Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 2.93

[1] But before the fleet, gone into the Crisaean gulf and to Corinth, was dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the commanders of the Peloponnesians in the beginning of winter instructed by the Megareans thought good to make an attempt upon Peiraeus, the haven of the Athenians. Now it was without guard or bar, and that upon very good cause, considering how much they exceeded others in the power of their navy.

[2] And it was resolved that every mariner with his oar, his cushion, and one thong for his oar to turn in should take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea that lieth to Athens and, going with all speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisaea, the arsenal of the Megareans, which then were there, and sail presently into Peiraeus.

[3] For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before it, nor was there any imagination that the enemies would on such a sudden come upon them; for they durst not have attempted it openly, though with leisure; nor if they had had any such intention, could it but have been discovered.

[4] As soon as it was resolved on, they set presently forward and, arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisaea and set sail, not now towards Peiraeus, as they intended, fearing the danger (and a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them), but toward a promontory of Salamis lying out towards Megara. Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay three galleys that kept watch to hinder the importation and exportation of anything to or from the Megareans. This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away after them and, being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also other parts of the island.

[1] Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but before dispersing the fleet, which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to be persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon Piraeus , the port of Athens , which from her decided superiority at sea had been naturally left unguarded and open.

[2] Their plan was as follows:—The men were each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and going overland from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to Megara as quickly as they could, and launching forty vessels, which happened to be in the docks at Nisaea , to sail at once to Piraeus .

[3] There was no fleet on the look-out in the harbor, and no one had the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise; while an open attack would, it was thought, never be deliberately ventured on or if in contemplation, would be speedily known at Athens . Their plan formed, the next step was to put it in execution.

[4] Arriving by night and launching the vessels from Nisaea , they sailed, not to Piraes as they had originally intended, being afraid of the risk, besides which there was some talk of a wind having stopped them, but to the point of Salamis that looks towards Megara ; where there was a fort and a squadron of three ships to prevent anything sailing in or out of Megara . This fort they assaulted, and towed off the galleys empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest of the island.

Ehe aber die Bemannung der Flotte, welche sich nach
Korinth und dem Krisäischen Meerbusen zurückgezogen hatte, aus einander
ging, wollten Knemos und Brasidas und die übrigen Feldherrn der
Peloponnesier zu Winters Anfang, von den Megarensern berathen. ^{1 2 3}
einen Versuch aus den athenischen Hafen Piräeus wagen. Derselbe
war nämlich unbewacht und unvershclossen, wie leicht zu erklären, da
die Athener zur See entschieden in der Uebermacht waren. Und zwar
wurde beschlossen, jeder Schiffssoldat solle sein Ruder, das Bankpolster
und den Ruderring nehmen und zu Fuß nach dem jenseitigen Meere
gehen; dann wollten sie in aller Eile nach Megara und von dem Werst
zu Nisäa vierzig Megarensische Schiffe, die eben daselbst lagen, in's
Meer ziehen und sogleich nach dem Piräeus fahren; denn es stand
dort weder eine Flottenabtheilung auf Wache, noch fiel es irgend
Jemanden ein, die Feinde könnten so ganz unerwartet heransegeln, denn
weder könnten sie, dachte man, einen offenen Angriff unbehelligt
unternehmen, noch auch könnte es unbemerkt bleiben, wenn sie wirklich
darauf sännen. Wie nun beschlossen worden war, so machten sie sich
auch allsogleich auf den Marsch, kamen noch bei Nacht an und zogen
zu Nisäa die Schiffe in's Meer, fuhren aber nicht gleich, wie sie
beabsichtigt hatten, auf den Piräeus los, denn sie fürchteten Gefahr, und
auch der Wind soll sie daran verhindert haben, sondern nach der Spitze
von Salamis, welche gegen Megara hinschaut. Auf derselben war
eine Befestigung und dabei ein Posten von drei Wachschiffen, damit
die Megarenser weder aus- noch einfahren könnten. Die Befestigung
nahmen sie und schleppten die leeren Dreiruderer mit sich; das übrige
Salamis aber, wo sie ganz unerwartet einfielen, verheerten sie.

XCIII. Avant la séparation de la flotte qui s’était retirée à Corinthe et dans le golfe de Crisa, Cnémus, Brasidas et les autres chefs des Péloponnésiens voulurent, sur les indications des Mégariens, faire au commencement de l’hiver une tentative sur le Pirée, port d’Athènes. Ce port n'était ni gardé, ni fermé, ce qui n’est pas étonnant, vu la grande supériorité de la marine athénienne, Il fut décidé que chaque matelot pren. drait sa rame, la courroie qui sert à l’attacher et son coussin, et qu’il s’en irait par terre de Corinthe à la mer qui regarde Athènes ; qu’arrivés en toute hâte à Mégare, ils tireraient de Nisée, chantier maritime des Mégariens, quarante vaisseaux qui s’y trouvaient, et feraient voile sur-le-champ pour le Pirée. Il n’y avait dans ce port aucune flotte pour le garder ; car on ne supposait pas que des vaisseaux ennemis pussent jamais venir l’attaquer à l’improviste ; une tentative à force ouverte et préparée de longue main ne semblait même pas à redouter aux Athéniens ; ou du moins, si on osait y songer, ils se croyaient assurés de la prévoir.

