Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.122

[1] "We have also many other ways of war, as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue; the building of forts in their territory; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper standeth the firmest, and he that is most passionate oftenest miscarries.

[2] Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings with it no less than manifest servitude, which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus.

[3] For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored, whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own but, claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us.

[4] Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.

[1] We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster.

[2] Let us also reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory between rival neighbors, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens , that is a match for our whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as individual nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have no other end than slavery pure and simple;

[3] a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas ; and in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual states we think it our duty to put down sole rulers.

[4] And we do not know how this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances,—a feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called, not contemptuous but contemptible.

..ES bleiben uns aber auch noch andere Wege der Krieg­ ^{1 2}
sührung: Aufforderung der Bundesgenossen zum Abfall, weil dadurch
gerade ihre Einkünfte geschmälert werden, in denen ihre Kraft besteht;
dann Anlegung von Befestigungen gegen das feindliche Gebiet hin,
und noch manches Andere, was man jetzt nicht voraussehen kann.
Denn der Krieg verläuft nicht nach abgeredeten Plänen, sondern
gestaltet sich meist aus sich selbst heraus nach den zufälligen Umständen,
und wer sich mit ruhiger Klugheit diesen anzupassen bemüht ist, der
ist im Vortheil; wer aber hitzig drein geht, der thut in demselben
Maße sich selbst weh ^5). Aber noch eins müssen wir beherzigen. Wenn
einer oder der andere von uns mit einem gleichstarken Gegner
Gränzstreitigkeiten auszusechten hätte, so ginge das an; nun aber sind die
Athener so stark wie wir alle mit einander, und jedem einzelnen Staat
weit überlegen. Wenn wir also nicht in unserem Bunde, und ebenso
in jeder einzelnen Völkerschaft und jeder einzelnen Stadt ganz
einmüthig zur Abwehr entschlossen sind, sondern Zwiespalt unter uns
herrschen lassen, so werden sie unser ohne alle Mühe Meister werden,
und man muß wissen, — mag es Einem auch schrecklich zu hören
sein, — daß die Niederlage nichts Anderes bringt, als gradezu die-
Knechtschaft. Unter diesen Umständen noch unschlüssig zu reden, ist
eine Schande für den Peloponnes, und eine Schande wäre es, wenn
so viele Staaten von einem einzigen sich mißhandeln ließen. Man
müßte entweder denken, daß solches als gerechte Straft über uns
verhängt sei, oder daß wir es aus Feigheit duldeten, und dann würden
wir entartet scheinen gegen unsere Väter, welche Hellas die Freiheit
wieder gegeben haben, da wir diese nicht einmal für uns selbst zu
erhalten vermögen und die Zwingherrschaft einer einzelnen Stadt
sich befestigen lassen, während wir doch darauf ausgehen, die
Gewaltherrscher in den einzelnen Städten zu stürzen. Und wir sehen nicht,
wie sich ein solches Betragen von den drei unglücklichsten Fehlern
freisprechen läßt, dem Unverstande, der Schwäche und dem Leichtsinn.
Diese Vorwürfe habt ihr nicht zu vermeiden gewußt und seid eben
deßhalb zu dem gelangt, was schon so Viele in Schaden gebracht hat,
zu der eingebildeten Ueberklugheit, deren Namen man in's Gegentheil, ^{3 4 5}
in Unklugheit, verkehrt hat, weil schon Mancher durch sie zu Fall
gekommen ist."

CXXII. « Nous avons encore d’autres moyens à leur opposer dans cette guerre : la défection de leurs alliés, dont la première conséquence est de tarir les revenus, source de leur puissance ; la construction de forteresses sur leur territoire ¹ , et tant d’autres ressources qu’on ne saurait prévoir actuellement. Car la guerre ne suit pas, tant s’en faut, une marche réglée à l’avance ; c’est elle-même qui, le plus souvent, combine ses moyens au gré des circonstances. Y rester maître de soi est le gage le plus sûr du succès ; s’y laisser emporter, c’est s’exposer à plus de revers.

« Songeons, en outre, que si chacun de nous n’avait à contester que sur des limites et contre des ennemis égaux en forces, on pourrait se résigner ; mais aujourd’hui les Athéniens, en état de lutter contre nous tous réunis, sont bien plus forts encore contre chaque ville isolément. Si donc nous ne nous réunissons tous ensemble, si peuples et villes ne se confédèrent dans une même pensée pour la défense commune, isolés, ils nous subjugueront sans peine ; et sachez que la défaite (quelque cruel que ce mot soit à entendre) n’apporterait avec elle rien moins que la servitude. Une pareille supposition, la seule pensée que tant de villes puissent être maltraitées par une seule, est déjà une honte pour le Péloponnèse. Éprouver un pareil sort ne paraîtrait alors que justice ; s’y résigner serait lâcheté. Nous montrerons-nous donc indignes de nos ancêtres ? Ils ont affranchi la Grèce entière ; et nous ne saurions affermir la liberté, même chez nous ! Nous laisserions une ville s’ériger en tyran, nous qui, lorsqu’un seul homme affecte la tyrannie dans un État, nous faisons gloire de le renverser ! Quant à nous, nous ne savons pas comment cette conduite échapperait au triple reproche d’imprévoyance, d’apathie ou d’incurie, trois vices funestes entre tous ; puisque c’est pour ne les avoir pas évités que vous en êtes venus à cette dédaigneuse indifférence qui a déjà causé bien des catastrophes, et qui, pour avoir conduit tant d’hommes à leur perte, a reçu le nom d’aveuglement.

