Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.141

[1] "Resolve therefore from this occasion either to yield them obedience before you receive damage, or if we must have war (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way nor keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command hath one and the same virtue, to make subject.

[2] As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand.

[3] The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience, for that the wars which they have had one against another have been but short through poverty.

[4] And such men can neither man their fleets nor yet send out their armies by land very often, because they must be far from their own wealth and yet by that be maintained and be besides barred the use of the sea.

[5] It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent, especially if the war (as it is likely) should last.

[6] So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races, everyone will press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed.

[7] For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And everyone supposeth that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good, not observing how by these thoughts of everyone in several the common business is jointly ruined.

[1] Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbor as commands, before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery.

[2] As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens .

[3] Personally engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each other.

[4] Powers of this description are quite incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea.

[5] Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than they expect, which it very likely will.

[6] In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas , but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at all.

[7] The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.

„Überlegt euch also, ob ihr klein beigeben wollt, ehe ihr
zu Schaden kommt, oder ob wir, was ich für das beste halte,
Krieg führen und, mögen sie viel oder wenig fordern, unter
keinen Umständen nachgeben und unseren Besitz furchtlos be­
haupten wollen. Denn jede Forderung, ob groß oder klein,
die man gegen seinesgleichen ohne Urteil und Recht durchsetzt,
bedeutet Knechtschaft. Daß wir ihnen mit unseren Streitkräften
und Hilfsmitteln gewahcsen sind, werde ich euch jetzt im ein­
zelnen auseinandersetzen. Hört zu. Die Peloponnesier sind
Bauern, die von ihrer Hände Arbeit leben; Geld haben sie
nicht, weder der einzelne noch der Staat. Auf lange, über­
seeische Kriege verstehen sie sich nicht, da sie ihrer Armut wegen
untereinander immer nur kurze Kriege führen. Flotten aus­
rüsten können sie nicht und ebensowenig öfter mit Heeren ins
Feld ziehen, weil sie sich dabei von Haus und Hof entfernen
und auf eigene Kosten leben müssen und ihnen noch dazu die
See verschlossen ist. Auch hält man einen Krieg leichter durch,
wenn man einen vollen Staatsschatz hat und keine Steuer­
schraube dazu anzusetzen braucht. Der Bauer setzt im Kriege
lieber seine Person ein als sein Geld, weil er darauf rechnet,
selbst allenfalls mit heiler Haut davonzukommen, während er
darauf gefaßt sein muß, sein Hab und Gut im Laufe deS
Krieges draufgehen zu sehen, zumal wenn der Krieg, wie dies­
mal doch wahrscheinlich, sich über Erwarten in die Länge zieht.
In einer einzelnen Schlacht können es die Peloponnesier und
ihre Verbündeten mit ganz Griechenland aufnehmen, einen
Krieg aber gegen einen besser gerüsteten Gegner vermögen sie
nicht zu führen, solange sie keine einheitliche BundeSgewalt
haben und deshalb zu rashcem Handeln unfähig sind; denn
bei gleichem Stimmrecht und Stammesverschiedenheit, wobei
jeder nur seine besonderen Interessen im Auge hat, kommt so
leicht nichts Zweckdienliches zustande. Da will der eine diesem
oder jenem zu Leibe gehen, der andere selbst nur möglichst
ungeschoren bleiben. Auf ihren Tagsatzungen, wenn es wirklich
mal dazu kommt, ist wohl hin und wieder auch von gemein­
samen Aufgaben des Bundes die Rede, zumeist aber handelt
eS sich auch hier nur um Angelegenheiten und Sonderinteressen
der Einzelstaaten. Jeder glaubt, es werde auch wohl ohne ihn
gehen oder ein anderer werde die Sache für ihn schon mit­
besorgen, und eben weil das alle glauben, merken sie nicht,
daß aus der Sache überhaupt nichts wird.

CXLI. « Avisez donc, d’après cela : ou bien obéissez avant d'avoir éprouvé aucun dommage, ou bien, si nous faisons la guerre, ce qui me paraît le meilleur parti, ne cédez pour aucun motif, grave ou léger, afin de n’être pas réduits à craindre sans cesse de perdre ce que vous possédez ; car il y a toujours esclavage dans l’obéissance à un ordre, que l’objet en soit important ou non, lorsqu’il vient d’un égal et précède tout jugement.

