Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.8

[1] When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta and of other the neighboring towns went presently to the aid of Pylus; but [the rest of] the Lacedaemonians came slowlier on, as being newly come from the former expedition.

[2] Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus, and also to their threescore galleys that were at Corcyra, which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus. And by this time their army of foot was also there.

[3] Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste, to tell them that they must come presently to him for as much as the place was in danger to be lost.

[4] And according as Demosthenes' message imported, so the fleet made haste. The Lacedaemonians in the meantime prepared themselves to assault the fort both by sea and land, hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste and not many men within it.

[5] And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour.

[6] For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe and the entries straight, one of them, nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden, in bigness, about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the beak-heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven.

[7] And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent.

[8] For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows; and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or other danger, win the place, seeing there was no provision of victual within it and that the enemy took it but on short preparation.

[9] Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms out of every band by lot. Some also had been sent over before by turns; but they which went over now last and were left there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

[1] On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for Pylos , the other Lacedaemonians following more slowly as they had just come in from another campaign.

[2] Word was also sent round Peloponnese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos ; while the sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra and being dragged by their crews across the isthmus of Leucas , passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron at Zacynthus , and reached Pylos , where the land forces had arrived before them.

[3] Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon them to his assistance.

[4] While the ships hastened on their voyage in obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison.

[5] Meanwhile, as they expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus , they intended, if they failed to take the place before, to block up the entrance of the harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it.

[6] For the island of Sphacteria , stretching along in a line close in front of the harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next the rest of the mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely covered with wood, and without paths through not being inhabited, and about one mile and five furlongs in length.

[7] The inlets the Lacedaemonians meant to close with a line of ships placed close together, with their prows turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use of the island to operate against them, carried over some heavy infantry thither, stationing others along the coast.

[8] By this means the island and the continent would be alike hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on either; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the open sea having no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point which they could use as a base to relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, without sea-fight or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, occupied, as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with provisions.

[9] This being determined, they carried over to the island the heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had crossed over before in relief parties, but these last who were left there were four hundred and twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus.

Als nun die Peloponnesier, die in Attika gestanden hatten,
abgezogen waren, rückten die Spartiaten selbst und von ihren
Beisitzern 8) die zunächst wohnenden rasch gegen Pylos heran; der Zuzug
der übrigen Lakedämonier geschah langsamer, da sie grade erst von
einem andern Feldzug zurückgekommen waren. Sie ließen aber im
ganzen Peloponnes herum ansagen, man solle so schnell als möglich zum
Angriff von Pylos zu ihnen stoßen, und sandten auch Botschaft zu
ihren sechzig Schiffen bei Kerkyra, welche über die Landenge der
Leukadier gebracht wurden und so nach Pylos kamen, unbemerkt von den
Attischen Schiffen, die bei Zakvnthos lagen. Das Fußvolk war da
schon in voller Zahl beisammen. Demosthenes nun, während die
Schiffe der Peloponnesier noch im Ansegeln begriffen waren, schickte ^{1 2}
unbemerkt noch zwei Schiffe mit Botschaft an den Eurymedon und ³
die Athener auf der Flotte bei Zakynthos: sie sollten herbeikommen, l
da der Platz in Gefahr wäre; und diese beiden Schiffe beschleunigten
auch ihre Fahrt, wie Demotshenes ihnen aufgetragen. Die
Lakedämonier schickten sich nun an, die Verschanzung von der Land- und
der Seeseite anzugreisen, in der Hoffnung, sie leicht zu nehmen, da
das Mauerwerk in Eile ausgeführt und nur geringe Mannschaft darin
sei. Weil sie aber auch gewärtig waren, daß die Attischen Schiffe
von Zakynthos her zu Hülfe kämen, so nahmen sie auch Bedacht, für
den Fall, daß sie den Platz nicht schon früher gewonnen haben sollten,
die Eingänge des Hasens zu sperren, damit den Athenern daS
Einlausen unmöglich wäre. Es macht nämlich die Insel, welche Sphak«
teria heißt und nahe beim Land sich vor der Küste hinstreckt, den
Hafen haltbar und die Einfahrten so eng, daß auf der Seite von
Pylos und der Athenischen Verschanzung nur zwei Schiffe zugleich
einsegeln können, auf der Seite gegen das andere Festland hin aber acht
oder neun. Sie war ganz verlassen und daher mit Wald bedeckt und
unwegsam und hatte in der Länge ungefähr fünfzehn Stadien ^5400
Schrittes. Die Einfahrten nun wollten sie verschließen, indem sie
Schiffe, eines dicht neben dem andern, mit den Vordertheilen gegen
einander gekehrt, austsellten. Die Insel selbst besetzten sie mit
Schwerbewaffneten, aus Vorsorge, die Athener möchten von ihr auS sie
angreisen, und ebenso stellten sie schweres Volk längs der Festlandsküstc
hin. So dachten sie, werde die Insel die Athener abwehren können,
und ebenso das Festland, welches eine Landung nicht erlaubte. Denn
was von Pylos außerhalb der Einfahrt gegen daS offene Meer zu
liegt, hat keinen Hafen und würde jenen keinen Punkt darbieten, von
dem auS sie den Ihrigen Unterstützung gewähren könnten; sie selbst
hingegen würden ohne Seekamps und ohne sonst etwas zu wagen den
Platz ganz gewiß nehmen, da er keine LebenSmittel und nur geringe
Kriegsrüstung besitze. Wie beschlossen, setzten sie denn auch
Schwerbewaffnete nach der Insel über, die sie aus allen Abtheilungen durch
das Loos hatten wählen lassen. Anfangs gingen aber auch Andere
ablösungsweise hinüber; deren aber, welche dieß zuletzt traf und die
dort eingeschlossen wurden, waren vierhundert und zwanzig und dazu
die Heloten bei ihnen. Ihr Anführer war Epitadas,deS Molobros Sohn.

