Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 2.90

[1] Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor and betime in the morning, having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along their own coast within the gulf, leading the way in the same order as they had lain at anchor, with their right wing.

[2] In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along his own coast likewise within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs and avoid the impression but be inclosed by their galleys on both sides.

[3] Phormio, fearing (as they expected) what might become of the town now without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will and in extreme haste went aboard and sailed along the shore with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him.

[4] The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore (which they most desired), upon one sign given turned suddenly everyone as fast as he could upon the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley.

[5] But of those the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea. The rest they intercepted and, driving them to the shore, sunk them. The men, as many as swam not out, they slew;

[6] and the galleys some they tied to their own and towed them away empty, and one with the men and all in her they had already taken. But the Messenian succours on land, entering the sea with their arms, got aboard of some of them and fighting from the decks recovered them again after they were already towing away.

[1] Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor.

[2] In this wing were placed twenty of their best sailors; so that in the event of Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus , and coasting along thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be able to escape their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be cut off by the vessels in question.

[3] As they expected, Phormio, in alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as he saw them put out, reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore; the Messenian land forces moving along also to support him.

[4] The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in single file, and by this inside the gulf and close in shore as they so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in line at their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole squadron.

[5] The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its sudden movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain as had not swum out of them.

[6] Some of the ships the Peloponnesians lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the men in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the Messenians dashing into the sea with their armor and fighting from the decks that they had boarded.

Solche Worte sprach auch Phormio zur Ermuthigung.
Die Peloponnesier aber, da die Athener nicht nach ihrem Wunsche in
den Meerbusen und die Enge einsegelten, wollten sie auch gegen ihren
Willen hineinbringen lind fuhren deshalb mit der Morgenröthe, je vier
Schiffe in Einer Linie, an ihrer Küste hin, einwärts gegen den
Meerbusen , den rechten Flügel voran, wie sie auch vor Anker gelegen waren.
Aus diesen Flügel hatten sie ihre zwanzig besten Segler gestellt, damit,
— wenn vielleicht Phormio in der Vermuthung, daß sie gegen
Naupaktos segelten, um dieser Stadt zu Hülfe zu kommen, selbst nahe an
ihnen vorübersahren sollte, — die Athener nickt über diesen Flügel
hinauskommen und so ihren Angriff vermeiden könnten, sondern sich von
eben diesen Schiffen müßten einschließen lassen. Wie nun jene erwartet ¹
halten, so fing Phormio, da er sie einwärts segeln sah, an, für den
unbeschützten Ort zu fürchten, ließ widerwillig und in aller Eile seine
Leute sich einschiffen und fuhr an der Küste hin, während das
mefsenische Heer am Lande neben Herzog. Als nun die Peloponnesier sie
Schiff hinter Schiff in Einer Linie auf ihren Flügel zusteuern sahen,
und schon innerhalb des Meerbusens und nahe an der Küste, grade
wie sie es gewünscht hatten, so machten auf ein gegebenes Zeichen alle
Schiffe linksum und fuhren so schnell als möglich grade auf die
Athener los, in der Hoffnung, so sämmtliche Schiffe abzufangen. Von
diesen waren aber die eilf voransegelnden Schiffe bereits über den
Flügel der Peloponnesier hinaus und vor dessen Wendung in die
offenere See gekommen, die andern aber schnitten sie ab, trieben sie
fliehend vor sich her nach dem Strand, richteten sie zu Grunde und
tödteten die Athener auf ihnen, die sich nicht durch Schwimmen retten
konnten. Einige von diesen Schiffen nahmen sie leer in's Schlepptau,
und eines eroberten sie sammt der Bemannung. Nun eilten aber die
Messenier herbei, sprangen in voller Rüstung in's Meer, erstiegen die
Schiffe und vom Verdecke fechtend entrissen sie ihnen einige, die bereits
im Schlepptau gingen.

