Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator), 6.49

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Lamachôs ouvrit l’avis de cingler droit contre Syracuse et d’y livrer au plus tôt bataille, avant que la ville fût en état de défense et revenue de sa frayeur, a Toute armée, dit-il, eSt d’abord formidable ; mais si elle tarde à se montrer, l’en-nemi se rassure et l'envisage avec dédain. Au contraire une attaque brusque, dans le premier moment d’effroi, procure ordinairement la victoire, soit par la peur qui grossit les forces de l’assaillant, soit par là perspective des ravages, soit surtout par le danger imminent du combat. Il est à présumer qu’une foule de personnes seront surprises dans les champs, parce qu’on doute encore de notre arrivée ; d’ailleurs les Syracusains auront beau transporter leurs effets dans la ville, l’armée qui viendra victorieuse camper sous leurs murs ne manquera pas de butin. Par là nous détournerons les Siciliens de l'alliance de Syracuse, et nous les attirerons à nous, sans leur permettre d’attendre les événements. » Lamachôs ajouta que le port à choisir pour lieu de retraite et de mouillage devrait être Mégara, endroit inhabité, peu distant de Syracuse soit par terre, soit par mer ¹.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator). Paris. 1863.

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Current edition First1KGreek

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése (French) (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.49.1 focus

[1] Λάμαχος δὲ ἄντικρυς ἔφη χρῆναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει ὡς τάχιστα τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι, ἕως ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ μάλιστα ἐκπεπληγμένοι.

[2] τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον πᾶν στράτευμα δεινότατον εἶναι· ἢν δὲ χρονίσῃ πρὶν ἐς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν, τῇ γνώμῃ ἀναθαρσοῦντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τῇ ὄψει καταφρονεῖν μᾶλλον. αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἢν προσπέσωσιν, ἕως ἔτι περιδεεῖς προσδέχονται, μάλιστ’ ἂν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι, τῇ τε ὄψει (πλεῖστοι γὰρ ἂν νῦν φανῆναι) καὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ ὧν πείσονται, μάλιστα δ’ ἂν τῷ αὐτίκα κινδύνῳ τῆς μάχης.

[3] εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς πολλοὺς ἀποληφθῆναι ἔξω διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφᾶς μὴ ἥξειν, καὶ ἐσκομιζομένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρημάτων, ἢν πρὸς τῇ πόλει κρατοῦσα καθέζηται.

[4] τούς τε ἄλλους Σικελιώτας οὕτως ἤδη μᾶλλον καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐ ξυμμαχήσειν καὶ σφίσι προσιέναι καὶ οὐ διαμελλήσειν περισκοποῦντας ὁπότεροι κρατήσουσιν. ναύσταθμον δὲ ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφορμηθέντας Μέγαρα ἔφη χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, ἃ ἦν ἐρῆμα, ἀπέχοντα Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολὺν οὔτε ὁδόν.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.49.1 focus

[1] But Lamachus was of opinion that it was best to go directly to Syracuse and to fight with them as soon as they could at their city whilst they were yet unfurnished and their fear at the greatest.

[2] For that an army is always most terrible at first, but if it stay long ere it come in sight, men recollect their spirits and contemn it the more when they see it. Whereas if it come upon them suddenly while they expect it with fear, it would the more easily get the victory, and everything would affright them, as the sight of it (for then they would appear most for number) and the expectation of their sufferings, but especially the danger of a present battle.

[3] And that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages without, as not believing they would come; and though they should be already gotten in, yet the army, being master of the field and sitting. down before the city, could want no money;

[4] and the other Sicilians would then neglect leaguing with the Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, no longer standing off and spying who should have the better. And for a place to retire unto and anchor in, he thought Megara most fit: being desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.49.1 focus

[1] Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse , and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its height.

[2] Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers—which would never appear so considerable as at present—by the anticipation of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the engagement.

[3] They might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city.

