Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Henry Dale (Translator), 8.89

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

View: By Section

← Previous Next →

[1] When the ambassadors sent from the Four Hundred arrived at Athens from Samos, and delivered the message from Alcibiades, namely, that he begged them to hold out, and not submit at all to the enemy; and that he had great hopes of reconciling the army to those at home, and of getting the better of the Peloponnesians; they gave much more courage to the greater part of those implicated in the oligarchy, who had even before been discontented with it, and would gladly have been quit of the business by any safe means.

[2] Accordingly they now united, and found fault with the present state of things, having as their leaders some of the most influential generals and men in office, such as Theramenes the son of Hagnon, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, and others; who, though amongst the first members of the government, were yet afraid, as they alleged, of the army at Samos, and of Alcibiades most especially, as also of those whom they were sending as ambassadors to Lacedaemon, lest without the authority of the greater part of them they might do the state some harm; ¹ and so they declared, not that they wished to escape from the administration falling into too few hands, but that they ought to establish the Five Thousand in reality, not in mere name, and to settle the government on a more equal basis.

[3] This, however, was but a public profession made by them in word; but it was from private ambition that most or them pursued that very method by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to be overturned. For all at once not only claim to be equal, but every one decidedly the first man. [And in such a case failure is intolerable:] whereas, when an election is made under a democracy, ² a man more easily submits to the result, as he does not think himself beaten on equal terms.

[4] But what most evidently encouraged them was the interest of Alcibiades being so strong in the army, and their not thinking that the power of the oligarchy would be permanent. Each one therefore strove to be himself the first to take the lead of the commons.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Henry Dale (Translator). London. 1851.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Current edition First1KGreek

History of the Peloponnesian War (English) (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 8.89 focus

[1] οἱ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες πρέσβεις ἐπειδὴ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπήγγειλαν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς κελεύει τε ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐλπίδας τε ὅτι πολλὰς ἔχει κἀκείνοις τὸ στράτευμα διαλλάξειν καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιέσεσθαι, ἀχθομένους καὶ πρότερον τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ἡδέως ἂν ἀπαλλαγέντας πῃ ἀσφαλῶς τοῦ πράγματος πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσαν.

[2] καὶ ξυνίσταντό τε ἤδη καὶ τὰ πράγματα διεμέμφοντο, ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνας τῶν πάνυ [στρατηγῶν] τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, οἷον Θηραμένη τε τὸν Ἅγνωνος καὶ Ἀριστοκράτη τὸν Σκελίου καὶ ἄλλους, οἳ μετέσχον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι τῶν πραγμάτων, φοβούμενοι δέ, ὡς ἔφασαν, τό τε ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ στράτευμα καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην σπουδῇ πάνυ, τούς τε ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβευομένους [ἔπεμπον], μή τι ἄνευ τῶν πλεόνων κακὸν δράσωσι τὴν πόλιν, οὐ τὸ † ἀπαλλαξείειν τοῦ ἄγαν ἐς ὀλίγους ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν καθιστάναι.

[3] ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ’ ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται· πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἱρέσεως γιγνομένης ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει.

[4] σαφέστατα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι· ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου γενέσθαι.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 8.89 focus

[1] The ambassadors of The Four Hundred being returned from Samos to Athens and having related what they had in charge from Alcibiades, how that he exhorted them to hold out and not give ground to the enemy, and that he had great hopes to reconcile them to the army and to overcome the Peloponnesians, whereas many of the sharers in the oligarchy were formerly discontented and would gladly, if they could have done it safely, have quitted the business, they were now a great deal more confirmed in that mind.

[2] And already they had their meetings apart and did cast aspersions on the government, and had for their ringleaders some of the heads of the oligarchicals and such as bare office amongst them, as Theramenes, the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, and others, who though they were partakers with the foremost in the affairs of state, yet feared, as they said, Alcibiades and the army at Samos; and joined in the sending of ambassadors to Lacedaemon, because they were loth, by singling themselves from the greater number, to hurt the state, not that they dismissed the state into the hands of a very few, but said that The Five Thousand ought in fact to be assigned, and not in voice only, and the government to be reduced to a greater equality.

[3] And this was indeed the form pretended in words by The Four Hundred. But the most of them, through private ambition, fell upon that by which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is chiefly overthrown. For at once they claimed every one not to be equal but to be far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when election is made, because a man is not overcome by his equals, he can better brook it.

