Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 2.63

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„Es versteht sich aber von selbst, daß ihr die Ehre, welche
unserer Stadt aus der Herrschaft erwächst, und mit der ihr alle
großthut, nicht im Stiche lassen dürfet, und keine Mühe scheuen, wenn
ihr nicht überhaupt das Streben nach Ehre ausgeben wollet. Auch
deutet nicht, daß es bei diesem Kampfe sich nur um Eines drehe, eigene
Abhängigkeit oder Unabhängigkeit, — nein, es handelt sich auch um den
Verlust der Herrschaft über Andere und um die Gefahren, die der
Haß mit sich bringt, welchen unsere Herrschaft uns zugezogen hat; und
diese aufzugeben, dazu ist jetzt gar keine Zeit mehr, wenn es auch
vielleicht unter den gegenwärtigen Umständen Einer aus Furcht und
aus biedermännischer Liebe zur Unthätigkeit thun möchte. Denn eure
Herrschaft ist bereits eine Zwangsherrschaft geworden, und solche an
sich zu reißen gilt zwar für Unrecht, allein sie aufzugeben ist gefahrvoll.
Dergleichen Leute, wenn sie irgendwo nach ihrer Weise ein freies
Staatswesen hätten und ihre Mitbürger mit ihren Meinungen ansteckten,
sollten ihren Staat bald zu Grunde gerichtet haben! Denn solche
Unthätigkeit kann die Freiheit des Staates nicht erhalten, wenn nicht eine
rührige Thatkraft daneben steht; und nicht in einem herrshcenden
Staate, sondern in einem unterworfenen ist gefahrlose Dienstbarkeit
von Nutzen."

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 2.63.1 focus

[1] τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν· μηδὲ νομίσαι περὶ ἑνὸς μόνου, δουλείας ἀντ’ ἐλευθερίας, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχῆς στερήσεως καὶ κινδύνου ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀπήχθεσθε.

[2] ἧς οὐδ’ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον.

[3] τάχιστ’ ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἴ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκήσειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν.

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 2.63.1 focus

[1] "You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the city hath gotten for her dominion in which you all triumph, and either not decline the pains or not also pursue the honour. And you must not think the question is now of your liberty and servitude only. Besides the loss of your rule over others, you must stand the danger you have contracted by offence given in the administration of it.

[2] Nor can you now give it over (if any fearing at this present that that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention of not to meddle hereafter), for already your government is in the nature of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up and unsafe to lay down.

[3] And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it or lived in a free city by themselves, would quickly overthrow it. For the quiet life can never be preserved if it be not ranged with the active life, nor is it a life conducible to a city that reigneth but to a subject city that it may safely serve.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 2.63.1 focus

[1] Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honors. You should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise.

[2] Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamored of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe.

[3] And men of these retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an unmolested servitude.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 2.63 focus

„Für die Ehre, welche unsere Stadt ihrer Machtstellung
verdankt, auf die ihr euch so viel zugute tut, müßt ihr natür
lich alle Kraft einsetzen und keine Beshcwerden scheuen, solange
ihr überhaupt noch Wert auf Ehre legt. Glaubt nicht, daß
es sich in diesem Kampfe einzig und allein um Knechtschaft
oder Freiheit handelt; es handelt sich auch um den Verlust
eurer Herrschaft und um die gefährlichen Folgen deS Hasses,
den ihr euch durch eure Herrschaft zugezogen habt. Und diese
aufzugeben, seid ihr gar nicht mehr in der Lage, sollte auch
dieser oder jener dunkle Ehrenmann unter den jetzigen Um
ständen um des lieben Friedens willen dazu raten. Denn sie
ist längst Gewaltherrschaft geworden, die an sich zu reißen
unrecht sein mag, aber wieder aufzugeben gefährlich ist. Solche
Schwachköpfe mit ihrem guten Rat würden ein Gemeinwesen
bald genug zugrunde richten, wenn sie in die Lage kämen, es
auf ihre Weise zu regieren. Denn mit Friedensliebe um jeden
Preis, der keine Tatkraft zur Seite steht, kommt man nicht durch;
jedenfalls schickt sie sich nicht für eine Großmacht, sondern
höchstens für einen Vasallenstaat, wo man nichts weiter ver
langt als ein knechtisches Stilleben.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 2.63 focus

