willing to launch all our available naval force and with two months' provisions go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, and make plain to them that the contest will not be first for Sicily, but before that for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should mightily astound them and force them to reflect that we have as our base a friendly country from which to keep watch and ward—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—whereas for them the open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament,¹ and it is difficult on account of the length of the voyage to keep in formation; consequently, coming up slowly and few at a time, they would be at the mercy of our attack. But if on the other hand they should lighten their ships and attack with the swift-sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body, then, in case they used their oars, we should set upon them when weary with rowing;

[5] or if it did not seem wise to attack them, we could retire to Tarentum again. They, however, having crossed with slender supplies in the prospect of a naval engagement, would be in distress in uninhabited regions, and either would remain and be blockaded, or trying to sail along the coast would leave behind the rest of their equipment, and, having no certainty as to the temper of the cities, whether they would receive them or not, would be discouraged.

[6] And so I for my part am of opinion that, deterred by this consideration, they would not even put out from Corcyra, but either, after taking time for deliberation and spying out how many we are and in what position, would be driven into winter-quarters by the lateness of the season, or in dismay at the unexpected turn of events would abandon the expedition, especially as the most experienced of their generals takes command, as I hear, against his will, and would gladly seize upon an excuse to abandon it if any considerable opposition on our part were observed. And reports of our strength would, I am convinced, be exaggerated;

[7] the opinions of men are apt to veer according to what they are told; and those who are first to attack, or those at any rate who in advance make it clear to the aggressors that they will defend themselves, inspire the greater fear in the foe, who thinks them equal to the emergency.

[8] And precisely this would be the effect at this time upon the Athenians. For they are coming against us in the belief that we shall not defend ourselves, rightly contemning us because we did not join the Lacedaemonians in the effort to destroy them.

[9] But if they Should see us unexpectedly displaying courage, they Would be more dismayed by this unlooked for resistance than by our real power.
“Be persuaded, then, as best of all to take this bold step, but if not that, to make all other preparations for the war with all speed; and let it come home to everyone that contempt of invaders is shown by valour in actual conflict,² but that at this present time, realizing that preparations made With fear are safest, it would prove most advantageous so to act as though in imminent danger. For the Athenians are surely coming against us; they are, I am quite certain, already under sail, and all but here.”

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.34.1 focus

[1]

With good courage, then, let us both make our preparations here, and send to the Sicels, to strengthen the attachment of some of them, and endeavour to enter into friendship and alliance with others; while we despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to prove that the danger is common to all; and to Italy, that either we may gain their alliance for ourselves, or they may refuse to receive the Athenians.

[2]

I think it better, too, that we should also send to Carthage. For this is nothing unexpected by them; but they are always in fear that they may some time or other find the Athenians coming against their country; and therefore thinking, perhaps, that if they abandoned these places, they would themselves be brought into trouble, they might be willing to assist us; at least secretly, if not openly; or at any rate in some way or other. And they are more able to do it, if they please, than any men of the present day; for they possess most gold and silver; and it is by means of these that war, like every thing else, prospers.

[3]

Let us likewise send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, begging them to come hither to our aid as quickly as possible, and to stir up the war there.

[4]

And what I think the most expedient course, though you, through your habitual love of quiet, would be least quickly persuaded to adopt it, shall, notwithstanding that, be mentioned. If then we Siceliots—all in one body, if possible; but if not, as many as possible in concert with us—would launch the whole of our present navy, with two months' provisions, and go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian foreland, and show them that they will not have to fight about Sicily before they have fought for their own passage over the Ionian Sea; we should strike them with the greatest fear, and set them on considering that we are starting from a friendly country as its guardians, (for Tarentum is ready to receive us,) but that for them the tract of open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament; which would hardly remain in order through so long a voyage, and would be easily attacked by us, while it came on slowly and in small divisions. But supposing, on the other hand, that, having lightened their ships, they should attack us with the better sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body;

