Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.91

[1] "Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have heard what is the design of the fleet now gone; and which the generals there, as far as they can, will also put in execution. Understand next that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot possibly hold out.

[2] For the Sicilians, though inexpert, if many of them unite may well subsist; but that the Syracusians alone, with their whole power already beaten and withal kept from the use of the sea, should withstand the forces of the Athenians already there is a thing impossible. And if their city should be taken, all Sicily is had, and soon after Italy also;

[3] and the danger from thence which I foretold you would not be long ere it fell upon you. Let no man therefore think that he now consulteth of Sicily only but also of Peloponnesus, unless this be done with speed.

[4] Let the army you send be of such as being aboard may row and landing presently be armed; and (which I think more profitable than the army itself) send a Spartan for commander, both to train the soldiers already there and to compel unto it such as refuse. For thus will your present friends be the more encouraged, and such as be doubtful come to you with the more assurance. It were also good to make war more openly upon them here, that the Syracusians, seeing your care, may the rather hold out, and the Athenians be less able to send supply to their army.

[5] You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in the territory of Athens, a thing which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for the only evil they have not yet tasted in this war.

[6] And the way to hurt an enemy most is to know certainly what he most feareth and to bring the same upon him. For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most as having the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As for the commodities which yourselves shall reap and deprive the enemy of by so fortifying, letting much pass, I will sum you up the principal. Whatsoever the territory is furnished withal will come most of it unto you, partly taken and partly of its own accord.

[7] The revenue of the silver mines in Laurium and whatsoever other profit they have from their land or from their courts of justice will presently be lost; and, which is worse, their confederates will be remiss in bringing in their revenue and will care little for the Athenians if they believe once that you follow the war to the utmost. That any of these things be put in act speedily and earnestly, men of Lacedaemon, it resteth only in yourselves; for I am confident, and I think I err not, that all these things are possible to be done.

[1] You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from the man who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the remaining generals will, if they can, carry these out just the same. But that the states in Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, I will now show.

[2] Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience, might even now be saved if their forces were united, the Syracusans alone, beaten already in one battle with all their people and blockaded from the sea, will be unable to withstand the Athenian armament that is now there.

[3] But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy immediately afterwards; and the danger which I just now spoke of from that quarter will before long be upon you.

[4] None need therefore fancy that Sicily only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily do as I tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall be able to row their ships themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; and what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan as commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to compel recusants to serve. The friends that you have already will thus become more confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to join you.

[5] Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that the Syracusans seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into their resistance, and that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their armament.

[6] You must fortify Decelea in Attica , the blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that they think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points and fears accordingly.

[7] The fortification in question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium , of their present gains from their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens , and see you addressing yourselves with vigour to the war.

