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[1] Tile term
enthymeme
1
is applied not merely to the actual argument, that is to say, the matter adduced to prove something else, but also to its expression, the nature of which, as I have already pointed out, is twofold.
2
It may be drawn from denial of
consequents, when it will consist of a proposition immediately followed by a proof, as in the following passage from the
pro Ligario;
3
At that point the justice of the cause was doubtful, since there was something to be said on both sides. But now we can only regard that cause as superior, which even the gods supported.
Here we have a proposition and a reason, but no formal conclusion: it is therefore tile incomplete syllogism known as an
enthymeme.[2] It may on the other hand be drawn from
incompatibles, in which case the proof will be much stronger; indeed some restrict the title of
enthymeme
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to this form of argument. The following passage from the
pro Milone
5
of Cicero will provide a parallel:
You are then sitting there to avenge the death of a man whom you would refuse to restore to life, even if you thought it within your power to do so.
[3] This form of argument may even at times consist of a number of clauses, as in the following passage from the same speech
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:
Was he resolved then to kill to the dissatisfaction of some a man whom he refused to kill to the satisfaction of all? Are we to believe that he did not hesitate, in defiance of the law and despite the unfavourable circumstances both of time and place and the risk involved to his own life, to kill one whom he did not venture to kill when he might have done so legally, at his own time and place and without the least danger to himself?
[4] The most effective kind of
enthymeme seems however to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar or contrary proposition as in the following passage from Demosthenes
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:
For if at any time an act has been committed contrary to law and you have imitated it, it does not therefore follow that you should go scot free; on the contrary it is an additional reason why you should be condemned. For if any of those who transgressed the law had been condemned, you would not have proposed this, and further, if you are condemned, no one else will propose anything of the kind.
[5] As regards the
epicheieme, some authorities hold that it consists of four, five, and even six parts. Cicero
8
urges that there are not more than five at most, i.e. the major premise and its reason, the minor premise and its proof, and fifthly the conclusion. But since at times the major premise does not require a reason nor the minor a proof, while occasionally even the conclusion is not necessary, he holds that the
epicheireme may consist of only four, three, or even two parts.
[6] Personally however follow the majority of authorities in holding that there are not more than three parts. For it follows from the very nature of reasoning that there must be something to form the subject of enquiry and something else to provide the proof, while the third element which has to be added may be regarded as resulting from the agreement of the two previous elements. Thus the first part will be the major, the second the minor premise and the third the conclusion. For the confirmation and development of both premises may reasonably be included in the parts to which they belong.
[7] Let us then take an example from Cicero
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of the
epicheireme consisting of five parts.
Those things which are controlled by reason are better governed than those which are not.
This they call the first part and consider that it requires to be established by various reasons and a copious display of eloquence. Personally I hold that the whole of this together with its reason forms but one part. Otherwise, if the
reason is to be treated as a separate part and if there are a variety of
reasons, this will involve an addition to the number of parts. Next he produces the
minor premise:[8]
But there is nothing better administered than the universe.
The proof of this minor premise is treated as the fourth part of the
epicheireme. My criticism of this statement is identical with my criticism of the preceding. [9] The fifth place they assign to the conclusion which either merely makes the necessary inference from the preceding parts (
i.e.
Therefore the universe is governed by reason
) or after briefly bringing major and minor premise together adds what is deduced from them with the following result:
But if on the one hand things that are controlled by reason are better governed than things which are not and on the other nothing is better administered than the universe, then it follows that the universe is governed by reason.
As regards this part of the
epicheireme I agree. [10] I have said that the
epicheireme consists of three parts: its form is not however invariable. There is firstly the form in which the
conclusion is identical with what has already been stated in the
major premise.
The soul is immortal, since whatever derives its motion from itself is immortal. But the soul derives its motion from itself. Therefore the soul is immortal.
This process occurs not merely in individual arguments, but in whole
cases, provided they are of a simple character, and also in
questions.
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[11] For cases and questions always have first a
major premise, such as
You have committed sacrilege,
or
Not everyone who has killed a man is guilty of murder.
Second comes a
reason, which is stated at greater length in cases and questions than in separate arguments, while finally comes the
conclusion in which as a rule they set forth the point they have proved either by enumeration of particulars or in the form of a hasty conclusion. In this type of
epicheireme the
major premise is doubtful, since it is still under investigation. [12] There is another form of
conclusion which is not actually identical with the
major premise, but has the same force
Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of' feeling, and that which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us.
There is a third form in which the
major premise and the
conclusion are different.