XC. Telles furent les exhortations de Phormion à ses soldats. Cependant les Péloponnésiens, voyant que les Athéniens ne voulaient pas s'engager dans le golfe ¹ et combattre dans une mer resserrée, résolurent de les y attirer malgré eux. Ils mirent à la voile dès le lever de l’aurore, et, rangés sur quatre vaisseaux de profon- deur, ils voguèrent, comme pour rentrer chez eux ² , vers l’intérieur du golfe, l’aile droite en avant, dans l’ordre où ils avaient mouillé. Vingt vaisseaux d’une marche supérieure avaient pris rang près de cette même aile. Ils avaient espéré que Phormion, dans la pensée qu’ils faisaient voile contre Naupacte, se porterait au secours de cette place en rangeant la côte ; qu’il ne pourrait alors échapper à la division naviguant en dehors de l’aile droite, et serait enveloppé. Ce qu’ils avaient prévu arriva : Phormion, craignant pour Naupacte qui était sans défense, ne les eut pas plutôt vus mettre à la voile, qu’il embarqua, quoiqu’à regret, ses soldats et se mit à longer la côte. L’infanterie messénienne suivait le rivage, prête à le secourir. Quand les Péloponnésiens virent que la flotte athénienne rangeait le rivage à la file et sur un seul vaisseau de front, que déjà elle était dans le golfe et près de la terre, ce qu’ils désiraient par-dessus tout, ils virèrent tout à coup de bord à un signal donné, et se dirigèrent en droite ligne sur les Athéniens de toute la vitesse de leurs navires. Ils comptaient envelopper toute la flotte ; mais les onze vaisseaux qui avaient la tête échappèrent à l’aile droite des Péloponnésiens et à ce mouvement de conversion, en gagnant le large. Les Péloponnésiens atteignirent les autres, les mirent en fuite, les poursuivirent à la côte et les désemparèrent. Ils tuèrent tous les Athéniens qui ne purent se sauver à la nage, se mirent à remorquer les bâtiments abandonnés, et en prirent même un avec son équipage. Mais à ce moment les Messéniens, qui avaient suivi le rivage, se précipitèrent au secours des Athéniens ; ils entrèrent tout armés dans la mer, montèrent sur quelques-uns des bâtiments qu’on remorquait déjà, et, combattant du haut des ponts, ils les arrachèrent à l’ennemi.

C’est ainsi que Phormiôn exhorta ses soldats. Les Pélo-ponésiens, voyant que les Athéniens évitaient de, s’engager dans le golfe et dans une mer étroite, résolurent ie'les y attirer malgré eux. Ils appareillèrent donc au lever de l’aurore •et cinglèrent vers l’intérieur du golfe, dans la direction de leur propre territoire. Les vaisseaux étaient rangés sur quatre de front, l’aile droite en tête, dans leur ordre de mouillage. A cette aile ils avaient placé leurs vingt bâtiments les plus lestes, afin que, si Phormion, dans l’idée qu’on allait attaquer Naupacte, se portait au secours de cette place menacée, les Athéniens ne pussent leur échapper en débordant leur aile, mais qu’ils fussent enveloppés par ces vingt vaisseaux. Ce qu’ils avaient prévu arriva. Phormion, craignant pour la place qui était déserte, ne les eut pas plus tôt aperçus en mer, qu’il se hâta d’embarquer son monde et suivit à regret le rivage, le long duquel marchait comme auxiliaire l’infanterie .des Mes-séniens.

Quand les Péloponésiens voient les ennemis, rangés à la file ■sur un seul vaisseau, serrant la côte et déjà engagés dans le golfe, près de la terre, comme ils le désiraient, soudain, à un signal donné, ils font une conversion à gauche et se dirigent de toute leur vitesse contre la ligne des Athéniens. Ils comptaient l’envelopper tout entière; mais les onze vaisseaux delà tête échappent à cette évolution. Les Péloponésiens atteignent les autres, les acculent à la côte, les brisent et massacrent ceux des matelots qui ne se sauvent pas à la nage. Déjà ils remorquaient un certain nombre de vaisseaux vides, un même avec son équipage, lorsque les Messéniens, accourus le long du bord, entrent tout armés dans la mer, montent sur quelques-uns de ces navires traînés à la remorque, et, combattant du haut des ponts, obligent les ennemis à lâcher prise.

[1] Such were the words with which Phormio also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them in against their will; so they put out to sea at dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep, ¹ sailed along their own shore towards the inner part of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at anchor, ² their right wing leading the way. ³

[2] Upon their right wing they had placed their twenty best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got the impression that their objective was Naupactus and should, following the coast, sail in that direction to its aid, the Athenians might not be able to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, but might be enveloped by these ships.