„Damit habt ihr nun von jemand, der genau Bescheid
weiß, gehört, worauf es bei dem jetzt unternommenen Zuge
unserseits abgesehen war, und die jetzt noch in Sizilien befind­
lichen Feldherren werden, soweit sie können, dasselbe Ziel ver­
folgen. Nun aber will ich euch auch sagen, daß Sizilien
verloren ist, wenn ihr ihm nicht zu Hilfe kommt. Denn die
dortigen Griechen verstehen sich nicht genug auf den Krieg;
immerhin würden sie sich auch jetzt vielleicht noch behaupten
können, wenn sie alle zusammenhielten. Allein aber werden
die Syrakuser, die bereits mit ihrem ganzen Heere geschlagen
und nun auch durch die Flotte von der See abgeschnitten sind,
nicht imstande sein, der Macht, womit die Athener dort auf­
treten, zu widerstehen. Und wenn diese Stadt genommen ist,
so haben sie ganz Sizilien und damit ohne weiteres auch
Italien, und die euch von dorther drohende Gefahr, von der
ihr soeben gehört, würde nicht lange auf sich warten lassen.
Man glaube also ja nicht, daß es sich jetzt nur um Sizilien
handelt; es handelt sich auch um den Peloponnes, wenn ihr
nicht unverzüglich Truppen hinüberschickt, die selbst den Ruder­
dienst an Bord versehen und dann gleich gegen den Feind
geführt werden können, und was ich noch für nützlicher als
Truppen halte, einen Spartaner als Feldherrn, um Ordnung
in die schon eingestellte Mannschaft zu bringen und die Wider­
spenstigen zum Dienst zu zwingen. Denn dann werden eure
jetzigen Freunde dort um so mutiger werden und die noch
Unschlüssigen sich um so unbedenklicher für euch erklären. Zu
gleicher Zeit müßt ihr hier den Krieg nachdrücklich wieder
aufnehmen, damit die Syrakuser sehen, daß es euch Ernst
damit ist, und um so besser standhalten, die Athener aber ihrem
Heere dort keine Verstärkungen mehr schicken können. Weiter
aber müßt ihr Dekeleia in Attika befestigen, was die Athener
schon immer am meisten gefürchtet haben, und was ihrer
Meinung nach das einzige ist, womit man es im Laufe des
Krieges gegen sie noch nicht versucht hat. Auf einen Erfolg
dem Feinde gegenüber wird man wohl immer am sichersten
rechnen können, wenn man ihn an der Stelle zu treffen ver­
steht, von der man merkt und aus guter Quelle weiß, daß er
es dort am meisten fürchtet. Denn natürlich weiß jeder selbst
am besten, wo ihn der Schuh drückt. Die Vorteile, die ihr
von dieser Befestigung haben werdet, und die Ungelegenheiten,
die ihr euren Gegnern dadurch bereiten könnt, will ich euch,
ohne auf alles einzelne einzugehen, wenigstens der Hauptsache
nach kurz andeuten. Was das Land an Vorräten und Hilfs­
mitteln bietet, werdet ihr euch alles aneignen können, oder es
wird euch von selbst zufallen. Die Einkünfte aus den Silber­
bergwerken von Laurion und die Einnahmen, die sie jetzt von
Ländereien und Gerichten beziehen, werden sogleich ausbleiben,
besonders aber werden die Steuern, welche die Bundesgenossen
ihnen zu zahlen haben, weniger einbringen, da diese, sobald sie
sich überzeugen, daß ihr den Krieg jetzt mit Nachdruck führt,
es daran fehlen lassen werden.

XCI. « Vous venez d’entendre, et de la bouche d’un homme parfaitement informé, la vérité sur l’expédition de Sicile : tels étaient nos desseins, et les généraux qui restent en poursuivront l’exécution, s’ils le peuvent. Maintenant, sachez bien que la Sicile ne pourra tenir si vous n’y envoyez des secours. Sans doute les Siciliens, tout inexpérimentés qu’ils sont, pourraient, aujourd’hui encore, s’ils se réunissaient, avoir l’avantage; mais les Syracusains isolés, vaincus déjà' avec toutes leurs forces dans un combat, bloqués en outre par une flotte, seront incapables de tenir contre l’appareil militaire que les Athéniens ont maintenant en Sicile. Et si cette seule ville est prise, toute la Sicile suivra, bientôt même l’ltalie; et alors le danger dont j’ai parlé tout à l’heure, comme devant venir de ce côté, ne tardera pas à fondre sur vous.

Qu’on ne s’imagine donc pas délibérer seulement sur la Sicile; le Péloponnèse aussi est en cause, si vous ne prenez en toute hâte les mesures suivantes; embarquez pour la Sicile une armée dont les soldats, rameurs pendant la traversée, seront aussitôt transformés en hoplites. Envoyez-y aussi, pour commander,— cela me semble bien plus utile qu’une armée, —un Spartiate qui discipline les troupes déjà formées, et force au service ceux qui s’y refusent. Par là vous donnerez plus de confiance aux amis que vous avez déjà, et ceux qui hésitent viendront plus hardiment à vous. En même temps il faut faire ici une guerre plus déclarée, afin que les Syracusains, sachant que vous vous intéressez à eux, fassent une plus vigoureuse résistance et que les Athéniens soient moins en état d’envoyer aux leurs d’autres secours. Il faut aussi fortifier Décélie ¹ en Attique : c’est là l’éternelle appréhension des Athéniens; c’est, dans leur pensée, le seul des maux de la guerre qu’ils n’aient pas éprouvé. Or, le moyen le plus sûr de nuire à ses ennemis est, quand on a le secret de leurs craintes, de leur faire le mal qu’on sait qu’ils redoutent le plus; car il est naturel que chacun sache fort exactement ce qu’il a personnellement le plus à craindre. Quant aux avantages que vous retirerez de cette position fortifiée et à ceux dont vous priverez vos ennemis, j’en passe bon nombre sous silence, pour signaler rapidement les principaux : presque tout ce qui garnit le pays ² vous reviendra de gré ou de force; du même coup vous enlèverez aux Athéniens les revenus des mines d’argent de Lauriura et ceux qu’ils tirent maintenant des terres ³ et des tribunaux ⁴ ; mais par- ^{5 6 7 8} dessus tout les tributs des alliés leur arriveront moins abondants, parce que ceux-ci se négligeront lorsqu’ils penseront que désormais vous poussez la guerre à outrance.