« Quant à la guerre et aux ressources des deux partis, vous vous convaincrez par les détails suivants que nous ne le céderons en rien : les Péloponnésiens vivent de leur travail ; ils n’ont ni richesses privées, ni fortune publique. Ils n’ont pas davantage l’expérience des longues guerres, de celles qu’on fait au-delà des mers ; parce que, grâce à leur pauvreté, leurs luttes entre eux sont de courte durée. Dans cette situation, ils ne peuvent ni équiper des vaisseaux, ni même faire sur terre de fréquentes expéditions au dehors ; car il leur fau- drait tout à la fois abandonner leurs propriétés et prendre sur eux-mêmes les frais de la guerre ; d’ailleurs la mer leur est interdite. C’est avec des trésors en réserve, bien plus que par des contributions forcées, qu’on soutient la guerre ; et des hommes qui vivent de leur travail sont bien plus disposés à sacrifier dans les com- bats leur corps que leur pécule ; car ils ont l’espérance d’échapper au danger, tandis qu’ils no sont point sûrs de n'avoir pas épuisé prématurément leurs ressources ; surtout si, contre leur attente, la guerre traîne en longueur, comme cela est ici vraisemblable.

« Les Péloponnésiens et leurs alliés sont en état de tenir tête à tous les Grecs réunis, dans une affaire unique ; mais ils ne peuvent faire une guerre soutenue, contre un ennemi qui a des ressources toutes différentes ; car, n’ayant pas un conseil unique, ils ne peuvent exé- cuter sur l’heure une résolution soudaine. En regard de l’égalité du suffrage, il y a chez eux différence de race, opposition d’intérêts ; et, par suite, rien n’arrive à bonne fin. Les uns sont surtout préoccupés de telle vengeance qu’ils ont en vue, les autres ne voient que leurs intérêts privés, qu’ils craignent par-dessus tout de compromettre ; on se rassemble lentement ; on n’accorde que peu d’attention aux affaires publiques ; on s’occupe le plus souvent des siennes propres. Chacun pense ne pas nuire, par sa négligence, à l’intérêt général, persuadé qu’un autre y pourvoira pour lui ; si bien que, tous faisant en particulier le même raisonnement, le bien public se trouve, en somme, avoir été sacrifié sans qu’on s’en doutât.

« Cela étant, disposez-vous ou bien à obtempérer avant d’àvoir souffert aucun dommage, ou bien — si vous prenez le bon parti, celui de la guerre — à ne fléchir sous aucun prétexte, afin de ne pas éprouver des craintes continuelles au sujet de vos possessions, car c’est toujours se laisser asservir que de subir une prétention exorbitante ou légère, imposée avant jugement par des égaux.

« Quant à ce qui concerne cette guerre et les ressources des deux partis, apprenez, par le détail que je vais vous faire, que nous n’aurons pas l’infériorité. Les Péloponésiens cultivent eux-mêmes leurs terres ; ils ne possèdent ni richesses privées ni richesses publiques ; ils n’ont pas l’expérience dés guerres longues et transmarines, parce que leurs luttes entre eux sont de courte durée à raison de leur pauvreté. De tels peuples ne peuvent ni équiper des flottes, ni expédier fréquemment des armées de terre, parce‘qu’ils se trouvent dans la double obligation de s’éloigner de leurs champs et de vivre de leurs récoltes, sans compter que la mer leur sera fermée. Or ce sont les trésors amassés qui soutiennent la guerre, bien plus que les contributions forcées. Les hommes qui travaillent de leurs mains sont plus disposés à payer de leur personne que de leurs deniers; car ils ont au moins l’espérance d’échapper aux périls,tandis qu’ils ne sont pas sûrs ,de ne pas voir leurs ressources prématurément épuisées, surtout si la guerre, comme il est probable, se prolonge au delà de leurs prévisions.

« Dans un seul combat, les Péloponésiens et leurs alliés sont en état de faire tête au reste de la Grèce ; mais ils ne sauraient soutenir la guerre contre une puissance qui la fait autrement qu’eux. L’absence d’un conseil unique les empêche de rien exécuter avec célérité. Égaux par le droit fie suffrage, mais différents d’origine, ils poursuivent chacun leur avantage particulier. Il en résulte que rien ne s’achève; car les uns veulent avant tout satisfaire leur vengeance, les autres nuire le moins possible à leurs propriétés. Assemblés avec lenteur, ils donnent peu de temps aux affaires générales et beaucoup aux intérêts locaux ; chacun se figure que sa propre négligence est sans inconvénient, qu’un autre avisera à sa place ; et comme ils font tous le même calcul, il s'ensuit que, sans qu’on s’en doute, l’utilité commune ést sacrifiée.

