Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 29.24

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

View: By Section

← Previous Next →

[1]

cum his ¹ mandatis ab rege legati ad Scipionem missi Syracusis eum convenerunt.

[2] Scipio quamquam magno momento rerum in Africa gerendarum magnaque spe destitutus erat, legatis propere, priusquam res volgaretur, remissis in Africam litteras dat ad regem,

[3] quibus etiam atque etiam monet eum ne iura hospitii secum neu cum populo Romano initae societatis neu fas, fidem, dexteras, deos testes atque arbitros conventorum fallat.

[4] ceterum quando neque celari adventus Numidarum Poterat—vagati enim in urbe obversatique praetorio Erant—et, si sileretur quid petentes venissent, periculum erat ne vera eo ipso quod celarentur sua sponte magis emanarent, timorque in exercitum incederet ² ne simul cum rege et Carthaginiensibus foret bellandum, avertit a vero falsis praeoccupando mentes hominum,

[5] et vocatis ad contionem militibus non ultra esse cunctandum ait; instare ut in Africam quam primum traiciat socios reges. Masinissam prius ipsum ³ ad C. Laelium venisse querentem quod cunctando tempus tereretur;

[6] nunc Syphacem mittere legatos idem admirantem, quae tam diuturnae morae sit causa postulantemque ⁴ ut aut traiciatur tandem ⁵ in Africam exercitus aut, si mutata consilia sint, certior fiat, ut et ipse ⁶ sibi ac regno suo possit ⁷ consulere.

[7] itaque satis iam omnibus instructis apparatisque ⁸ et re iam non ultra recipiente cunctationem, in animo sibi esse, Lilybaeum classe traducta eodemque omnibus peditum equitumque copiis contractis, quae prima dies cursum navibus daret, deis bene iuvantibus in Africam traicere.

[8] litteras ad M. Pomponium mittit ut, si ei videretur, Lilybaeum veniret, ut communiter consulerent quas potissimum legiones et ⁹ quantum militum numerum in Africam traiceret.

[9] item circum oram omnem ¹⁰ maritimam misit ut naves onerariae comprensae Lilybaeum omnes contraherentur.

[10] quidquid militum naviumque ¹¹ in Sicilia erat cum Lilybaeum convenisset, et nec urbs multitudinem hominum neque portus naves caperet,

[11] tantus omnibus ardor erat in Africam traiciendi ut non ad bellum duci viderentur, sed ad certa victoriae praemia. praecipue qui superabant ex Cannensi exercitu milites illo, non alio duce credebant navata rei publicae opera finire se militiam ignominiosam posse.

[12] et Scipio minime id genus militum aspernabatur, ut qui neque ad Cannas ignavia eorum cladem acceptam ¹² sciret neque ullos aeque veteres milites in exercitu Romano esse expertosque non variis proeliis modo sed urbibus etiam oppugnandis.

[13] Quinta et sexta Cannenses erant legiones. eas se traiecturum in Africam cum dixisset, singulos milites inspexit, relictisque quos non idoneos credebat, in locum eorum subiecit quos secum ex Italia adduxerat,

[14] supplevitque ita eas legiones ut singulae sena milia et ducenos pedites, trecenos ¹³ haberent equites. sociorum item Latini nominis pedites equitesque de exercitu Cannensi legit.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

Ab urbe condita (Latin) (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).)

Editions (2)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 29.24 focus

[1] cum iis mandatis ab rege legati ad Scipionem missi Syracusis eum convenerunt.

[2] Scipio quamquam magno momento rerum in Africa gerendarum magnaque spe destitutus erat,

[3] legatis propere, priusquam res vulgaretur, remissis in Africam litteras dat ad regem, quibus etiam atque etiam monet eum, ne iura hospitii secum neu cum populo Romano initae societatis neu fas, fidem, dexteras, deos testes atque arbitros conventorum fallat.

