Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 3.31

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Alkidas wollte sich jedoch darauf nicht einlassen. Nun
wurde ihm von anderen, ionischen Flüchtlingen und Lesbiern,
die mit auf der Flotte waren, empfohlen, wenn er den Vor
schlag für zu gefährlich hielte, so möge er wenigstens eine der
ionischen Städte oder auch das äolische Kyme besetzen und
von dort aus Jonien zum Abfall zu bringen suchen. Hoffnung
dazu sei vorhanden; denn unerwünscht seien sie hier keinem
gekommen. Den Athenern aber würde damit ihre ergiebigste
Einnahmequelle entzogen, und wenn sie dann gar zu einer
Blockade schritten, würden sie sich obendrein noch in Unkosten
stürzen müssen. Wahrscheinlich würde sich auch Pissuthnes wohl
zu einem Bündnis mit ihnen verstehen. Aber auch darauf
ging Alkidas nicht ein; denn nachdem er bei Mytilene doch
einmal zu spät gekommen, war ihm nur darum zu tun, so
schnell wie möglich wieder nach dem Peloponnes zu gelangen.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 3.31.1 focus

[1] ὁ μὲν τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἔπειθε τὸν Ἀλκίδαν. ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀπ’ Ἰωνίας φυγάδων καὶ οἱ Λέσβιοι 〈οἱ〉 ξυμπλέοντες παρῄνουν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον φοβεῖται, τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πόλεων καταλαβεῖν τινὰ ἢ Κύμην τὴν Αἰολίδα, ὅπως ἐκ πόλεως ὁρμώμενοι τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἀποστήσωσιν (ἐλπίδα δ’ εἶναι· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀκουσίως ἀφῖχθαι) καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων [ἢν] ὑφέλωσι, καὶ ἅμα, ἢν ἐφορμῶσι σφίσιν, αὐτοῖς δαπάνη γίγνηται· πείσειν τε οἴεσθαι καὶ Πισσούθνην ὥστε ξυμπολεμεῖν.

[2] ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐνεδέχετο, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς γνώμης εἶχεν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς Μυτιλήνης ὑστερήκει, ὅτι τάχιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πάλιν προσμεῖξαι.

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 3.31.1 focus

[1] Thus said he, but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of lonia and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet, gave him counsel that, seeing he feared the danger of this, he should seize some city of Ionia or Cume in Aeolia, that having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence force Ionia to revolt, whereof there was hope because the Ionians would not be unwilling to see him there; and if they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great revenue and withal put them to maintain a fleet against them, it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They said besides that they thought they should be able to get Pissuthnes to join with them in the war.

[2] But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this opinion that since they were come too late to Mytilene, they were best to return speedily into Peloponnesus.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 3.31.1 focus

[1] These words of Teutiaplus failing to move Alcidas, some of the Ionian exiles and the Lesbians with the expedition began to urge him, since this seemed too dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian cities or the Aeolic town of Cyme, to use as a base for effecting the revolt of Ionia . This was by no means a hopeless enterprise, as their coming was welcome everywhere; their object would be by this move to deprive Athens of her chief source of revenue, and at the same time to saddle her with expense, if she chose to blockade them; and they would probably induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war.

[2] However, Alcidas gave this proposal as bad a reception as the other, being eager, since he had come too late for Mitylene , to find himself back in Peloponnese as soon as possible.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 3.31 focus

So redete dieser, gewann jedoch den Alkidas nicht. Da
forderten ihn denn einige Andere von den Ionischen Flüchtlingen und
mitsegelnden Lesbiern auf, wenn er schon diese Gefahr fürchte, so
möge er eine der Ionischen Städte wegnehmen oder das Aeolische
Kyme, damit sie an einer solchen Stadt einen Ausgangspunkt hätten,
um Jonien zum Abfall zu bringen. Dazu sei Hoffnung vorhanden;
denn sie seien keinem unerwünscht hierher gekommen. Sie sollten
also diese bedeutendste Einnahmsquelle der Athener ihnen wegnehmen,
und wenn dieselben dann zu einer Blokade schritten, so würde ihnen
dadurch noch obendrein Aufwand abgenöthigt. Auch seien sie der
Meinung, man könne den Pissuthnes sden persischen Satrapen^ wohl
überreden, sich ihrer Kriegführung anzuschließen. Alkidas aber ging
auch darauf nicht ein, sondern dachte nur, da er bei Mytilene schon
einmal zu spät gekommen war, so bald als möglich den Peloponnes
wieder zu gewinnen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 3.31 focus