[3] Now he did just what they expected him to do; when he saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore to support him.

[4] And when the Peloponnesians saw that they were skirting the coast in single file and were already inside the gulf and close. to shore, which was just what they most desired, at one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down with ships in line as fast as each could upon the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships.

[5] But eleven of these, which were in the lead, got past the Peloponnesian wing, as it swung round, and escaped into the open water; but the rest were overtaken, driven ashore as they attempted to escape, and disabled, and all the Athenians on them who did not succeed in swimming ashore were slain.

[6] Some of the ships they made fast to their own and proceeded to tow away empty—though they had already captured one with its crew—but some others, which were already in tow, were taken from them by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, rushed armed as they were into the sea, boarded the ships, and fought from their decks.

[1] Such was the exhortation that Phormio, on his side, addressed to his men. Now when the Athenians did not sail into the narrow part of the gulf to meet them, the Peloponnesians, wishing to lead them on even against their will, weighed in the morning, and having formed their ships in a column four abreast, sailed to their own land towards the inner part of the gulf, with the right wing taking the lead, in which position also they lay at anchor.

[2] In this wing they had placed their twenty best sailers; that if Phormio, supposing them to be sailing against Naupactus, should himself also coast along in that direction to relieve the place, the Athenians might not, by getting outside their wing, escape their advance against them, but that these ships might shut them in.

[3] As they expected, he was alarmed for the place in its unprotected state; and when he saw them under weigh, against his will, and in great haste too, he embarked his crews and sailed along shore;

[4] while the land-forces of the Messenians at the same time came to support him. When the Peloponnesians saw them coasting along in a single file, and already within the gulf and near the shore, (which was just what they wished,) at one signal they suddenly brought their ships round and sailed in a line, as fast as each could, against the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships.

[5] Eleven of them, however, which were taking the lead, escaped the wing of the Peloponnesians and their sudden turn into the open gulf; but the rest they surprised, and drove them on shore, in their attempt to escape, and destroyed them, killing such of the crews as had not swum out of them.

[6] Some of the ships they lashed to their own and began to tow off empty, and one they took men and all; while in the case of some others, the Messenians, coming to their succour, and dashing into the sea with their armour, and boarding them, fought from the decks, and rescued them when they were already being towed off.

[1] Hujusmodi verbis et ipse Phormio suos adhortabatur. Peloponnesii vero, postquam Athenienses non procedebant contra ipsos in sinum et angustias, quum eos invitos in sinum producere vellent, statim primo diluculo instructa classe in ordines, quorum singuli quaternas naves habebant, portu solventes, secundum suam terram introrsum sinum versus navigare coeperunt, dextro cornu proce-dente, sicut etiam in statione erant.

[2] In hoc autem cornu viginti naves maximae celeritatis constituerunt, ut, si forte Phormio, ratus eos Naupactum versus tendere, ipse quoque opem laturus hac praeternavigaret, Athenienses paratam suarum navium impressionem extra suum cornu praetervehendo vitare non possent, sed hae naves eos intercluderent.

[3] Ille vero, id quod illi exspectabant, metuens oppido praesidiis nudato, postquam vidit eos navigantes, invitus, et festinanter militibus in naves impositis oram maritimam legebat; et simul etiam Messeniorum peditatus oram maritimam secutus aderat, ut suis opem ferret.

[4] Peloponnesii vero, quum eos singulis navibus longo agmine praeter navigare et jam intra sinum et prope terram esse vidissent, id quod maxime cupiebant, uno omnibus signo repente dato naves convertentes, proris adversis in Athenienses ferri coeperunt, quanta maxima celeritate quisque poterat, omnesque naves se intercepturos sperabant.

[5] At illarum undecim quidem quae praecedebant, Peloponnesiorum coriiu et conversionem vitantes, in apertum mare fugerunt; sed reliquas assecuti sunt, et fugientes ad terram compulerunt, et corruperunt, militesque Atheniensium, quotquot ex illis non enataverunt, interfecerunt.