Les matelots, arrivés de nuit, mirent à flot les vaisseaux de Nisée ; mais ils ne se dirigèrent pas tout d’abord vers le Pirée, comme ils en avaient eu l’intention : retenus par la crainte ou contrariés par le vent, comme on l’a prétendu, ils cinglèrent vers le promontoire de Salamine, en face de Mégare. Là se trouvaient un fort' et une station de trois vaisseaux pour bloquer le port de Mégare. Ils attaquèrent le fort, amenèrent les trirèmes abandonnées, et, se portant inopinément sur tout le territoire de Salamine, ils le ravagèrent.

Avant de licencier l’armée navale qui s’était retirée à Corinthe et dans le golfe de Crisa^némos, Brasidas et les autres généraux péloponésiens voulurent, à l’instigation des Mégariens et au commencement de l’hiver, faire une tentative sur le Pirée, port d’Athènes. Il n’était ni gardé ni fermé; ce qui n’est pas surprenant, vu la grande supériorité de la marine athénienne. U fut résolu que chaque matelot prendrait sa rame, son coussinet, sa courroie ¹ , et se rendrait à pied de Corinthe à la mer qui est du côté d’Athènes; qu’après avoir promptement gagné Mégare, on tirerait de Niséa, chantier de cette ville, quarante vaisseaux qui s’y trouvaient, et qu’on cinglerait immédiatement contre le Pirée. Il n’y avait dans ce port aucune escadre de garde, et l’on était loin de s’attendre à un coup de main si hardi. Les Athéniens n’appréhendaient guère une agression ouverte et préméditée, ou, le cas échéant, ils croyaient qu’ils ne pouvaient manquer de la prévoir.

Leur plan arrêté, les Péloponésiens se mirent aussitôt en marche. Arrivés de nuit à Niséa, ils tirèrent les vaisseaux à la mer. Toutefois, intimidés par le danger et contrariés, dit-on, par le vent, ils cinglèrent, non plus contre le Pirée, selon leur première intention, mais vers le promontoire de Salamine qui fait face à Mégare ; il y avait là un fort avec une station de trois vaisseaux athéniens, qui tenaient cette ville bloquée. Ils assaillirent le fort, emmenèrent les trirèmes vides, et, grâce à leur incursion soudaine, ravagèrent le reste de l’île.

[1] However, before dispersing the fleet which had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, at the beginning of the winter Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders, instigated by the Megarians, wished to make an attempt upon the Peiraeus, the port of Athens; for it was unguarded and unclosed, and quite naturally, since the Athenians were decidedly superior at sea.

[2] And it was determined that each sailor, taking his oar and cushion and oar-loop, should go on foot from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side and hastening to Megara should launch from the docks at Nisaea forty slips of theirs which chanced to be there, and then sail straight for the Peiraeus.

[3] For there was no fleet on guard in the harbour, nor was there any expectation that the enemy would ever suddenly attack it in this way, since they would not dare such a thing openly, and if they should plan it secretly they would not fail to be detected in time.

[4] But once they had determined upon the scheme they set to work immediately. Reaching Nisaea at night they launched the ships and sailed, not now to the Peiraeus as they had intended, since they were appalled by the risk—and a wind, too, is said to have prevented them—but to the promontory of Salamis that looks towards Megara. There was a fort here and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from entering or leaving the harbour of the Megarians. This fort they assaulted, towed away the triremes without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis, falling on the inhabitants unawares.

[1] Before, however, the fleet dispersed which had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Bay, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the rest of the Peloponnesian commanders wished, at the suggestion of the Megareans, to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the port of Athens; which, as was natural from their decided superiority at sea, was left unguarded and open.

[2] It was determined, therefore, that each man should take his oar, and cushion, and ¹ tropoter, and go by land from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens; and that after proceeding as quickly as possible to Megara, they should launch from its port, Nisaea, forty vessels that happened to be there, and sail straightway to Piraeus. For there was neither any fleet keeping guard before it, nor any thought of the enemy ever sailing against it in so sudden a manner;

[3] and as for their venturing to do it openly and deliberately, they supposed that either they would not think of it, or themselves would not fail to be aware beforehand, if they should. Having adopted this resolution, they proceeded immediately [to execute it];

[4] and when they had arrived by night, and launched the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not against Athens as they had intended, for they were afraid of the risk, ( ² some wind or other was also said to have prevented them,) but to the headland of Salamis looking towards Megara; where there was a fort, and a guard of three ships to prevent any thing from being taken in or out of Megara. So they assaulted the fort, and towed off the triremes empty; and making a sudden attack on the rest of Salamis, they laid it waste.