[4] ceterum quando neque celari adventus Numidarum poterat — vagati enim in urbe obversatique praetorio erant — et, si sileretur, quid petentes venissent, periculum erat, ne vera eo ipso, quod celarentur, sua sponte magis emanarent, timorque in exercitum incideret, ne simul cum rege et Carthaginiensibus foret bellandum, avertit a vero falsis praeoccupando mentes hominum

[5] et vocatis ad contionem militibus non ultra esse cunctandum ait; instare, ut in Africam quam primum traiciat, socios reges; Masinissam prius ipsum ad C. Laelium venisse querentem, quod cunctando tempus tereretur;

[6] nunc Syphacem mittere legatos idem admirantem, quae tam diuturnae morae sit causa, postulantemque, ut aut traiciatur tandem in Africam exercitus aut, si mutata consilia sint, certior fiat, ut et ipse sibi ac regno suo possit consulere.

[7] itaque satis iam omnibus instructis paratisque, et re iam non ultra recipiente cunctationem in animo sibi esse, Lilybaeum classe traducta eodemque omnibus peditum equitumque copiis contractis, quae prima dies cursum navibus daret, deis bene iuvantibus in Africam traicere.

[8] litteras ad M. Pomponium mittit, ut, si ei videretur, Lilybaeum veniret, ut communiter consulerent, quas potissimum legiones et quantum militum numerum in Africam traiceret.

[9] item circum oram omnem maritimam misit, ut naves onerariae cotmprensae comprensae Lilybaeum omnes contraherentur.

[10] quidquid militum naviumque in Sicilia erat, cum Lilybaeum convenisset, et nec urbs multitudinem hominum neque portus naves caperet,

[11] tantus omnibus ardor erat in Africam traiciendi, ut non ad bellum duci viderentur, sed ad certa victoriae praemia. praecipue qui superabant ex Cannensi exercitu milites illo, non alio duce credebant navata rei publicae opera finire se militiam ignominiosam posse.

[12] et Scipio minime id genus militum aspernabatur ut qui neque ad Cannas ignavia eorum cladem acceptam sciret neque ullos aeque veteres milites in exercitu Romano esse, expertosque non variis proeliis modo sed urbibus etiam oppugnandis.

[13] quinta et sexta Cannenses erant legiones; eas se traiecturum in Africam cum dixisset, singulos milites inspexit, relictisque, quos non idoneos credebat, in locum eorum subiecit, quos secum ex Italia adduxerat,

[14] supplevitque ita eas legiones, ut singulae sena milia et ducenos pedites, trecenos haberent equites. sociorum item Latini nominis pedites equitesque de exercitu Cannensi legit.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Conway, Robert Seymour; Walters, Charles Flamstead; Johnson, Stephen Keymer, editors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914-1935. (Oxford Classical Texts)) — 29.24 focus

[1]

cum his mandatis ab rege legati ad Scipionem missi Syracusis eum conuenerunt.

[2] Scipio quamquam magno momento rerum in Africa gerendarum magnaque spe destitutus erat, legatis propere priusquam res uolgaretur remissis in

[3] Africam litteras dat ad regem quibus etiam atque etiam monet eum ne iura hospitii secum neu cum populo Romano initae societatis neu fas fidem dexteras deos testes atque arbitros conuentorum fallat.

[4] ceterum quando neque celari aduentus Numidarum poterat—uagati enim in urbe obuersatique praetorio erant—et, si sileretur quid petentes uenissent, periculum erat ne uera eo ipso quod celarentur sua sponte magis emanarent, timorque in exercitum incederet ne simul cum rege et Carthaginiensibus foret bellandum, auertit a uero falsis praeoccupando mentes hominum, et uocatis ad contionem militibus non ultra esse cunctandum ait;

[5] instare ut in Africam quam primum traiciat socios reges. Masinissam prius ipsum ad C. Laelium uenisse querentem quod cunctando tempus tereretur:

[6] nunc Syphacem mittere legatos idem admirantem quae tam diuturnae morae sit causa postulantemque ut aut traiciatur tandem in Africam exercitus aut, si mutata consilia sint, certior fiat ut et ipse sibi ac regno suo possit consulere.