« Nous avons encore d’autres armes à opposer aux Athéniens, par exemple la défection de leurs alliés, excellent moyen de tarir les revenus qui alimentent leur puissance; la construction de forts sur leur territoire, et diverses mesures qu’on ne saurait préciser dès à présent ; car la guerre ne suit pas une marche déterminée; elle se fournit à elle-même des ressources nouvelles d’après les circonstances. L’entreprendre avec calme, c’est se ménager le succès ; s’y jeter tête baissée, c’est courir au-devant des revers.

« S’il ne s’agissait pour nous que de contestations de détail avec nos égaux pour des limites territoriales, on pourrait s’y résigner; mais aujourd’hui nous avons affaire aux Athéniens, qui sont à même de lutter contre nos forces réunies, à plus forte raison contre chacun de nous isolément. Si donc, nations et villes, nous ne concentrons pas contre eux tous les efforts, nous trouvant désunis ils nous terrasseront sans peine. Or, sachez-le bien, quelque dur qu’il soit de l’entendre : pour nous, la défaite c’est l’esclavage. Et quand ce ne serait qu’un simple doute, il suffirait de l’énoncer pour couvrir de confusion le Péloponèse, à la pensée que tant et tant de villes auraient à subir l,e joug d’une seule. Nous semblerions avoir mérité une telle ignominie ou la souffrir par lâcheté. Ce serait nous montrer moins courageux que nos pères, qui affranchirent la Grèce, au lieu que nous n’assurons pas même notre propre liberté. Nous laissons une ville s’ériger en tyran au milieu de nous, et nous avons la prétention de renverser les tyrannies locales! Comment une pareille conduite échapperait-elle au triple et sanglant reproché d’ineptie, de mollesse d’imprévoyance? C’est parce que vous n’avez pas évité ces écueils, que vous vous laissez aller à ce dédain superbe qui a déjà perdu bien des gens, et qui, pour en avoir tant égaré, a changé son nom en celui de démence.

[1] " But we have other ways also of waging war—inducing their allies to revolt, which is the best means of depriving them of the revenues in which their strength consists, the planting of forts in their territory, and all the other measures which one cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources allow; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be safe, while he who loses his temper over it ¹ makes more blunders.
  "

[2] And let us reflect also that, if we individually were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines with an enemy who was no more than our equal, that might be borne; but as the case stands, the Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, unless all of us together, every nation and town, with one accord resist them, they will easily overpower us because we shall be divided. And as to defeat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it be well understood that it brings nothing else than downright slavery.

[3] That such an outcome should even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single states.

[4] We know not how such a course can be acquitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose that, escaping those errors, you have reached that most fatal spirit of proud disdain ² which has ruined so many men that it has taken on a new name, that of despicable folly.

[1] "We have also other ways of carrying on war, such as causing their allies to revolt, (which is the most effectual mode of taking from them the revenues in which they are so strong,) and ¹ raising works to annoy their country; with other things which one could not now foresee. For war least of all things proceeds on definite principles, but adopts most of its contrivances from itself to suit the occasion: in the course of which he that deals with it with good temper is more secure; while he that engages in it with passion makes the greater failure.

[2] Let us reflect also, that if we were severally engaged in [only] quarrels with our equals about boundaries of territory, it might be borne : but as it is, the Athenians are a match for us all together, and still more powerful against single states; so that unless all in a body, and nation by nation, and city by city, with one mind we defend ourselves against them, they will certainly subdue us without trouble, when divided. And as for defeat, though it may be a terrible thing for any one to hear of, let him know that it brings nothing else but downright slavery:

[3] which is disgraceful for the Peloponnese to be even mentioned as contingent, and for so many cities to be ill-treated by one. In that case we should appear either to be justly treated, or to put up with it through cowardice, and to show ourselves inferior to our fathers, who liberated Greece; whereas we do not even secure this liberty for ourselves, but allow a tyrant state to set itself up amongst us, though we think it right to put down monarchs in any one state.

[4] And we do not know how this conduct is cleared of three of the greatest evils, folly, or cowardice, or carelessness. For you certainly have not escaped ² these by betaking yourselves to that contempt of your foes, which has injured far more than any thing else; and which, from ruining so many, has been called by the opposite name of senselessness.