[5]

then, if they use their oars, we shall fall on them when they are wearied; or if we should not choose to do so, we may also retire to Tarentum: while they, having crossed with few provisions, on purpose for an engagement, would be at a loss what to do in uninhabited regions; and would either be blockaded, if they remained, or if they attempted to sail along the coast, would abandon the rest of their armament, and would be dispirited, from having no certainty whether the cities would receive them or not. I therefore, for my part, am of opinion, that being deterred by this consideration, they would not so much as put out from Corcyra;

[6]

but would either, after deliberating and reconnoitring how many we are, and in what position, be driven on by the season of the year into winter; or, in consternation at the unexpected result, break up the expedition: especially since the most skilful of their generals, as I hear, is taking the command against his will, and would gladly seize an excuse to return, if any considerable resistance were seen on our part. We should be reported too, I am quite sure, ¹ as being more than we really are:

[7]

and in accordance with what is told them are men's feelings also affected; and of those who are beforehand in attacking, or, at any rate, let those who are going to attack them see beforehand that they will defend themselves, they stand in greater fear, considering them equal to the danger And this would be the case now with the Athenians.

[8]

For they are coming against us with a belief that we shall offer no resistance; with good reason contemning us, because we did not join the Lacedaemonians in destroying them. But if they saw us acting with courage beyond their expectation, they would be more dismayed at that unlooked-for result, than at the power which we really possess.

[9]

Be persuaded, therefore to show this boldness, if possible; but if not, then, as quickly as possible, to get ready all other resources for the war; and to think, every one of you, that contempt for your assailants is best shown by bravery of deeds; but that, for the present, to consider those preparations most safe which are made with a feeling of fear, and to act as in a season of danger, would prove most to your advantage. For those men are both coming against us, and already, I know for certain, on their voyage, and all but here.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.34.1 focus

[1] « Confidenter igitur et res in Iioc ipso loco praeparemus, et nuntiis ad Siculos missis alios magis confirmemus , cum aliis vero amicitiam atque societatem inire studeamus, et in reliquas Siciliae partes legatos mittamn» hoc periculum commune esse docentes, et in Italiam, ut aut societatem nobiscum faciant aut ne recipiant Athenienses.

[2] Existimo autem utile esse Carthaginem quoque legatos mittere; non enim res inexspectata iis accidit, sed in perpetuo metu sunt, ne quando Athenienses contra suam urbem veniant; quamobrem facile illi fortasse, rati, si has res neglexerint, se quoque laboraturos, aut clam aut palam aut aliquo denique modo nobis opem ferre voluerint; et profecto hoc poterunt vel maxime omnium, qui nunc sunt, m velint; auri enim argenlique vim maximam possident, unde et bellum et cetera commode administrantur.

[3] Mittamus etiam Lacedaemonem et Corinthum, orantes, ut celeriter auxilium huc mittant, et bellum illic moveant,

[4] Quod autem et ego maxime opportunum arbitror, et vos propter solitam desidiam minime prompte vobis persuaderi patiemini, tamen a me dicetur. Sicilienses enim si velimus universi, aut sin minus, quam plurimi nobiscum, deducta omni praesente classe cum duorum mensium cibariis Atheniensibus ad Tarentum et ad Japygiam promontorium occurrere, iisque demonstrare, non de Sicilia prius iis certamen fore, quam de Ionio mari ab iis trajiciendo, maxime eos terrebimus, et cogemus considerare, nos quidem ex agro amico regionis nostra custodes proficisci (Tarentum enim nos excipiet), ipsis vero cum toto classis apparatu pelagus ingens esse transeundum, et propter navigationis longitudinem difficile esse ordinem servare, nobis vero facile fuerit eorum classem lente navigantem et raram paol* latim contra nos venientem invadere.