[1] So make up your minds, here and now, either to take their orders before any damage is done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me at least seems best--do so with the determination not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not to hold our possessions in fear. For it means enslavement just the same when either the greatest or the least claim is imposed by equals upon their neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by dictation. "

[2] But as regards the war and the resources of each side, make up your minds, as you hear the particulars fiom me, that our position will be fully as powerful as theirs.

[3] For the Peloponnesians till their lands with their own hands; they have no wealth, either private or public; besides, they have had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief campaigns separately against one another.

[4] Now people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently sending out expeditions by land, since they would thus have to be away fiom their properties and at the same time would be drawing upon their own resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred from the sea as well. ¹

[5] Again, it is accumulated wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own lands are more ready to risk their lives in war than their property; for they have confident hope of surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will not use up their funds before the war ends, especially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted beyond expectation.

[6] Indeed, although in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are not strong enough to maintain a war against a military organisation which is so different from theirs, seeing that they have no single general assembly, and therefore cannot promptly put into effect any emergency measure; and as they all have an equal vote and are of different races they each strive to advance their own interests. In such circumstances it usually happens that nothing is accomplished.

[7] And indeed it could scarcely be otherwise, for what some of them want is the greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, others the least possible damage to their own property. And when after many delays they do meet, they give but a scant portion of their time to the consideration of any matter of common concern, but the larger portion to their own individual interests. And each one thinks no harm will come from his own negligence, but that it is the business of somebody else to be provident on his behalf; and so, through all separately cherishing the same fancy, universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole body.

[1] "Henceforth then make up your minds, either to submit before you are hurt, or, if we go to war, as I think is better, on important or trivial grounds alike to make no concession, nor to keep with fear what we have now acquired; for both the greatest and the least demand from equals, imperiously urged on their neighbours previous to a judicial decision, amounts to the same degree of subjugation.

[2] Now with regard to the war, and the means possessed by both parties, that we shall not be the weaker side, be convinced by hearing the particulars. The Peloponnesians are men who ¹ cultivate their land themselves;

[3] and they have no money either in private or public funds. Then they are inexperienced in long and transmarine wars, as they only wage them with each other for a short time, owing to their poverty. And men of this description can neither ² man fleets nor often send out land armaments;

[4] being at the same time absent from their private business, and spending from their own resource sand, moreover, being also shut out from the sea: but it is super-abundant revenues that support wars, rather than compulsory contributions.

[5] And men who till the land themselves are more ready to wage war with their persons than with their money: feeling confident, with regard to the former, that they will escape from dangers; but not being sure, with regard to the latter, that they will not spend it before they have done; especially should the war be prolonged beyond their expectation, as [in this case] it probably may. For in one battle the Peloponnesians and their allies might cope with all the Greeks together;

[6] but they could not carry on a war against resources of a different description to their own; since they have no one board of council, so as to execute any measure with vigour; and all having equal votes, and not being of the same races, each forwards his own interest; for which reasons nothing generally is brought to completion. For some of them wish to avenge themselves as much as possible on some particular party;

[7] while others wish as little as possible to waste their own property. And after being slow in coming together, it is but during a small part of the time that they look to any of the general interests, while during the greater part they are contriving for their own. And each individual does not imagine that he will do any harm by his own neglect, but thinks that it is the business of every one else too to look out for himself; so that through the same idea being individually entertained by all, the common cause is collectively sacrificed without their observing it.

[1] « Hinc igitur statuite vel imperata facere, antequam, ullam cladem accipiamus, vel num bellum geramus, id quod mihi satius esse videtur, nulla paritet nec magna nec parva de causa cessuri neque cum metu habituri ea, qua; possidemus. Nam eadem servitute constat, sive maxima, sive minima sint ea, quae aliis ante judicium a paribus imperantur.

[2] De belli vero apparatu et facultatibus quae utrisque nostrum adsunt, non inferiores nos fore, intelli-gite singulatim de re quaque audientes.

[3] Peloponnesi enim sunt inopes, nec privatim, uec publice pecunias lia-bent: deinde diuturnorum ac maritimorum bellorum sunt imperiti, quia propter paupertatem ipsi bellum inter se ad exiguum temporis spatium gerunt

[4] Hujusmodi autem homines neque naves explere neque pedestres exercitus saepe emittere possunt, quod simul et a re familiari absunt, et sumptus de suis privatis facultatibus fadunt, et praeterea etiam maris usu prohibentur.

[5] Atqui opes bella magis quam violentae pecuniarum collationes sustinent. Homines autem inopes ad bellum gerendum corporibus, quam pecuniis sunt promptiores; nam illa quidem ex periculis evasura confidunt, has vero non certi sunt. fore ut non vel ante belli finem consumant, praesertim si, quod est verisi -mile, bellum praeter ipsorum opinionem producatur.