[7] itaque satis iam omnibus instructis apparatisque et re iam non ultra recipiente cunctationem, in animo sibi esse Lilybaeum classe traducta eodemque omnibus peditum equitumque copiis contractis quae prima dies cursum nauibus daret dis bene iuuantibus in Africam traicere.

[8] litteras ad M. Pomponium mittit ut, si ei uideretur, Lilybaeum ueniret ut communiter consulerent quas potissimum legiones et quantum militum numerum in Africam traiceret.

[9] item circum oram omnem maritimam misit ut naues onerariae comprensae Lilybaeum omnes contraherentur.

[10] quicquid militum nauiumque in Sicilia erat cum Lilybaeum conuenisset et nec urbs multitudinem hominum neque portus naues caperet,

[11] tantus omnibus ardor erat in Africam traiciendi ut non ad bellum duci uiderentur sed ad certa uictoriae praemia. praecipue qui superabant ex Cannensi exercitu milites illo non alio duce credebant nauata rei publicae opera finire se militiam ignominiosam posse.

[12] et Scipio minime id genus militum aspernabatur, ut qui neque ad Cannas ignauia eorum cladem acceptam sciret neque ullos aeque ueteres milites in exercitu Romano esse expertosque non uariis proeliis modo sed urbibus etiam oppugnandis. quinta et sexta Cannenses erant legiones.

[13] eas se traiecturum in Africam cum dixisset, singulos milites inspexit, relictisque quos non idoneos credebat in locum eorum subiecit quos secum ex Italia adduxerat,

[14] suppleuitque ita eas legiones ut singulae sena milia et ducenos pedites, trecenos haberent equites. sociorum item Latini nominis pedites equitesque de exercitu Cannensi legit.

Translations (3)

History of Rome Perseus (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library)) — 29.24 focus

[1]

With these instructions ambassadors were sent to Scipio by the king, and they met him at Syracuse.

[2] Scipio had lost, to be sure, an important factor for the campaign in Africa and a high hope; nevertheless, sending the messengers back to Africa promptly, before the matter should be widely reported, he gave them a letter to the king.

[3] In this he insistently admonished him not to prove false to the claims of a guest-friendship entered into with himself, nor to those of an alliance contracted with the Roman people, nor to divine law, to honour, to the clasped hands, to the gods as witnesses and arbiters of compacts.

[4] But the arrival of the Numidians could not be kept secret, for they had roamed about the city and had showed themselves at headquarters; ¹

[5] and if the object of their mission was passed over in silence there would be danger that the facts might of themselves transpire, all the more from the very attempt to conceal them, and that the fear of having to fight at the same time with the king and the Carthaginians might overtake the army.

[6] For that reason Scipio diverted men's attention from the truth by preoccupation with false statements, and summoning the soldiers to an assembly, he told them that there must be no further delay; that the kings, their allies, were insisting that he cross over to Africa as soon as possible.

[7] Masinissa, he said, had previously come in person to Gaius Laelius complaining because they were wasting time in hesitation; and now Syphax was sending ambassadors, stating that he also was at a loss to explain what was the reason for a delay so protracted, and demanding either that the army be at last ² transported

[8] to Africa, or, if their plans had been changed, that he be informed, so that he on his part might take measures for himself and his kingdom.

[9] Accordingly, since now everything had been duly fitted out and made ready and the situation admitted of no further delay, Scipio said

[10] it was his intention to shift his fleet to Lilybaeum and concentrate there all his infantry and cavalry forces, then on the first day that offered a passage to his ships to cross over with the blessing of the gods to Africa.

[11] He sent a letter to Marcus Pomponius, ³ requesting him, if he approved, to come to Lilybaeum, so that they might jointly decide which particular legions to transport to Africa and how large a number of men.