VIII. Dès que l’armée péloponnésicnne fut rentrée de l’Attique, les habitants de Sparte ¹ et les Lacédémoniens du voisinage ² se portèrent en toute hâte contre Pylos. Le reste, arrivant à peine d’une autre expédition, ne marcha que plus tard. Ils firent publier dans le Péloponnèse qu’on eût à diriger, sans aucun retard, des secours sur Pylos, et mandèrent les soixante vaisseaux qu’ils avaient à Corcyre. Cette flotte, transportée par-dessus l’isthme de Leucade, parvint à Pylos sans être aperçue par les vaisseaux athéniens stationnés à Zacynthe ³ . Déjà l’armée de terre était arrivée de son côté. Mais pendant que les Péloponnésiens étaient encore en mer, Démosthènes avait eu le temps d’envoyer secrètement deux vaisseaux à Zacynthe, pour annoncer à Eurymédon et à la flotte athénienne lé danger qui menaçait la place, et réclamer leur secours. Sur cet avis de Démosthènes, la flotte partit précipitamment.

Les Lacédémoniens se préparaient à attaquer Pylos par terre et par mer : ils comptaient l’emporter aisément ; car les ouvrages avaient été élevés à la hâte, et la garnison était peu nombreuse. Cependant, s’attendant à voir la flotte athénienne de Zacynthe arriver au secours, ils projetèrent, s’ils ne s’emparaient pas de la forteresse auparavant, de boucher les passes du port pour empêcher les Athéniens d’y aborder. En effet, l’ile nommée Sphactérie, qui s’étend devant le port à une petite distance, lui sert d’abri et ne laisse, pour y pénétrer, que deux étroits passages : l’un, en face de Pylos et des ouvrages athéniens, ne peut recevoir que deux vaisseaux de front ⁴ ; le second, à l’autre extrémité de l’île, huit ou neuf. Cette île, alors inhabitée, était entièrement couverte de bois et sans chemins battus. Son étendue est d’environ quinze stades. Les Lacédémoniens avaient résolu de fermer étroitement les passes en y plaçant des vaisseaux, la proue en avant. Quant à l’île, craignant que l’ennemi ne s’en fît un point d’appui pour les attaquer, ils y firent passer des hoplites ; d’autres furent placés sur le continent, afin que les Athéniens, trouvant partout l’ennemi devant eux, et dans l’île et sur le continent, ne pussent aborder. Car la côte de Pylos n’étant abordable par mer sur aucun autre point que le port lui-mème, les Athéniens ne devaient avoir aucun moyen de venir au se- cours des leurs. Dès lors les Lacédémoniens s’empareraient vraisemblablement de la place sans combat naval, sans aucun danger, d’autant mieux que les vivres manquaient et que l’occupation avait eu lieu sans moyens de défense suffisants. Sur ces conjectures, ils firent passer dans l’île des hoplites tirés au sort dans toutes les cohortes. D’abord on les relevait à tour de rôle. Les derniers qui y furent envoyés et qui y restèrent étaient au nombre de quatre cent vingt, indépendamment des Hilotes à leur service. Épitadas, fils de Mélobrus, les commandait.

Dès que les Péloponésiens furent de retour d’Attique, les Spartiates et leurs Périèques les plus voisins n’eurent rien de plus pressé que de marcher contre Pylos; mais le reste des Lacédémoniens, à peine retenu d’une autre expédition, mit peu d’ardeur à les suivre. Ils firent savoir par tout le Péloponèse qu'on eût à se rendre le plus tôt possible à Pylos. Ils rappelèrent leurs soixante vaisseaux de Corcyre. Cette flotte, transportée par-dessus l’isthme de Leucade, trompa la surveillance des Athéniens qui mouillaient à Zacynthe et parvint à Pylos. L’armée de terre y était déjà. D’autre part Démosthène, avant l’arrivée de la flotte péloponésienne, avait dépêché à Zacynthe deux vaisseaux pour avertir Eurymédon et les Athéniens du danger de Pylos. Sur ce message de Démosthène, ceux-ci,ne perdirent pas un instant pour aller à son secours. Les Lacédémoniens se préparaient à attaquer par mer et par terre. Ils espéraient s’emparer sans peine d’ouvrages construits à la hâte et gardés par une poignée de défenseurs. Comme ils s’attendaient bien à voir accourir de Zacynthe la flotte athénienne, ils avaient le projet, en cas de non-réussite, d’obstruer les entrées du port, pour le fermer aux Athéniens. L’île de Sphactérie, qui s’étend un peu en avant de ce port, le met à l’abri des vents et ne laisse que deux passes fort étroites : la première, en face de Pylos et des ouvrages athéniens, n’offre accès qu’à deux vaisseaux de front; la seconde, à l’autre extrémité, peut en recevoir huit ou neuf. Cette île, alors déserte, était boisée et sans chemins frayés. Son étendue est d’environ quinze stades ¹ . Les Lacédémoniens se disposaient à fermer les passes au moyen d'une rangée de vaisseaux, la proue en dehors. Quant à l’île, de peur que l’ennemi ne s’en servît contre eux, ils résolurent d’y faire passer des hoplites et d’en poster d’autres le long du continent. De cette manière les Athéniens trouveraient l’île occupée, etla terre ferme ne leur offrirait aucun lieu de débarquement. Or, comme la rade de Pylos est le seul point des environs où l’abord possible, ils ne sauraient où descendre pour aller au secours des leurs. Ainsi les Péloponésiens comptaient emporter sans combat naval et sans danger une place mal approvisionnée et insuffisamment défendue. En conséquence ils firent passer dans l’île des hoplites tirés au sort d’entre tous les bataillons. Les premiers qu’on y transporta furent relevés à tour de rôle ; les derniers, ceux qui plus tard s’y trouvèrent enfermés, étaient au nombre de quatre cent vingt, non compris leurs Hilotes ² . Le chef de cette troupe était Epitadas fils de Molobros.

[1] On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the Perioeci who were in the neighbourhood of Pylos at once came to its relief; but the other Lacedaemonians were slower in coming, since they had just got back from another campaign.

[2] Word was also sent round to the states of the Peloponnesus, summoning them to come to the relief of Pylos as quickly as possible, and also to the sixty ships that were at Corcyra. ¹ These were hauled across the Leucadian isthmus, and without being discovered by the Attic ships, which were now at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where their land forces had already arrived.

[3] But before the Peloponnesian fleet had yet reached Pylos, Demosthenes managed to send out secretly ahead of them two ships which were to notify Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus to come at once to his aid, as the place was in danger. And so the fleet proceeded in haste in compliance with Demosthenes' summons;

[4] meanwhile, however, the Lacedaemonians were busy with their preparations to attack the fortification both by land and by sea, and they thought that they would have no difficulty in capturing a structure which had been built hastily and was occupied by only a few men.

[5] But since they expected the Athenian fleet to arrive soon from Zacynthus, it was their intention, in case they should fail to take the place before these came, to block up the entrances to the harbour and thus make it impossible for the Athenians to anchor inside and blockade them.
  Now the island called Sphacteria stretches along the mainland, lying quite close to it, and thus makes the harbour safe and the entrances to it narrow;

[6] on one side, opposite the Athenian fortifications and Pylos, there is only room for two ships to pass through, on the other side, next to the other part of the mainland, there is room for eight or nine. ² The whole island was covered with timber and, since it was uninhabited, had no roads, its length being somewhere near fifteen stadia. Now it was the intention of the Lacedaemonians to close up the entrances tight by means of ships placed with their prows outward;

[7] and as for the island, since they were afraid that the Athenians would use it as a base for carrying on the war against them, they conveyed some hoplites across, at the same time posting others along the mainland.