All animate things are better than inanimate, but there is nothing better than the universe, wherefore the universe is animate.
It may be thought that in this case there is no real
major premise, since it would be possible to state the reasoning in the following form:
The universe is animate, for all things animate are better than inanimate,
etcetera. [13] This
major premise is either an admitted fact as in the last example or requires to be proved as in the following:
He who wishes to live a happy life, must be a philosopher
: for this is not an acknowledged truth, and the premises must be established before we can arrive at the conclusion. Sometimes again the
minor premise is an admitted fact, as for instance,
But all men wish to live a happy life,
while sometimes it requires to be proved, as for example the statement quoted above,
That which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of feeling,
since it is doubtful whether the soul is immortal after its release from the body or only continues to exist for a time. Some call this a
minor premise, some a
reason.[14] There is no difference between the
epicheireme and the
syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the
epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible. For if it were always possible to prove controversial points from admitted premises, the orator would have little to do in this connexion.
[15] For what skill does it require to say,
The property is mine, for I am the only son of the deceased,
or
I am the sole heir, since possession of the testator's estate is given by the law of property in accordance with the terms of his will: the property therefore belongs to me
? [16] But when the reason given is itself disputable, we must establish the certainty of the premises by which we are proposing to prove what is uncertain. For example, if our opponent says
You are not his son
or
You are illegitimate
or
You are not his only son
; or, again,
You are not his heir
or
The will is invalid
or
You are not entitled to inherit
or
You have co-heirs,
we must prove the validity of the reason on which we base our claim that the property should be adjudicated to us. [17] But when
a reason of unusual length intervenes, it is necessary to state the final conclusion, otherwise the
major premise and the
reason would suffice.
Laws are silent in the midst of arms, and do not require us to await their sanction when the circumstances are such that he who would await their sanction is certain to be the victim of an unjust penalty before ever the just penalty can be claimed.
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Hence it has been asserted that the form of
enthymeme which is based on denial of consequents resembles a
reason. But sometimes, again, it is sufficient to state a single proposition as in the example just quoted,
The laws are silent in the midst of arms.
[18] We may also begin with the
reason and then proceed to the conclusion as in another passage from the same speech
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:
But if the Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a thief by night under any circumstances, and by day if he used a weapon to defend himself, who is there who will contend that the slayer must be punished under whatever circumstances a man has been killed?
'The process is still further varied by Cicero, and the
reason placed third, as in the phrase,
When he sees that the sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves.
[19] On the other hand, he places the various parts in the regular order in the following instance:
How can it be unjust to kill a robber who lies in wait for his victim?
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Next comes the
reason:
What is the object of our escorts and our swords?
Last comes the conclusion resulting from the
major premise and the
reason:
Which we certainly should not be permitted to have, if we were absolutely forbidden to use them.
[20] This form of proof may be countered in three ways, that is to say it may be attacked in all its parts. For either the
major premise or the
minor or the
conclusion or occasionally all three are refuted. The
major premise is refuted in the following case:
I was justified in killing him, as he lay in wait for me.
For the very first question in the defence of Milo is
whether it is right that he who confesses that he has killed a man should look upon the light of day.
[21] The
minor premise is refuted by all the methods which we mentioned in dealing with refutation.
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As to the
reason it must be pointed out that it is sometimes true when the
proposition to which it is attached is not true, but may on the other hand sometimes be false although the proposition is true. For example,
Virtue is a good thing
is true, but if the reason,
Because it brings us wealth,
be added, we shall have an instance of a true
major premise and a false
reason.[22] With regard to the
conclusion, we may either deny its truth when it infers something which does not logically result from the premises, or we may treat it as irrelevant. The truth is denied in the following case:
We are justified in killing one who lies in wait for us; for since, like an enemy, he threatens us with violence, we ought to repulse his attack as though he were an enemy: therefore Milo was justified in killing Clodius as an enemy.
The conclusion is not valid, since we have not yet proved that Clodius lay in wait for him But the conclusion that we are therefore justified in killing one who lies in wait for us is perfectly true, though irrelevant to the case, for it is not yet clear that Clodius lay in wait for Milo. [23] But while the
major premise and the
reason may both be true and the conclusion false, yet if both are false, the conclusion can never be true.
[24] Some call the
enthymeme a
rhetorical syllogism, while others regard it as a part of the
syllogism, because whereas the latter always has its premises and conclusion and effects its proof by the employment of all its parts, the
ethymeme is content to let its proof be understood without explicit statement.