LXIII. « Ce respect qu’inspire notre ville, grâce à l'empire qu’elle exerce, et dont vous êtes tous si fiers, vous devez le lui garantir par vos efforts ; vous devez ou vous soumettre aux fatigues, ou renoncer aux honneurs. Ne croyez pas d’ailleurs qu’une seule chose soit en cause, l’esclavage ou la liberté. Il s’agit de la perte de l'empire et de tous les dangers qu’entraînent les haines contractées dans l’exercice du commandement. Vous en dessaisir n’est plus désormais en votre pouvoir : si quelqu'un, préoccupé pour le moment de ces haines, espère que vous vous ferez un mérite de votre renoncement aux affaires, il se trompe ; car il en est aujourd'hui de votre domination comme de la tyrannie· ; s’en emparer semble injuste ; mais s'en dessaisir est périlleux. Ceux qui donnent de semblables conseils auraient bientôt perdu et l’État qui consentirait à les écouter, et eux-mêmes, à supposer qu’ils vécussent quelque part libres et indépendants. Car pour conserver le repos il faut y associer l’énergie. L’inaction ne convient point à une ville qui commande ; un État soumis à des maîtres trouve seul dans cet te inaction la garantie d’un paisible esclavage.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 2.63 focus

« Ce respect universel que notre ville doit à son empire et dont vous êtes si glorieux, votre devoir est de le maintenir à tout prix, et de ne pas renoncer aux fatigues, à moins de renoncer aussi aux honneurs. Ne croyez pas que la question soit uniquement de savoir si nous conserverons ou non la liberté.. Il y a plus : il s’agit de la perte de votre prééminence ; il s’agit des dangers qu’ont attirés sur vous les haines encourues durant votre domination. Or il ne vous est plus possible d’abdiquer, lors même que, par crainte et par amour du repos, vous seriez aujourd’hui portés à cet acte d’héroïsme. Il en est de cette domination comme de la tyrannie, dont il est injuste de s’emparer et dangereux de se dessaisir. Ceux qui vous le conseillent, s’ils étaient écoutés, auraient bientôt conduit l’État à sa ruine, en supposant même qu’ils fussent capables de maintenir la liberté. Le repos n’est assuré qu’à la condition de s’allier à l’énergie : désastreux pour un État qui commande, il convient à un peuple sujet, auquel il garantit un paisible esclavage.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 2.63.1 focus

[1] " You may reasonably be expected, moreover, to support the dignity which the state has attained through empire—a dignity in which you all take pride—and not to avoid its burdens, unless you resign its honours also. Nor must you think that you are fighting for the simple issue of slavery or freedom; on the contrary, loss of empire is also involved and danger from the hatred incurred in your sway.

[2] From this empire, however, it is too late for you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, through fear and shrinking from action does indeed seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is dangerous to let go.

[3] Men like these would soon ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to their views, or if they should settle in some other land and have an independent state all to themselves; for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men of action; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, but only in a vassal state, to seek safety by submission.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 2.63.1 focus

[1] "It is but fair, too, that you should sustain the dignity of the state derived from its sovereignty, on which you all pride yourselves; and that either you should not shrink from its labours, or else should lay no claim to its honours either. Nor should you suppose that you are struggling to escape one evil only, slavery instead of freedom; but to avoid loss of dominion also, and danger from the animosities which you lave incurred in your exercise of that dominion.

[2] And from this it is no longer possible for you to retire; if through fear at the present time any one is for so playing the honest man in quiet. For you now hold it as a tyranny, which it seems wrong to have assumed, but dangerous to give up.

[3] And men with these views would very quickly ruin the state, whether they persuaded others [to adopt the same], or even lived any where independently by themselves; for quietness is not a safe principle, unless ranged with activity; nor is it for the interest of a sovereign state, but of a subject one, that it may live in safe slavery.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 2.63.1 focus

[1] « Decet vos dignitati, quam respublica propter imperium habet, qua vos omnes gloriamini, opem ferre et aut labores non subterfugere, aut ne honores quidem consectari; neque existimare, de una tantum re, de libertate aut servitute, certamen esse, sed et de imperio amittendo, et de periculo ob offensas in imperio contractas impendente.