[1] Prius tamen quam classis, quae ad Corinthum et in Crisaeum sinum recesserat, domum dimitterent» Cnemus et Brasidas et ceteri Peloponnesiorum doces in-eunte hieme volebant, a Megarensibus hoc edocti, Piraeeum

Atheniensium portum temptare; erat autem neque custodi tus neque clausus, ut par erat, quum Athenienses classe longe superiores essent

[2] Placebat autem ut singuli naut» cum singulis remis et singulis pulvinis, quos sibi remigantibus substernerent, et cum singulis strupis Corintho pedibus irent ad mare, quod Athenas spectat, atque illinc Megara quam celerrime profecti, deductis ex Nisaea, illorum navali, quadraginta navibus, quae illic erant, confestim in Piraeeum navigarent;

[3] nec enim in eo ulla classis erat, quae pro portu excubias ageret, nec ulla prorsus erat suspicio, ne quando hostes repente sic infesta classe eo venturi essent; quippe neque aperte hoc ausuros per otium, neque, si in animum inducerent, se non praesensuros.

[4] Postquam autem hoc ipsis placitum est, statim etiam discedebant, quumque noctu advenissent, et naves ex Nise* deduxissent, in Piraeeum quidem non amplius navigabant, quemadmodum in animo habebant, periculum formidantes, (quanquam quidam etiam ventus eos impedivisse fertur), sed ad Salaminis promontorium, quod Megara spectat; ibi autem erat propugnaculum triumque navium praesidium, ne quid Megarensibus importaretur, neve quid exportaretur. Hoc propugnaculum adorti sunt et triremes vacuas deduxerunt et ceteram Salaminem ex improviso aggressi diripiebant.

[1] So biete ich denn, obschon ich, wie anfangs gesagt, den mächtigsten Staat vertrete, der eher zum Angriff als zur Abwehr berufen erscheint, in Erwägung der Folgen die Hand zum Nachgeben. Warum auch in thörichter Rachsucht sich selber den grössten Schaden zufügen oder in der Verblendung der Leidenschaft hinsichtlich des Schicksals, dem man nicht gebieten kann, sich ebenso als eigenen Herren dünken, wie in seinen eigenen Entschliessungen, und nicht lieber der Billigkeit sich fügen? Folget nun auch ihr meinem Beispiel, eh' ihr euch dazu vor dem Feinde, nicht mehr vor Landsleuten bequemen müsst. Denn das ist keine Schande, dem eigenen Volksgenossen sich zu fügen, nicht blos der Dorier dem Dorier, oder der Chalcidenser seinem Stammverwandten, sondern wir alle als Nachbarn, als Bewohner der einen, von der Natur umgrenzten Heimat, als Träger des gemeinsamen Namens Sikelioten. Unsere Kriege, wenn es sein soll, müssen wir fortan für uns allein führen, oder auch sie beilegen, wie es uns gemeinsam recht dünkt, wider den Fremdling aber, wenn er kommt, in vernünftiger Eintracht zusammenhalten, so gewiss die Niederlage der Einzelnen dem Ganzen Gefahr bringt; Bundesgenossen aber oder Schiedsrichter sollen nie mehr ins Land gerufen werden. Bei diesem Verfahren werden wir für jetzt Sicilien der frohen Aussicht nicht berauben, der Athener und des Bürgerkrieges mit einemmale los zu werden, und in Zukunft in unabhängiger Freiheit und vom Ausland weniger behelligt darin wohnen.

Cnemo poi, Brasida e gli altri capitani dei PeIoponnesi, prima di licenziar la flotta che si era ritirala a Corinto e nel seno di Crisa, cominciando l' inverno , vollero , secondo che erano stati istruiti dai Megaresi, fare un tentativo contro il Pireo porto degli Ateniesi che era senza presidio e senza sbarre ; nè ciò rechi meraviglia , atteso la gran superiorità degli Ateniesi nella marina. Risolvettero adunque prendendo ciascuno un remo col suo scanno e più-macciolo, drandare per la via di terra da Corinto al mare che guarda Atene ; ed arrivati prestamente a Megara varare da Nisea loro arsenale le quaranta navi che vi erano, e navigare direttamente contro il Pireo, non vi essendo navi a guardarlo. Gli Ateniesi non si aspettavano punto di esser cosi all’improvviso assaliti dalla flotta dei nemici, poiché stimavano eh’ e’ non avrebbero osato di farlo neanche scopertamente e con tutto l’agio, e che, se mai ciò corresse loro nettammo, non sarebbe senza che lo presentissero. Appena risoluto ciò si misero in cammino. Arrivarono di notte a Megara, e varate in mare da Nisea le navi, non andarono più, come avevano disposto, contro al Pireo, impauriti dal pericolo, ed impediti anche, come si racconta , da non so qual vento ; ma bensì contro al promontorio di Salamina che guarda Megara , ove era una fortezza e tre navi di guarnigione, per impedire che nulla entrasse in Megara od uscisse. Diedero l’assalto alla fortezza, e menaron via le tre navi abbandonate dalla ciurma, ed assaltando inaspettatamente il resto di Salamina, presero a saccheggiarla.