[4] But the great power of Alcibiades at Samos and the opinion they had that the oligarchy was not like to last was it that most evidently encouraged them; and thereupon they every one contended who should most eminently become the patron of the people.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 8.89 focus

[1] the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos arrived at Athens . Upon their delivering the message from Alcibiades, telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the enemy, and saying that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the army and of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members of the oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much inclined to be quit of the business in any safe way that they could, were at once greatly strengthened in their resolve.

[2] These now banded together and strongly criticised the administration, their leaders being some of the principal generals and men in office under the oligarchy, such as Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of Scellias, and others; who, although among the most prominent members of the government (being afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos , and most especially of Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom they had sent to Lacedaemon , might do the state some harm without the authority of the people), without insisting on objections to the excessive concentration of power in a few hands, yet urged that the Five Thousand must be shown to exist not merely in name but in reality, and the constitution placed upon a fairer basis.

[3] But this was merely their political cry; most of them being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct so surely fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies. For all at once pretend to be not only equals but each the chief and master of his fellows; while under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his equals.

[4] But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the power of Alcibiades at Samos , and their own disbelief in the stability of the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should first become the leader of the commons.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 8.89 focus

Als nun die von Samos zurückkehrenden Abgesandten der
Vierhundert den Bescheid des Alkibiades zu Athen meldeten, daß er
sie ausfordere, den Krieg beharrlich fortzuführen und den Feinden in
Nichts nachzugehen, und daß er große Hoffnung habe, das Heer mit
ihnen auszusöhnen und die Peloponnesier zu besiegen, so wurde die
Mehrzahl der an der Oligarchie Betheiligten, die schon seit einiger
Zeit sehr gern auf irgend eine Weise der Sache los und ledig
geworden wären, wenn es nur mit ihrer Sicherheit anginge, in dieser ihrer
Absicht noch viel mehr bestärkt. Schon hielten sie Zusammenkünfte
und beklagten und tadelten die Verhältnisse, und an der Spitze standen
dabei die Angesehensten unter den Feldherrn und höheren Beamten,
wie TherameneS, Sohn des Hagnon, und AristokrateS, des SkelliaS
Sohn, und Andere, welche mit an der Spitze der Geschäfte standen,
jetzt aber, wie sie sagten, das Heer auf Samos fürchteten und den
Alkibiades, und diejenigen unter den Oligarchen, welche Gesandte
nach Lakedämon schickten: daß dieselben nämlich ohne Zuziehung der
Mehrzahl etwas zum Unheil der Stadt unternehmen möchten, und
zwar nicht in dem Sinne, daß die allzuschars ausgesprochene
Oligarchie aufgegeben werden solle. Aber man müsse jetzt die
Fünftausend nicht nur dem Namen nach, sondern auch in der That einführen
und die Regierungsgewalten mehr nach dem Recht der Gleichheit
Aller vertheilen. Dieß war aber nur ein Deckmantel, den sie in >
ihren Reden.brauchten, um die Bürger zu gewinnen; in der That
aber gab sich die Mehrzahl unter ihnen aus persönlichem Ehrgeiz
solchen Bestrebungen hin, durch welche fast jede Oligarchie, die aus ¹
der Demokratie hervorgegangen ist, sich selbst zu Grunde richtet.
Denn vom ersten Tag an will Keiner nicht nur nicht mehr den
Andern gleich, sondern sogar vor allen Andern der Erste sein 5 bei
Mahlen aber-, die nach.demokratischen Gesetzen stattfinden, erträgt
Einer leichter das Ergebniß, da er ja von seines Gleichen nicht
zurückgesetzt. werden kann. Am meisten beunruhigte sie aber offenbar
die gesicherte Macht des Alkibiades auf Samos, und daß sie selbst
keinen Glauben an den Bestand der Oligarchie hatten, und deßhalb
eben suchte Jeder dem Andern den Rang abzulaufen, um nur ja der
erste Vorsteher einer demokratischen Regierung zu werden.- " '