[5] Quod si frequen-tiore ea parte classis, quae celeritate prastat, navibus exoneratis nos adoriantur, si quidem remis utentur, defessos aggrediemur; sin id non placebit, Tarentum etiam nos* met recipere licet, illi vero cum exiguo commeatu ut ad navale proelium mare transgressi inopia laborabunt in toCh desertis, et aut manentes obsidebuntur, aut prfftervelu conantes et ceterum apparatum relinquent et incerti, num eos aliquae civitates sint recepturae, animis consternabuntur.

[6] Quamobrem ego quidem arbitror eos hac ratiocinatione deterritos ne soluturos quidem ex Corcyra, sed aut consilia inuenles et explorationem instituentes, quot numero simus, et quo in loco, anni tempestate in hiemem extractum iri, aut inopinata re perculsos navigationem desituros, praesertim quum, quantum ego audio, peritissimus illorum dux exercitum invitus ducat, et lubenler occasionem sit arrepturus, si quae copiae pares ad resistendum a nobis ostendantur.

[7] Illud autem certo scio, rumorem de nostris viribus in majus emanaturum, quales autem sunt rumores, tales etiam sunt hominum opiniones; et eos, qui priores invadunt, aut eos, qui invadentibus inature significant, se ad vim propulsandam paratos esse, magis timent, quod eos discrimini pares putant.

[8] Id quod Atheniensibus nunc accidet. Mos enim ut non repugnaturos invadunt, merito tam contemptim de nobis sentientes, quod eos cum Lacedaemoniis conjuncti non profligarimus; si vero praeter opinionem nos audentes viderint, ie inopinata magis terrebuntur, quam vero nostrae potentiae apparatu.

[9] Obedite mihi igitur, potissimum quidem haec audentes , sin minus,saltem in eo, ut ceteras res ad bellum necessarias primo quoque tempore praeparetis, cuilibet autem appareat, contemptionem quidem invadentium in ipsarum rerum robore demonstrari, si qui vero, apparatus eos, qui cum metu liant, firmissimos rati, ut jam in periculo constituti agant, id utilissimum evenire. Hostes vero et contra nos veniunt, et in ipso itinere (quod probe scio) jam sunt, et jam jamque aderunt. »