« Telle est, je le sais mieux que personne, la pensée qui a présidé à notre expédition. Les généraux qui restent ne négligeront rien pour en poursuivre l’accomplissement. Apprenez maintenant que , sans vos secours, la Sicile doit infailliblement succomber.

« Les Siciliens manquent d’expérience. S’ils se coalisaient, ils pourraient encore se défendre ; mais les Syracusains isolés, déjà vaincus en corps de nation, bloqués d’ailleurs par notre flotte, sont hors d’état de résister longtemps. Or, Syracuse prise, la Sicile est perdue et l’Italie suivra de près. Dans ce cas, le danger que je vous ai signalé ne tardera pas à vous atteindre.

« Ce n’est donc pas seulement de la Sicile , c’est du Péloponèse qu’il s’agit, si vous ne prenez immédiatement les mesures que je vais indiquer. Envoyez en Sicile des soldats qui, après avoir manié la rame pendant la traversée, feront le service d’hoplites aussitôt après leur débarquement. Joignez-y — ce que j’estime plus essentiel qu’une armée — un commandant Spartiate, chargé d’organiser les hommes présents et de contraindre les retardataires. Par là vous doublerez les forces de vos amis, et vous entraînerez les tièdes.

« Ce n’est pas tout : il faut faire ici une guerre plus décidée, afin que les Syracusains, vous voyant prendre intérêt à eux, résistent avec plus d'énergie, et que les Athéniens soient moins en état d’envoyer des renforts à leur armée.

« Il faut aussi fortifier Décélie en Attique. C’est là l'éternelle appréhension des Athéniens; c'est, dans leur pensée, le seul des maux de la guerre qui leur ait été jusqu’ici épargné. Or le plus sûr moyen de nuire à ses ennemis, une fois qu'on a le secret de leurOrainte, c’est d’employer contre eux l’arme qu'ils redoutent le plus; car chacun est le meilleur juge des dangers qui le menacent. Quant aux avantages que vous recueillerez de cette occupation et aux dommages qu’elle occasionnera à vos adversaires, il suffit de les indiquer. Toutes les richesses du pays tomberont, de gré ou de force, entre vos mains. Vous leur enlèverez du même coup les revenus des mines de Lau-rion ¹ ceux qu’ils retirent actuellement de leurs terres et des tribunaux ² ; enfin les alliés leur fourniront moins de subsides, parce qu’ils se relâcheront en vous voyant pousser la guerre avec vigueur.

[1] "That such were the objects of the expedition which has sailed, you have heard now from one who knows most accurately what we purposed; and the rest of the generals will, if they can, carry out these plans without change. But that the people over there cannot hold out unless you aid them, let me now show you.

[2] The Siceliots have indeed less military experience than the Athenians, yet if they were united in one body they could, even as it is, gain the victory. But the Syracusans alone, being already worsted in battle with their full force and at the same time hemmed in at sea, will be unable to withstand the army of the Athenians now there.

[3] And if this city shall be taken, all Sicily is theirs, and so presently will Italy be also; nor will it be long before the danger which I have just now predicted from that quarter would fall upon you.

[4] Therefore let nobody think that you are deliberating about Sicily only, but about the Peloponnesus also, unless you do quickly the following things: send thither by ship such a body of troops as, after working their own passage at the oar, can at once serve as hoplites; also what I consider even more indispensable than the army, a Spartan as commander, that he may organize the forces already present and press into service those that are unwilling. For in this way the friends you have already will be encouraged, and those who are in doubt will come over with less misgiving.

[5] And the war here you must at the same time prosecute more openly, in order that the Syracusans, convinced that you are really concerned, may offer greater resistance, and the Athenians be less able to send reinforcements to their own troops.