[4] The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.49 focus

Lamachos aber sagte, man müsse gradezu.auf Syrakus
lossegeln und so rasch als'möglich dicht bei der Stadt die Schlacht
herbeiführen,-so lange sie dort ungerüstet und noch in der ersten
Bestürzung seien, öenn im Anfang sei jedes Heer am sfurchtbarsten; lasse
man aber die Zeit vorübergehen und zeige sich nicht allfogleich, so
fasse der Feind wieder Muth und verachte Einen, wenn man dann
hinterdrein sich zeige. - Wenn sie aber jetzt rasch'und unversehens
angriffen, so lange jene noch in furchtsamer Erwartung seien, so würden
sie auf diese Weise gewiß jene besiegen und in jeder Beziehung in
Schrecken setzen, sowohl durch den Anblick, — denn jetzt würden die
Athener noch iN, der größten Zahl erscheinen — als auch durch die
Erwartung dessen, was sie von einem solchen Heere zu befahren
hätteii) vorzüglich l aber durH-die unmittelbare Gefahr der Schlacht. ¹
Und gewiß würden auch auf dem, Lande noch Viele abgefangen
werden, weil man an ihr Kommen nicht glaube, und.da diese Leute dann
eben damit beschäftigt wären, ihre-Habe nach der Stadt zu schaffen,
so werde das Heer keinen Mangel an Geld leiden, wenn es siegreich
sich bei der Stadt festsetze. Aus diese Weise würden auch die übrigen
Sikelioten abgehalten, mit jenen Bundesgenossenschaft zu schließen,
und vielmehr zu ihnen übertreten und nicht erst lange zaudern und
ausschauen, welcher Theil siegen werde. Und wenn sie sich (von
Syrakus) zurückgezogen und ihre Schiffe an's Land gebracht hätten,
so müßten sie Megara, einen verlassenen Ort, der weder zur.See,
noch auf dem Landweg weit von Syrakus entfernt sei, zur
Flottenstation machen.. ' . - s ^

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 6.49 focus

Lamachos aber meinte, man müsse sich ohne weiteres
gegen Syrakus wenden und baldmöglichst in der Nähe der
Stadt eine Schlacht liefern, solange man dort darauf nicht
vorbereitet und noch nicht wieder zur Besinnung gekommen sei.
Im ersten Augenblick sei ein Heer immer am furchtbarsten.
Warte man zu lange, ehe man sich blicken lasse, so fasse der
Gegner wieder Mut, und auch der Anblick sei ihm nicht mehr
so furchtbar. Wenn man also die Syraknser jetzt, solange sie
noch in banger Erwartung seien, unversehens angreife, so
habe man die meiste Aussicht, sie zu besiegen und sie sowohl
durch den Anblick, der Masse, mit der man auftrete, als auch
durch die Furcht vor dem, was ihnen bevorstehe, besonders vor
der ihnen unmittelbar drohenden Schlacht, völlig aus der
Fassung zu bringen. Wahrscheinlich seien viele von ihnen noch
draußen auf dem Felde geblieben, weil sie nicht an die An
kunft der Athener geglaubt; aber auch wenn sie ihre Habe in
die Stadt geschafft, werde das Heer keinen Mangel leiden,
wenn es sich nach dem Siege vor die Stadt lege. Um so eher
würden dann auch die übrigen Griechen in Sizilien sich nicht
ihnen, sondern den Athenern anschließen und nicht erst ab
warten, wer von beiden die Oberhand behielte. Für den Fall
eines Rückzugs müsse man das zurzeit unbesetzte Megara zum
Standort für die Flotte machen, wohin es von Syrakus zu
Wasser und zu Lande nicht weit sei.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.49 focus