[12] He likewise sent orders round the entire coastline to have all merchantmen pressed into the service and concentrated at Lilybaeum.

When all the soldiers and ships in Sicily had been brought together at Lilybaeum and the city could not contain the multitude of men nor the harbour the ships, such was the ardour of every man

[13] for the passage to Africa that it seemed as though they were being led, not to a war but to assured rewards of victory.

[14] Especially the soldiers who were left of the army at Cannae believed that under that general and no other, by active duty for the state they could bring their ignominious service to an end. ⁴

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 29.24 focus

[1]

The ambassadors, sent to Scipio by the king with these instructions, met him at Syracuse.

[2] Scipio, though disappointed in an affair which was of the greatest importance with regard to his operations in Africa, and in the sanguine expectations he had formed from it, sent the ambassadors back into Africa speedily, before their business was made

[3] known, giving them letters for the king, in which he warned him over and over again

not to violate the laws of hospitality which bound them together; the obligation of the alliance entered into with the Roman people; nor make light of justice, honour, their right hands pledged, and the gods the witnesses and arbitrators of compacts.

[4] But, as the coming of the Numidians could not be concealed, for they lounged about the city, and had frequently appeared at the pavilion; and as, if nothing were said about the object of their visit, there was danger lest the truth, from the very circumstance of its being made a secret, should spontaneously spread the more; and, in consequence, the troops become alarmed lest they should have to wage war at once with the king and the Carthaginians, Scipio endeavoured to divert their attention from the truth by preoccupying their minds with false information; and, summoning his soldiers to an assembly, said,

that it was not expedient to delay any longer.

[5]

That the kings, their allies, urged them to cross over into Africa with all speed.

[6]

That Masinissa himself had before come to Lalius, complaining that time was consumed in delays, and that now Syphax sent ambassadors, expressing his astonishment on the same account, namely, what could be the cause of such long delay; and requesting either that the army would now at length be transported into Africa, or, if the plan was changed, that he might be informed so that he might himself take measures for the safety of himself and his dominions.

[7]

Therefore, as every thing was now ready and prepared, and as the business admitted of no further delay, he was resolved, after having removed the fleet to Lilybaeum, and collected here all his forces of foot and horse, with the blessing of the gods to pass over into Africa the first day the ships could sail.

[8] He sent a letter to Marcus Pomponius, directing him, if he thought proper, to come to Lilybaeum, that they might consult together as to what legions, in preference to any others, and how large a number of soldiers, they should convey into Africa;

[9] he also sent round to every part of the sea-coast, with directions that all the ships of burthen should be seized and collected at Lilybaeum.

[10] When all the soldiers and ships in Sicily were assembled at Lilybaeum, and neither the city could contain the multitude of men, nor the harbour the ships, so ardent was the desire possessed by all of passing over to Africa, that they did not appear as if going to wage war, but to reap the certain rewards of victory.

[11] Particularly those who remained of the soldiers who had fought at Cannae felt convinced that under Scipio, and no other general, they would be enabled, by exerting themselves in the cause of the state, to put an end to their ignominious service.

[12] Scipio was very far from feeling contempt for that description of soldiers, inasmuch as he knew that the defeat sustained at Cannae was not attributable to their cowardice, and that there were no soldiers in the Roman army who had served so long, or were so experienced not only in the various kinds of battles, but in assaulting towns also.

[13] The legions which had fought at Cannae were the fifth and sixth. After declaring that he would take these with him into Africa, he inspected them man by man; and leaving those whom he considered unfit for service, he substituted for them those whom he had brought from Sicily, filling up those legions so that each might contain six thousand two hundred infantry and three hundred horse.

[14] The horse and foot of the allies. of the Latin confederacy, he also chose out of the army of Cannae.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 29.24 focus

[1]

Furnished with these instructions the king's envoys repaired to Syracuse to interview Scipio.