[6] Nam in uno quidem proelio Peloponnesii eorumque socii Graecis omnibus resistere possunt; sed cum dissimili adversariorum apparatu bellum gerere non possunt, quando neque uno eodemque concilio utentes in tempore aliquid acriter conficere possunt, et omnes par suffragii ferendi jus habentes diversasque patrias suam quisque rem urgent, unde nihil ad finem perduci solet.

[7] Alii enim nonnullos quam maxime cupiunt ulcisci, alii vero, res domesticas quam minime corrumpi. Quumque post longam cunctationem vix tandem in unum conveniant, exiguo tantum temporis momento de communibus rebus consultant, majorem vero temporis partem in rebus privatis curandis ponunt. Et unusquisque non per suam negligentiam stare putat, ut damnum fiat, sed et aliquem alium esse, qui sibi prospiciat, ut eadem ab omnibus privatim opinione universa respublica ipsis insciis perdatur.

[1] Diesen Grundsätzen, die wir von unsern Vätern überkommen und selber stets bewährt erfunden haben, lasst uns nicht ungetreu werden und nicht binnen weniger Stunden über so viel Menschenleben und Eigenthum, über Staatenglück und Ehre einen übereilten Beschluss fassen, sondern uns Zeit nehmen. Wir haben den Vortheil der Macht, um nichts zu versäumen. Nach Athen also sendet wegen Potidäas und wegen der Beschwerden der Bundesgenossen, besonders da sie eine gerichtliche Entscheidung nicht ablehnen. Wer diese anbietet, den hat man kein Recht als bereits Verurtheilten anzugreifen. Aber zugleich rüstet euch auch zum Kriege. Dies ist das Beste, was ihr beschliessen könnt, und wird bei dem Feind am meisten Eindruck machen.

« Pertanto deliberate (ino da questo momento o di obbedire prima di essere offesi, o volendo noi far guerra , come io credo il meglio , di tioti cedere a qualsivoglia costo , e diportarci da gente che sdegna ritenere il suo con paura. Imperciocché qualunque richiesta, piccola o grande che sia, intimata da un eguale in suono di comando, innanzi alla determinazione del giudizio , importa l’istesso che un vero servaggio. Che poi non saremo inferiori quanto alle cose pertinenti alla guerra e a tutti gli altri apparecchi onde siamo entrambi forniti, ne andrete convinti, dopò averne udito da me il ragguaglio particolare. I Peloponnesi lavorano da sé le loro terre, non hanno denaro né pubblico nè privato , né pratica di guerre diuturne e marittime, posciaché oppressi dall9 indigenza muovonsi solamente le armi contro loro stessi e per breve durata. Gente si fatta non possono spedire al di fuori nè navi armate nè soldatesche di terrà sostenute da nuove leve, perchè ad un medesimo tempo dovrebbero allontanarsi dai loro fondi, e spendere nondimeno del proprio , mentre sarebbero per noi anche esclusi dal mare. Or le ricchezze che s’abbiano in avanzo, meglio delle forzate contribuzioni sostengono le guerre : e la gente addetta alla coltivazione delle terre , è più pronta a guerreggiare colla persona che col denaro ; perchè quanto alla persona sperano di scampar dal rischio, ma nulla vi è che gli assicuri dal non consumare il denaro prima che cessi la guerra, specialmente se ella si prolunghi, come è verosimile , più che non credevano. Imperocché sono certamente i Peloponnesi con gli alleati in istato di resistere in una sola battaglia a tutti i Greci insieme ; non gih a stare in guerra contro chi abbia apparati e regole affatto diverse. Infatti non usa tra loro un solo corpo deliberante per eseguir sollecitamente ciò che richiede il momento, ma essendo tutti eguali nel diritto del suffragio, e divisi in varie popolazioni, ciascuno si studia per il proprio vantaggio j e quindi deriva che nulla si conduca a compimento.

Vogliono alcuni al tutto vendetta d’un tale ; altri soffrire il minor danno possibile nelle loro terre ; sono lenti a radunarsi ; spendono pochissimo tempo a deliberar delle cose pubbliche, il più a brigarsi delle private ; e ciascuuo crede non esser per nuocere la sua trascuratezza , sperando che altri si darà cura di ciò che ad esso toccherebbe a prevedere : cosicché con questa opinione comune a tutti in particolare va in rovina , senza che alcuno se ne accorga, l’universa Repubblica.