XXXI. Alcidas ne se rendit point à ces raisons. Des exilés d’Ionie¹ et les Lesbiens embarqués sur la flotte conseillèrent, puisqu’il craignait de courir cette chance, d’occuper quelqu’une des villes d’Ionie, ou Cumes² en Éolie ; on aurait ainsi une base pour faire révolter l’Ionie, et on pouvait l’espérer, disaient-ils, car on n’y voyait pas avec déplaisir l’arrivée des Péloponnésiens. Ils ajoutaient qu’on enlèverait par là aux Athéniens leur plus grande source de revenus, en même temps qu’on leur imposerait des dépenses considérables, s’ils voulaient y envoyer une flotte. Enfin, ils espéraient engager Pissythnès à prendre part à la guerre. Alcidas ne goûta pas davantage cet avis, tout entier à cette pensée que, puisqu’il n’avait pas secouru à temps Mytilène, il lui fallait regagner au plus vite le Péloponnèse.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 3.31 focus

Alcidas demeura sourd à ce langage. Alors quelques exilés ioniens, de même que les Lesbiens embarqués sur la flotte ¹, lui conseillèrent, à défaut de ce projet, d’occuper une des villes ioniennes ou Cymé d’Éolide, qui servirait de point d’appui pour insurger l’Ionie. A les entendre, il y avait espoir d’y réussir ; car personne n’avait vu de mauvais œil leur arrivée. Quoi de mieux que de tarir la source principale des revenus des Athéniens ou du moins de leur occasionner les frafis d’une croisière²? Ce serait d’ailleurs le moyen d’attirer Pissouthnès dans l’alliance³. Mais Alcidas ne goûta pas davantage cette proposition. Du moment que Mytilène lui échappait, il n'eut rien de plus pressé que de regagner le Péloponèse.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 3.31.1 focus

[1] Thus he spoke, but could not win Alcidas to his plan. Then some others, exiles from Ionia, and the Lesbians¹ who were with the fleet, advised him, since he feared the risk of this enterprise, to seize one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolia, in order that they might have a city as their base and bring Ionia to revolt (and that there was a prospect of success, seeing that everyone welcomed his coming) and might thus steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, and at the same time the Athenians might be put to expense, in case they should attempt to blockade their base. They thought, moreover, that they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war.

[2] Alcidas, however, would not accept these proposals, either, but his chief concern, now that he was too late for Mytilene, was to get back to Peloponnesus as quickly as possible.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 3.31.1 focus

[1] Such was his speech; but he did not persuade Alcidas. On the other hand, some of the exiles from Ionia and the Lesbians who were on board with them, advised, that since lie was afraid of that danger, he should seize one of the Ionian cities, or Cyme in Aeolia; so that having a city as the base of their operations they might excite Ionia to revolt: (and there was reason to hope this, for their arrival was unwelcome to no one.) If then they should take away from the Athenians this their chief source of revenue, ¹ and if at the same time they should themselves incur the expense of keeping a fleet of observation, they thought they should prevail on Pisuthnes also to take part in the war with them.

[2] He did not, however, accede to this proposal either; but was most strongly inclined, since he had come too late for Mytilene, to reach the Peloponnese again as quickly as possible.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 3.31.1 focus

[1] Hic quidem ita locutus Alcidae non persuadebat. Alii vero nonnulli ex Ionia exsules, et qui Lesbii cum ipso navigabant, ei suadebant, ut, quandoquidem hoc periculum formidaret, aliquam in Ionia urbem aut Cumam iEolicam occuparet, ut ex urbe ut certa sede prodeuntes Ioniam ad defectionem impellerent; posse autem illud sperari, et quod nemini adventus suus contra voluntatem accidat, et praesertim si reditum ex his regionibus omnium maximum Atheniensibus interciperent, ac simul si illis cum classe parata contra se excubantibus insuper etiam sumptus faciendi necessitas existeret; atque se etiam sperare, Pissu-Ihnen a se adductum iri, ut ad hujus belli societatem se adjungeret

[2] Sed Alcidas ne his quidem movebatur, sed potissimum ad eam sententiam animo inclinabat, ut, quoniam a Mytilenae servandae consilio tardiore adventu dejectus esset, in Peloponnesum quam celerrime se reciperet.

Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides First1KGreek (Thucydides. Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides. Gürsching, Heinrich, translator. Augsburg: Wirth, 1856.) — 2.35.1 focus

[1] Wenn es bisher bei den Rednern an dieser Stätte fast allgemeiner Brauch geworden, den Mann zu rühmen, der mit der Bestattung diese Rede verband, weil an dem Grabe gefallener Krieger ein ehrendes Wort sich zieme, so würde ich es für hinreichend gehalten haben, dass man Helden der That mit einer festlichen Handlung ehre, — wie das denn der Staat durch die Bestattung gethan hat, deren Zeugen ihr so eben gewesen — und würde die Verherrlichung so vieler Männer nicht einem Einzelnen und der zufälligen Wirkung seines Vortrags anheimgegeben haben.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 3.31 focus

Con tutto che egli avesse sì caldamente parlato e’ non piegò Alcida : ed alcuni altri fuorusciti dell’ Ionia, e quei dei Lesbii che formavano parte della flotta, lo confortavano (dappoiché ei temeva dell’accennato pericolo) ad occupare o qualche città dell’Ionia , o Cuma dell’Eolide ; per avere una terra donde muoversi a ribellare l’Ionia agli Ateniesi. Affermavano ciò potersi sperare , perchè vi arriverebbero col gradimento di tutti : che se e’ privassero gli Ateniesi di questo ramo di entrata che era per loro il più grande, e se vi tenessero stabilmente guarnigione ad osservarli, ne ricaverebbero per sè le spese necessarie. Aggiugnevano poi che pensavano di potere indurre anche Pissutne ad unire con loro le sue armi. Ma Alcida non aderì pure a queste proposte : anzi non essendo stato a tempo a giungere a Mitilene, volgeva sopratlutto il pensiero a riprendere terra f al più presto possibile, nel Peloponneso.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 3 (Thucydides, Book III. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

οἱ Λέσβιοι —for these see cc. 4, 4, 5, 4.

ἐλπίδα δ’ εῖναι —sc. ἀποστῆσαι.

ἀκουσίως —i.e. ‘no one was unwilling to see them come,’ the adverb applying to οὐδενί, not to the subject of ἀφῖχθαι: cf. Soph. Antig. 70 ἐμοῦ γ’ ἂν ἡδέως (sc. ἐμοὶ) δρῴης μέτα.

καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον . . ὑφέλωσι —parallel to ἀποστήσωσιν, ‘(that) they might gradually draw away this which was the main source of A. revenue.’ Not ‘ one of the chief sources’; and the position of ταύτην renders a second τήν unnecessary. The φόρος from the Carian and Ionian cities is meant; they had been grouped together and treated as one since 436 B.C., and the lists in CIA. vol. i. show that this combined φόρος was the largest item in the Athenian πρόσοδοι. ( ἢν before ὑφέλωσι can scarcely be right: the loss of the φόρος would be the necessary outcome of the revolt of Ionia, and could hardly be stated as an independent condition of what follows, however that be understood.)

καὶ ἄμα . . . δαπάνη γίγνηται —‘and at the same time, in case the Athenians should blockade them (in the Ionian port), the Athenians might be put to expense.’ (A majority of MSS. gives ἢν ἐφορμῶσιν αὐτοῖς—or αὐτοὺς—δαπάνη σφίσι γίγνηται, i.e. ‘if the Peloponnesians should blockade the Athenians, they (the Pel.) might have a fund to draw on, viz. the φόρος.’ The objections to this are, as I think, ( a) ἢν ἐφορμῶσιν αὐτοῖς is too vague: surely the Lesbians and Ionians cannot be thinking here of a blockade of the Attic coast—c. 15, 1 —and an undertaking of such magnitude—see c. 16, 1— could not possibly be suggested in this casual way—and the alternative explanation, that the proposal is that Alcidas shall ‘maintain a squadron of observation in Ionian waters,’ with a victorious Athenian fleet of equal numbers at Mytilene—cf. especially c. 33, 1—is out of the question. ( b) It is true that δαπάνη can mean ‘money for spending,’ where the context makes the drift clear, but it is hardly possible that δαπάνη τινὶ γίγνεται can mean anything but δαπανᾶται ὑπό τινος, according to the idiom; and there is force in Kruger's remark that the previous sentence here decidedly suggests the idea of ‘loss.’)

Πισσούθνην —Ionia and Caria were included in his satrapy. As Persia claimed and did not receive tribute from the Greek cities, it was by no means unlikely that the satrap might be induced to aid the enemies of Athens.

τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς γνώμης εἶχε —‘strongly inclined to,’ ‘regarded it as decidedly best,’ like the Herodotean πλεῖστος γνώμην εἰμί.

Μυτιλήνης ὑστερήκει —‘too late for’ means here ‘too late to help,’ as in Xen. Ages 2, 1 ὡς ὑστερήσειε τῆς πατρίδος.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.31

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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