Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.37

[1] "I have often on other occasions thought a democracy incapable of dominion over others, but most of all now for this your repentance concerning the Mytilenaeans.

[2] For through your own mutual security and openness, you imagine the same also in your confederates and consider not that when at their persuasion you commit an error or relent upon compassion, you are softened thus to the danger of the commonwealth not to the winning of the affections of your confederates; nor do you consider that your government is a tyranny and those that be subject to it are against their wills so and are plotting continually against you, and obey you not for any good turn, which to your own detriment you shall do them, but only for that you exceed them in strength, and for no good will.

[3] But the worst mischief of all is this, that nothing we decree shall stand firm and that we will not know that a city with the worse laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws when they be not binding, and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty is more profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance, and that the more ignorant sort of men do, for the most part, better regulate a commonwealth than they that are wiser.

[4] For these love to appear wiser than the laws and in all public debatings to carry the victory as the worthiest things wherein to show their wisdom, from whence most commonly proceeds the ruin of the states they live in. Whereas the other sort, mistrusting their own wits, are content to be esteemed not so wise as the laws and not able to carp at what is well spoken by another, and so, making themselves equal judges rather than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part well.

[5] We therefore should do the like and not be carried away with combats of eloquence and wit to give such counsel to your multitude as in our own judgments we think not good.

[1] ‘I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire, and never more so than by your present change of mind in the matter of Mitylene .

[2] Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily relations with each other, you feel just the same with regard to your allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led by listening to their appeals, or by giving way to your own compassion, are full of danger to yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting that your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is insured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by your own strength and not their loyalty.

[3] The most alarming feature in the case is the constant change of measures with which we appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad laws which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that have no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than quick-witted insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more gifted fellows.

[4] The latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their wit in more important matters, and by such behavior too often ruin their country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are content to be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather than rival athletes, generally conduct affairs successfully.

[5] These we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our real opinions.

„Schon oft habe ich auch bei andern Gelegenheiten einen
demokratishcen Staat als unfähig erkannt, über Andere zu herrschen,
nie aber deutlicher als heute, wo euch der Mytilenäer wegen Reue
ergriffen hat. Weil ihr euch nämlich im täglichen Verkehr unter
einander selbst furcht- und arglos benehmt ^), so zeigt ihr euch euren
Bundesgenossen gegenüber ebenso, und wenn ihr hierin irgend eine
Thorheit begeht, sei es nun, daß ihr euch von ihnen beschwatzen laßt,
oder daß ihr eurem eigenen Mitleiden den Gesallen thut, so bedenkt
ihr nicht, daß eure Weichmüthigleit weder für euch selbst gefahrlos
sei, noch euch den Dank der Bundesgenossen erwerben könne. Ihr ^{1 2}
bedenkt nicht, daß eure Herrschaft eine Gewaltherrschaft ist, daß eure ³
Unterthanen Ränke gegen euch schmieden und euer Joch widerwillig
tragen. Sie werden euch nicht etwa in dem Maße lieber gehorchen,
als ihr euch zu eurem eigenen Schaden ihnen gefällig erzeiget, sondern
in dem Maße, als ihr eure Herrschaft über sie mehr ans eure
Uebermacht, als auf ihr Wohlwollen gründet. Das Unglückseligste aber ist
es, wenn Nichts von dem, was wir einmal beschlossen haben, in
Kraft verbleibt, und wenn wir nicht lernen wollen, daß ein Staat,
der zwar schlechtere, aber unwandelbare Gesetze beobachtet, mächtiger
ist, als wenn er bei vortrefflichen Gesetzen sie nicht zur Ausführung
bringt; daß geringer Verstand bei Selbstbeschcidung nützlicher wirkt
als große Geschicklichkeit bei zügellosem Wankelmuth, und daß
ungebildetere Leute mit ihrem Gemeinwesen meist besser zurechtkommen
als gebildetere 22). Denn diese wollen weiser ershceinen als die
Gesetze und immer noch Klügeres missen als das, was zum Besten des
Gemeinwesens bereits gesagt worden ist, als ob es keine trefflichere
Gelegenheit gäbe, ihr Licht leuchten zu lassen, und grade durch solches
Benehmen bringen sie die Staaten in's Unglück. Die Andern aber
in ihrem Mißtrauen in die eigene Einsicht bescheiden sich, nicht so
weise zu sein wie die Gesetze und unfähig, an der Rede eines Mannes
Ausstellungen zu machen, der Treffliches vorgebracht hat, und grade
weil sie mehr unparteiische Richter als Parteikämpfer sind, so treffen
sie meist das Richtige. So müssen auch wir es machen und nicht im
Eifer, gegen Andere unsere Redetüchtigkeit und unsern Scharfsinn
geltend zu machen, uns hinreißen lassen, gegen die eigene Ueberlegung
euch zu irgend etwas zu bereden." '

