Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 7.55

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Da die Syrakusaner nun auch zur See einen glänzenden
Sieg erfochten hatten — früher aber hatten sie sich vor den mit
Demotshenes neu angekommenen Schiffen gefürchtet — so. versanken
die Athener jetzt in die tiefste Entmuthigung. Groß war ihre
Enttäuschung, viel größer noch die Reue über den ganzen Kriegszug.
Jetzt nämlich waren sie zum ersten Mal an Staaten gerathen von
derselben Beschaffenheit, nämlich vom Gemeinwesen regiert, wie sie
selber, und die auch Schiffe und Reiterei und sonst großartige Mittel
besaßen. Hier konnten sie nicht durch Umwandlung des
Staatswesens den Zankapfel unter sie werfen, wodurch sie sie sonst; wohl
gewonnen hätten, noch auch waren sie an Kriegsrüstung weit
überlegen, sondern vielmehr meist im Nachtheil geblieben. Und drückte
sie vorher schon Verlegenheit, so war dieß jetzt noch-vielmehr der
Fall, nachdem sie auch zur See geschlagen worden, denn daS hätten
sie nie geglaubt.. , s.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.55.1 focus

[1] γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρᾶς ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ (πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο τὰς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ναῦς ἐπελθούσας) οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος.

[2] πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη ὁμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες, δημοκρατουμέναις τε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις, οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ’ ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ᾧ προσήγοντο ἄν, οὔτ’ ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῷ κρείσσονος, σφαλλόμενοι δὲ τὰ πλείω, τά τε πρὸ αὐτῶν ἠπόρουν, καὶ ἐπειδή γε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκρατήθησαν, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾤοντο, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.55.1 focus

[1] When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their fleet (for they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes), the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of heart. And as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of the voyage.

[2] For having come against these cities, the only ones that were for institution like unto their own and governed by the people as well as themselves, and which had a navy and horses and greatness, seeing they could create no dissension amongst them about change of government to win them that way, nor could subdue it with the greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs, they were then at their wits' end; but now, when they were also vanquished by sea (which they would never have thought), they were much more dejected than ever.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.55.1 focus

[1] The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until now they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and deep, in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and great their disappointment, and greater still their regret for having come on the expedition.

[2] These were the only cities that they had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, under democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of considerable magnitude. They had been unable to divide and bring them over by holding out the prospect of changes in their governments, or to crush them by their great superiority in force, but had failed in most of their attempts, and being already in perplexity, had now been defeated at sea, where defeat could never have been expected, and were thus plunged deeper in embarrassment than ever.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.55 focus

Nach diesem glänzenden Siege, den die Syrakuser, die
sich anfangs vor der mit Demotshenes angekommenen neuen
Flotte gefürchtet, nun auch zur See erfochten hatten, wurden
die Athener völlig mutlos. So groß der Schmerz über den
unerwarteten Verlauf des Krieges war, weit größer noch die
Reue, daß man ihn unternommen. Hier zum erstenmal hatten
sie Städte angegriffen, welche wie sie demokratisch verfaßt und
mit Schiffen, Pferden und sonstigen Mitteln überreichlich ver
sehen waren, Städte, die sie nicht durch die Aussicht auf Ver
fassungsänderungen auf ihre Seite ziehen konnten, und denen
sie auch im Kriege nicht wesentlich überlegen oder auch nur
gewahcsen gewesen waren. Hatten sie schon vorher das Be
denkliche ihrer Lage empfunden, so war das jetzt, nachdem sie,
was sie nimmer geglaubt, auch mit der Flotte geschlagen waren,
noch weit mehr der Fall.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.55 focus

LV. Cette victoire éclatante, surtout une victoire navale, remportée par les Syracusains qu’effrayait jusque-là la nouvelle flotte amenée par Démosthènes, jeta les Athéniens dans le plus complet découragement : la déception était grande, et plus grand encore le regret de l’entreprise. De toutes les villes auxquelles ils avaient fait la guerre jusque-là, celles de Sicile seules avaient mêmes institutions qu’eux, même gouvernement démocratique; elles étaient considérables, possédaient des flottes et de la cavalerie; il ne leur était possible par conséquent ni d’y semer des germes de sédition en vue de quelque révolution qui les leur soumît, ni de compter sur une grande supériorité de forces, puisqu’ils avaient le plus souvent échoué et se trouvaient dans une position critique même avant les derniers événements : aussi la défaite de leur flotte, qu’ils n’auraient pas supposée possible, mit-elle le comble à leur consternation.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.55 focus

