Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.27

[1] The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the island, knew not what they should do to it and feared lest winter should overtake them in their siege, fearing not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also that they should be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it were summer; and again, that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie anchor in against them, but that the watch there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape or in some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that brought them meat.

[2] But that which they feared most was that the Lacedaemonians seemed to have some assurance of them already, because they sent no more to negotiate about them.

[3] And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon, knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the agreement, said that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon, they that came thence advising them, if they would not believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it.

[4] But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said whom he before calumniated or, saying the contrary, be proved a liar, he advised the Athenians, seeing them inclined of themselves to send thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit to send to view the place nor to lose their opportunity by delay;

[5] but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men; and glanced at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, then general, upon malice and with language of reproach, saying it was easy, if the leaders were men, to go and take them there in the island; and that himself, if he had the command, would do it.

[1] At Athens , meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and that corn found its way in to the men in the island caused no small perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that winter might come on and find them still engaged in the blockade. They saw that the convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be then impossible. The country offered no resources in itself, and even in summer they could not send round enough. The blockade of a place without harbor could no longer be kept up; and the men would either escape by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad weather and sail out in the boats that brought in their corn.

[2] What caused still more alarm was the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, who must, it was thought by the Athenians, feel themselves on strong ground not to send them any more envoys; and they began to repent having rejected the treaty.

[3] Cleon, perceiving the disfavor with which he was regarded for having stood in the way of the convention, now said that their informants did not speak the truth; and upon the messengers recommending them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen by the Athenians as commissioners.

[4] Aware that he would now be obliged either to say what had been already said by the men whom he was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a fresh expedition, that instead of sending commissioners and wasting their time and opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail against the men.

[5] And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it would be easy, if they had men for generals, to sail with a force and take those in the island, and that if he had himself been in command, he would have done it.

In Athen nun, als dahin Nachricht kam, daß ihr Heer
Noth leide und denen auf der Insel Lebensmittel zugeführt würden,
war man in Verlegenheit und fürchtete, der Winter könne über der
Einschließung herankommen; denn sie sahen, daß dann die Zufuhr
des Nöthigen um den Peloponnes herum unmöglich sein werde,
zumal bei der Verödung des Landstrichs, da sie ja nicht einmal zur
Sommerszeit im Stande seien, genügende Zufuhr zu liefern; auch
würden sie in der hasenlosen Gegend keinen Landungsplatz finden,
sondern die Männer würden entweder, wenn sie selbst in ihrer
Wachsamkeit nachließen, sich dort leicht behaupten, oder auch einmal
stürmisches Wetter abpassen und auf den Fahrzeugen, die ihnen
Lebensmittel zugeführt, davongehen. Am meisten aber fürchteten sie
die Lakedämonier, denn sie glaubten, daß diese ihrer Sache ganz
sicher sein müßten, weil sie ihnen keine Friedensvorschläge mehr
machten, und darum reute es sie jetzt, sich nicht znm Vergleiche
verstanden zu haben. Kleon aber, der sah, wie sich ihre Laune gegen
ihn selbst wendete, weil er damals den Frieden hintertrieben, be- ^{1 2 3}
hauptete, die, welche jene Meldung gebracht, sagten nicht die
Wahrheit. Da aber die Leute, welche von Pylos gekommen waren,
daraufdrangen, wenn man ihnen nicht Glauben schenke, so solle man
einige Männer dahinsenden, sich mit eigenen Augen von der Lage
zu überzeugen, so wurde er selbst und mit ihm Theagenes von den
Athenern hiezu gewählt. Jetzt sah er für sich keine andere Wahl,
als entweder bei seiner früheren Rede und Verläumdung stehen zu
bleiben, oder sie zurückzunehmen und damit sich selbst als Lügner
hinzustellen, und weil er sah, daß die Athener schon von sich selbst
gestimmt seien, diese Kriegsunternehmung mit größerem Eifer zu
betreiben, so forderte er sie auf, lieber Niemanden zur Untersuchung
abzuschicken und nicht durch einen solchen Zeitverlust die günstige
Gelegenheit vorbeigehen zu lassen; sondern, wenn sie schon der
Meldung Glauben schenkten, so sollten sie eine Flotte gegen die
Mannschaft auskaufen lassen. Damit wollte er aber dem Nikias, des
Nikeratos Sohn, dessen Feind er war, eine Falle stellen; und arglistig
meinte er, wenn man mit solcher Rüstung in See gehe, so wäre es
gar leicht, die Leute aus der Insel abzufangen, sofern die Feldherrn
nur Männer seien, und er selbst, wenn er das Kommando hätte,
wurde das ausführen.