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.34 focus

« Laonde faccia m cuore e prepariamo qui le cose nostre; mandiamo ai Siculi per confermar meglio alcuni e per procurarci l'amicizia e la lega di altri ; inviamo le« gfet! al resto di Sicilia mostrando che il pericolo è comune, ed io Italia acciò facciano alleanza con noi, o almeno non ricevano gli Ateniesi. Credo anche ben fatto spedire a Cartagine, perchè anche là pur troppo si aspettano e sono sempre in timore che gli Ateniesi o prima o poi non assaltino la loro città : talché forse , al riflettere che non dandosi ctìra di queste cose potrebber trovarsi anch’essi in travaglio, vorranno soccorrerci o di furto o alla scoperta, o in qualunque altro modo. E certo, volendo, possono farlo più di tutti i popoli d’ora, perchè hanno molto oro ed argento, che come sono l’anima delle altre cose , così lo sono della guerra. Mandiamo eziandio a Sparta e a Corinto pregandoli di pronto soccorso per qua, e di mover la guerra nell’Attica. Ma non voglio tacervi qual io mi tenga miglior partito, benché voi non l’approverete tostamente per la vostra solita infingardia ; cioè che noi Siciliani tutti insieme , se vorremo, o almeno moltissimi con esso noi, messo in mare quel che abbiamo di flotte andiamo col foraggio per due mesi ad incontrar gli Ateniesi a Taranto ed al capò Iapigio, ed a far loro chiaro che non avranno prima a combattere per la Sicilia, ma per aprirsi il passaggio dell’Ionico. In questo modo gli sbigottiremo sommamente, e li ridurremo a pensare che noi difensori della patria avremo un ridotto, onde muoverci, in terra amica quale è Taranto ove saremo ricevuti ; che essi dovranno valicar molto mare con tutti gli apparecchi; che difficilmente la loro flotta potrà mantener l’ordine per la lunghezza del tragitto, e che movendosi lentamente ed assaltandoci alla spartita, noi potremo con vantaggio assalirla. Nel caso poi che votate le navi leggere vengano con queste più serrate ad assalirci, allora, se useranno dei remi, gl’ investirérao già stanchi ; e dove non ci piaccia, potremo ritirarci a Taranto. Ed essi intanto che avranno fatto quel tragitto con iscarse provvisioni, quasi si trattasse di una battagli» navale, saranno sorpresi dalla carestia in luoghi deserti, ovi rimanendo saranno assediati; tentando di proseguire il corso dovranno abbandonare gli altri apparecchi e perdersi d’animo, non avendo la sicurezza che le città vogliano riceverli. Laonde io stimo che ristretti da questi pensieri, neanche sciorranno da Corfù ; ma mentre deliberano e vanno spiando quanti e dove siamo , si troveranno dalla stagione spinti nell’inverno ; o attoniti del nostro inaspettato ardimento porranno fine alla navigazione. E ciò tanto pia quanto che (come sento) il più esperto de’ loro generali li conduce a mal grado , e volentieri piglerebbe il pretesto di veder per parte nostra che noi abbiamo di che stargli a petto. Io son certo che di noi avranno nuove maggiori di nostre forze : or le opiuioni degli uomini vanno dietro alla fama, e più si teme chi primo assale, che chi per tempo mostrasi pronto a ributtar l’assalitore; perchè lo crediamo pari a noi nel cimento. E tal sarà ora degli Ateniesi : conciossiachè dispregiandoci giustamente perchè noo ci siamo uniti co’ Lacedemoni a distruggerli, ci vengono contro come a gente che non sappia difendersi. Ma se vedranno 1J inaspettato nostro ardire, saranno più atterriti da questo impensato coraggio, che dal vero ragguaglio di nostre forze. Seguite adunque il mio consiglio soprattutto di mostrar questo ardire , o almeno di apparecchiar prontamente le altre cose per la guerra ; richiamatevi tutti alla mente che il disprezzo per l’assalitore si mostra dal vigore dei fatti, e che sarà nostro grandissimo bene se per quanto stimiamo sicurissimi i preparamenti fatti per paura, nondimeno opereremo come se fossero mal sicuri. Ma già i nemici ci muovono incontro, già, lo so bene, sono in corso, già già son presenti ».

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

γίγνεσθαι δὲ κτλ. —‘the prompt and efficient execu tion of these plans rests with you.’

οὐδὲ ὑποπτεύεσθαι κτλ. —‘nor do I think suspieion should be cast upon my words on the ground that I display the zeal of an exile.’ For ἐς the edd. quote VIII. 88 βουλόμενος αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν φιλίαν διαβάλλειν. The gen. μοῦ separated from τὸν λόγον has the force of an ethic dat., as often in Thuc.

φυγάς τε γὰρ κτλ. —‘an exile, indeed, I am from the villainy of those who banished me, but not from the power of aiding you’ (Wilkins). This refers to ἐς τὴν φυγαδικὴν π., but the extreme artificiality of the expression is not redeemed by its ingenuity. φυγάς is used in two senses.

καὶ πολεμιώτεροι κτλ. —referring to μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων above. Enemies within are more dangerous (to Athens) than enemies without.

ἤ —strictly ἀλλά is required, as οὐχ follows πολεμιώτεροι. For the opposite, ἀλλἀ in place of ἤ. cf. II. 43 οὐκ ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται μᾶλλον, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ ἡ δόξα . . καταλείπεται. (The Scholiast is wrong in saying οὐχ οὕτως ὑμᾶς πολεμίους ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς Ἁθηναίους .)

οἱ . . ἀναγκάσαντες —referring to his own enemies at Athens.

τό τε φιλόπολι κτλ. —‘love of country consists for me not in suffering injustice, as I now am doing, but in the feeling that I once lived securely as a citizen’ (Hampke, Studien p. 11). ἐν ᾧ= ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι. Cf c. 55, 4. Classen wrongly supplies εἶχον to ἐν ᾧ . . ἑπολιτεύθην. Alc. ‘is not saying that he was once a patriot and had now ceased to be one, but he claims or pretends to be still a patriot’ (note in Jowett), as is shown by what follows.

οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν κτλ. —‘nor yet do I think that I am now attacking (a city) that is still my country, but rather that I am trying to recover one that is not my country.’ by helping you to defeat Athens, to destroy her power, and to start a new hegemony founded on good will and independence (§ 5).

καὶ φιλόπολις κτλ. —Jebb suggests that in these words, written after the end of the war, Thuc. may have been thinking of Thrasy bulus and the downfall of the Thirty. ‘Just after the restoration of the democracy the point would have been peculiarly effective.’ Cf. Isocrates 16, 14, where the comparison between Alc. and the patriots under Thrasybulus is made.

ἀπολέσας , ‘lost.’

διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν —cf. Andoc. 2, 10 εἰσῆλθέ μοι ἐπιθυμία τῆς μεθ’ ὑμῶν πολιτείας. ‘The true patriot is not he who abstains from moving against the country from which he has been unjustly banished, but he who, in his passionate love for her, strives by all means to regain her’ (Jebb). The whole of §§ 3 and 4 is sophistry.

ἐμοί τε —answered by καὶ αὐτούς. ταλαιπωρία often means the suffering that war or disease brings

προβαλλόμενον —‘put forward’; cf. I. 73 τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ . . αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις (mid.) ἀνἀγκη λέγειν (a passage which is, I think, misundcrstood by the edd.).

εἰ πολέμιός γε κτλ. —we should expect rather to have a general statement: the plea is ‘just as I injured you greatly as an enemy, so I should help you effectually as a friend.’

ὅσῳ —‘inasmuch as’ (oftener with compar. or superl. following). ‘I only conjectured your intentions, whereas I know those of the Athenians.’

διαφερόντων —‘interests.’

βραχεῖ μορίῳ —‘with a small part of your forces.’

μεγάλα is considered by Poppo predicative, by Classen proleptic; but perhaps the order is only due to the antithesis between βραχεῖ and μεγάλα—‘a slender aid to secure great interests’ (Bloomfield’).

τὴν μέλλουσαν —referring to the Athenian designs as he had foreshadowed them.

τῆς ἁπάσης Ἑλλάδος —he contrasts the mildness of the coming Spartan hegemony with the oppression of the present Athenian Empire. The contrast is of course imaginary.

κατ’ εὔνοιαν —‘in virtue of their goodwill.’

καὶ αὐτοί —‘even unasked’ they were thinking of sending an expedition against Athens, but were ‘hesitating and looking about them.’

ἐπερρώσθησαν is opposite of ἀρρωστεῖν: cf. VII. 7 ἐς τἆλλα πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο: the ἐπ‐ denotes addition.

διδάξαντος . . καὶ νομίσαντες —the participles are timeless. They were encouraged ‘by his explanation and by the thought that he knew.’

προσεῖχον ἤδη τὸν νοῦν —‘from this moment they set their minds on it.’ The plan was not carried out until March 413. The Peace of Nicias was still nominally observed: Sparta shrank from violating it openly.

καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα —with πέμπειν. which depends on προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν in a slightly different meaning.

τιμωρίαν = βοήθειαν (Schol.), Ionic. No troops were sent immediately.

Γύλιππον —see Freeman, Hist. Sic. III. p. 201. His arrival in Sicily was the turning-point of the war. His father, exiled for taking bribes from Athens, had settled at Thurii in 445 B.C.

προστάξαντες ἄρχοντα —Thucydidean expression for the appointment of a commander.

τοῖς Συρ . is dat. commodi.

μετ’ ἐκείνων —sc. the Syracusans, though only the envoys are meant, as also in Κορινθίων.

ποιεῖν ὅπῃ . . ἤξει —‘to devise how help may reach their friends in Sicily most effectually and speedily.’