XXXVII. « Bien des fois déjà j’ai reconnu, en d’autres circonstances, qu’un État démocratique est incapable de commander à d’autres peuples ; aujourd’hui surtout j’en ai la preuve dans votre repentir au sujet des Mytiléniens. Vous portez dans vos relations avec vos alliés la sécurité et la franchise réciproque de vos rapports journaliers ; et quand, cédant à leurs discours, ou mus par un sentiment de pitié, vous vous laissez entraîner à quelque faute, vous ne songez pas que votre faiblesse tourne contre vous, sans leur inspirer aucune reconnaissance. Vous ne réfléchissez point que votre domination est une tyrannie, imposée à des hommes qui conspirent contre elle et n’obéissent qu’à la contrainte. Ce n’est point en leur faisant du bien, à votre propre détriment, que vous assurerez leur soumission, mais en asseyant votre autorité sur la force bien plus que sur leur bienveillance. Mais le pire de tout serait qu’il n’y eût rien de stable dans nos résolutions, et que nous en vinssions à ignorer que mieux vaut, pour un État, être gouverné par des lois moins bonnes, mais immuables, que par d’excellentes lois sans autorité ; que l’ignorance modeste est préférable à l’habileté présomptueuse, et qu’en général les hommes les plus obscurs gouvernent mieux les États que les plus habiles. Ceux-ci, en effet, veulent se montrer plus sages que les lois et faire triompher leur opinion per- sonnelle dans toutes les délibérations d’intérêt général ; ils pensent ne pouvoir trouver jamais plus belle occasion de faire montre de leur esprit ; et par là ils perdent souvent les empires. Ceux au contraire qui se défient de leur propre habileté croient en savoir moins que les lois. Ils ne sont pas aussi capables, il est vrai, de réfuter le discours d’un orateur habile ; mais, justes appréciateurs des choses, plutôt que jouteurs à la tribune, ils réussissent ordinairement. C’est ainsi que nous devons agir, au lieu de faire orgueilleusement parade de notre faconde, de notre dextérité dans ces passes oratoires, et d’inculquer à nos concitoyens des opinions paradoxales.

« Mainte fois j’ai reconnu qu’un État démocratique n’est pas fait pour commander à d’autres; mais rien ne le prouve mieux que votre revirement actuel au sujet des Mytiléniens. Accoutumés dans vos rapports journaliers à une confiance et une sécurité réciproques, vous avez les mêmes dispositions envers vos alliés; et, lorsque leurs discours ou la commisération vous out fait commettre quelque faute, vous ne songez pas que votre faiblesse entraîne pour vous un péril, sans vous attirer de leur part aucune reconnaissance. Vous oubliez que votre domination est une véritable tyrannie ¹ , imposée à des hommes malintentionnés, qui n’obéissent qu’à contre-cœur, qui ne vous savent aucun gré des concessions, onéreuses pour vous, que vous leur faites ; mais qui se soumettent moins par déférence que par nécessité.