[25] The following is an example of a syllogism:
Virtue is the only thing that is good, for that alone is good which no one can put to a bad use: but no one can make a bad use of virtue; virtue therefore is good.
The
enthymeme draws its conclusion from denial of consequents.
Virtue is a good thing because no one can put it to a bad use.
On the other hand take the following syllogism.
Money is not a good thing; for that is not good which can be put to a bad use: money may be put to a bad use; therefore money is not a good thing.
The
enthymeme draws its conclusion from incompatibles.
Can money be a good thing when it is possible to put it to a bad use?
[26] The following argument is couched in syllogistic form:
If money in the form of silver coin is silver, the man who bequeathed all his silver to a legatee, includes all money in the form of coined silver: but he bequeathed all his silver: therefore he included in the bequest all money in the form of coined silver.
But for the orator it will be sufficient to say,
Since he bequeathed all his silver, he included in his bequest all his silver money.
[27] I think I have now dealt with all the precepts of those who treat oratory as a mystery. But these rules still leave scope for free exercise of the judgment. For although I consider that there are occasions when the orator may lawfully employ the syllogism, I am far from desiring him to make his whole speech consist of or even be crowded with a mass of
epicheiremes and
enthymemes. For a speech of that character would resemble dialogues and dialectical controversies rather than pleadings of the kind with which we are concerned, and there is an enormous difference between the two.
[28] For in the former we are confronted with learned men seeking for truth among men of learning; consequently they subject everything to a minute and scrupulous inquiry with a view to arriving at clear and convincing truths, and they claim for themselves the tasks of invention and judgment, calling the former
τοπική or the art of selecting the appropriate material for treatment, and the latter
κριτική or the art of criticism.
[29] We on the other hand have to compose our speeches for others to judge, and have frequently to speak before an audience of men who, if not thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: and unless we attract them by the charm of our discourse or drag them by its force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims of truth and justice.
[30] Eloquence aims at being rich, beautiful and commanding, and will attain to none of these qualities if it be broken up into conclusive inferences which are generally expressed in the same monotonous form: on the contrary its meanness will excite contempt, its severity dislike, its elaboration satiety, and its sameness boredom.
[31] Eloquence therefore must not restrict itself to narrow tracks, but range at large over the open fields. Its streams must not be conveyed through narrow pipes like the water of fountains, but flow as mighty rivers flow, filling whole valleys; and if it cannot find a channel it must make one for itself. For what can be more distressing than to be fettered by petty rules, like children who trace the letters of the alphabet which others have first written for them, or, as the Greeks say, insist on keeping the coat their mother gave them.
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Are we to have nothing but premises and conclusions from consequents and incompatibles? Must not the orator breathe life into the argument and develop it?
[32] Must lie not vary and diversify it by a thousand figures, and do all this in such a way that it seems to come into being as the very child of nature, not to reveal an artificial manufacture and a suspect art nor at every moment to show traces of an instructor's hand? What orator ever spoke thus? Even in Demosthenes we find but few traces of such a mechanism. And yet the Greeks of to-day are even more prone than we are (though this is the only point in which their practice is worse than ours) to bind their thoughts in fetters and to connect them by an inexorable chain of argument, making inferences where there was never any doubt, proving admitted facts and asserting that in so doing they are following the orators of old, although they always refuse to answer the question who it is that they are imitating. However of figures I shall speak elsewhere.
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[33] For the present I must add that I do not even agree with those who hold that arguments should always be expressed in language which is not only pure, lucid and distinct, but also as free as possible from all elevation and ornateness. I readily admit that arguments should be distinct and clear, and further that in arguments of a minor character the language and words should be as appropriate and as familiar as possible.
[34] But if the subject be one of real importance every kind of ornament should be employed, so long as it does nothing to obscure our meaning. For metaphor will frequently throw a flood of light upon a subject: even lawyers, who spend so much trouble over the appropriateness of words, venture to assert that the word
litus is derived from
eludere, because the shore is a place where the waves break in play.
[35] Further, the more unattractive the natural appearance of anything, the more does it require to be seasoned by charm of style: moreover, an argument is often less suspect when thus disguised, and the charm with which it is expressed makes it all the more convincing to our audience. Unless indeed we think that Cicero was in error when he introduced phrases such as the following into an argumentative passage:
The laws are silent in the midst of arms,
and
A sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves.
However, we must be careful to observe a happy mean in the employment of such embellishments, so that they may prove a real ornament and not a hindrance. Institutio Oratoria. Quintilian. Harold Edgeworth Butler (Translator). Cambridge, Mass.. 1920-1922.
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