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 8.89 focus

Als die Gesandten der Vierhundert nach Athen zurück-
gekommen waren, berichteten sie, was Alkibiades ihnen gesagt,
wie er geraten, auszuhalten und den Feinden nicht nachzugehen,
auch daß er die beste Hoffnung habe, das Heer mit ihnen
auszusöhnen und die Feinde zu besiegen. Infolgedessen wurden
freilich alle die, welche schon bisher nur widerwillig mit der
Oligarchie gegangen waren und sie gern bei guter Gelegenheit
losgeworden wären, nun erst recht aufsässig. Sie hielten be
reits Zusammenkünfte und schalten auf die Regierung, ja selbst
angesehene Feldherren und Männer, die unter der Oligarchie
in Amt und Würden standen, wie Theramenes, Hagnons Sohn,
und Aristokrates, Skellias' Sohn, und andere, gaben dabei
den Ton an. Die waren zwar damals in hohen Stellungen,
fürchteten aber, wie sie sagten, einerseits Alkibiades und daS
Heer auf Samos, anderseits aber auch, daß die beständigen
Gesandtschaften nach Lakedämon hinter dem Rücken der Bürger
schaft der Stadt schlecht bekommen könnten. Sie sagten nicht
gradezu, daß sie diese Herrschaft einer so kleinen Minderheit
am liebsten loswären, aber doch, daß man die Fünftausend
nicht nur dem Namen nach, sondern wirklich zur Regierung
berufen und die Gleichheit der Bürger verfassungsmäßig mehr
zur Anerkennung bringen müsse. Es war jedoch bloße Redens
art, wenn sie sich scheinbar so für das Recht der Bürgerschaft
erwärmten; bei den meisten war es nur eigener Ehrgeiz, wenn
sie eine Politik einschlugen, wie solche ein aus der Demokratie
hervorgegangenes oligarchisches Regiment in der Regel zu Fall
bringt. Denn in dem Augenblick ist es keinem um die Gleich
heit aller zu tun, sondern jeder will eben selbst der Allererste
sein. In einer Demokratie nimmt man eine Wahlniederlage
weniger schwer, weil man darin keine Zurücksetzung durch seine
Standesgenossen erblickt. Den Ausschlag bei ihnen aber gab
die große Stellung, welche Alkibiades jetzt in Samos gewonnen
hatte, und die Überzeugung, daß die Oligarchie nicht von Be
stand sein werde. So strebten sie alle um die Wette, nach
Herstellung der Volksherrschaft selbst an die Spitze zu kommen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 8.89 focus

LXXXIX. Les ambassadeurs envoyés par les quatre cents rapportèrent, à leur retour de Samos à Athènes, ce que leur avait dit Alcibiade : qu’il engageait à tenir ferme contre l’ennemi, sans lui faire aucune concession, et qu’il avait bon espoir de réconcilier l’armée avec eux et de triompher des Péloponnésiens. Déjà la plupart de ceux qui avaient été mêlés au mouvement oligarchique en étaient aux regrets et ne demandaient pas mieux que de trouver une issue quelconque pour sortir de là s’ils le pouvaient sans danger. Leur confiance s’en accrut; ils formaient des réunions, ils critiquaient l’ordre de choses présent. A leur tête étaient des hommes du plus grand poids dans le parti oligarchique, généraux, fonctionnaires en charge, tels que Théramènes, fils d’Agnon, Aristocrates, fils de Scellias, et d’autres encore. Quoiqu’aux premiers rangs parmi les chefs actuels du gouvernement, ils redoutaient— et ils ne s’en cachaient pas — l’armée de Samos et Alcibiade; ils craignaient que les ambassadeurs envoyés à Lacédémone ne prissent sans la participation du peuple quelque mesure compromettante pour la république; aussi, tout en se gardant de dire qu’il fallait modifier l’ordre actuel comme concentrant le pouvoir dans un cercle trop étroit, ils réclamaient pour les cinq mille une action politique réelle et non plus nominale, et un gouvernement plus conforme aux principes d’égalité. Mais la raison politique, mise ainsi en avant, n’était qu’un leurre; en réalité, la plupart d’entre eux, dans des vues d’ambition privée, cédaient à des préoccupations personnelles, fatales surtout à une oligarchie issue de la démocratie. Car alors une rivalité incessante s’établit entre tous; ce n’est plus à l’égalité qu’on as- pire : chacun veut primer de beaucoup tous les autres. Sous le régime démocratique, au contraire, où c’est l’élection qui décide, on accepte plus aisément le résultat, parce qu’on ne se croitpas rabaissé par ses égaux¹. Ce qui fortifiait surtout ces tendances, c’était la forte position prise par Alcibiade à Samos et la conviction que l’oligarchie n’avait, pas d’avenir. On briguait donc à l’envi le rôle de chef du peuple, et c’était à qui arriverait le premier.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 8.89 focus