[8] By these measures, they thought, the Athenians would find not only the island hostile to them, but also the mainland, since this afforded no landing-place; for there were no harbours along the shore of Pylos itself outside the entrance, ³ on the side toward the sea, and therefore the Athenians would have no base from which they could aid their countrymen. Consequently the Lacedaemonians believed that, without running the risk of a battle at sea, they could probably reduce the place by siege, since it had been occupied on short notice and was not supplied with provisions.

[9] As soon as they reached this conclusion they proceeded to convey the hoplites over to the island, drafting them by lot from all the companies. Several detachments had before this time crossed over, one group relieving another; the last to do so—and this is the force that was captured—numbering four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots who accompanied them, and they were under the command of Epitadas son of Molobrus.

[1] On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci immediately went to the rescue of Pylus; but the other Lacedaemonians were more slow in marching against it, as they had but just reached home from a different expedition.

[2] They despatched orders also through the rest of the Peloponnese to bring up their reinforcements to Pylus as quickly as possible and sent for their sixty ships at Corcyra. These having been hauled over the isthmus of Leucas, and having so escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, reached Pylus; the land-forces also having by that time arrived.

[3] While the Peloponnesians were yet sailing up, Demosthenes anticipated them by secretly sending two ships with a message to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus to join him, as the place was in danger.

[4] So the ships sailed with all speed, according to the orders of Demosthenes; while the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the place both by land and sea, hoping easily to take a building completed in haste, and with only a few men in it.

[5] At the same time, expecting the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus to its relief, they intended, in case of their not having taken it before, to bar also the entrances into the harbour, that the Athenians might not be able to come to anchor in it.

[6] For the island that is called Sphacteria both secures the harbour, by stretching in a line with it, and close off it, and narrows its entrances; on one side, near the Athenian fortifications and Pylus, leaving a passage for two ships; on the other, towards the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. It was all woody and pathless from its desert condition, and in extent about fifteen stades. The entrances then they intended to bar with a close line of vessels, with their heads looking outwards;

[7] while fearing this island, lest the enemy should carry on their operations against them from it, they conveyed over some heavy-armed troops into it, and posted others along the mainland.

[8] For so they thought that both the island would be unfavourable to the Athenians, and the mainland also, as it did not afford any landing-place; for the shores of Pylus itself outside the inlet, looking towards the open sea, would present no ground from which they might proceed to the aid of their countrymen; and so they should storm the place, in all probability, without the risk of a sea-fight, as there were no provisions in it, and it had been occupied after short preparation.

[9] Having adopted these resolutions, accordingly they conveyed over the heavy-armed into the island, drafting them by lot from all the ¹ lochi There had also been some others sent over before in turns; but these last who went, and who were left there, were four hundred and twenty in number, with their attendant Helots; their commander being Epitadas son of Molobrus.

[1] Quum autem Peloponnesii ex Attica domum redito, sent, Spartani quidem quum ipsi tum proximi muniripum opem Pylo celeriter ferebant, ceterorum vero Lacedaemo- niorum adversus hostem profectio tardior erat, quod cx altera expeditione modo revertissent.

[2] Sed nuntiis etiam per Peloponnesum circummissis imperabant, ut ad opem Pylo ferendam primo quoque tempore concurrerent, et ad suas sexaginta naves, quae apud Corcyram erant, nuntium miserunt; quae per Leucadium Isthmum transportatae, quum Atticam classem, quae ad Zacynthum erat, latuissent, ad Pylum pervenerunt; atque aderant jam etiam copiae pedestres.

[3] Demos thenes vero, quum Peloponnesii navigationis cursum eo adhuc tenerent, duas naves clara ocius emisit, quae nuntiarent Eurymedonti et ceteris Atheniensibus, qui cum classe ad Zacynthum erant, ut celeriter venirent, quod locus in discrimine versaretur.

[4] Et illae quidem duae naves, prout Demosthenes mandarat, magnam in navigando celeritatem adhibebant; Lacedaemonii vero se ad illius loci munitionem terra marique oppugnandam parabant, sperantes facile se capturos opus properanter factum, et in quo pauci propugnatores essent,

[5] Ceterum cum etiam Atticarum navium e Zacyntho auxilia ventura exspectarent, in animo habebant, nisi forte prius munitionem expugnassent, ipsas etiam portus fauces obstruere, ne Atheniensibus in eo consistere liceret.

[6] Insula enim nomine Sphacteria ante portum porrecta et prope adjacens efficit et portum tutum et introitus angustos, ut hac quidem, qua ad Atheniensium munitionem et Pylum vergit, bina navigia, illae vere, qua vergit ad reliquam continentem, octona vel novena transire possint; totaque silvestris et propter solitudinem invia, et quindecim ferme stadiorum magnitudine erat.

[7] Portus igitur ostia navibus confertim collocatis, ita ut proras hostibus adversas ha. berent, obstruere statuerant; in hanc insulam autem, timentes , ne ex ea bellum sibi facerent, gravis armaturae milites transportarunt, et alios in continente collocarunt.

[8] Ita enim existimabant et ipsam insulam Atheniensibus hostem fore, atque etiam continentem, utpote quae nullum haberel locum ad exscensum faciendum; nam quum illa ipsius Pyli ora, quae extra portus ostium erat, et quae altum spectabat, importuosa esset, sciebant eos non habituros, unde proficiscerentur ad suos adjuvandos; se vero sine proelio navali et sine periculo locum expugnaturos, ut quidem erat verisimile, quod nullus in eo commeatus esset, et quod ab exiguo apparatu occupatus esset.

[9] Quum autem hanc sententiam comprobassent, milites in insulam transportabant, ex omnibus lochis sortiti. Atque primo quidem etiam alii subinde per vices eo trajecerunt; postremi vero, qui etiam illic deprehensi sunt, erant quadringenti et viginti, praeter Helotas, qui circum ipsos erant; praeerat iis autem Epitadas Molobri filius.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

Ritornati i Peloponnesi dall’Attica , gli Spartani propio ed i più prossimi dei circonvicini corsero subito a Pilo : ma più tarda fu la mossa del rimanente dei Lacedemoni tornati di fresco da un'altra spedizione. Mandavano in giro pel Peloponneso intimando di soccorrer Pilo il più prontamente ; e spedirono per le sessanta navi che avevano a Corfù , le quali trasportate sull’ istmo di Leucade e non osservate dalla flotta ateniese di Zacinto, giungono a Pilo , ove si trovava anche l’esercito di terra. Ma Demostene, mentre i Peloponnesi navigavano tuttora verso cola , spedi innanzi colatamente due navi (che secondo gli ordini avuti da esso affrettarono il corso) ad avvertire Eurimedonte e gli Ateniesi che erano colla flotta a Zacinto di presentarsi a Pilo , perchè quel luogo pericolava. I Lacedemoni dal canto loro si allestivano risoluti di assaltar quel forte per terra e per mare, confidando di dover espugnare facilmente un lavoro fatto in furia, entrovi poca gente. Nondimeno aspettandosi il rinforzo delle navi attiche da Zacinto , aveano in animo , se pur non lo espugnassero prima del loro arrivo , di asserragliare l' imboccatura del porto , acciò gli Ateniesi non potessero intro-

Goode dtirvisi; giacché l’Isola chiamata Sfatteria, stendendosi dinanzi al porto e soprastandogli d9 appresso, lo rende sicuro ed angusto alle imboccature ; talché dalla parte del forte degli Ateniesi e di Pilo non più che due navi possono traghettare insieme, e non più di otto o nove dalla parte che guarda il rimanente di terraferma. Inoltre tutta l’isola era boscosa e senza vie perchè disabitata, e di circuito non più grande di quindici stadii. I Lacedemoni adunque intendevano di serrarne l' ingresso colle navi congiunte insieme e volte in fuori colle prore : ma perchè temevano non i nemici gli guerreggiassero da quell’isola, vi fecero passare delle milizie gravi, ed altre ne schierarono per le costiere ; cosicché gli Ateniesi avrebbero nemica l’isola e la terraferma non potendovisi sbarcare. Perocché essendo importuosa quella punta dell’ istessa Pilo ehe fuori della bocca del porto guarda il mare, non avrebbero donde muoversi a soccorrere i loro ; laddove essi senza battaglia navale od altro pericolo speravano di dovere espugnare il castello ove era stato lasciato poco presidio e mancava la vettovaglia. Ciò risoluto trasportarono nell’ isola delle genti di grave armatura sortite da tutte le compagnie , mentre per l’avanti altre ve ne passa« rono a vicenda : quest’ ultime poi che furonvi lasciate erano quattrocentoventi (senza contare gl’ Iloti a loro ser» vizio) capitanate da Epitada di Molobro.