Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.32

[1] Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, which they so ran to, in their cabins and as they were taking arms. For they knew not of their landing but thought those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night according to custom, as they had been wont to do.

[2] As soon as it was morning, the rest of the army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had, being all [that rowed] except only the Thalamii: eight hundred archers, targetiers as many, all the Messenians that came to aid them, and as many of them besides as held any place about Pylus, except only the garrison of the fort itself.

[3] Demosthenes then, disposing his army by two hundred and more in a company, and in some less, [at certain distances], seized on all the higher grounds to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do or against what part to set themselves in battle and be subject to the shot of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be charged behind;

[4] and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched, the light-armed and such as were meanliest provided of arms followed them at the back with arrows, darts, stones, and slings, who have courage enough afar off, and could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action.

[1] The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians was at once put to the sword, the men being scarcely out of bed and still arming, the landing having taken them by surprise, as they fancied the ships were only sailing as usual to their stations for the night.

[2] As soon as day broke, the rest of the army landed, that is to say, all the crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of oars, with the arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round Pylos , except the garrison on the fort.

[3] The tactics of Demosthenes had divided them into companies of two hundred, more or less, and made them occupy the highest points in order to paralyze the enemy by surrounding him on every side and thus leaving him without any tangible adversary, exposed to the cross-fire of their host; plied by those in his rear if he attacked in front, and by those on one flank he moved against those on the other.

[4] In short, wherever he went he would have the assailants behind him, and these light-armed assailants, the most awkward of all; arrows, darts, stones, and slings making them formidable at a distance, and there being no means of getting at them at close quarters, as they could conquer flying, and the moment their pursuer turned they were upon him. Such was the idea that inspired Demosthenes in his conception of the descent, and presided over its execution.

Auf diese Art waren sie vertheilt. Die Athener nun
hie-ben die vorderste Wachmannschaft, gegen die sie Sturm liefen,
sogleich nieder, denn diese war noch in ihren Schlafstätten und wollte
sich erst waffnen. Die Landung hatten sie nicht gemerkt, da sie
glaubten, daß die Schiffe, wie gewöhnlich, des Nachts nach ihren
Ankerplätzen ruderten. Mit der Morgenröthe wurde niu auch der
übrige Theil des Heeres gelandet, auf etwas mehr als siebzig
Schiffen, Alle — mit Ausnahme der Ruderer auf dem Vordertheile
— die Einen so, die Andern so gewaffnet, achthundert Bogenschützen
und eine gleiche Zahl von Leichtbewaffneten, dazu die Hülsstruppen
der Messenier und die übrigen Alle, die um Pylos standen,
ausgenommen die Besatzung der Festung. Auf Anordnung des
Demosthenes vertheilten sie sich je zu zweihundert Mann und darüber, hie
und da auch darunter, und besetzten die hervorragendsten Punkte,
damit die Feinde in die größte Verwirrung geriethen und von allen
Seiten umringt nicht wüßten, wo sie Widerstand leisten sollten, ¹
sondern von der großen Zahl von beiden Seiten in den Schuß
genommen würden: von denen in ihrem Rücken getroffen, wenn sie die
vor sich angriffen, und von denen längs ihrer Front und dem Rücken
Aufgestellten, wenn sie nach der Flanke ausfallen wollten. Wohin
sie sich aber auch wendeten, immer sollten die leichten Schwärmer sie
im Rücken belästigen, denen am schwersten beizukommen ist, weil sie
mit ihren Pfeilen, Wurfspießen, Steinen und Schleuderkugeln aus
der Ferne wirken, und ihnen etwas anzuhaben war unmöglich, da
sie, selbst im Fliehen Schaden zufügten und dem Feind auf dem
Rückzug augenblicklich wieder zusetzten. Auf diese Art hatte
Demotshenes früher schon den Landungsplan entworfen, und so setzte er
ihn auch in's Werk.