[6] Et nonnullas harum navium ex suis religantes vacuas trahebant; unam vero cum ipsis viris ceperunt; nonnullas etiam Messenii, subsidium ferentes, et cum ipsis armis in mare ingressi, conscenderunt, et ea earum fabulatis pugnantes, hostibus, qui eas jam trahebant, eripuerunt.

[1] So biete ich denn, obschon ich, wie anfangs gesagt, den mächtigsten Staat vertrete, der eher zum Angriff als zur Abwehr berufen erscheint, in Erwägung der Folgen die Hand zum Nachgeben. Warum auch in thörichter Rachsucht sich selber den grössten Schaden zufügen oder in der Verblendung der Leidenschaft hinsichtlich des Schicksals, dem man nicht gebieten kann, sich ebenso als eigenen Herren dünken, wie in seinen eigenen Entschliessungen, und nicht lieber der Billigkeit sich fügen? Folget nun auch ihr meinem Beispiel, eh' ihr euch dazu vor dem Feinde, nicht mehr vor Landsleuten bequemen müsst. Denn das ist keine Schande, dem eigenen Volksgenossen sich zu fügen, nicht blos der Dorier dem Dorier, oder der Chalcidenser seinem Stammverwandten, sondern wir alle als Nachbarn, als Bewohner der einen, von der Natur umgrenzten Heimat, als Träger des gemeinsamen Namens Sikelioten. Unsere Kriege, wenn es sein soll, müssen wir fortan für uns allein führen, oder auch sie beilegen, wie es uns gemeinsam recht dünkt, wider den Fremdling aber, wenn er kommt, in vernünftiger Eintracht zusammenhalten, so gewiss die Niederlage der Einzelnen dem Ganzen Gefahr bringt; Bundesgenossen aber oder Schiedsrichter sollen nie mehr ins Land gerufen werden. Bei diesem Verfahren werden wir für jetzt Sicilien der frohen Aussicht nicht berauben, der Athener und des Bürgerkrieges mit einemmale los zu werden, und in Zukunft in unabhängiger Freiheit und vom Ausland weniger behelligt darin wohnen.

Con queste parole anche Formione rincorava la sua gente. Ma i Peloponnesi, al vedere che gli Ateniesi non venivano verso loro nel golfo, e dove è più angusto , volendo condurveli dentro a loro dispetto, sul far dell’aurora presero il largo, £ ordinate le navi con quattro di fronte si avviarono nell’interno del golfo verso il loro territorio. Precedeva lala destra con lo stesso ordine che aveva tenuto sta ndo sull’ancora : avevano però in cotest’ala collocato venti delle navi più spedite, aflfmchè se mai

Formione, credendoli dirizzati contro di Naupatto , si avviasse anch’egli colà per soccorrerlo, la flotta Ateniese non potesse spingersi oltre quell9 ala destra, e scansare coai d' essere investila da loro ; anzi quelle venti navi dovesser chiuderla in mezzo, ripiegandosi sopra di lei. Come Formione vide i nemici partire impauri, conforme ei si aspettavano , per Naupatto rimasto senza presidio, e fatte suo malgrado e frettolosamente montar le navi alla sua gente, scorreva lungo la costa, su la quale lo seguitava la fanteria dei Messeni pronta a soccorrerlo. I Peloponnesi visto gli Ateniesi avanzarsi con le navi schierate una dopo Tal« tra, ed ornai ingolfati (ciò che appunto bramavano), allora fatto un solo segnale voltarono improvvisamente di bordo, e con la maggior celerità che ognuno poteva vogavano di fronte addosso agli Ateuiesi. Speravano essi di poter prendere tutte le navi, ma undici di esse che erano innanzi all'altra, preso il largo, si sottraggono all’ala dei Poloponnesi, e al ripiegarsi su loro delle venti navi. Raggiungono bensì il restante, e spintele a terra mentre fuggivano, le fracassarono, ed uccisero tutta la gente ateniese che non si era salvata a nuoto. Alcune altre restate vuote le legavano alle loro e le rimorchiavano, ed una ne presero entrovi la ciurma. Allora i Messeni accorsero in aiuto, ed entrando armati nel mare salirono sopra alcune, e combattendo di su i banchi, mentre venivano rimorchiate , le riebbero.