XLIX. Lamachos, contrairement à cet avis, proposa de cingler vers Syracuse et de transporter au plus tôt la lutte sous les murs de cette ville, avant que les préparatifs y fussent faits et le premier effroi dissipé. Il disait que c’est surtout au premier moment qu’une armée paraît redoutable; que si elle tarde, les esprits se raffermissent avant de l’avoir aperçue, la vue est moins troublée, et déjà on la dédaigne. Qu’il fallait donc tomber sur l’ennemi à l’improviste pendant qu’on était encore attendu avec effroi; qu’on aurait d’autant plus de chances de succès et que tout contribuerait à l’épouvante, l’aspect de l’armée qui ne paraîtrait jamais plus nombreuse, l’attente du mal qu’elle allait faire, et par-dessus tout la nécessité de courir sur-le-champ les hasards du combat. Que probablement beaucoup d’habitants étaient restés au dehors dans la campagne, ne croyant pas à l’invasion, et que leur retraite laisserait l’armée¹ dans l’abondance, si elle campait victorieuse sous les murs de la ville. Les autres peuples de Sicile seraient alors moins portés à s’allier aux Syracusains et passeraient aux Athéniens, au lieu d’observer et d’attendre que la victoire soit décidée. Il ajoutait que, pour avoir un port de refuge, il fallait retourner et jeter l’ancre à Mégare, place déserte et peu éloignée de Syracuse par terre et par mer.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.49.1 focus

[1] Lamachus maintained that they ought to sail direct for Syracuse and as soon as possible make the fight near the city, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and their consternation was at its height.

[2] For every army, lie argued, is always most formidable at first, but if it delay before coming into sight, men recover their spirit and even at the sight of it are more inclined to despise than to fear it. But if it attack suddenly, while the enemy are still in terror of its coming, it will have the best chance for victory and in every way will strike fear into them, both by the sight of it—for at this moment it would appear most numerous—and by the expectation of the fate in store for them, but most of all by the immediate peril of the battle.

[3] And, he added, probably many people have been left behind on their farms outside the city on account of the disbelief that the Athenians will come, and while they are bringing in their property the army will not lack supplies, if it once controls the land and invests the city.

[4] And as for the rest of the Siceliots, if we follow this course they will at once be more likely, not to make an alliance with the enemy, but to come over to us, and not to make delays, looking about to see which side will be the stronger. And he said, finally, that they should return and make a naval base and a watch-station at Megara, since it was uninhabited, and not far from Syracuse either by sea or by land.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.49.1 focus

[1] Lamachus, again, urged that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and immediately fight the battle under the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were most unprepared and panic-struck. For every armament was most formidable in the first instance;

[2] but if it spent much time before coming into sight, men grew bold again in spirit, and felt more contempt for it even on its appearance. If, then, they attacked them on a sudden, while they were still with terror looking for them, they would gain the most decided advantage over them, and strike fear into them in every way; by their sight of the forces, (for they would appear most numerous at the present time,) by their expectation of what they would suffer, and, most of all, by the immediate peril of the engagement. It was probable, too, that many would be surprised outside the city in consequence of their not believing that they would come;

[3] or, ¹ if they were now carrying in their effects, yet the army would be in no want of property, if it sat down in superior force before the city. And so the rest of the Siceliots would then the more shrink from entering into alliance with the Syracusans, and join the Athenians;

[4] and would not put off, while they waited to see which party would be the stronger. As for a naval station, he said that after retiring [from before Syracuse,] and bringing their ships to anchor, they should establish one at Megara; which was an uninhabited place, at no great distance from Syracuse either by sea or land.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.49.1 focus

[1] Lamachus vero recta dicebat adversus Syracusas navigandum esse, et primo quoque tempore prmlium ad urbem committendum, dum adhuc imparati essent et maxime perterriti.

[2] Omnem enim exercitum principio maximum terrorem afferre; sed si moram interponat, antequam in conspectum veniat, homines ex pavore se colligentes etiam visu magis contemnere. Sed si repente invaserint , dum illi adhuc metu perculsi in exspectatione essent, facillime se superiores illis futuros, omnibusque rebus terrorem illis incussuros, tum adspectu (plurimos enim nunc se numero visum iri) tum exspectatione cladium, quas essent accepturi, praecipue vero subito proelii periculo.

[3] Verisimile autem esse, in agris etiam multos extra urbem remansisse, quod non crederent se venturos, quibus res suas in urbem comportantibus exercitum, si victor urbem obsideret, satis pecuniarum habiturum.