Cette victoire éclatante, remportée sur la flotte par les Syracusains, qui jusqu’alors avaient redouté le renfort amené par Démosthène, acheva de plonger les Athéniens dans le découragement. Grand était leur mécompte et plus grand encore le regret de l’expédition. C’était la première fois qu’ils attaquaient des villes semblables à la leur, soumises au même régime démocratique, possédant des vaisseaux, des chevaux, une , popqlation nombreuse. Ils n’avaient pas la ressource d’y susciter des dissensions et des troubles, pour les exploiter à leur profit ; lès moyens d'attaque étaient peu supérieurs à ceux de défense ; enfin ils avaient commis des fautes nombreuses, et leurs embarras s”étaient considérablement augmentés depuis l’échec imprévu qu'ils venaient d’essuyer sur mer. Aussi étaient-ils fort abattus.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.55.1 focus

[1] The victory of the Syracusans having now proved decisive by sea also—for before this they had always been afraid of the new fleet that had come with Demosthenes—the Athenians were in utter despondency. Great had been their miscalculation, and far greater still was their regret at having made the expedition. For of all the cities with which they had gone to war, these alone were at that time similar in character to their own, democratic in constitution like themselves, and strong in ships, cavalry and size.

[2] And so, finding themselves unable either to bring about a change in their form of government,¹ and thus introduce among them that element of discord by which they might have brought them over to the Athenian side, or to subdue them by means of a military force that was greatly superior, and having failed in most of their undertakings, they had even before this been at their wits' end, and now that they had suffered defeat even with their fleet, a thing that they could never have anticipated, they were in far greater perplexity still.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.55.1 focus

[1] When the victory had now been so decisive on the side of the Syracusans, even at sea, (for before this they were afraid of the ships newly come with Demosthenes,) the Athenians were in a state of utter despondency; and great was their disappointment, but far greater still their regret, for having made the expedition. For these were the only states they had hitherto attacked with institutions similar to their own, and living under a democracy like themselves;

[2] possessing, too, ships, and horses, and greatness: and as they were not able either to introduce any change, as regarded their government, to create dissension among them, by which they might have been brought over, nor to effect that by means of their forces, (though ¹ they were far superior,) but had failed in most of their attempts, they were even before this event in perplexity; and after they were defeated even at sea, which they could never have expected, they were far more so still.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.55.1 focus

[1] Quum autem Syracusanis insignis victoria jam etiam de navalibus copiis contigisset (prius enim reformidabant classem, quae cum Demosthene advenerat), Athenienses quidem maximum animi moerorem conceperunt, et vehementer sibi opinione falsi esse videbantur; longe autem magis etiam belli eos poenitebat.

[2] Quod enim illis solis civitatibus bellum jam intulissent, quae iisdem institutis uterentur, et quae populari dominatu, ut et ipsi, regerentur, et quae classem et equitatum et potentiam possiderent, quum etiam facultatem nullam haberent neque mutanda reipublicae forma dissidioque excitando aliquos sibi adjungendi, neque bellico apparatu, quippe quod Uli multo superiores essent, sed quum in plerisque rebus sui conatus infeliciter sibi cederent, ut antea jam inopes erant consilii, ita tunc quidem multo etiam magis, postquam navali quoque proelio superati sunt, quod nunquam putassent.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.55 focus

Ma già per questa insigne vittoria navale de’ Siracusani , che prima temevano delle navi sopraggiunte con Demostene, erano gli Ateniesi del tutto scoraggiati, e grandemente stupiti, ed anche viepiù pentiti di quella spedizione. Imperocché, quantunque avessero portato le armi contro Siracusa, allegati con quelle città che sole ornai usavano i medesimi istituti di loro, e si reggevano a popolo com’essi, ed aveauo navi, cavalli e grandezza ; con tutto ciò uon essendo riusciti a mettere riissima discordia tra i Siracusani, o mediante il cambiamento del governo con che speravano di ridurli in poter loro , o mediante gli apparecchi in che erano superiori ; ed al contrario essendo rimasti frustrati nella maggior parte de’ loro disegni , trovavansi anche di prima nell’esitanza. H quando poi furono vinti colla flotta (cosa che non si sarebbono aspettata), allor daddovero più che mai si persero d’animo.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.55

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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