XXVII. Quand on apprit à Athènes que l’armêe souffrait et qu’il passait dans l’île des subsistance, on fut dans un grand embarras. On craignait que l’hiver ne vînt surprendre la flotte qui gardait Sphactérie ; car on sentait qu’il serait alors impossible de transporter des vivres sur les côtes du Péloponnèse, surtout dans un pays désert où l’on ne pouvait pas même en faire passer suffisamment en été ; d’ailleurs lp flotte ne pourrait stationner sur une côte sans mouillage ; et si la surveillance devenait moins active, les assiégés pourraient subsister dans l’île, ou profiteraient d’un mauvais temps pour s’échapper sur les barques qui leur apportaient des vivres. On craignait surtout que les Lacédémoniens, ayant désormais quelques motifs de confiance, n’envoyassent plus de hérauts ; en un mot on regrettait de n’avoir pas consenti à la paix.

Cléon, sachant que des défiances s’élevaient contre lui pour s’être opposé à l’accommodement, prétendit que les nouvelles apportées étaient mensongères ; et comme ceux qui arrivaient de Pylos demandaient, si on ne les croyait pas, qu’on envoyât sur les lieux quelques commissaires, les Athéniens choisirent pour cette mission Cléon lui-même et Théagène. Cléon sentit qu’il serait obligé de faire les mêmes rapports que ceux qu’il calomniait, ou que, s’il disait le contraire, il serait convaincu d’imposture : aussi conseilla-t-il aux Athéniens, qu’il voyait incliner vers la guerre, de ne pas envoyer aux informations et de ne pas perdre, en différant, l’occasion favorable ; mais d’aller attaquer les assiégés dans l’île même, si ces nouvelles leur paraissaient exactes. En même temps, faisant allusion à Nicias, fils de Nicératus, alors général, qu’il détestait, il l’accusait indirectement en disant qu’avec les préparatifs dont on disposait il serait facile, si les généraux étaient hommes de coeur, d’attaquer l’île et de s’emparer des guerriers ; que c’était là ce qu’il ferait luimême, s’il avait le commandement.

Lorsqu’on apprit à. Athènes que l’armée était en souf-fance et l’île ravitaillée, où fut dans un grand embarras. On craignait que la mauvaise saison ne surprît les troupes expéditionnaires, et qu’il ne devînt impossible de leur envoyer des vivres en faisant le tour du Péloponèse, puisqu’en été même on ne pouvait suffisamment alimenter une place dénuée de tout. La flotte ne saurait plus où mouiller sur cette côte sans port. Pour peu que la croisière fût moins active, les assiégés auraient moyen de se procurer des vivres ou même de s'échapper sur les embarcations qui leur en apportaient et à la faveur d’un gros temps. On appréhendait surtout que les Lacédémoniens rassurés ne songeassent plus à négocier, et l’on était aux regrets de n’ayoir pas accepté leurs propositions pacifiques.

Cléon, s’apercevant qu’on lui en voulait pour s’être opposé à l’accommodement, prétendit que les nouvelles étaient fausses; et, comme ceux qui arrivaient de Pylos demandaient, si on ne les croyait pas, qu’on envoyât sur les lieux pour faire une enquête, les Athéniens choisirent dans ce but Cléon lui-même et Théagénès. Alors Cléon sentit qu’il serait obligé de confirmer le rapport de ceux qu’il calomniait ou que, s’il disait le contraire, il serait convaincu d’imposture. Voyant d’ailleurs les Athéniens incliner à la guerre, il leur conseilla de renoncer à une enquête qui entraînerait des longueurs ; mais, si les nouvelles leur paraissaient vraies, de cingler immédiatement contre les ennemis. Lançant ensuite une insinuation contre le général Nicias fils de Nicératos, dont il était l’ennemi personnel et l’adversaire politique, il déclara que, si les généraux étaient des hommes, il leur serait aise, avec les forces dont ils disposaient, d'aller s’emparer des guerriers de l’île ; ajoutant que lui-même, s’il était général, il n’hésiterait pas à le faire.

[1] At Athens, meanwhile, when they heard that their army was in distress and that food was being brought in to the men on the island, they were perplexed and became apprehensive that the winter would overtake them while still engaged in the blockade. They saw that conveyance of supplies round the Peloponnesus would be impossible—Pylos being a desolate place at best, to which they were unable even in summer to send round adequate supplies—and that, since there were no harbours in the neighbourhood, the blockade would be a failure. Either their own troops would relax their watch and the men on the island would escape, or else, waiting for bad weather, they would sail away in the boats which brought them food.

[2] Above all they were alarmed about the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, thinking that it was because they had some ground for confidence that they were no longer making overtures to them; and they repented having rejected their proposals for peace.

[3] But Cleon, knowing that their suspicions were directed against him because he had prevented the agreement, said that the messengers who had come from Pylos were not telling the truth. Whereupon these messengers advised, if their own reports were not believed, that commissioners be sent to see for themselves, and Cleon himself was chosen by the Athenians, with Theagenes as his colleague.

[4] Realizing now that he would either be obliged to bring the same report as the messengers whose word he was impugning, or, if he contradicted them, be convicted of falsehood, and also seeing that the Athenians were now somewhat more inclined to send an expedition, he told them that they ought not to send commissioners, or by dallying to let slip a favourable opportunity, but urged them, if they themselves thought the reports to be true, to send a fleet and fetch the men.

[5] And pointing at Nicias son of Niceratus, who was one of the generals and an enemy of his, and taunting him, he said that it was an easy matter, if the generals were men, to sail there with a proper force and take the men on the island, declaring that this was what he himself would have done had he been in command.

[1] When they heard at Athens the circumstances of the army, that it was thus being harassed, and that corn was thus taken in for the men in the island, they were perplexed, and afraid that winter might surprise them in the blockade. For they saw that both carrying provisions round the Peloponnese would then be impossible—at the same time they were in an uninhabited country, [where they could get none themselves,] and even in summer they were not able to send round sufficient supplies for them—and that the blockade by sea of so harbourless a country could not be continued; but that the men would either escape through their giving up their guard, or would watch for a storm, and sail out in the boats that carried the corn in for them.

[2] Above all, they were alarmed by the conduct of the Lacedaemonians; for they imagined that it was from their having some strong point on their side that they made no more overtures to them;

[3] and they regretted not having assented to the treaty. Cleon observing their suspicions of him, with regard to the obstacles thrown in the way of the convention, said that their informants did not speak the truth. When those who had come with the tidings advised them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, he himself, with Theogenes, was chosen by the Athenians for that purpose.

[4] Aware therefore that he would be compelled either to give the same account as those whom he was slandering, or to be proved a liar if he gave a different one, he advised the Athenians—seeing that they were really more inclined in their minds for a fresh expedition—that they should not send commissioners, nor delay and waste their opportunity, but sail against the men, if they thought the report was true.