[4] Praeterea reliquos Sicilienses sic jam facilius et illorum societati non accessuros, et ad se transituros, minimeque cunctaturos circumspiciendo, utri victores essent futuri. Stationem autem navium reversis, et ad portum appulsis Megara dicebat facienda esse, quae deserta essent et a Syracusis neque mari multum neque terra distarent.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.49 focus

Lamaco poi diceva apertamente che bisognai navigare a Siracusa, e combatter prontamente la ritti ma tre è tuttora sprovviste e nel massimo sbigottimento : « ogni esercito essere alla prima formidabile ; se poi indugi’ a mostrarsi, la gente ripiglia cuore, e quando si mostrilo dispregia maggiormente; che se assalissero all1 improvvise i Siracusani mentre attoniti ciò si aspettano, affermava che facilmente li vincerebbero, e ad ogni modo gli spaventerebbero coll’aspetto dell’esercito (che certo ora comparirei), grandissimo), e coll’espellati va de’danni che avranno a soffrire , e soprattutto col subitaneo pericolo della battaglia. Soggiungeva che senza dubbio avrebbero sorpresa moto gente alla campagna , perchè non si credeva alla loro venuta ; e dato anche che si ricovrassero entro le mura, l'esercito, padróne del territorio, non mancherebbe del bisognevole quando si fermasse all’assedio della città. Allora gli altri Siciliani tanto più ricuseranno di unir le armi loro co Siracusani, e si accosteranno agli Ateniesi senza aspettar di vedere qual de’due ottenga vittoria. Finalmente diceva che in caso di doverne partire e mettersi all’ancora, doveasi aver per sicuro ridotto alle navi Megara, luogo abbandonato e poco lontano da Siracusa, si per mare che per terra.

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

L’opinion de Lamachos semble plus conforme à la tactique moderne, et Thucydide lui-même (VII, xlii) paraît lui donner raison. Cependant le plan proposé par Alcibiade s’accordait mieux avec les principes de la stratégie ancienne. Pout faire la guerre à une grande puissance, qui possédait un empire, on regardait comme nécessaire de détacher préalablement d’elle le plus grand nombre possible de ses sujets, et de ne l’assaillir directement que lorsqu’on l’avait réduite à ses propres forces. Tel est le plan suivi par Alexandre· contre les Perses, par Annibal contre les Romains, et par les Lacédémoniens contre Athènes dans la dernière période de la guerre du Péloponèse. Même après le désastre de Sicile, ils ne se crurent pas en état d’assiéger Athènes.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

Λάμαχος —it is generally agreed that his advice ought to have been followed: (1) to attack Syracuse at once, (2) to make the site of Hyblaean Megara their head-quarters.

ἄντικρυς —with πλεῖν. 2

πρὸς τῇ πόλει —‘to fight the battle under the walls of the city.’

ἢν δὲ χρονίσῃ —‘if it delay before making itself seen, men gradually recover their spirit, and when they actually see it, are inclined to despise it.’

τῇ ὄψει is dat. of circumstance.

σφεῖς —that σφᾶς (see crit. note) is equally correct is certain: when a plur. subj. of infin. includes the subj. of the main verb, whether in whole or part, it is put either in nom. or accus. at will. But πλεῖστοι below makes σφᾶς mtolerable.

εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι —‘Many, not fully believing that the Athenians were coming, would not yet have sought shelter in the city. They would be made prisoners in the open country, and their property would be useful’ (Freeman). Stahl makes ε·σκομιζομένων αὐτῶν apply to the Syr. in general, placing εἰκὸς . . ἥζειν in parenthesis, but the difficulty is imaginary.

ἢν πρὸς κτλ —this is the plan for the army: they would win a victory under the walls, and then take up a strong position there. The superfluous men with the ships would seek the nearest convenient harbour, and Megara would be a better site than Alcibiades's Messene for this ἐφόρμησις .

Μέγαρα —see c. 4, 2. On Lamachus see Intr. p. xiv.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.49

Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator)

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