[6] You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in Attica, ¹ the very thing the Athenians are always most in dread of and reckon the only peril of which they have not made full trial in this war. And the surest way in which anyone can hurt his enemies is this: acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them that which he perceives they most fear; for it is natural that every man should have the most accurate knowledge of his own dangers and should fear them accordingly.

[7] But as to the benefits which you yourselves will gain by this menacing stronghold ² and will prevent your opponents from obtaining, I will pass over many and sum up only the most important. Whatever their country is stocked with will for the most part come into your hands, either by capture or by voluntary surrender. ³ And the revenues of the Laureian silver mines and whatever profits they now derive from their land and from their courts, ⁴ they will at once be deprived of, and above all of the tribute from their allies, that would be less regularly brought in; for these, convinced that the war is now being prosecuted on your part with all your might, will take their obligations lightly.

[1] "Thus, then, concerning the expedition which has now sailed, you have heard its objects from the man who knows with the greatest accuracy what we purposed by it: and the generals who still remain there will, if they are able, carry them out in the same way. But that the people there will not escape their attack, unless you succour them, you must now learn.

[2] The Siceliots indeed, although untrained, might still even now gain the victory, if united in one body. But the Syracusans alone, defeated as they have already been in battle with all their forces, and hemmed in by sea at the same time, will be unable to hold out against the Athenian armament now there.

[3] And if that city is taken, the whole of Sicily also is in their possession, and Italy, too, straightway; and the danger which I just now mentioned as impending from that quarter, would in no long time fall upon you. Let no one then think that he is deliberating about Sicily alone, but about the Peloponnese also, unless you quickly adopt these measures;

[4] unless, I mean, you send thither on board ship such a body of troops, as, after working their own passage, shall immediately act as heavy infantry; and also, what I consider to be still more serviceable than troops, a Spartan as commander, both to discipline their present forces, and to compel those who are unwilling to serve. For so the friends you already have will feel the greater confidence, and those who are doubting between the two sides will more fearlessly join yours. You must also carry on hostilities here in a more decisive manner; that the Syracusans, convinced that you take an interest in them, may offer the greater resistance;

[5] and that the Athenians may the less easily send reinforcements to their troops. And for that purpose you must fortify Decelea, in Attica; a blow of which the Athenians have always been most afraid, and the only one which they think they have not experienced in the present war.

[6] And in that way would one most surely hurt his enemies, if, acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them those things which he knows them to fear most: for it is but reasonable that every people should know most accurately its own dangers, and fear them accordingly. But with regard to the difficulties which, while you benefit yourselves, you will create for your opponents by thus fortifying the place, though I pass over many, I will briefly mention the chief.

[7] Whatever then the country is stocked with, the greater part will come to you, either through being captured, or ¹ of their own accord. They will also at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, with the advantages they now derive from their land and their ² courts of justice; but, especially, of the revenue from the allies, which will be less regularly paid by them, when they consider that the war on your part is now vigorously prosecuted, and so think lightly of them. To have each of these things done with greater speed and spirit rests with you, Lacedaemonians; for that they are possible I am very confident, and I do not think that I shall be proved to have been mistaken.

[1] « Quae igilur fuerint nostra consilia de dassc nunc profecta, ex homine, qui res istas exploratissimas habet, audistis, et qui reliqui sunt duces, pariter hac, si possint, peragent. Res autem illas salvas non fore, nisi succurratis, jam dis: ite.

[2] Sicilienses enim sunt illi quidem mimis periti, sed tamen, si frequentes in unum coeant, nunc etiam superstites esse poterunt. Syracusani vero sotietptoeltocuin universis copiis jam victi et classe simul obsessi non poterunt Atheniensium apparatui, qui nunc fllic est, resistere.

[3] Et haec urbs si capietur, tenetur omnis etiam Sicilia, et mox etiam Italia; atque periculum, quod illinc vobis impendere mod i praedixi, non multo post in vos irruat.

[4] Quare nemo dc Sicilia tantum, sed etiam de Peloponneso se consultare putet, nisi haec celeriter fodetis, scilicet et exercitum in naves impositum illoe mittetis, ita ut qui ipsi remigantes transvecti fuerint, deinde statim milites sint, et, quod ipso exercitu longe utilius esse puto, virum Spartanum imperatorem, ut et eoe, qui adsunt, ordine componat, et illos, qui adesse recusant, ad officium compellat; ita enim et qui vobis amici sunt, majorem habebunt fiduciam, et qui animo sunt dubio, minus timide accedent.