De retour à Athènes, les députés envoyés à Samos par les Quatre-Cents rapportèrent la réponse d’Alcibiade , qui était de tenir ferme sans céder aucunement à l’ennemi, vu qu’il avait les meilleures espérances de les réconcilier avec l’armée et de triomper des Péloponésiens. Déjà plusieurs de ceux qui avaient donné les mains à l’établissement de l’oligarchie en étaient aux regrets, et ne demandaient pas mieux que de trouver un prétexte pour y échapper sans danger. Le langage d’Alcibiade les enhardit; ils formèrent des réunions, dans lesquelles on critiquait la direction des affaires. Parmi eux se trouvaient quelques-uns des chefs du parti aristocratique, généraux et fonctionnaires , tels que Théraménès fils d’Hagnon, Aristo-cratès fils de Scellias, et plusieurs autres. Bien qu’ils tinssent le premier rang dans le régime actuel, ils n’étaient pas, disaient-ils, sans inquiétude à l’égard de l’armée de Samos, et paiücor lièrement d’Alcibiade ; ils craignaient même que les députés partis pour Lacédémone ne prissent, sans l’aveu de ceux qui les avaient envoyés, quelque résolution funeste à l’État. Sans donc renoncer à une tendance oligarchique , ils se bornaient à demander qu’on désignât effectivement les Cinq-Mille, qui n’existaient encore que de nom, et qu’on établît plus d’égalité entre les citoyens. Du reste il n’y avait là que de vains semblants de popularité; au fond, la plupart n’écoutaient que leur ambition personnelle, cause fréquente de la chute des oligarchies issues de l’état populaire; chacun aspire à devenir de plein saut, non pas l’égal, mais le premier de tous ; dans la démocratie, au contraire on prend mieux son parti du résultat des élections , parce qu’on ne se voit pas préférer ses égaux¹. Mais rien ne fît sur eux plus d’impression que l’autorité dont Alcibiade jouissait à Samos et le peu d’avenir que leur semblait avoir l’oligarchie. Aussi travaillaient-ils à Tenvi à devenir chacun les chefs du parti populaire.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 8.89 focus

[1] When the envoys sent by the Four Hundred arrived at Athens on their return from Samos and reported what Alcibiades had said— urging them to hold out and make no concessions to the enemy, and saying that he had great hopes both of reconciling the army to the people at home and of prevailing over the Peloponnesians—most of those who shared in the oligarchy,¹ who were even before this in distress, and would have been glad to be safely rid of the business in any way, were far more encouraged.

[2] And they were already beginning to form groups and criticize the state of affairs, having as their leaders some of the very men who were members of the oligarchy and held office, such as Theramenes son of Hagnon, Aristocrates son of Scelias, and others. These had been among the foremost of those who had taken an active part in the revolution, but being afraid in real earnest, as they said, of the army at Samos and of Alcibiades, as well as of those who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon, who they thought might, by acting without the sanction of the greater number, work some harm to the city, they did not indeed openly profess that they wanted to avoid reducing the government to an extreme oligarchy, but maintained that they ought to appoint the Five Thousand in fact and not merely in name, and to establish the government on the basis of a greater equality.

[3] Now this phrase of theirs was a mere political catchword, and in their personal ambitions most of them eagerly pursued the sort of methods by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to come to ruin; for all demand forthwith, not equality, but each that he shall be quite the first himself; whereas under a democracy an election is held and every man acquiesces more readily in the result because he feels that those to whom he owes his defeat² are not his equals.³

[4] But what most evidently encouraged these men was the fact that Alcibiades' position at Samos was so strong, and their opinion that the power of the oligarchy would not last long. Each one, therefore, strove to become the foremost leader of the people himself.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 8.89 focus

[1] Legati autem a quadringentis viris missi, quum e Samo regressi Allienas Alcibiadis mandata renuntiassent, liortari eum, ut hostibus resisterent, nulloque modo cederent, maximamque eum spem habere, fore, at et diis exercitum reconciliaret, et Peloponnesios superaret, his verbis plerosque eorum, qui paucorum dominatus erant participes , qui jam antea animis essent infensis et lubenter vellent aliquo modo se tuto ex illo negotio expedire, tunc multo magis corroborarunt.

[2] Atque coibant jam et de illo rerum statu conquerebantur, duces habentes ex praecipuis imperatoribus, qui in paucorum dominatu et in magistratibus erant, veluti Theramenem Hagnonis, et Aristocratem Scellii filium, et alios, qui inter primos quidem rerum participes fuerant, sed, ut aiebant, ideo, quod metuerent exercitum Samium, et Alcibiadem, et eos, qui per legatos cum Lacedaemoniis agerent, Samum misissent, ne illi sine majore civium parte malo aliquo civitatem afficerent, non quidem professi se impedituros, ne res in nimis paucorum dominatum concederent, sed quinque millia re, non autem nomine, oportere creare, et aequabiliorem reipublicae formam oonsti-tuere.