XXXII. Les Athéniens, se précipitant au pas de course sur le premier posté, massacrent aussitôt les gardes dans leur lit même, pendant qu’ils saisissent leurs armes. Ils né s’étaient pas aperçus de la descente ; car ils avaient cru que les vaisseaux venaient, comme de coutume, occuper leur station de nuit. Au point du jour, tout le reste des troupes, excepté le dernier rang des rameurs ¹ , débarqua des vaisseaux, chaque corps avec les armes qui lui étaient propres. Le nombre des bâtiments était d’un peu plus de soixante-dix. Il y avait huit cents archers, un nombre égal de peltastes, un corps de Messéniens auxiliaires, et toute la garnison de Pylos, à l’exception de ceux qui gardaient les murs. Démosthènes les disposa par groupes de deux cents hommes, plus ou moins, et leur fit occuper les hauteurs ; il voulait que les Lacédémoniens, enveloppés de toutes parts et au comble de la perplexité, ne sussent de quel côté faire face, assaillis qu’ils seraient dans tous les sens par une multitude d’ennemis ; frappés par derrière, s’ils voulaient marcher en avant, en flanc, s’ils se portaient à droite ou à gauche. De quelque côté qu’ils s’avançassent, ils auraient toujours à dos des troupes légères, insaisissables, qui, de loin, les attaqueraient avec des flèches, des javelots, des pierres et des frondes, et contre lesquelles ils ne pourraient même pas marcher ; car, pour fuir, elles avaient l’avantage, et quand l’ennemi cédait elles revenaient à la charge. Tel était le plan qu’avait conçu Démosthènes, du moment où il songea à une descente, et il le mit à exécution.

Les Athéniens fondent au pas de course sur l’avant-poste. En fin un clin d'œil, ils massacrent les soldats encore couchés ou prenant à peine leurs armes. La descente s’était opérée avec tant de süeneè que les ennemis l'avaient prise pour le mouvement ordinaire des vaisseaux dans leur station de nuit. Au point du jour, le reste des soldats, chacun selon son arme spéciale, débarqua de soixante et dix navires on un peu plus, sur lesquels on ne laissa que le dernier rang de rameurs ¹ . Il y avait huit cents archers, autant de peltastes, les Messéniens auxiliaires, enfin toute la garnison de Pylos, excepté ceux qui étaient de garde sur le rempart. Démosthène les distribua par groupes de deux cents ou davantage, auxquels il fit occuper les hauteuis. Il voulait que les Lacédémoniens, cernés de toutes parts, ne sussent de quel côté faire face, assaillis en tous sens par k multitude, pris à dos s'ils avançaient, en flanc s'ils se portaient à droite ou à gauche. Ile ne pourraient faire un pas sans avoir derrière eux les troupes légères, insaisissables ennemis, qui les attaqueraient de loin à coups de flèches, de javelots, de pierres ou de frondes, et qu’il n'y aurait pas moyen de poursuivre ; car elles triomphaient même en fuyant ; et, dès que l'ennemi rétrogradait, elles revenaient à la charge. Tel était le plan d’attaque précédemment conçu par Démosthène et qu’il mit alors à exécution.

[1] As for the Athenians, they immediately destroyed the men of the first post, upon whom they charged at full speed, finding them still in their beds or endeavouring to snatch up their arms; for they had not noticed the Athenians' landing, supposing that the ships were merely sailing as usual to their watch-station for the night. ¹

[2] Then as soon as day dawned the rest of the army began to disembark. These were the crews of somewhat more than seventy ships (with the single exception of the rowers of the lowest benches ² ), equipped each in his own way, besides eight hundred archers and as many targeteers, and also the Messenians who had come to reinforce them, and all the others who were on duty about Pylos except the men left to guard the fort.

[3] Under Demosthenes' direction they were divided into companies of two hundred more or less, which occupied the highest points of the island, in order that the enemy, being surrounded on all sides, might be in the greatest possible perplexity and not know which attack to face, but be exposed to missiles on every side from the host of their opponents—if they attacked those in front, from those behind; if those on either flank, from those arrayed on the other.

[4] And they would always find in their rear, whichever way they moved, the light-armed troops of the enemy, which were the most difficult to deal with, since they fought at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings. Nay, they could not even get at them, for they were victorious even as they fled, and as soon as their pursuers turned they were hard upon them again. Such was the idea which Demosthenes had in mind when he devised the plan of landing, and such were his tactics when he put this into effect.