[2] A quo ne discedere quidem vobis amplius licet, si quis forte vestrum in hoc quoque propter rerum praesentium terrorem negotia detrectando virum bonum agit; nam ut tyranni-dem hoc imperium jam tenetis, quod occupare quidem videtur injustum, deponere vero periculosum.

[3] Atque celerrime hujusmodi homines et si ceteris persuaserint, urbem perdant, et si forle inter se alicubi liberi civitatem incolant; otii enim studium, nisi*cum agendi studio sit conjunctum, servari non potest, neque id in civitate principatum obtinente utile est, sed in subdita, ad agendam tutam servitutem.

Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides First1KGreek (Thucydides. Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides. Gürsching, Heinrich, translator. Augsburg: Wirth, 1856.) — 2.63.1 focus

[1] Muss also dies Beides, die ungewisse Furcht vor dieser dunkeln Macht und die bereits drohende Gefahr durch die Anwesenheit der Athener, uns bange machen, und können wir solchen Hindernissen gegenüber vollkommen über das Zurückbleiben hinter unsem etwaigen Erwartungen und Entwürfen uns trösten, wohlan so lasset uns die lauernden Feinde aus dem Lande schicken und unter uns wo möglich einen ewigen Frieden, zum wenigsten aber einen möglichst langen Stillstand schliessen und unsern Bruderzwist auf die Zukunft vertagen. Mit einem Worte: folget ihr mir, dann werden unsere Städte insgesamt der Freiheit gemessen, die uns in den Stand setzt, als ein unabhängiges Volk Wohlthaten oder Anfeindungen gleich sehr nach Gebühr zu erwidern. Hören wir aber nicht, sondern unterwerfen uns Fremden, dann ist es zu spät mit Befreiungsversuchen¹ , dann ist, selbst wenn uns alles nach Wunsch geht, Verbrüderung mit dem Erbfeind und ein Zustand unnatürlicher Feindschaft unwiderruflich unser Loos.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 2.63 focus

« A voi dunque è richiesto che senza fiiggtr le fatiche, o cooperiate all' onoranza onde pel suo impero è fregiata la Repubblica (lo che è pur decoro di ognuno di voi ), ovvero che nemmeno pretendiate a siffatta onoranza. Nè dovete credere d’avere a combattere soltanto per non cambiare la libertà in servaggio ; ma di più per non perder l’impero, e per schifare il pericolo degli odii contratti quando lo tenevate. Nè ora potete altramente receder da quello ; sebbene vi sia chi preso da questo timore nel caso presente, fa consistere la virtù di buon cittadino in un inerte riposo. L' impero che tenete è oramai come un’ assoluta monarchia; e per quanto paia ingiusto l’averlo preso, è pericoloso il dimetterlo. Or gente di tal fatta , se riuscisse ad insinuare negli altri i propri sentimenti, e se avesse sopra di sè T intero governo della Repubblica , non ad altro varrebbe che a perderla prontamente : poiché tranquillità non dura se non congiunta con attività ; nè conviensi a città dominante, ma a suddita , per vivere in sicura schiavitù.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides Book 2 (Thucydides, Book II. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1891.) focus

Τῆς τε —the topic changes to τὸ συμφέρον; see c. 62, 3, Index s.v. τόποι. εἰκὸς — decet.

τῷ τιμωμένῳ —c. 59, 3. ‘You are bound to support the dignity which the state has obtained through our empire.’

ὑπὲρ ἅπαντας —not a common use of ὑπέρ. Cf. Isocr. ep. 4, 8 τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὑτοὺς ὄντας. τιμὰς—which, though belonging to the state, directly benefit every citizen; in those times the city was everything, the citizen nothing. Cf. 60, 3.

περὶ δουλείας ἀγωνίζεσθαι —as remarked on c. 62, 3, sentences like ἀγὼν περὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἀδίκως ἐπιθυμεῖν and ἀγὡν περὶ τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν ἀ. ἐ. are identical in meaning. In the same way, with all verbs or nouns implying a contest, the noun with περὶ may describe either the object which the combatant referred to wishes to obtain, or the disaster he wishes to avoid, the two being the same thing regarded from different views: thus Lysias' ἐναντιοῦσθαι περὶ έλευθερίας (13, 17) is the same as ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ δουλείας. Cf. Lys. 3, 44 ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ θανάτου; 21, 20 ἀ. περὶ ἀσεβείας. Demosth. 1, 5 οὐ περὶ δόξης κίνδυνος άλλ’ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος. δουλείας — i.e. dependence on Sparta, as δ. often denotes merely the opposite of αὐτονομία. κινδύνου ὧν — periculo ob offensas in imperio contractas, danger due to the hatred to which you have been exposed in that empire. ὧν = τούτων ἅ, cognate accus. to ἀπήχθησθε. (One or two edd. prefer to take ὧν as masc., danger from those in governing whom you have incurred hatred; but that does not agree well with the abstract nature of the whole passage.)

Εἴ τις —referring to the combination to which the overtures to Sparta were due.

καὶ τόδε — i.e. τὸ ἐκστῆναι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ‘if that is the honourable part that any of you, prompted by his present apprehension and an indolent spirit, wishes to play.’ τόδε is cognate accus. to ἀνδραγαθίζεται. Cf. 1 above. The friends of peace did not admit that they wished ἐκστῆναι τῆς ἀρχῆς, but Pericles asserts that their policy would lead to loss of empire and even worse disasters.

ἀπραγμοσύνῃ — dat. of manner. The word is purposely chosen to include all who were playing into the hands of Sparta, if only by their apathy. Cf. Intr. p. lxxiii.

ὡς τυραννίδα —it is remarkable that Cleon, who had done so much to get up the attack on Pericles, utters the same sentiment, III. 40. Cleon was really by no means anxious for peace (see Intr. p. lxxiv. fol.), and it is probable that Pericles here points out the absurdity of Cleon's present attitude by adopting a phrase of which all knew that he was fond; leaving the friends of ἀπραγμοσύνη to settle matters with the friends of τυραννὶς as best they could.

ἄδικον δοκεῖ — viz. ‘to the world.’ Pericles does not himself assert that the empire is a despotism, or that it was unjustly acquired: he alludes to an opinion then especially prevalent.

ἐπικίνδυνον —sc. ἐστί.

Οἱ τοιοῦτοι — i.e. οἱ τόδε ἀνδραγαθιζόμενοι. ἑτέρους πείσαντες—‘if they should get others to adopt their views.’

καὶ —with τέ , sive ... sive. Observe the ἰσόκωλον on each side of καί, cf. c. 40, 1, and the ὁμοιοτέλευτα in ἀπολέσειαν and οἰκήσειαν. (These similar endings are not common in Thuc.: there are about a dozen in this book.)

εἴ που —the second protasis to πόλιν ἀπολέσειαν. ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν—‘by themselves,’ a hint that if they want their ideas carried out, they had better go and live somewhere else. For the phrase, cf. v. 67 , 1; VI. 40, 2 αὐτὴ έφ’ αὺτῆς; VIII. 63, 4.

τὸ ἄπραγμον —‘indolence is not secure unless it be ranged beside activity; nor yet is it expedient in a sovereign state, but only in one that is in subjection, to seek safety by submission.’ τὸ ἄπραγμον and τὸ δραστήριον are for οἱ ἀπράγμονες, οἱ δραστήριοι. Cf. c. 44, 1.

σῴζεται ... τεταγμένον —military words. If indolent persons wish to come out of the struggle safe, they had better take sides with the active; i.e. the peace party can only gain a secure peace by supporting the war party, instead of making overtures to the enemy. Cf. Demosth. 6, 25 οὐ φυλάξεσθ’ ὅπως μὴ πολέμου ζητοῦντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι δεσπότην εὕρητε; ξυμφέρει —subject ὰσφαλῶς δουλεύειν, before which τὸ is omitted, as in c. 35, 1, 39, 4.

ἀσφαλῶς δ. — this is what τὸ ἄπραγμον really means, says Pericles, it is not σωτηρία, as the friends of peace pretend, but δουλεία : ἀσφαλῶς corresponds to οὐ σῴζεται, δουλεύειν to μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραο τηρίου τεταγμένον, which shows that the adv. is emphatic.

δουλεύειν —cf. 1 above; a state now ἄρχουσα becomes a slave by submitting. Cf. c. 42, 4. (For other views of this passage, see other editions.)

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 2.63

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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