« Le pire à mes yeux serait qu’il n’y eût rien de stable dans nos résolutions, et que nous ne comprissions pas que mieux vaut pour un État avoir des lois imparfaites, mais immuables, que des lois excellentes, mais dépourvues de sanction ; que l’ignorance modeste est préférable à l’habileté vaniteuse ; et qu’en général les États sont mieux gouvernés par les médiocrités que par les intelligences d’élite. En effet les uns veulent se montrer plus sages que les lois et, dans les assemblées, faire toujours prévaloir leurs opinions personnelles, parce que c’est l’arène la plus favorable à leurs talents, — et voilà surtout ce qui perd les républiques; —tandis que les autres, se défiant de leurs propres lumières, ne croient pas en savoir plus que les lois. Ils sont, il est vrai, moins aptes à critiquer les discours d’un harangueur habile ; mais, jugeant avec plus de modestie que d’émulation, ils évitent mieux les écueils. C’est là ce que nous devons faire, nous autres orateurs, au lieu de nous engager dans une lutte d’éloquence ou de génie, et de vous donner des conseils contraires à nos propres convictions.

[1] "On many other occasions in the past I have realized that a democracy is incompetent to govern others, but more than ever to-day, when I observe your change of heart concerning the Mytilenaeans.

[2] The fact is that, because your daily life is unaffected by fear and intrigue in your relations to each other, ¹ you have the same attitude towards your allies also, and you forget that whenever you are led into error by their representations or yield out of pity, your weakness involves you in danger and does not win the gratitude of your allies. For you do not reflect that the empire you hold is a despotism ² imposed upon subjects who, for their part, do intrigue against you and submit to your rule against their will, who render obedience, not because of any kindnesses you may do them to your own hurt, but because of such superiority as you may have established by reason of your strength rather than of their goodwill.

[3] But quite the most alarming thing is, if nothing we have resolved upon shall be settled once for all, and if we shall refuse to recognize that a state which has inferior laws that are inviolable is stronger than one whose laws are good but without authority; that ignorance combined with selfrestraint is more serviceable than cleverness combined with recklessness;

[4] and that simpler people for the most part make better citizens than the more shrewd. The latter always want to show that they are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public discussions, as if there could never be weightier questions on which to declare their opinions, and as a consequence of such conduct they generally bring their states to ruin; the former, on the contrary, mistrusting their own insight, are content to be less enlightened than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker, but being impartial judges rather than interested contestants they generally prosper.

[5] Thus, then, we ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and combat of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own judgment.

[1] "On many other occasions before this have I been convinced that a democracy is incapable of maintaining dominion over others, and I am so more than ever from your present change of purpose respecting the Mytilenaeans.

[2] For owing to your daily freedom from fear, and from plotting against each other, you entertain the same views towards your allies also. And you do not reflect, in whatever case you may either have made a mistake through being persuaded by their words, or may have given way to pity, that you show such weakness to your own peril, and at the same time too gain no gratitude from your allies; not considering that it is a tyrannical dominion which you hold, and over men who are plotting against you, and involuntarily subject to you;

[3] and who obey you not from any favours you confer on them to your own hurt, but from the fact of your being superior to them through your power, rather than their good feeling. But of all things is the most fearful if nothing of what we have resolved stedfast; and if we are not convince that a state with inferior laws which are unchanged is better than one with good ones which are not authoritative; the homely wit with moderation is more useful than cleverness with intemperance;

[4] and the duller class of men, compared with the more talented, Generally speaking, manage public affairs better. For the latter wish to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule what is ever spoken for the public good—think in that they could not show their wisdom in more important matters—and by such means they generally ruin their country. But the former, distrusting their own talent deign to be less learned than the laws and less able than to find fault with the words of one who has spoken well; and being judges on fair terms, rather than rivals or a prize they are more commonly right in views.

[5] So then rivals to do, and not to advise your people contrary to our real opinion, urged on by cleverness and rivalry of talent.

[1] « Quum saepe alias ego statum popularem intellexi minime aptum esse ad imperium in alios obtinendum, tum vero praecipue nunc in hac vestra de Mytilenaeis poenitentia.

[2] Nam quia quotidiana haec vestra inter vos consuetudo metu et insidiis caret, eandem fiduciam etiam in socios habetis, etquicquid vel oratione eorum adducti erraveritis vel misericordia remiseritis, non creditis hanc mollitiam vobis periculum, nec tamen apud socios gratiam creare, non considerantes, imperium, quod obtinetis, ty-rannidem esse, eamque in homines, qui insidias vobis faciunt vestroque imperio inviti parent, et qui non pro eo, ut vos iis gratum feceritis vestro cum incommodo, obediunt vobis, sed pro eo, ut vos vi potius quam illorum benivolentia valueritis.