[1] « Adsunt nobis praeterea aliae quoque belli gerendi viae, et sociorum sollicitatio, quae praecipua est eversio redituum, in quibus sita est ipsorum potentia; et aedificatio munitionum, quae illorum agrum oppugnent; et multa alia, quae nemo nunc prospicere possit. Belli enim progressus omnium minime certis legibus fiunt, sed ipsum per se plerumque comminiscitur quae ad quemque eventum commoda sunt; in quo is quidem, qui in eo animo moderato se gerit, tutior existit; is vero, qui in eo animi affectu abripitur , non leviter offendit.

[2] Cogitemus autem, si singulis quidem nostrum cum paribus adversariis de agri finibus esset controversia, ferendum hoc erat; jam vero Athenien ses et adversus nos universos satis virium habent, et adversus singulas civitates etiam potentiores sunt, ut nisi et universi et per nationes et per singulas civitates uno consensu ipsos propulsabimus, divisos nos sine labore iu suam potestatem redigent, et cladem, licet hoc alicui sit grave auditu, sciat tamen nihil aliud, quam servitutem manifeste nobis allaturam;

[3] quod vel dubia oratione commemorare turpe est Peloponneso, et tot urbes ab una vexari. Qua in re aut merito pali aut propter ignaviam haec perferre, et a majoribus, qui Gneciam liberaverunt, degenerare videbi- mur; nos vero ne nobis quidem ipsis hoc stabilimus, sed civitatem quidem inter nos tyrannum fieri sinimus; qut vero singuli in una civitate imperant, de medio tollere volumus.

[4] Nec intelligimii8 quomodo haec tribus maximis vitiis careaot, imprudentia et ignavia et negligenlia. Nec enim ab istis vitiis alieni accessistis ab contemptionem, quae plurimos jam laesit; quae quia inultos in errorem induxit, contrario nomine stultitia est appellata.

[1] Diesen Grundsätzen, die wir von unsern Vätern überkommen und selber stets bewährt erfunden haben, lasst uns nicht ungetreu werden und nicht binnen weniger Stunden über so viel Menschenleben und Eigenthum, über Staatenglück und Ehre einen übereilten Beschluss fassen, sondern uns Zeit nehmen. Wir haben den Vortheil der Macht, um nichts zu versäumen. Nach Athen also sendet wegen Potidäas und wegen der Beschwerden der Bundesgenossen, besonders da sie eine gerichtliche Entscheidung nicht ablehnen. Wer diese anbietet, den hat man kein Recht als bereits Verurtheilten anzugreifen. Aber zugleich rüstet euch auch zum Kriege. Dies ist das Beste, was ihr beschliessen könnt, und wird bei dem Feind am meisten Eindruck machen.

« Abbiamo inoltre altre vie per far la guerra; la ribellione degli alleati, mezzo il più efficace per dimir nuime le rendite in cui consiste il loro potere, l' edificazione di forti che ne minaccino il territorio e tutte le altre cose che ora non si potrebbero prevedere. Conciossiachè la guerra non procede per le vie che sieno esposte in un’ arringa, ma di per sè stessa procura la maggior parte dei compensi secondo le occorrenze : nelle quali, chi la amministra, se si mantenga padrone della propria collera è più sicuro di sostenersi ; mentre chi si lascia condurre dallo sdegno suole ricevere gran crollo. Pur nondimeno consideriamo che se ciascuno di noi avesse contesa pei confini del territorio con nemici di forza eguale , ciò potrebbe tollerarsi : ma nel caso presente , gli Ateniesi forti abbastanza contro noi tutti insieme, lo sarebbero molto più di fronte ad ogni particolar città ; cosi che se popolo per popolo e città per città non ci uniremo concordemente a difenderci , ci soggiogheranno senza fatica , appunto perchè divisi. E la nostra disfatta ( tutto che terribile a rammentare) sappiate dover sicuramente portare non altro che il servaggio, e far si che molte città sieno soggette ad una sola : avvilimento, la cui sola dubitazione in parlandone è un’ infamia pel Peloponneso. Allora o parrebbe meritata la nostra sciagura, o che per codardia la sopportiamo, degeneranti in ciò da'padri nostri che diedero libertà alla Grecia, dove noi non sappiamo mantenerla nemmeno per noi stessi : anzi permettiamo che una sola città ci ponga da tiranna i piè sul collo, mentre pretendiamo sterminare i tiranni che ad una sola comandino. E non ci accorgiamo che cosi procedendo non andiamo esenti da uno di questi tre grandi vituperi , o imprudenza , o dappocaggine, o trascuranza. Kè, stimando di sfuggire coteste tacce, vogliate ricorrere a chiamar ciò dignitosa noncuranza dei nemici, la quale per aver già causato la rovina di molti ha cambiato il suo nome con quello di inconsideratezza.