[5] And he pointedly alluded to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was general at the time; hating him, and tauntingly observing, that it was easy, if their generals were men, to sail with a force and take those in the island; and that if he had himself been in office, he would have done it.

[1] Athenis vero quum intelligeretur, exercitum variis incommodis affligi, et commeatus ad illos, qui in insula erant, transportari, consilii inopes erant, et verebantur, ne hiems suum praesidium opprimeret, videntes nullam facultatem fore res necessarias circa Peloponnesum advehendi, quum simul et in loco deserto necessitas major esset et ne aestate quidem satis commeatuum circummittere possent; et praeterea certam stationem classi illic non futuram, quod loca essent importuosa, sed aut custodia a se remissa hostes incolumes obsidionem perlaturos aut navigiis, quae commeatus importabant, tempestate observata erupturos.

[2] Sed quod omnium maxime formidabant, illud erat, quod Lacedaemonios certa causa nixos nullum caduceatorem de pace acturum ad se postliac missuros arbitrarentur, eosque poenitebat, quod foedera non admisissent.

[3] Cleo vero quum intelligeret, in se tendere suspicionem de foedere im- ρedito, negabat verum dicere eos, qui nuntios affeebauL Quum autem illi,qui nuntios attulerant, suaderent, ota fidem sibi non haberent, aliquos exploratores eo mitterent, ipse cumTlieogene explorator ab Atheniensibus electus est

[4] Ille vero quum intelligeret, se coactum iri vel eadem dicere , quae illi, quos criminabatur, vel, si contraria dixisset, se mendacem visum iri, suadebat Atheniensibus, quod eos ad bellum vel majore mole gerendum animis propensos esse videret, ut nullos quidem exploratores mitterent, neque cunctando occasionem praetermitterent, sed, si vera ipsis viderentur ea, quae nuntiabantur, cum classe proficiscerentur contra viros illos.

[5] Et Niciam N icerat i filium, qui tunc dux erat, obscure designabat, inimicus ei et cum exprobratione praedicans, facile esse paratis copiis, si duces viros se praeberent, eo pro fectos capere viros in insula interceptos, hocque se facturum, si in imperio esset.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

Risaputosi in Atene il disagio dell’ esercito, e T introduzione del foraggio nell’ isola , stavano sopra pensiero e temevano che la vernata non dovesse cogliere colà le loro genti ; vedendo che oltre al trovarsi in luogo deserto, sarebbe impossibile portar loro i viveri col circuire il Peloponneso ( lo che non valevano a fare ne anche in estate per mandarvi il bisognevole); e che in quelle coste importuose non avrebbero le navi ove fermarsi : cosicché rallentandosi la guardia , o i prigioni dell’ isola la vincerebbero, o col favore d’una burrasca s’involerebbero sulle barche che vi portavano il grano. Ma ciò che più di tutto temevano era il vedere che i Lacedemoni trovandosi alquanto più forti non manderebbero più araldo ; e si pentivano della tregua non accettata. Onde avvistosi Cleone di esser preso in sospetto perchè avea attraversato l’accordo , disse che i messaggi arrivati in Atene non rapportavano il vero : ma questi esortando che se non credessero a loro, mandassero degli esploratori, e venendo a ciò deputato dagli Ateuiesi lo stesso Cleone insieme con Teogene, senti egli che o e’ dovrebbe dir lo stesso di quelli che calunniava , o dicendo il contrario comparirebbe mentitore. Però vedendo che la mente degli Ateniesi pendeva piuttosto per una nuova spedizione , suggeriva loro non vi esser bisogno di mandare esploratori, nè di perder tempo lasciando fuggir l' occasione : ma quando credan vere le nuove recate , si mettessero in mare per andar contro coloro. E per pugnere il generale Kicia figlio di Nicerato cui disamava , disse proverbiando : esser facile colle forze presenti, se i capitani fosser uomini, navigare all’isola e prender quelle genti ; e bene egli vi riuscirebbe se avesse in mano il comando.