[1] The Athenians immediately put to the sword the men forming the first guard, whom they had thus attacked; for they were still in their beds, or only just taking up their arms, the landing having surprised them, as they fancied that the ships were only sailing, according to custom, to their stations for the night.

[2] As soon as it was morning, the rest of the forces also disembarked, viz. all the crews of seventy ships and rather more, (except the lowest rank of rowers,) with their different equipments; eight hundred bowmen, and no less a number of targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all others who were in any positions about Pylus, except the garrison on the fortifications.

[3] By the arrangement of Demosthenes, they were divided into parties of two hundred, more or less, and occupied the highest grounds, that the enemy might be most severely harassed by being surrounded on all sides, and not know where to make resistance, but be annoyed by a double discharge of missiles; being attacked by those behind them, if they charged those before, and by those posted on each side, if they made a flank movement.

[4] And so, wherever they went, they would have the enemy on their rear, light-armed, and the most difficult to deal with, being strong at a distance from the use of arrows, darts, stones, and slings, and it being impossible even to get near them; for they would conquer while flying, and when their enemy retreated, would press them close. It was with such a view of the case that Demosthenes both originally planned the descent, and made his arrangements in the execution of it.

[1] Athenienses vero primos quidem custodes, in quos incurrerant, confestim interfecerunt, in cubilibus adhue arma capientes et exscensu in terram ex navibus clam con- fecto, illis opinantibus naves ex consuetudine ad stationem noctu commeare.

[2] Sed simul atque dies illuxit, reliquus etiam exercitus in terram descendit , ex navibus paulo pluribus quam septuaginta, omnes praeter thalamios, pro suo quique genere armati; et octingenti sagittarii, et peltastae his non pauciores, et Messenii, qui auxilium tulerant, et ceteri omnes, quotquot circa Pylum erant, exceptis custodibus, qui in munitionibus erant.

[3] Hi autem a Demosthene intervallis interpositis instructi sunt, ita ut in quoque loco duceni, et plures, in nonnullis etiam pauciores essent, occupatis locis superioribus, ut hostes quam maxima dubitatione undique circumventi premerentur, nec haberent, adversus quam partem instructi in aciem prodirent, §ed undique telis expositi essent multitudinis, si in frontem procurrerent, a tergo petili, si in latera, ab alterutra parte.

[4] A tergo autem levis hostium armatura, et adversus quos minime ratio aliqua reperiri poterat, ipsis, quocunque se vertissent , semper haesuri erant, sagittis et jaculis et lapidibus et fundis eminus multum valentes, quos ne persequi quidem licebat; nam et fugiendo adversarios vincebant, et cedentibus instabant.

[5] Tali igitur consilio Demosthenes et ante copias in insulam exponere cogitarat, et in ipsa re gerenda instruxit;

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

Gli Ateniesi che erano scesi nell’isola inosservati ( perche i nemici stimavano che quelle fossero le navi che al solito scorressero per guardar Pisola ) uccidono subito coloro che avevano assaliti mentre erano in letto , e mentre riprendevano le armi. E al nascer dell’aurora sbarcò dalle settanta navi , o poco più , tutto il resto dell’esercito, salvo i rematori disottani, ciascuno dal canto suo armato, con più otto centinaia d’arcieri e bene altrettanti palvesari, e il rinforzo de’Messenii, e quanti stanziavano intorno a Pilo, tranne le guardie che custodivano il castello. Queste genti, secondo le disposizioni di Demostene , si spartirono in squadroni di dugento, ed or più ed or meno , occupando le più elevate parti de' luoghi , affinchè i nemici accerchiati per ogni lato si trovassero in grandissimo iiitricamento ; e non che sapessero a chi mostrare il viso , fossero anzi per ogni verso infestati dalla moltitudine : cosicché se urtassero di fronte, fossero percossi da quelli a tergo ; se di fianco, da quelli schierati su i due lati. Insomma dovunque il nemico si volgesse, avrebbe sempre alle spalle 1« milizie leggere , dalle quali è più difficile salvarsi, perchè mediante le frecce, gli strali, pietre e fionde hanno forza da lontano, e non v’è modo d’inseguirle; avvegnaché, fuggendo vincano, e cedendo il nemico, l' incalzano. Con questa mente Demostene da prima ruminava lo sbarco, e con tale poi lo regolò in effetto.