[3] Erat autem hoc speciosum quoddam orationis genus , quo publice uterentur, privatim vero ob ambitionem plerique eorum tale consilium amplectebantur, qua potissimum ratione interit paucorum dominatus ex populari statu constitutas; omnes enim tantum abest ut pares inter se esse velint, ut primo quoque die se quisque ipsum longe omnium principem esse aequum judicet; contra in populari statu, in quo electio fit, quae ex eo eveniunt, facilius quisque fert, ut non a paribus suis commodo privatus.

[4] Manifestissime autem eonim animos erexerunt et Alcibiadis potentia, quam Sami habebat, jam confirmata, et quod hic paucorumdomina-tus iis haud stabilis fore videbatur; certatim igitur unusquisque ipse princeps popularis slatus^iatronus esse annitebatur.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 8.89 focus

Ma i mandatari de’quattrocento tornati da Samo ad Atene, e riferite le risposte di Alcibiade con cui ordinava di persistere e non cedere ai nemici , giacché egli avea molta speranza di riconciliar con loro l’esercito e di superare i Peloponnesi, ispirarono assai maggior coraggio a coloro, i quali, tuttoché avesser parte al reggimento oliparchico, pure ne erano (li prima indispettiti , e volentieri avrebber preso qualche via di sicurezza per uscir da quell'intrigamento. E già si accoglieano in brigate , e biasimavano quello stato di cose, avendo in ciò per capi generali ragguardevolissimi addetti alloligarchia e costituiti in carica, come Teramane di Agnone, Aristocrate di Sicelio ed altri, che avean mano tra’primi al governo degli affari, e che temendo (per quanto dicevano) dell’esercito di Samo e di Alcibiade , ed anche de’ loro ambasciatori a Sparta, man -daron dicendo a quest’ultimi che badassero bene di non recar danno alla patria, ove qualche trattato concludessero seuza il consenso del maggior numero de’cittadini. Credevano essi che con questo temperamento libererebbero la Repubblica dal cadere sotto il governo di troppo pochi ; e dicevano che bisognava creare i cinquemila non in parole ma in fatti, e ridurre lo Stato a maggiore eguaglianza. Tutto questo però era im pretesto politico delle loro mire, e la maggior parte di essi, mossi da private ambizioni, erano attaccali a tal forma di governo, in cui l’oligarchia , più che altro, nata dalla democrazia è un sogno. Essendoché nel primo giorno stesso del governo oligarchico , ciascun pretende di primeggiar di gran lunga sugli altri, non che di essere eguale: laddove negli squittinii che si fanno dal popolo, ognun si accomoda più facilmente al resultameuto senza credersi soverchiato, perché é opera di cittadini eguali. Quello poi che manifestamente sollevò gli animi di costoro fu la ferma autorità che aveva Alcibiade in Samo, e la opinione in cui essi erano , che il reggimento de pochi non potesse durare stabilmente. Laonde ciascuno faceva oltremodo a gara per essere il principal protettore dello stato popolare.

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. φοβούμενοι δ᾽, ὡς ἔφασαν, κ. τ. λ.] This passage, as it stands in Arnold's text, being utterly untranslatable, I was compelled either to omit it altogether, or to adopt such corrections as would at any rate give some sense to it, whether the true one or not. I have therefore, with Göller, changed τούς into οὕς taken away the comma after πρεσβευομένους, and substituted ἀπαλλαξείειν for ἀπαλλάξειν. With regard to the τό before that infinitive, I am disposed to think that it is not so hopeless a reading as has been considered; but that this may be added to those instances given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. §670, in which the article shows that

especial emphasis is laid on the notion expressed by the infinitive.

Compare especially II. 53. 4, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν; Xen. Apol. Soc. 13, τὸ προειδέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον πάντες λέγουσι Id. Symp. III. 3, οὐδεὶς σοι, ἐφη, ἀντιλέγει τὸ μὴ οὐ λέξειν. The last two quotations prove that this construction is common after verbs of ' saying;' and in the present instance I suppose the infinitive to depend upon such a verb understood from ὡς ἔφασαν in the preceding part of the paragraph. There seems therefore to be no reason for changing τό into τοί as I was once led by the various reading τῷ to conjecture, before I knew that Göller had done the same.

2. ῥᾶον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ... φέρει.] Because, as Arnold observes,

they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing therefore to lessen the mortification of defeat.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 8.89

Henry Dale (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers