Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator), 3.30

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« Alcidas et vous, généraux péloponésiens mes coflê-gues, mon avis est que nous cinglions sur Mytilène avant d’avoir été signalés. Les ennemis étant depuis peu maîtres de h ville, tout porte à croire que nous les trouverons faisant mauvaise garde, surtout du côté de la mer, où ils ne s’attendent pas à être attaqués et où nous sommes en forces. Il est même pro- I bable que leurs soldats sont dispersés négligemment dans les maisons, suivant l’usage des vainqueurs. Si donc nous les assaillons de nuit et à l’improviste, j’espère qu’avec le concours de ceux des habitants qui nous sont restés fidèles, nous aurons le dessus. Ne reculons pas devant le danger. Il ne s’agit ni plus ni moins que d’une surprise de guerre. Or le général qui, étant lui-même sur ses gardes, sait tenter de pareils oouds de vigueur, est ordinairement victorieux. »

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator). Paris. 1863.

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Current edition First1KGreek

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése (French) (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 3.30.1 focus

[1] ‘Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύστους γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔχομεν.

[2] κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακτον εὑρήσομεν, κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνυ, ᾗ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀνέλπιστοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἄν τινα σφίσι πολέμιον καὶ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα οὖσα· εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζὸν αὐτῶν κατ’ οἰκίας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρατηκότων διεσπάρθαι.

[3] εἰ οὖν προσπέσοιμεν ἄφνω τε καὶ νυκτός, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἔνδον, εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὑπόλοιπος εὔνους, καταληφθῆναι ἂν τὰ πράγματα.

[4] καὶ μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ εἴ τις στρατηγὸς ἔν τε αὑτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν ἐπιχειροίη, πλεῖστ’ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο.’

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 3.30.1 focus

[1] Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go to Mytilene as we are before advice be given of our arrival.

[2] For in all probability we shall find the city, in respect they have but lately won it, very weakly guarded and to the sea (where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong) not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in one house and some in another, carelessly as victors.

[3] Therefore if we fall upon them suddenly and by night, I think, with the help of those within, if any be left there that will take our part, we may be able to possess ourselves of the city.

[4] And we shall never fear the danger if we but think this: that all stratagems of war whatsoever are no more but such occasions as this, which, if a commander avoid in himself and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for the most part have good success.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 3.30.1 focus

[1] ‘Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene , before we have been heard of.

[2] We may expect to find the Athenians as much on their guard as men generally are who have just taken a city: this will certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of any enemy attacking them, and where our strength, as it happens, mainly lies; while even their land forces are probably scattered about the houses in the carelessness of victory.

[3] If therefore we were to fall upon them suddenly and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that we shall become masters of the place.

[4] Let us not shrink from the risk, but let us remember that this is just the occasion for one of the baseless panics common in war; and that to be able to guard against these in one's own case, and to detect the moment when an attack will find an enemy at this disadvantage, is what makes a successful general.’

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 3.30 focus

„Alkidas und ihr andern Heerführer der Peloponnesier,
soviel unserer hier sind! Mir scheint, wir sollten ungesäumt auf
Mytilene lossegeln, bevor wir noch ausgekundschaftet werden. Wir wer- ¹
den gewiß die Feinde, die eben erst die Stadt eingenommen haben, in
großer Sorglosigseit überraschen, zumal auf der See, von woher jene
am allerwenigsten das Erscheinen des Feindes erwarten, und aus der
wir ihnen jetzt grade überlegen sind. Gewiß sind auch ihre
Landtruppen , wie es beim Sieger natürlich ist, sorglos durch die Häuser
zerstreut. Wenn wir also unversehens und zur Nachtzeit über sie
herfallen, so ist Hoffnung, daß wir mit Hülfe derer in der Stadt, wenn
überhaupt noch Einer von unserer Partei übrig ist, das Ganze wieder
an uns reißen. Zaudern wir also nicht vor der Gefahr, sondern
glauben wir, daß dieß eben ein solcher Ueberrashcungssall im Kriege ist,
wie ihn ein Feldherr wohl bei sich selbst verhüten soll, den er aber,
am Feinde bemerkt, allsogleich benutzen muß, will er anders großen
Erfolg haben."

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 3.30 focus

„Alkidas und ihr peloponnesischen Befehlshaber hier, ich
schlage vor, jetzt auf der Stelle nach Mytilene zu fahren, ehe
dort etwas von unserem Kommen verlautet. Denn sicherlich
werden wir die Athener in der eben eroberten Stadt in größter
Sorglosigkeit überraschen, zumal sie einen feindlichen Angriff
von der See für gänzlich ausgeschlossen halten, wo wir ihnen
grade jetzt völlig gewahcsen sind. Wahrscheinlich werden sich
auch ihre Truppen im Hochgefühl des Sieges ganz sorglos
in die Häuser zerstreut haben. Wenn wir also plötzlich und
bei Nacht über sie herfallen, so wird es uns hoffentlich mit
Hilfe unserer unter der Einwohnerschaft doch wohl immer noch
vorhandenen Freunde gelingen, uns der Stadt wieder zu be
mächtigen. Laßt uns deshalb unbedenklich den Versuch wagen,
da wir hier einmal Gelegenheit zu einem solchen plötzlichen
Überfall haben, vor dem ein Feldherr sich selbst freilich nicht
genug hüten kann, die er aber, wenn der Feind sie ihm bietet,
ergreifen muß, wenn er überhaupt etwas erreichen will."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 3.30 focus

XXX. « Alcidas, et vous, Péloponnésiens, qui commandez l’armée avec moi, mon avis est de faire voile pour Mytilène, tels que nous sommes, et avant que notre arrivée soit connue. Car, vraisemblablement, des hommes qui viennent tout récemment de s’emparer d’une ville ne seront guère sur leurs gardes, et nous les surprendrons. Du côté de la mer surtout, ils n’auront pris aucune précaution, parce qu’ils ne s’attendent pas à voir arriver l’ennemi de ce côté ; et c’est là précisément qu’est notre force. Il est présumable aussi que leurs troupes de terre sont dispersées dans les maisons, avec l’incurie naturelle aux vainqueurs. Si donc nous tombons sur eux de nuit et à l’improviste, j’ai bon espoir qu’avec l’aide de ceux des habitants qui peuvent nous être restés favorables, nous nous saisirons de l’autorité. Ne nous laissons pas détourner par la crainte du danger, et songeons que c’est là, ou jamais, l’occasion d’une de ces surprises de guerre qui d’ordinaire assurent le succès au général qui, sachant s’en préserver lui-même, observe, attaque à propos, et y fait tomber l’ennemi. »

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 3.30.1 focus

[1] “Alcidas, and you who, like myself, are present here as commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, it seems to me that we should sail to Mytilene before our approach becomes known, without a moment's delay.

[2] For in all probability we shall find that men who have but lately come into possession of a city are very much off their guard. At sea, indeed, they will be altogether so, where they have no expectation of any possible hostile attack and our role is chiefly to act on the defensive;¹ and on land also their forces are probably scattered among the houses all the more carelessly because they believe that they are victors.

[3] If, then, we should fall upon them suddenly and at night, I believe that, in concert with our supporters inside, if any are left, we should find ourselves masters of the situation.

[4] And let us not shrink from the danger, remembering that the element of surprise in warfare is precisely of this nature.² And if a general guards against such surprises in his own case, and, whenever he sees an opportunity to employ them in the case of the enemy, makes the attempt, he will win the greatest success.”

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 3.30.1 focus

[1]

Alcidas, and the rest of my Peloponnesian colleagues in the command of the forces, my opinion is that we should sail ¹ straightway to Mytilene, before we have been heard of.

[2]

For in all probability we shall find great want of watchfulness, as is usual on the part of men who have but recently taken possession of a city. By sea, indeed, where they have no thought of any enemy attacking them, and where our strength mainly lies, this will be altogether the case; and even their land-forces are likely to be dispersed through the houses too carelessly.

[3]

If then we were to fall upon them suddenly and in the night, I hope that with the aid of those in the city, (if, indeed, there be any one left who wishes us well,) ² possession of the place might be gained.

[4]

And let us not shrink from the danger, but consider that the proverbial

surprises of war

are nothing else than chances such as this; which if any one should guard against in his own case, and avail himself of them, when he saw them in the case of his enemy, he would be a most successful general.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 3.30.1 focus

[1] « Alcida, celerique Peloponnesiorum, qui hic adsumus, copiarum duces, mihi Videtur, Mytilenennobis esse navigandum, ita ut jam sumus, antequam adventus noster divulgetur.

[2] Nam, ut verisimile est, quum homines urbe recens sint potili, magnam ipsorum in custodiis negligentiam offendemus, praecipue vero a mari, qua ex parte, quum ipsi nullum hostem contra se venturum sperant, tum etiam nostrae vires sunt firmissimae; verisimile autem etiam est, ipsorum peditatum, quippe quod sint victores, negRgen-tius per hospitia dispersum esso.

[3] Si igitur ex improviso et noctu impetum in eos faciamus, spero fore, ut cum illis , qui sunt in urbe, si quis nobis benevolus adhuc superest, res illas in potestatem nostram redigamus.

[4] Proinde ne tergiversemmi periculum istud subire, reputantes,quae nova in bello vocantur, nihil aliud esse, quam tale quid, a quo si quis dux sibi ipsi caveat, et hostes hujusmodi arrepta occasione adoriatur, res plurimas recte geret. »

Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides First1KGreek (Thucydides. Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides. Gürsching, Heinrich, translator. Augsburg: Wirth, 1856.) — 2.35.1 focus

[1] Wenn es bisher bei den Rednern an dieser Stätte fast allgemeiner Brauch geworden, den Mann zu rühmen, der mit der Bestattung diese Rede verband, weil an dem Grabe gefallener Krieger ein ehrendes Wort sich zieme, so würde ich es für hinreichend gehalten haben, dass man Helden der That mit einer festlichen Handlung ehre, — wie das denn der Staat durch die Bestattung gethan hat, deren Zeugen ihr so eben gewesen — und würde die Verherrlichung so vieler Männer nicht einem Einzelnen und der zufälligen Wirkung seines Vortrags anheimgegeben haben.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 3.30 focus

« O Alenda, e quanti de’Peloponnesi siete qui coa meco al comando dell’armata, mio parere si è di navigar subito sopra a Mitilene pria che nulla si sappia del come ci troviamo. Presa dagli Ateniesi non ha guari la terra , li troveremo, come pare , in gran trascuranza della difesa, e più che altro dalla parte del mare, donde essi non temono che possa sopravvenire alcun nemico, e dove consiste principalmente la nostra forza. Inoltre il loro esercito di terra vuoisi credere, perchè vincitore, sparso spensieratamente per le case. Se dunque di notte, e all5 improvviso daremo l’assalto, spero col favor di quei di dentro, se pur vi resta chi sia per noi, poterci venir fatto di insignorirci di tutto. Però non ita che il cuor non ci basti d’affrontare il pericolo, considerando non esservi in guerra , per procacciare straordinarie imprese , al tro caso che questo ; nel quale se un capitano guardi di non trovarsi; ed all’opposto, vedendovi il nemico, lo assalga, dovrà nella più parte delle azioni a lieto fíne riuscire ».

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.30

Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator)

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