[3] Omnium vero perniciosissimum, si ni hil eorum, quae a nobis decreta fuerint, firmum mansurum est, nec intelligemus eam rempublicam, quae malis quidem, sed immotis legibus utitur, praestantiorem esse illa, quae bonis sed neglectis, et imperitiam cum continentia junctam, plus prodesse quam dexteritatem cum intemperantia junctam, mediocresque homines, si cum callidioribus conferantur, fere plerumque respublicas melius administrare.

[4] Nam isti quidem et legibus sapientiores volunt videri, et quae quoque tempore consuluntur in publicum, ea vincere, ut qui in aliis majoribus rebus ingenii praestantiam declarare non possint, atque ob tale studium respublicas plerumque evertunt; illi vero, quia suae peritiae diffidunt, se legibus imperitiores esse sibi persuadent, et facultatem sibi non sufficere ad ejus, qui pulchre dixerit, reprehendendam rationem, sed quia rerum aequi potius judices sunt quam concertatores, plerumque recte res gerunt.

[5] Sic Igitur oportet nos quoque facere, et non dicendi facultate et solertiae aemulatione elatos praeter sententiam vestrae multitudini suadere decet.

[1] Wir erfreuen uns einer Verfassung, welche nicht entstanden aus der Uebertragung fremder Gesetze, keine Nachahmung, sondern vielmehr selber ein würdiges Vorbild für andere ist. Mag sie Volksherrschaft heissen, sofern die Bürgerschaft, nicht ein Adel der Berechtigte ist ¹ ; aber bei aller Gleichheit, welche das Gesetz den persönlichen Unterschieden gegenüber allen gewährt, ist es doch lediglich die Tüchtigkeit, wo sie sich auch hervorthun mag, welche den Rang bestimmt und den Weg zu Ehren und Würden bahnt, ja auch für den Aermsten, wofern er nur dem Staate zu nützen vermag, bildet seine niedrige Stellung kein Hindernis.

« Non esser buono a tenere impero su gli altri lo stato popolare bene altre fiate l’ho io conosciuto; ma non mai come in questo vostro cambiamento d’animo riguardo ai Mitilenei. Nè già io mi maraviglio , attesoché la sicurezza e lealtà con cui usate giornalmente fra voi, ingenera nel vostro animo i medesimi sentimenti in ciò che spetta agli alleati. E quantunque volte o andiate errati perchè sedotti dai loro discorsi, o per compassione rimettiate un punto del vostro rigore ; voi non avvisate di rilasciarvi con vostro pericolo, senza obbligarvi gli alleati : nè considerate che il vostro impero è tirannico, e sovra genti che vi tramano insidie, e che stanno a lor dispetto soggette ; genti che vi obbediscono non pei buoni uffizi che a danno vostro facciate loro , o per benevolenza di animo, ma più presto perchè gli avanzate in potere. Soprattutto però stupisco che nulla debba restar fermo di ciò che è stato risoluto, e che non vogliamo intendere, pin valere una città con leggi peggiori ma invariabili, di una che buone le abbia ma senza vigore ; più giovare l’imperizia unita alla moderanza, che una sfrenata accortezza ; e meglio d’ordinario governare le città i più idioti fra gli uomini a comparazione dei più scienziati. Questi vogliono comparire più sapienti delle leggi e prevalere sulle deliberazioni prese di mano in mano nelle comuni adunanze, quasi che fossero per mancar loro occasioni più importanti da far mostra di loro ingegno ; e cosi per lo più rovinano le repubbliche : gli altri all’ incontro, diffidando dalla propria avvedutezza, si pregiano d’esser men dotti delle leggi, e inabili a vituperare chi abbia dirittamente parlato : però operando da giudici di equità, e non da nyali, dirizzano frequenti volte le cose a buon termine. Dobbiamo adunque anche noi oratori adoperar così; e senza gonfiarci per bravura di eloquenza, o per gara di accorgimento, guardarci dal dare al popolo consigli che non approviamo noi stessi.