ἐκ τῶν παρόντων —‘under the circumstances,’ viz. those explained by Alc. in c. 91, 2.

οἱ —the only case of the sing. of this pron. at all frequent in prose.

Ἀσίνην —in Messenia, mentioned also in IV. 13 . It is strange that it is not more clearly defined, esp. as there is a place of the same name in Laconia. The further movements of Gylippus are recorded in c. 104.

ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ —it was now winter, and so not time to sail.

ἡ . . τριήρης —see c. 74, 2. τροφήν is money to pay the troops. The sum is 300 talents (c. 94, 4). Cf. the inscription given in Hicks, p. 79 ‘ επὶ τῆς Ἀντιοχίδος ὀγδόης πρυτανευούσης τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ (this date would be somewhere in March, which fits in with the text here) τῆς πρυτανείας’: a sum of 300 talents is paid as a loan from the treasure of Athena (cf. II. 13 ) to Aristocrates, Euonymus, and the other strategi, who pay it over for the army in Sicily. Then follows an account of a further loan of 4 talents, 2000 drachmas, for the ships that were to convey the money to Sicily.

ἐτελεύτα —see on c. 7, 4.

Μεγάρων, οὕς —for the change from place-name to inhabitants, which is very common, cf. cc. 48; 74, 1; 75, 2. Observe that unless gender and number are in agreement with the antecedent, attraction of rel. is impossible. Cf. c. 20, 3 Νάξου καὶ Κατάνης, ἂς ἤλπιζον .

ὥσπερ καὶ κτλ —at c. 4, 2.

ἐδῄωσαν τούς [τε] ἀγρούς —for the wrong insertion of τε see on c. 6, 2. It is improbable that Thuc. would write such a sentence as ἐδῄωσαν τούς τε ἀγροὺς καὶ . . τὸ πεδίον ἐδῄουν for ἐδῄωσάν τε τοὺς ἀ. καὶ ἐδῄουν τὸ πέδιον, for in all other places where τε is misplaced the verb in the second clause is different; the second clause refers to the return journey and should not be joined to the first by τε . . καί: if so joined τὸ πεδίον ought to refer to a plain at Megara. Herbst, who brackets τοὺς ἀγρούς as well, says that there is no passage in Thuc. in which τε is a real parallel to this. His objections to τοὺς ἀγρούς are, however, less forcible. By these words we are to understand estates about Megara that were held by Syracusans; cf. II. 13 τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς αὑτοῦ, of Pericles' estates.

ἔρυμα —‘Thuc. had already twice mentioned Megara as a φρούριον of Syr. in cc. 49, 75. . . This ἔρυμα is surely something smaller than τὰ Μἐγαρα φρούριον in c. 75’ (Freeman).

αὖθις —refers to ἐδῄουν, in the sense of ‘next’; cf. c. 90, 2.

παρακομισθέντες —this goes with πεζῇ and ναυσί: all returned along the coast, some by sea, some by land. The Terias forms the boundary between Syracusan and Catanean territory.

τό τε πεδίον — i.e. τὸ τοῦ Τηρίου πεδίον. ἀναβάντες applies only to the land forces. Notice the three participles, ἑλόντες, παρακομισθέντες, ἀναβάντες. Cf. c. 97, 4.

Κεντόριπα — Centorbi, one of the Sicel towns that refused to join the A. It is close to Inessa and Geleatic Hybla.

τῶν Ἰνησσαίων —the exact site of Inessa is unknown. In III. 103 it is τὸ Σικελικὸν πόλισμα. In 426 the Athenians tried to take it and failed. For the attempt to take Hybla see c. 62, 5. Both were overlooked by Centuripa. Freeman notices that the article is wanting to Centuripa, as also to Hyccara c. 62, 3, and thinks that they were much less well-known places than Inessa, which was a famous place in the time of Ducetius.

τοὺς ἱππέας —see c. 93, 4.

τῶν ἵππων —‘the required horses’ were to be got in Sicily.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.34

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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