[5] Et quod attinet ad hujus regionis loca, oportet vos simul hinc apertius bellum inferre, ut et Syracusani existimantes, vos de se solicilos esae, acrius resistant, et Athenienses aliud auxilium suis in Siciliam minus mittant.

[6] Munire autem oportet Deceleam, que est in Attica, quod Athenienses praeter cetera perpetuo formidant et hoc solum contra se in bello non temptatum esse putent. Et sane quis ita certissimis damnis hostes afficiat, si qua· maxime ipsos formidare senserit, haec ipse plane comperta habens iis inferat ;. par est enim optime sua quemque ipsum mala, unde pcncolum aliquod impendeat, oognoscere ac formidare.

[7] Commoda autem, quae ex hac munitione exstructa vos ipsi perdpietis, et quibus adversarios fnir prohibebitis, ut multa omittam, ea, qua; maxima eant, sum-matim dicam. Nam et ea, quibus ipsorum ager est instructus, pleraque partim capta, partim sua sponte in vestram potestatem venient, et proventibus, quos percipiunt ex argenti secturis, quao sunt in Laurio monte, et commodis, qusecumque nunc ex agro judiciisque capiunt, statim privabuntur, maxime quum a sociis vectigalia non afferentur, qui existimantes, bellum a vobis acriter jam. administrari, illos contemnent.

« Voi avete inteso per la bocca di tale clic ne ha la più minuta contezza quali fossero le nostre intenzioni circa la flotta andata ora in Sicilia ; e gli altri capitani restativi le metteranno ad effetto , potendo, come s’io vi fossi. State ora a sentire che senza il vostro soccorso le cose di là non saran salve. I Siciliani certamente , quanto che sieuo poco esperti, pure accogliendosi insieme potrebbero anche adesso scamparla. Ma i Siracusani da sè soli, e già vinti con tutte le loro genti, e al tempo stesso ristretti dalle navi, saranno inabili a resistere all’armata ateniese di là; e se questa città sarà presa, ecco vinta tutta Sicilia, e subito ancora l’Italia. E quel pericolo, che io testé vi prediceva da quella parte , non starà molto a cadervi addosso. Laonde s’immagini l'iascuu di voi di deliberare non solo sulla Sicilia , ma anche sul Peloponneso, se non farete prontamente quanto sono per dirvi. Manderete colà sulle navi truppe tali che facendo nel cammino il servizio di remiganti sieno poi atte a far quello di milizia grave ; e (quel eh’ io credo anche più utile dell’armata stessa) un generale spartano idoneo a ridurre al buon ordine quelle genti che hanno prese le anni, ed a costringervi quelle che si ricusino. In questo modo quei che vi sono amici s’incoraggiranno maggiormente, e gl' irresoluti più francamente vi si accosteranno. Nel medesimo tempo bisogna romper qui la guerra più scopertamente, a volere che i Siracusani veggano che vi date cura di loro, e resistano con più calore ; e così gli

Ateniesi sieno meno in grado di mandar nuovo soccorso all’esercito loro. Fa d’uopo inoltre fortificare Decelìa nell’Attica , di che soprattutto temono sempre gli Ateniesi ; e tra i mali della guerra questo solo pensano non avere assaggiato. Ora il mezzo più sicuro per nuocere a’ nemici è questo : che quando uno s’accorga di ciò che principalmente temono , di quello appunto s' informi con certezza, e lo porti loro in sul viso. Imperocché è da credere che quel timore nasca dal conoscer bene ognuno di essi dove sta il suo male. E per non parlare di tutti i vantaggi che con quella fortificazione procaccerete a voi stessi ed impedirete a’ nemici, io voglio ridurvi insomma i più rilevanti. Primieramente il più di quelle cose onde è fornito il dominio ateniese verrà a voi, parte preso a forza, parte spontaneo. Dipoi saranno loro tolte subito l' entrate delle miniere d’argento che sono in Laureo, e tutti i vantaggi che presentemente ricavano dalla campagna e dai tribunali. In ultimo (e questo è il più importante) riceveranno meno esattamente le rendite, i quali stimando che voi vigorosamente guerreggiate gli Ateniesi dagli alleati, metteranno dall’ un de’ lati ogni rispetto per essi.