[2] He recognised that he was deprived of the valuable support which he had hoped for in his African campaign, but he decided to send the envoys back at once before their mission became generally known.

[3] He gave them a letter for the king in which he reminded him of the personal ties between them, and the alliance he had formed with Rome, and solemnly warned him against breaking those ties or violating the solemn engagements he had undertaken, and so offending the gods who had witnessed and would avenge them.

[4] The visit of the Numidians could not, however, be kept secret, for they strolled about the city and were seen at headquarters, and there was a danger of the real object of their visit becoming all the more widely known through the efforts made to conceal it, and of the army being discouraged at the prospect of having to fight the king and the Carthaginians at the same time. To prevent this Scipio determined to keep them from the truth by preoccupying their minds with falsehood.

[5] The troops were summoned to assembly and Scipio told them that there must be no further delay. The friendly princes were urging him to start for Africa as soon as possible;

[6] Masinissa himself had already gone to Laelius to complain of the way in which time was being wasted, and now Syphax had sent envoys to express his surprise at the delay and to demand that the army should be sent to Africa or, if there was a change of plan, that he should be informed of it in order that he might take measures to safeguard himself and his kingdom.

[7] As therefore all the preparations were completed and circumstances did not admit of any further delay, it was his intention to order the fleet to Lilybaeum, to muster the whole of his infantry and cavalry there and on the very first day which promised a favourable voyage set sail, with the blessing of heaven, for Africa.

[8] He then wrote to M. Pomponius requesting him, if he thought it advisable, to come to Lilybaeum that they might consult together as to what legions should be selected and what ought to be the total strength of the invading force.

[9] Orders were also sent all round the coast for every transport vessel to be requisitioned and brought to Lilybaeum.

[10] When the whole of the military and naval forces in Sicily were assembled there, the town could not afford accommodation for all the men, nor could the harbour hold all the ships, and such enthusiasm prevailed in all ranks that it seemed as though instead of marching to war they were to reap the fruits of a victory already won.

[11] This was particularly the case with the survivors of Cannae, who felt quite certain that under no other leader would they be able to do such service for the commonwealth as would put an end to their ignominious condition.

[12] Scipio was far from despising these men, he was quite aware that the defeat at Cannae was not brought about by any cowardice on their part, and he knew, too, that there were no soldiers in the Roman army who had had such a long experience in every kind of fighting, and in the conduct of sieges. They formed the fifth and sixth legions.

[13] After announcing to them that he would take them with him to Africa, he inspected them man by man, and those whom he did not consider suitable he left behind, replacing them from the men whom he had brought from Italy.

[14] In this way he brought up the strength of each legion to 6200 men and 300 cavalry. He selected the Latin contingent also, both horse and foot, out of the army of Cannae.

Notes on the current edition

Ab urbe condita

1. his CRaMBDANK: hiis J: iis PR.

2. incederet P ( probably (1)N, not reported by Conway ): incideret P 4 ?M 7 HJK Aldus, Froben: insideret Madvig (with in exercitu from P ).

3. prius ipsum N3 HJK Froben 2: ipsum prius P (3) n Aldus.

4. quae ... postulantem- om. P (1) N, two lines supplied from A3 N3 HJK.

5. A.U.C. 550

6. ipse om. P (1) N.

7. possit P 4 and (om. suo)SpHJK Froben 2: posset P (1) N Aldus .

8. instructis apparatisque N3 HJK Aldus, Froben, Conway ( with paratisque Weissenborn , Madvig ): instructisque P (1) N.

9. et P (1) N 2 or N3 Aldus : om. Sp ?HJK Froben 2.

10. omnem om. P (1) n Aldus.

11. naviumque om. (1) N: P has only quae deleted.

12. A.U.C. 550

13. trecenos glareanus : tricenos P (1) N: trecentos P 5: cc HJK.

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 29.24

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition Perseus

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers